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PREFACE 
This study has been made as a contribution to 
knowledge and analysis of Portuguese activity in Portu-
guese West Africa or Angola. Generally the bulk of the 
material presented falls within the 19th century. The 
years from approximately 1836 to 1891 have been chosen 
for special emphasis, first, because these years coincide 
with one general theme of territorial expansion, and 
secondly, because in the realm of treaties and laws 
this is a distinct era in the history of .Angola. As 
Dr. James Duffy writes, this age was nthe transition 
from one colonial age to another in Angola and 
Mozambique, from the traditional to the modern. 111 
Although my chief concern has been activity in 
Angola, I have wandered from this theme to explain 
another ~elevant force: Portuguese colonial thought and 
theory in th~ 19th century. Without knowledge of 
Portuguese history in this era, in the same way, one 
theme will be a stranger to the other. In some ways 
this study is an analysis and survey of the important 
literature in the field. If this is true, it is due 
to the relative lack of English material on the subject. 
1James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 225. 
iii 
iv 
Many English-speaking authors when dealing with 
Pontuguese activity in Africa have done so with certain 
assumptions about why Portugal did not gain more terri-
tory, or indeed, why she gained as much as she did. 
Such statements assume that Portugal was too weak in 
finance, development, initiative, and population to 
2 
make the outcome any different. Others state that 
Portugal's colonial efforts were significant only after 
1870 in Angola and Mozambique. 3 Too often it has been 
assumed that Portuguese administration in Angola a 
century ago was a shallow and formless pattern of 
activity.4 In current knowledge about colonial admin-
istrations in the 19th century, the Portuguese person-
alities have remained mute. It is the task of this 
study to attempt to reVise these assumptions with the 
aid of unpublished documents and literature from 
Portuguese archives and libraries. 
As a survey of conditions, administration, and 
expansion in the entire territory of Angola, this study 
cannot b.ope to treat any-'one region in depth. Perhaps 
more attention has been paid the area north of the 
2 Charles E. Nowell, 11Portugal and the Partition 
of Africa, 11 The Journal of Modern History (XIX, No. :e, 
March 1947), p. 1. 
in 
p. 
4 Jobn Fage and Roland Oliver, A Short History of 
Africa, (Penguin African Library, London, 1962), pp. 5e, 
198. 
v 
.Cuanza because of the available documentation, and the 
utmost importance of the Congo and the region in the 
hinterland of the capital of Luanda. 
Without the appearance of Dr. Duffy's Portuguese 
Africa in 1959 this study might not have been attempted. 
His is the pioneering effort for which all students must 
be grateful. Nevertheless, the student in surveying 
new material has somewhat inevitably come to differ0 
with b.is uteacher" in certain conclusions. 
MY sincere gratitude is due to the United States 
Government which made possible the grants and funds 
under which much of this material was gathered and 
organized. To thank all my friends, colleagues, and 
helpers in Boston, Lisbon, Oporto and London would mean 
too long a list. My most immediate thanks go to the 
Fulbright Commission in Lisbon, and Dr. Alberto Iria, 
Director of the Arquivo Historico Ultramarine of Lisbon 
for their aid and permission in reading the documents. 
My excellent typist has been Mrs. Shirley Backstrom. 
All of the translations from Portuguese are my 
own. In many c.ases tb.ey b.ave been free translations. 
------------------------......... .... 
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Abbreviations Used in the Footnotes 
A.H.U. 
B.M.P.P. 
B.N. 
B.S.G.L. 
c.u. 
J.C. 
G.E.P.eB. 
Arquivo Historico Ultramarine, Lisbon 
Biblioteca Municipal Publica do Porto, Oporto 
Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon 
Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa 
Conselho Ultramarine (1851-1868, Overseas Council) 
Junta Consultiva (1868-1888, new name for Conselho 
Ultramarine) 
Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira 
(Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, 1926-1956) 
A Note on Spellings 
The reader will note that the Portuguese spellings 
vary. In 1911 a spelling reform, and another change in 
1945, altered certain vowel and consonant spellings. I 
have kept tne original titles of books published before 
1911. Some geographical terms here nave been kept with 
tne old 19th century spellings, such as Mossamedes and 
Bihe. 
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CHAPTER I 
PORTUGAL AND THE EMPIRE 
The Portuguese people, as the Gallician, have 
fame for being a resigned and suffered people who 
endure all without protest and without passion •••• 
The anger of the gentle is the most terrible. 
-Miguel de Unamuno 
Por Tierras de Espana y Portugal 
(Madrid, 1914), p. 41 
OHAPTER I 
PORTUGAL, THE ANOIENT ALLIANOE AND 
THE EMPIRE: BAOKGROUND 
A. Portugal and the Em.pire to 1836 
An understanding of Portuguese activity in Angola 
during tb.e 19tb. century requires some knowledge of 
Portugal and her empire, already centuries-old, before 
1836. Both Portugal and the. empire were affected in the 
early 19th century by two major events: the independence 
of Brazil in 1822 and the establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy in Portugal after 1826. Both of these 
factors with their many ramifications were as important 
ilil. enoouraging change in Angela as was the decree of 
1836 calling !or the abolition of the slave trade. 
The prelude te these momentous events was the 
disastrous French invasion of Portugal beginning in 1807. 
The Portuguese royal family, along with the court and 
the Gevernment, left Lisbon, the capital, with British 
naval aid, and were taken to reside in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, in 1808. The King of Portugal remained in 
Brazil until 1821. In the year of bis arrival; the 
ports of Brazil were opened to British commerce for the 
first time and the long-standing Portuguese monopoly 
1 
2 
was broken. British interests engineered this revolu-
tion; and a Portuguese writer later claimed that Brazil 
had ceased to be a colony of Portugal the very day the 
1 
trade monopoly ceased. 
The French invasion was a disaster for Portugal. 
2 
Recovery was not accomplished for several decades. Portu-
guese industry, as weak as it was, lay prostrate after the 
departure of the French. Agriculture was ruined and the 
population uprooted by famine and disease. A British loan 
in 1809 led to the Treaty of Commerce and Alliance in 1810, 
giving new trade relations to Brazil and Britain at the 
3 
expense of Portuguese commerce. In short, Portugal was 
in ruin by 1815 when general peace had returned to Europe. 
The course of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in 
the 19th century certainly was not smooth. On the one 
hand Britain supported Portugal against threats from 
neighboring Spain with loans, naval protection, military 
aid, and diplomatic support. On the other hand, the 
alliance was nearly broken several times during the 
1Almeida Garrett, Portugal na Balan9a da Europa 
(Lisbon, 1830), p. 328. 
2J. B. Trend, Portugal (London, 1957, Praeger), 
p. 153. 
3william Walton, A Letter (London, 1831), p. 33. 
For impressions of a naturalized Portuguese industrial-
ist on Portuguese industry before 1810, see Jacome Ratton, 
Recordacoens de Jacome Ratton sobre ecourrencias do Seu 
Tempo em Portugal ••• (to 1810), (London, 1813). 
period because of the Portuguese empire. Portugal 
frequently accused Britain o~ trying to carve up her 
empire and conspiring to gain possession of parts e! 
3 
it, or ruining other parts she did not want !or herself. 
Although there were times when Britain evinced interest 
in actual terri terial possessi(UJ., far the most part 
British interests were concerned with maintaining two 
cardinal policies: tree trade on the coasts between 
European powers, and the abolition o! slave trade and 
slavery in Africa. 
In the 19th century~ the Anglo-Portuguese 
alliance was both a curse and a blessing for Portugal. 
Withoat British aid, Portugal would surely b.ave !allen 
prey to the aggressions of Napoleon and Spain during 
the first three-quarters of the century. J3ut when 
Portuguese leaders took a hard look at tb.e empire in 
Africa, they found much evidence that Britain was con-
spiring to destroy it. 
The Treaty o! Commerce and Alliance o! May 
1810 was the first abject of Portuguese grievance after 
the opening of Brazilian ports in 1808. Portugal had 
agreed to cede Bissau and Oacheu in Portuguese Guinea 
for fifty years, 1! sne recovered the :frontier previnee 
of Olivenca with British. a1d.4 British got»ds were given 
more preference tb.an before, and Portuguese merchants' 
4Rarold Liver:ai.ore, A His-Gory of Portusal (Cambridge, 
1947), pp. 4o2-3. 
interests complained that Britain took advantage ef 
5 
Portugal because of the war-time crisis. At the Treaty 
of Vienna in 1815, Portuguese delegates succeeded in 
annulling the 1810 Treaty, thus retaining the territory 
6 
4 
in Guinea. The Portuguese struek baek at Britain later, 
and in 1822 Portugal put a new customs import duty of 
15% on English woolens. 
7 
Conflict over the Portuguese empire increased 
during the early 19th century. British forces, in order 
to safeguard India, had occupied Portuguese India from 1801 
to 1815. Portugal then protested and suspected British 
8 
designs on the territory. Again in the 1830's and 1840's, 
Britain tried to buy Portugal's possessions on the coast 
of India but with no success. The-Portuguese were con-
vinoed that "perfidious Albion'' was after their Asian empire, 
9 
or what was left of it, as well as her African empire. 
Britain 1 s role in the independence of Brazil is 
well known. British eommeroial interests supported a 
complete break between Portugal and Brazil. Statesmen 
5walton, Letter, ]>. 30. 
6Livermore, History, p. 402. 
7lbid...!., p. 413. 
8Pinheiro dhagas, As dol6nias Portuguezas (Lisbon, 
1891) ' ]>. 114. 
9 Ibid., pp. 10-35· 
5 
like Lord Canning were sympathetic towards Brazilian 
aspirations. 10 Portuguese colonial thinkers later blamed 
Britain for tne loss of Brazil in 1822, for Brazil held 
supreme importance in the Portuguese empire since the 
17th century. 11 The Portuguese ambassador in London, 
the Count ef Lavrad1o, wrote in 1856 that the present 
PortUgUese Minister of OVerseas. had to stop 
the Eng~ish, who already have stolen from us 
all we possessed in Asia, who were also the 
principal authors of the separation of Brazil, 
from robbing us by indirect means of what we 
still possess in Africa. 12 
Besides colltributihg to a long~standing Portu-
guese inferiority complex,13 the independence of Brazil 
caused still more loss to the already dislocated ecmnomy. 
Moreover, a good portion of the Portuguese navy was 
retained or crippled by Brazil after the abortive cam-
paigns following the declaration of independence in 1822. 
A veteran of those campaigns, in a letter from Angola, 
referred to these campaigns as nshameful" for Portugal.14 
10
c. K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of 
Latin .Anlerioa, (London, 1938) 2 vola.). 
11 claarles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil 
(Berkeley, 1962), pp. 1-10. 
12conde do Lavradio, Mem&rias do Oende do Lavradio 
(8 vols., 1~37-42, Lisbon}, VI, p. 166~ 
13Rar.mond Cantel, Pro h~tisme et Messianisme Dans 
L' Oeuvre D • .Antlnio Vie iTa Par s, 19 0, E oiones H~spano .. 
Amerieanas), p. 167. In mid-17th century, Vieira said the 
Portuguese were known as ttthe Kaffirs of Europe." 
14Archivo H1stori~o Ultramarine, Lisbon, .(Angola), 
Caixa 70, 1825. Pasta 38, Nov. 21, 1868, No. 6A; Gov. 
Gen. Garrido. 
6 
The reparations from Fran~e under the Treaty of Vienna 
were very inadequate in comparison with the damage done 
by French torces. 15 British aid made up tor the loss 
ot Brazi11an trade only in part. Altogether the picture 
was depressing !or finance and this situation in faot 
worsened during the remainder of the century. 
Politics conVUlsed the nation for the first halt 
of the century. In 1820 a l.iberal. revol.ution broke CJU.t 
and Portugal was given a Const1 tution. :ua· 1821 Xing 
John VI was ob1iged to return from Brazil to take his 
place in a new Government, and he swore to uphold the 
new constitution. Reaction and counter-reaction followed 
after the various disruptive events such as the 1oss 
of Brazil and the consequent loss of power, the loss of 
privileges by the nobility, and the appearance in 1823 
of French troops in Spain to support tb.e absolutist 
reg1me. 16 
The younger son of King John VI, Prince M1gue1, 
rose as an absolutist leader in 1824, and tor ten years 
Portugal suffered under civil war and political anaroh7. 
ICing Jolm. died in 1826 and b.is sens, Miguel, the absolu-
tist, and Pedro, the liberal and.former Emperor of Brazil 
{1822-1831), fought over the thro~e after Pedro returned 
to uphol.d the l.iberal charter {or Constitution) ef 1826. 
15L1Vermore, History, p. 403. 
16I.b1d., p. 413. 
-
7 
Both liberals and absolutists were divided in their 
programs, but they consolidated forqes to fight a civi~ 
war which. ended 1n 1834 'Wi tb. the de! eat of Dom Miguel 
and the tripph ot the party of Dom Pedro.- Pedro }lad 
saved the thr(!)n.e for Maria da Gloria, his daughter, but 
he soon succumbed to fatigue and disease, leaving his 
fifteen-year-old daughter a legacy o! political confu-
sion and economic ruin.11 
In 1834 Portugal. was already weighed down with 
heavy debt to pay !or tb.e civil. wars ,and numerous out-
breaks of violence. These ttMiguelite Wars" weakened 
Portugal further so that plans tor development at home 
or overseas always met serious obstacles in the advo-
cates of a balanced budget.. The public debt increased 
during the rest of the century, for there was no apparent 
solution between two extremes: increasingly heavy loans, 
or economies and reductions in the publ.ic programs and 
services.18 
Polities remained turbulent until about 1851 and 
the so-called "Regeneration Mavementn. Radicals and 
maderates !ought their battles on .financial or patriotic 
issues, and the lack of means of most Governments to 
enforce legislation led right back to the basic problem 
o! finance. Even the program ef ttRegeneration", which 
17v. Braganca-Ounha, Eight Centuries of Portu-
guese Monarchy (London, 1911), pp. 122-142. 
18Liverm.ore, A Ristog, p. 424; Trend, Portugal, 
p. 179. 
8 
from 1851 to 1856 attempted to combine economic deve~op­
ment wi.tb. reform, had to continue contracting foreign 
~oans, mainly in London and Paris, to pay for railroad 
and road construct1ons. 19 
Looking back from the vantage point of 1836, or 
even at the end of the century, Portuguese believed two 
factors had seriously affected co~onial effort overseas:. 
ane, the independence of Brazil, and the otaer, nthe 
exc~us1ve preoccupation with the material development 
of the metropo~is."20 Hence programs .for the sale or 
mortgage o:f the .African possessions were quite common 
during the 19th century. As early as 1836 tb.ere was a 
plan, though it never materialized, whereby the KLng of 
Belgium would b.ave taken the African colonies in return 
for military aid to the Queen of Portugal.21 And 
throughout tb.e century, tb.ere were various negotiations 
by creditors in Britain, France, and Germany to use tne 
African colonies as security for loans. 22 
B. The Portuguese Colonial Movement 
In spite of economic weakness and political. 
division, Portugal had a significant colonial movement 
l9Fttsehin1, Augusto, 0 l?resente e 0 Futuro de 
Port!lgal (Lisbon, 1899), Chapters v, VI. Herbert Feis, 
Europe, The Worl.d's Banker, 1870-1914 (New York, 1930), 
Chapter XI. · 
20Pinheiro Ohagas, As Colonias, p. 49. 
21 L1\termore, A His.tory, pp. 424-425. 
22Trend, Portugal, p. 180. 
9 
directing activity in Africa. Portugal in the late 
1830's and 1840's began a colenial movement which was 
perhaps the earliest of its kind in Europe 1n the 19th 
~entury. Writers, soldiers, and political leaders 
declared that Africa cau1d replace Brazil as Portugal's 
major empire and could help Portugal recover in Europe. 
The adversity of the early decades drove some men to seek 
imperial answers to the problems of the metropolis. 
More nationalistic than strictly economic, this imper-
ialistic movement met opponents who questioned its ration-
ale from both national and ecenomie arguments. At its 
deepest level, the motivation of the mevemeat was fear 
o~ Spain and a natural Portuguese anxiety for the pre-
servation of national independence and prestige.23 
~his colonial movement had two distinct phases 
in Portugal during the 19th century. The first one 
began about 1836 and lasted until 1875. The second 
began about 1875 and, running through the treaties of 
partition, became part of the general movement to develop 
the colonies in A:t'rioa. The earlier phase coincided with 
the public life of the Marquis si da Bandeira (1835-1875), 
a liberal soldier and statesman who embodied an intense 
interest and knowledge abeut Portuguese Africa. In 
23Richard J. Hammond, .. Economic Imperialism: 
Sidelights on a Stereotype", The Journal. of Economic 
Histery, No. 4, XXI, Dee. 1961, pp. 582-598. Hammond 
indicates that Pertugal's imperial motivation was more 
traa~t~ona1 than economic. 
10 
pasts as Fareign Minister or Minister of Navy and Over-
seas, St da Bandeira led a genuine rei'arm mavement 
beginning with his term as Minister of Navy and Overseas 
in 1835.24 
Both the early and the late phases of the 
colonial movement had similar characteristics. The 
ultimate aim of the movement was patriotic: the reno-
vation of Portuguese wealth .and prestige in the European 
situation. In 1879 a Portuguese thinker expressed the 
yearnings of the early and late phases alike: 
In the Oounoil of Nations, Portugal should 
be principally esteemed a colonial power. 
Only the colonies can give us in Europe the 
influence .and positien which otherwise wettld 
be denied us so justifiably because of the 
narrow boundaries of the Metropolis, and its 
situation in the. Peninsul.a. 25 
Brazil was lost as a col.any, or so it seemed in 
the 1820's, and Africa be~ame the feeus of imperial 
th~ers. Since Portugal was weak eoanomicall.y, how-
ever, the eelonial. movement had to justify its pragram 
for spending in Africa with appeals to predictions ot 
profit from the tropical regions. Recalling the tradi-
tional uoivilizing mission•t CDf Portugal. was little more 
than rhetoric for this movement, :for the basic probl.em 
24Louren9o Oayolla, S~ da Bandeira (No.·5, Pelo 
Imperio Series, Lisbon, 1936) ~- p. 28. ' The standard full. 
biography is Simao Luz Soriano, Vida do Marguez de Sa 
da Ba.ndeira (:Lihbon, 1887-1888, 2 vols.). · 
25manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, As Oon£erencias e o 
It.in.erario do Via:lante Serpa Pinto (Lisbon, 1 tl79), p. 754. 
11 
of :Portugal. was finance, and no amount of oration in 
Parliament could convince the anti-imperialists that 
spending in Africa was reasonable when the homeland was 
a shambles. This important debate lasted throughout the 
century- and continues in Portugal to some extent today. 
Other great thinkers like the writer Almeida Garrett 
were convinced that Portugal, beginning in the 1820's, 
had to concentrate on reform at home and that improvement 
overseas was only a marginal pr.oblem. 26 
Tb.ose groups int.erested in foreign af£ai.rs 
tended to disagree and desired to give priority to pro-
grams of overseas action. Military officers, ambassadors, 
and certain politicians felt that :Portugal could find 
long-lost power in Africa. During the years 1835 to 
1875, S~ da :Bandeira led the movement; his great prestige 
and power in Portugal was manifest at the end of his 
li:t'e. In 1876 the historian Alexandre Heroulano wrote 
that this one-armed patriot was "the most ilJ.ustriG~us 
Portuguese of our century-.n27 Foreign diplomats b.ad a 
26see Garrett, Port~al na Balan~a; J~ P: Oliveira 
Martins, Portugal Oontempor ea (2 v~ls. • llisbo:tw 1881), 
p. 400. lie:x:andre Hercul.ano, Oarta a Sociedade Real. de 
~rioultur~t annotated by Dr. Jose R. de Mattos, (Lisbon, 
1 74), p. 24. Tb.e commentator not$d: "It is not econo-
mical to colonize Africa, thus sacrificing the Metropolis. 
since it is better to work in one•.s own field than ill. a 
neighbor's £ieJ.d." (1874). 
27Quoted in Peres Monteiro, uAcpao 01v1llza.dora 
dos Port-agueses em .Angola," :Boletim da Soeiedade de 
Geosra:t'ia de Lisboa, Series 66, (July-Aug. 1948), 
pp. 389~92. (Hereafter referred to as :B.S.G.L.) 
12 
28 
high regard for his integrity. Yet others, as Oliveira 
Martins, an advocate of republicanism in Portugal, were 
convinced that colonies had a very dubious role in reno-
vating the Portuguese economy; Martins remarked that 
Stf da Bandeira had a 11 mania 11 for colonies. 
29 
The year 1836 was important as a watershed for 
the colonial movement since the Government then decreed 
the abolition of the slave-trade in all Portuguese domin-
ions, submitted a report to the Quean on colonial problems 
in general, and changed the administrative structure of 
Angola from that of a Captaincy-General to a Government-
General in order to stress civil as opposed to military 
30 
administration. 1836, therefore, has been chosen as the 
beginning point of this study on Angola. 
Sa da Bandeira became Foreign Minister in November 
1836 and led through Parliament the abolition decree pub-
lished at Lisbon on December lOth, together with a report 
or Relatorio to Queen Maria II which contained the program 
of the first colonial movement of the century. The basic 
problems of Portuguese endeavor were laid out; the slave-
trade both in Angola and in Mozambique had to end before 
28Ruben Andresen Leitao, Novoa Documentos Dos 
Arguivos de Windsor (Coimbra, 1958), pp. 176-78, No. 107, 
Letter, 11 Secret and Confidentialn, Sir Hamilton Seymour 
to Lord Palmerston, 22 March, 1851. 
29Peres lYionteiro, 11 Acpao Civilizadora, 11 p. 392. 
3°Francisco Castelbranoo, Hist6ria de Angola 
(Lisbon, 1932), p. 100. 
13 
both colonies could achieve any measure o£ development. 
Although Brazil had been £or Portugal •tthe most natural 
:fiel.d <i>£ labors," it stated reminiscently, Africa was 
now to be tne new empire, With a traditional basis since 
the 15th century. Portugal oaul.d profit :from this 
change.31 
This 1836 Re1at6rio began by deol.aring Portugal.'s 
m.issien o:f "civilizing." Beneath. the statements o:f 
con:fidenoe, however, ran tlle :fear and resentment e:f 
:foreign criticism and. intervention. Threats :from 
Britain espee1a11y preoccupied Portugal, and some 
motive of idealism beeame a reaction to these compl.i ... 
cations in tlle end. The report stated: 
And yet, there is not one document in all 
the :first epoch o:f our discoveries that does~~ 
prove that the principal and a1most only · 
motive a:f the .Portuguese Government was tb.e 
Oivil.izatian o:f the Natives by means o:f the 
Faith. Commerce was secondary, since it was 
entirely a civilizing medium, and the subju-
gation was a co:nseq-aent necessity, and not 
a:m. object. The er:rers of religious doctrine, 
and the vices o:f pGl.itical means were of the 
century, not o:f the men. 32 
Nevertheless, when it came down to the hard :facts and 
realities o:f policy on the spot in Africa, high o:f:fioials 
as, :for example, the Governor o:f Angola in 1838, would 
spare no words in exposing the real motives behind some 
o:f the idealistic programs o:f the colonial movement. 
31nooumentos O:f:fioiaes Relatives a Aboli ~o, 
(Lisben, 1 9 , Imprensa Nae onal, p. 7 • 
32 6 Documentos, p. 7 • 
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I Sa da Bandeira was sincere, but the s~ave-tra.de 1n Africa 
was too we~l-entrenohed to agree with the deo~aration in 
far-away Lisbon that »civilization of the Natives" was 
the prime motive for being in Afrioa. In actual faot, 
interest and power politics called the tunes in Angola 
in 1838 as they did 1ater an. Governor Noronha wrote in 
1838 to Lisbon that the continuation o£ the slave trade 
was impossible 
without exposing those Provinces to the insul.ts 
of the English cruisers, and giving them pre-
texts for neg0tiating direot~y with the neigh-
boring Potentates of the Ooast, as Commodore 
Owen did in 1825 (if I remember correctly) in 
the Bay of Marques, thus making doubtful and 
precarious in law, and seaming the fact of, 
Portuguese sovereignty 1n those Regions. 33 
Despite the strong opposition to abo11t1on of the 
sl.ave-trade, and 1ater of slavery, abo11t1onists found 
a "Portuguese Wil.berforoe" in s~ da Bandeira. This man's 
p1ans for reform had the support of some 11beral 1eaders 
in J?ortuge.l., but in Africa itsel.f, Portuguese, from 
the small bush trader to the Lisbon importer, continued 
to fight tor the traditional system.34 
33AeH.U., Angola, Pasta 2, Gov. Gen. Noronha to 
Lisbon, No. 798, 1838 ~etter. 
34James Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 76, 144 ff; s' da Bandeira, Trabalho Rurai e Admin1stra2ao Co1onia1 (Lisbon, 1873), this work was written by the statesman 
in a ~ast eff0rt to fight for abo11tion of sl.avery in 
.Angola and Mezam.bique. Opposition by Lisbon merchants 
openly declaring against bis decrees. brought him to 
speak out a 1ast time for liberalism. 
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sf da Bandeira's death in 1876 marked the passing 
of the early phase of the Portuguese colonial movement. 
In 1875 the Society of Geography was :founded in Lisbon 
by a group ef scientific and military figures. Their 
; 
motivation for activity was basically that of Sa da 
Bandeira: that Portugal could be propped up by colonial 
re~e~ in Africa. Yet tb.ere was one significant differ• 
ence in the activity of the later movement: l.ed by Luoia.Jlo 
Cordeiro in the 1870's, this group was more interested 
in strategic considerations and tend.ed to sacrifice 
liberal ideas :fer advantages in the race for African 
territory and a l.ate bid for the contra-costa dream..35 
After 1875, reformers of colonial traditions were opposed 
in the later phase by growing elements an the Left within 
Portugal. Fear of losing territory, heightened by a 
severe financial crisis, obscured the ideas of sl da 
Bandeira and his school. During both paases of the 
movement, it ran repeatedly into the inevitable dilemma 
of colonial administration: th.e ideals and plans of Lisbon 
or even of Luanda, the colonial capital, rarely were 
executed well on the spot.36 . The battle for a free 
35uaontra-costa" was the 19th century term for 
the plan to lioid and occupy the territory between .All.gola 
and Mozambique, meaning "the opposite coast,u or one might 
say ttcaast-to-coast." . . 
. 36 . 
Peres Monteiro, "Ac9ao Oivilizadora," p. 392. 
sJ. da Bandeira's enemies in 1865 berated liberal legis-
lation and taunted, ••Let the Marquis of Sa come to govern 
the province o£ Angola." 
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trade system. and free enterprise in the African colonies. 
was eventually lost by both phases ot the colonial movement. 
A liberal element· disappeared with the death o:f 
/ Sa da Ba.n.deira. But miE.isters like .An.drade Corvo, 
himself a yoUllger version of the deceased Marquis, took 
up the battle for colonial reform and development with 
essentially the same principles of :free labor and tree 
trade. In the end, liberal solutions to ancient malaises 
were snowed under by tradition and vested interest, at 
home and in the colonies. 
c. Literature of the Early Colonial Movement: Debate and 
Disunity · 
From 1 825 to 1877, a number of Portuguese works 
appeared discussing the problems· of the empire. In the 
beginning these studies were written in reaction to th.e 
independence of Brazil and expressed feelings that the 
.A.frican empire would gain new i:rn.p.orta.n.ce. Such books 
include those o.f Feo Cardozo (1825 publ.ieation), Das 
Neves (1830), Oarvalb.o e M~ezes (1834 and 1848), 
Botelho (1835 and 1840), Lopes de Lima (1844-46), 
Valdez (1861 and 1864), and Jos6 de Lacerda (1867). 37 
Generally these authors urged Portugal to reform 
the col.on.ies, or .Angol~ as one speci.fie colony, and to 
get profit out o.f them tor Portugal. Resources in 
Southern Africa were des'cribed in glowing terms, and 
it was bel.ieved African regions could be economically 
37see the bibliography tor ~ull titles o:f these. 
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self-sufficient and thus attract more Portuguese colonists 
. 38 from the traditional migratory route to Braz1l. 
Feo Cardozo urged Portugal to look to a brilliant 
future for the rtvery useful establishment of Angola and 
Benguella," since it was rich in potential wealth. He felt, 
however, that the slave-trade was a bad foundation for 
39 
Angola's economy, and he advocated a plan of abolition. 
Jose das Neves, a distinguished economist-writer 
of the early 19th century in Portugal, felt that Portuguese 
Africa should end its dependence upon Brazil. Referring to 
British and French colonial activity in Africa at that 
time, he urged that Portugal execute a plan for colonial 
development. His reasoning for doing so was typical of 
the ideology of his day, for he felt that the loss of Bra-
zil and the disasters of 1807 to 1830 had seriously altered 
the Portuguese situation. Now Portugal could not afford 
to abandon or neglect the colonies in Africa as before: 
All is changed; and in the very moment Portugal 
loses her colonies, she will lose all that re-
mains to her of her former appearance and great-
ness.... When the Metropolis suffers, then the 
colonies must also suffer; and the evils that 40 
afflict the colonies must affect the Metropolis. 
38 See Appendix KI for the emigration figures on 
Portugal in the late 19th century. 
39 Feo Cardozo, Mem6rias ••. (Paris, 1825), Preface, 
p. xi, pp. 215, 370. 
40 Das Neves, Considerayoes Politicas e Commer-
ciaes (Lisbon, 1830), pp. 349-50. 
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For Das Neves, .Angola could be "a second BraziJ.,u 
bat the territory in ~act was in rain. T~e slave-trade 
dominated all activity of the Partuguese, and its aboli-
tion immediately threatened to ruin t~e scanty reu.enue 
:fram this dubious :foundation.41 
Books of this period on the colonies saught ta 
revive interest in Africa. Brazil had diverted atten-
tion :from Africa in the past two centuries be.fore 1822, 
but the ultimate object was a re~orgimento of the homeland 
itself. Mast authors were convinced that reform aver-
seas would aid re:for.m at home. Sebastiao Xavier Botelho, 
a Governor of Mozambique in the 1820's, in his Escra-
vatura, beneficios que podem ;provir as nossas Possessoes 
d'.Africa da :groibic;a:o daguelle Tra!ico (Lisbon, 1840) 
indicates the op~1Qn of liberals on the causal relation-
ship between abolition and econo~c renovation, and this 
reform was envisioned as especially nationalistic. T~e 
very economic ~ragility of Portugal forbade colonial thought 
in terms of private enterprise on a significant scale. 
The key issues of the 19th century in Portugal 
are discussed in the literature of the early colonial 
mevement. There are common themes, as, slave trade and 
slavery, monopoly or free trade economy, centralized or 
decentralized colonial government. In spite of the ideals 
41 Ibid., pp. 229-230. Das Neves was also con-
cerned witili'ii'dustry at b.ome in Portuga~. See his 
Mem&ria sobre os Meios de Melhorar a Industria (Lisbon, 
1822). 
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ot Portuguese colonialists in Europe, conditions in 
Portugal and in .Africa thwarted many plans. Change was 
doubly hard, due to division among Portuguese in Portugal. 
An eternal debate between liberals and conservatives at 
home was reflected in colonial legislation overseas. 
Involved with the strictly political debate was 
the question of the Roman Oatb.olio Church in Portugal. and 
its role in Africa. Early l.iberal governments were 
fired with extreme anti-clericalism. A vital plank of 
any party platform in this century and later was a stand 
on the religious question. Legislation in the 1830's 
(as well as later, during tb.e :Republic of 1910-26) 
severely out down the power of the Ob.urch. 
Leaders of the later colonial movement severely 
criticized the liberals of tb.e 1830's for the passing 
of the decree of May 30, 1834, abolishing missions in 
Angola and Mozambique. Accusations that liberal legis-
lation had permanently crippled missionary (hence 
colonial) effort in this era were in tact quite irrelevant. 
The history of Portugal and Portuguese Africa could prove 
that over-all Portuguese weakness, not liberal legislation, 
was responsible. for a slow process of reform. 
Father Ant6nio Barrosa, writing in 1890, scorned 
the Minister Aguiar who had passed thiS 1834 law against 
missions in Angola and he misplaced much of the blame. 
He killed our colonial influence, he 
kil.l.ed our agriculture, and he killed our 
colonies, which have vegetated ~ a sea of 
misery. 42 
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In fact, Portuguese missions and missionary acti-
vity in Africa in 1834 were in a sorry state, and had 
been so since 1700 or before .. 43 
Each party in Partugal blamed the other for the 
conditions in Portugal following the French invasian of 
1807. The deficit, the increasing foreign debts and 
consequent loans, and the political instability af 
governments under a shaky parliamentary system, combined 
to weaken any united colonial movement. There was a fatal. 
intergependence between politics and economics in Portugal. 
A vicious circle was inevitable under the circumstances 
of no financial reserves for Portugal. Das Neves in the 
1830's came to assert this very fact as ineseapable. 44 
Some writers became more desperate in their con-
clusions by the 1880'$.. Ferreira Lobos believed that 
"econGm1z1ng" the budget in Portugal lay at the basis 
of all tne problems. Perhaps he went too far 1n his 
J/ 
condemnation o! "economy•» for apparently he ha,S no solu-
tion for escaping from the labyrinth of Portuguese finance: 
42 / I Antonio Brazio, D. Antonio Barroso (Lisbon, 
1961 ) ' p. 157. 
43Duf:fy, Portuguese Africa, p. 120. Ralph Del.gado, 
Hist6ria de .An~ola (Lisbon, 1955), Vol.. IV, p. 419. Delgado 
shows b:ow miss onaries were scarce 1n the early 18th century 
or be:fare. 
44nas Neves, Oonsideraooes, P• 350. Das Neves 
haped for a return o:f publ.ic security to Portugal to bring 
in more foreign investment. Portuguese currency in 1830 
was so worthless that administrators going to Africa knew 
their scanty pay was omly an invitation to earn more by 
trading, p. 352. 
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The economies are all as old as the de~ieit •••• 
Sad economy is this; however, even sadder still 
is another, that few eyes see--the economy o~ 
all that should and could be done ~ar the 
aggrandizement and prosperity of the Fatherland: 
education that is not improved, the arts and 
the industries are not improved, the civilization 
that does not deepen, the roads that are not 
built, the army that is not complete, the navy 
that does not develop, the colonies that de not 
progress. our backwardness is an homage to 
economy;--the economy is the idol ta which we 
sacrifice ourselves..... the econemies (cutting 
down spending) have resulted in the cemplete 
ruination of all serVices: what it tries to do 
is to spend less, if it spends well or poorly 
doe~~t matter. 45 
Portugal in the 19th century realized that 
colonial activ1~Y in Africa would be a di~!iotilt battle 
since other European powers were opposing Portugal's 
advance. Tb.e coasts o~ Africa had become the scene of 
much activity. Portugal was :forced to recall the con-
flicts of the 17th and 18th centuries on the Western 
coasts at Congo and Angola, where French and Dutch forces 
struck at will. 
Before Livingstone drew the attention of Europe 
to Central Africa beginning in 1857, and to the Portu-
guese territories in Southern Af'riea, the Portuguese 
authorities knew the tenuous condition of their African 
empire. Since the indep.encl_ence of Brazil1 Angola, and 
Mozambique had been directly threatened by foreign 
~luences. Strong competition in coastal trade :fore-
shadowed the later struggle for territorial control in 
45Ferreira Lobbs, As Contissoes dos Einistros de Portugal ••• 
{Lisbon, 1874), p. 17. 
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the era Gf Livingstone. Portuguese observers were con• 
vinced that Britain~ as the most powerful nation on the 
sea, was out to ruin their maritime empire. Again the 
Ambassader in London wrote in 1856: 
The British. Government must find pretexts 
to defend tb.e petu1ence of her agen-ts and to 
profit from this to achieve their goals, which, 
as far as I am cencerned, are to. act as the 
pretector and de facto master of peoples who 
inhabit the coasts of Africa, and, with time, 
to come to establish an Empire in Africa like 
that which she established in India, also at 
the cost of Partugal, who has been a frequent 
victim of England for centuries. 46 
Partugal's colonial efforts were based on fear, 
pride, and self-interest, to be sure. But the liberal 
principles in her 19th century effort were no less 
important. General. weakness, isol.at'ion, and tb.e weight 
of tradition obseured the favorable side of the movement 
in the years from 1836 to 1877. But even the keenest 
British Gbservers underestimated Portuguese endurance. 
The ups and downs of accomplishment could not be dis-
cerned by outsiders, overpowered by the obvious ruins. 
Only a survey of tb.e condition of b.er most important 
Atrican territory, Angola, can reveal why, in 1877, there 
was no .. second Brazil" in. the empire. 
The condition of .Angola will. reveal only one 
concern in tb.e entire history of Portugal and the empire 
in the 19th century. Another factor consistently bothering 
the leaders of the nation was the question ot the English 
46Lavradio, Mem6rias, Vol. VI, p. 166, l.etter 
dated Nov. 16, 1856. 
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Allianoe. 47 At mid-century, all the English aid tor 
Portugal in Europe seemed to be outweighed by British 
interference in the African empire. Both nations were 
pledged to obligations, but now it seemed Britain was 
trying to emancipate another terri tory, tb.is time in 
Africa. The difficulties convinced Portuguese who had 
a European perspective that perhaps the traditional 
course. of Alliance and Empire was wrong. In 1860 young 
King Pedro V wrote to a Minister about tb.e crisis in 
Angola. .Uthough his words were never meant to be 
read by the Portuguese or British public, their very 
ring is proof that Portugal has tried to revolt against 
her history and ~~iled. 
England should realize the benefits of not 
souring her relations with a nation forced to 
be faithful to her ebligations, but wb.o some 
fine day may be tempted to revolt against her 
history. 
Many of our misfortunes in Angola clearly 
originate in the policy of expansion, which the 
overseas Council began, and which today we find 
ourselves obliged to continue because of cir-
cumstances. To follow this policy, it is 
necessary to a~cept all the consequences, and 
these are the weakening of the Metropolis in 
~avor of the Oolonies. These are matters not 
discussed in public, but better left thought 
out in private. rTe are moving to destroy the 
special civilization of tb.e natives--that is to 
say, their absolute 1iberty--but we cannot sub-
stitute ours, since they cannot accept it, and 
because they do not know it or understand it. 48 
47see Marques Guedes, A Allian;a Inslesa (Lisbon, 1943). 
" 48Ruben A. Leita'o, Oartas de D. Pedro V Aos Seus 
Oontempor~eos (Lisbon, 1961}, doc. no. 168, letter 8 May, 
1860, D. Pedro to Fontes Pereira de Mello, p. 307. 
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.ANGOLA. TO 1836: BAOKGROUND 
Without Rum, Geribita, tb.e negroes refuse to finish 
their trading; it is indeed fortunate for the trades 
of Brazil and Africa that the desires of its inhabitants 
are in tb.eir favor •••• The Masses drain in an instant 
the cargo of a small vessel from Brazil; but instead of 
producing energies for some more active trade, it makes 
them like a multitude of ants, who in one day devour 
large leaves on a tree, and when each has disposed 
quickly of his own supply, all vanishes with the brutal 
kick of a foot. 
-Elias Silva Oorr~a 
Hist6ria de Angola, II, p. 40 
Written between 1782 and 1799 
CHAPTER II 
ANGOLA ~0 1836: BACKGROUND 
A. OL!mate and_ Geography of Angola 
From his throne he casts upon us 
with cruel and bloody war, 
with the power of the land, 
and pestile:m.ce, 
Ret and malignant fever 
which. from three days to seven 
plaoes beneath the earth, 
the most robust. (Anonymous 17th century poem)t 
The Portuguese wb.o came to Angola before the 19th 
cen.tur;r were often obsessed with fear of death.. Angol.a 
had a reputation tor bei:m.g no dif.fere:nt !rom the ''White 
man's grave u of Guinea. ~he :nameless Eur.opean poet who 
composed the lines above wrote of the coastal region of 
northern Angola in the latter half o.f the 17th century. 
~his poem is included in the work of Antonio de Oadornega, 
a soldier, Historia Geral Das Guerras Angolanas, t68Q.81. 
Oadornega wrote about the northern areas of what is now 
Angola and described campaigns along the lower Ouanza 
river. He says that "the climate was an enemy for him 
~he Portuguese] since the interior was very sickly, so 
that many died and others sickened i:m. pure misery."2 
1Ant6nio de Oliveira de Oadornega, Hist6ria Gera1 
Das Guerras Angolanas (Lisbon, 1940-42, Agencia Geral), 
III, p. 383 .. 
2 
I:'!2!,!., I, P• 33. 
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Wb.i te str8.lllgers came to the land and soon. were 
sickened 0r cut down (er so it seemed.) by the air and 
water around them. .Ul observers discussed climate 
because at the time it was the most important factor. 
The coast was unhealthy, but men stayed to make a living 
by sending the native peoples across the sea. Outcasts 
from.cities in Portugal and Brazil came to trade. 
Climate seemed to dominate all on the face of the 
land. It is characteristic that the first known piece 
of literature written in Angola, the anonymous 17th 
century peem, is not an epic of glory to the conquist-
adores of Africa; rather it is a drama of adversity in 
which climate plays the main role. 
The Brazilian-born soldier, Elias Alexandre da 
Silva Oorrea observed conditions in Angola between 1782 
and 1799. Spending most of his time in the region of 
Luanda, he spoke of the great heat and aridity of the 
coast, the misery of disease and fever, and the numerous 
deaths caused by the "pestilence.u T}le :first matter he 
mentions in his introductory statement is "the cruel 
blows of the climate."3 .Angola was a land of exiles, 
and for all normal men; the land was a hell and purgatory 
put together. 
Yet the climate of Angola like all territories 
in. Africa is varied. Botb. Oadorl!l.ega and Silva Correa 
3silva Oorrea, Rist~ria de .Angola {2 vola., Lisbon, 
Agencia Geral das Oolonias, 1937J, I, p. 13, "Introduoao.•' 
had limited experience in penetrating the interior or 
traveling south; their chronicles survey conditions 
in the northern region. What is more, both men lived 
several decades in Angola ~d lived.to tel.l the tal.e. 
A more comprehensive approach is needed to understand 
the physical being of Angola. 
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Angola is situated in West Oentral Africa, south 
of the Equator between 5 degrees and 18 degrees South 
Latitude, and between 12 degrees and 24 degrees Longitude 
east of Greenwich. It is a transitional region in 
climate, vegetation, and relief. 
Angol.a's relief can be divided generally into 
three zones. First, a coastal lowland, at its widest 
l.ittle more than one hundred miles, extends £rom the 
extreme south to near the mouth of the Oongo River in 
the north. Next • a narrow subplateau step rises from 
1000 to 3500 feet. Finally• the true plateau, or 
planalto, then rises in a series of tablelands, from 
4000 to 7000 feet, falling away in the east. These 
three zones are merely relief zones oriented in relation 
to the .b.1nterland.4 
The coast of Angola below the mouth of the Congo 
was the first view the Portuguese b.ad of th.e l.and(l> It 
is a dry and parched l.cnrland. The cool. Benguel.a current 
4van :pong en, I .s. , tt An.gol.a, " F0cus (.American 
Geograpnical Society), New York, Vol. VII, No. 2, Oot. 
1956. 
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~lows northward past Southwest Africa and contributes to 
the dryness from 18 degrees te 2 degrees, South Latitude. 
A1tb.ough desert and semi-desert conditions prevail along 
this coast, it has a high relative humidity.s 
Except ~or the eastern hal~ o~ the vast territory 
o£ 480,000 square miles, Angola is essentially an Atlantic 
territory. The eastern part o~ the upland plateau belongs 
to Central Africa, and the Congo-Kasa1, and Zambesi basins. 
But the western area o:t .Angola, that regien which is 
most developed and highly populated, is Atlantic-oriented. 
Facing Brazil, this region's major rivers drain into the 
Atlantic: the Congo f .,,, the Cuanza, and the Cunene 
Rivers. Angola's major ports o~ the last century, Luanda 
and Benguela, are South-Atlantic counterparts of the 
Brazilian ports in the same latitudes, of Pernambuco, 
Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro. Both Brazil and .Angola have 
higl'!l.J.and plateaus behind the low and G:ften UE.healtb.y 
coastal strip. The two territories have been called 
comparable geographioally,6 but there is yet another 
analogy between them: both lands' subsistence foods 
have been the same since the 16th century. Manioc, 
maize, and sweet potato are used by the great mass of 
the population o~ .Augola; all three staple subsistence 
5Kimble, George T., Tropical Africa {New York, 
The Twentieth Century Fund), Vol. I, 1960, p. 34. 
6 I Jose Ribeiro da Cruz, Geograf1a de Angola 
(Lisbon, 1940~, p. 49. 
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crops were introduced by the Portuguese ~rem Brazil in 
the 16th century. Spreading over Central Africa from 
the old Oongo Kingdom where they were introduced,7 these 
American crops have made Angola more o£ a sister of Brazil 
than before. 
In order to describe regions o! Angola in more 
detail, it is best to divide the area into ''Geographical 
Provinces~/1 that is, proVinces which historically as 
well as geographically have become more or less distinct 
units. The Portuguese expansion in Angola was affected 
by relief of the land as well as by the climate; this 
scheme o~ division, as suggested by an American §eographer 
of this century, 8 fits well the historical pattern of 
penetration and colonization described in this study. 
There are six "Geographical Provinces" of Angola. They 
are: 
1. Luanda 4. Mossamedes 
2. Oongo Border 
3. Benguela 
5. Upper Zambesia 
6. Kalahari-Desert Border 
Luanda, Benguela, and :OO:ossamedes proVinces in this scb.eme 
are nuclear provinces stretching inland ~rom the coast. 
Traditionally th~se areas, each with its capital on the 
coast, were jump-of~ points for penetration into the 
7George Peter Murdeok, ustaple Subsistence Orops 
of Africa.," The Geographical Review (Oct., 1960), Vol.. L, 
No. 4, pp .. 523-54o.-
8wnittlesey, D.s •• uGeographic Provinces of .Angola: 
An Outline Based on Recent Sources,n The_Geo~ra~hical 
Review (Jan., 1924), Vol. XIV, No .. 1, pp .• 11 -1 6. 
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,.; $ertao, or hinterland, and they remain to this day the 
most developed and with the highe$t density of population. 
The three 11marg1nal provinces," the Congo border, Upper 
Zambesia, and Kalahari-Desert border, are areas of 
sparse population; little economic activity, except in 
isola.ted places, and less desirable climate. 9 
Luanda region was the first area of Portuguese 
activity in ..Al:il.gola after the ttoo:m.go experiment" of the 
16th century. The coastal lowland is desolate. The 
soil near the city of Luanda, founded in 1575, is poor; 
Luanda must look to the north, to the :fertile Benga 
river valley, :for its :faod, wat.er, and salt supplies. 
Historical.ly this ul.aoking to the north" tor even basic 
supplies, influenced the ex~psion policy o:f the Portuguese.· 
Luanda region is favored with the auanza. River, 
the largest river in Angol.a except for the Conga. The 
ouanza opened the interior of the Luanda sertao to com• 
meree and colonization. From the beginning, the river 
acted as a higb:way :for tt;Le PGrtuguese and favored the 
north often to the detriment of the south. The river 
had the e:f:fect of concentrating European e:f:fort north 
of it in the Golungo Al.to and Oazenge districts, which 
long remained the richest areas in.the entire territory. 10 
9wn1 ttlesey, op. ill.·, p. 126. 
1 0rb1d., p. 122. 
The. Cuanza is navigable far about 120 miles, 
being impassable after the ~alls at Oambambe~ Along 
this early route into the interior many of tne first 
Portuguese settlements were placed ver;r elose to the 
river, or sl.iglltly aboveit on tb.e plateau. 
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The upland region of the Luanda province is 
reached b;r gradual steps, with some very broken country} 
yet the plateau is more easily reached, and is of more 
moderate elevatian than tb.e plateaus to the south. in 
Angol.a. 11 Tlle accessibility of the Luanda plateau was 
a key factor in determining the pattern of penetration 
and colonization; the southern plateaus were more 
difficult o£ access, and as such they remained untouched 
by European administration and expansion for a longer 
period. Within less than a century of the founding of 
the port town of Luanda, Portuguese settlements were 
reaching over 180 miles into the backland. 12 
Benguela Province has been termed "the eore 
of the regiontt of .Angola by its central position and 
its importance as a population region. Benguela's 
coastal lowland was considered very unhealthy for 
1 1 Whittlesey, ~· eit., p. 122. 
12The European settlement furthest inland on 
the plateau, founded in 1671, was Pungo Andongo. Tala 
fortress remained a frontier town and post for aver a 
century. Although there were trading "fairs" further 
inland, as that of Oassange, Pungo Andongo remained the 
furthest eastern European settlement. 
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centuries; yet it compares .:favorably with that of Luanda 
and is richer in soil than that of Mossamedes. The 
highland of Benguela has much of the land most highly 
prized as suitable for European settlement today. Yet 
its sub-plateau is more broken, and difficult of access 
.:from the coast than that of Luanda; the highest mountains 
1n the territory are in this western region and rise to 
8000 feet. on the true plateau, the climate is healthy 
and suitable for European settlement. Like most of the 
series of southern plateaus in Angola, the climate is 
drier than the north and more like climates in Portugal. 
Not until the middle o.:f the 18th century, was there a 
concerted attempt to take adv.antage o.:f this plateau; pene-
tration up the Cuanza River diverted the Portuguese from 
moving onto the southern uplands. Moreover the Benguel.a 
pl.ateau has problems o£ internal transportation since it 
is crossed by "countless streams" which in the rainy 
season are oft~n 1mpassable.13 
Although the Benguela upland is generally healthy, 
it has a deceiving reputation. Until recently in the 
20th century, most Europe.ans living there permanently 
have been af.:fected by !ever; 14 many settlers probably 
13 Whittlesey, 2.1?.• £11., pp. 117-119. 
14Ibid., Alexandre Malheiro, Ohr~nicas do Bihl 
(Lisbon, 1903T, pp. 212-215. Malb.eiro was a Portuguese 
official in Bin$ in 1900-1901; after a short stay on the 
plateau, b.e became so ill with £ever, he had to retire 
to the coast. 
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carried malaria w1 th them on their ascent to the "heal thy" 
plateau. Like so many SQ-called healthy areas in the 
history Qf AngCiJla, aeeeunts varied about.fever, or 
malaria. One must conclude that even areas on the 
higher plateaus had fever until recently because ot the 
unsanitary conditions and because of the mobility of 
Europeans who caught malaria on the coastal lowland. 
The Mossam.edes region is the last to be cGlon.ized 
with permanent white settlements. From a dry, desert-
like coast, the plate.au rises very sharply to the east; 
access to the upland is made difficult by mountain ranges 
like the Ohella range which was a ma3or obstacle between. 
tb.e coast and the sertlio. In t.b.e coastal· lowland, rain 
is very scarce; although the Mossam.edes coast is the 
healthiest of the regional coasts in Angola, the back 
country is also the driest and rivers are not navigable. 
The Ounene is useless as a route to the interior since 
a sandbar blocks its mouth and there are :falls a few 
miles up river. 
Muon of the area soutb. and east of Mossamedes 
is too dry to be useful to the European without exten-
sive irrigation. The Ohella range prevented early 
colonization since there are few good passes and even 
the railroad has been obliged to skirt the edge of it 
on its ascent to the plateau. The "Kalahari-Desert 
:Border" region is generally a worthless area and is 
more a transition to Southwest Africa than it is part 
of .Angola. 
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The Portuguese entered the "Congo Border" region 
in the late 15th century. Its climate, location, and 
resources soon discouraged them. More a part of the 
Congo basin, this area contains heavy forestation, 
generally low relief, and a tldebilitati:m.g climate" 
for the European. 15 After the 16th century, few Portu-
guese lived there permanently; until the last decade, 
the European population in Congo district has been very 
sparse. 
4¥ The capital o:f Sao Salvador is on a low plateau, 
in a relatively isolated position 100 miles from the 
nearest point on the Congo, and 200 miles. from the 
western coast. Climate and location have continued to 
prove disadvantageous ~or the development of the area. 
The Luanda region, beginning with the founding .of Luanda 
in 1575, soon took the place o£ Congo as the focal point 
,..,. 
ot Portuguese activity and expansion into the sertao. 
The Oab1nda enclave north o:f the Congo River is 
today part of the Congo district o£ Angola. It is an 
unhealthy region about 2,800 square miles in size. 
Mainly a coastline with a :few good ports, the sertao is 
"miles of steaming, tangled, equatorial rain £orest.ul6 
15Houk, Richard J., "Recent Developments in the 
Portuguese Congo," The Geog;a~hical Review (April, 1958), 
Vol. XLVIII, No.2, pp. 201-2 1; Whittlesey, £.1?.• ill_., p. 125. 
16van Dongen, 2£• £1i.; Ribeiro da Cruz, ~· £11•, 
p. 62; a survey taken before 1940, :found that Oabinda had 
an average annual relative humidity of 88.4%; next to the 
high humidity o£ the coastal town of Novo Redondo, this 
is the highest in Angola. 
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The last marginal. region in Angola to be described 
is the "Upper Zambesian province in the east. This 
region is a part of Oentral Africa, and represents the 
watershed for the upper Zambesi and the Kasai rivers; 
much of it is deserted plateau falling toward the east 
into marshy~ malarial basins. This region has never 
had permanent white settlement because of the isolatio~ 
from the coast~ the tsetse fly activity~ and the undesir-
able climate. As on the Benguela plateau, many rivers 
cross the land, flood during much of the year, and make 
road and bridge-building very difficult. 
Although the European population in Angola has 
tended to concentrate in Luanda, it has expanded south-
wards in. the last two centuries to reach the area with 
the highest African population density. Benguela pro-
vince has evolved as a central region; the plateau is 
over 3,500 .teet above sea level and there is a low 
relative humidity compared with other areas. European 
colonization schemes are favored in this region. .And 
it is clear that the original pattern of expansion from 
the focal centers of Luanda and Benguela continues to 
this day. Until the 20th century, the settlements 
furthest east were on the Luanda plateau, that is, the 
most accessible upland. 
The seasons of Angolan climate have affected the 
h1stery sf the land. There is a rainy season beginning 
in September and lasting to the first of May. The dry 
35 
season, or cayim.bo, lasts from May to late August. .Both 
May and September are transitional mo:ntb.s.17 Oayim'bo 
season, named after the typical morning fog of the dry 
months, is historically the time when the Portuguese 
undertook expeditions and military campaigns. And the 
shortness of the season of dependable weather certainly 
limited activity far from settlements i:n the sertio. The 
rainy season was the time of the year when the dreaded 
yearly epidemic of carneirado visited the settlements.18 
Portuguese settled on the coast had reports of a 
healthier plateau to the south. They found the monotony 
of the temperature and the aridity on the coast unbear-
able. Governor General Sousa Coutinho in 1769 wrote to 
Lisbon of the Southern uplands: 
These lands are as healthy as are those 
of Europe; rainfall is never lacking there 
during the proper seasons; they have the same 
frost, hail, and clouds as Portugal. 19 
The Luanda plateau was not so healthy as that of 
Benguela. .But it had the Oua.nza R1 ver as an entrance 
and the Portuguese traders would brave malaria and other 
disaases 1n order to use the convenient outlet to the 
Atlantic. Again, the land 1 s western region remained 
17Ribe1ro da Cruz, ~· g1i., p. 76. 
l8Whittlesey, ~· !!1•• p. 115. This epidemic 
was probably a form of malaria. 
19Ribeiro da Oruz, ~· 21i•• P• 78. 
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faitb.tul to its Atlantic orientation. 20 
In conclusion, the geography of Angola should be 
analyzed in terms of the needs of the Portuguese who 
came to settle. Finding sickly and humid country in 
the Congo kingdom, and along the coast, they sought 
higher and more open country in cooler climates. In the 
region directly east south-east of Luanda they concentrated 
efforts of development. Nevertheless, this plateau region 
cut by many rivers, was and is, in some ways, a very 
unhealthy place. 
A modern study concluded that malaria in Angola 
was 0 of primary importance" in most of the prov~ae. It 
is tth:rperendemia" on the coastal plain from the Congo 
to the Cuanza and in most river valleys of the north, 
and from 50-70,000 annual cases were reported mainly in 
Luanda province. In the higher areas, malaria outbreaks 
occurred with periods ot heavy rainfall. .Sleeping sick-
ness, trypanosomiasis, is endemic north of 12 degrees 
south latitude. Yellow fever has not been reported in 
the ports of Angola since 1900, but it is liable to occur 
in all warm humid regions. There was a slight epidemic 
of smallpox in 1931 with some 1,408 cases reported. 21 
20 Walter Fitzgerald, Africa, A Socialt Economic 
and Political Geo ra h. of its Major RegionsNew York, 
1939, E. P. Dutton and Co. , pp .. 277-2 • 
21 James Stevens Simmons, ed., Global Eiidemiolofl (Phila., 1944), Saunders, Vol. II, u.AngoJ.a," pp. 324-33 • 
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As a place of EUropean settlement, Angola began 
depending upon the Atlantic and with an inland orientation 
to the region north of the Cuanza River. European control 
tended to remain in areas with endemic malaria, and only 
in the 19th century was thetB serious effort to settle the 
healthimr places on the plateaus. Until the 20th century, 
only the 11 Geographic Provinces 11 of Luanda, Benguela, and 
Mossamedes received considerable white colonization. 
Early travelers to Angola feared the climate as 
much as men who visited the Guinea coast. After 1845 the 
use of sulphate of quinine became frequent in the terri-
22 
tory. Endemic malaria, nevertheless, remained a problem 
for Europeans well past 1900, and at the beginning of the 
century, an authority believed that three major obstacles 
to development persisted: 11malaria, alcoholism, and the 
23 
climate." 
Some observers dismissed the horror and fear exist-
ing in life in Angola. For some, who forgot the misery of 
the great majority of inhabitants, that land was a scene of 
inspiration. The geologist Joaquim John Monteiro referred 
24 
to Angoill.a as 11 th is wonderful and beautiful country." 
For many others, however, their impressions were quite 
22 Jofre A. Nogueira, 0 Govero de Sousa Coutinho 
(Lisbon, 1960), p. 17. 
23Jos6' Francisco Vieira, 11 0s Tres Maiores Inimigos 
do Colona Portuguf3s em Africa," Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa (March, 1901) 'Hereafter as B .S .G .L.) 
Series 19, pp. 225-247. · 
24J.J. Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo 
(New York, 1876), p. 327. 
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different. Later in the 20th century, one nickname for 
.Angola was "the hunger country." 25 
B. Trade and Conquest in the Early Period 
The navigator Diogo Cao discovered the mouth of 
the Congo River in late 1482 or early 1483. He returned 
to Portugal before April 1484, and carried with him four 
Congolese whom he wished to teach_ Portuguese for later 
contact. 26 Along the coast of what is now Angola, oio 
had come into contact with groups of the Ba-kongo 
speaking peoples owing allegiance to a supreme leader, 
tb.e Manioongo._ With his capital at Mbanza, later named 
,..,; by the Portuguese, Sao Salvador, this Manicongo enjoyed 
fruitful relations with the Portuguese for nearly 80 
years. Early Portuguese policy in the Congo hoped to 
create a religious and commercial community without 
occupation or conquest. Unfortunately1 the slave 
trader accompanied the Catholic priest, and by the late 
16th century, the power and prestige of the Congo king-
dom was on the wane. 27 As inter-tribal rivalries began 
to sap the power of the supreme King of Congo, the 
Portuguese shifted their attention to the south in search 
of good ports and an entrance to the interior. 
25
wnitt1esey, ~· £ii., p. 115. 
26Edgar Prestage, The Portusuese Pioneers (London, 
Black, 1933), pp. 206-8. There is still a question·as to 
the exact date o£ Cao's first voyage. 
27Ja.mes Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, 
1959)' 20-23 •. 
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In 1571 the King of Portugal granted a proprietor-
ship of land on the Angolan coast to a soldier, Paulo 
Dias de Novais. Set out in the tradition of donat,rios 
of Brazil, the grant gave the soldier exclusive ownership 
:for life of th.e coast between the Da:nde and Ouanza Rivers, 
and as far inland as he could pessess. Dias' major 
obligation by contract was to "plant" 100 European couples 
in this area within tb.e space o:f six years. 28 
Amagni:ficent bay and natural harbor attracted 
the commercially-minded Portuguese to the area north of 
the outlet o:f the Ouanza. In 1575, Dias de Novais founded 
the city of ttst. :Eaul o:£ the Assumption of Loanda" (Here-
after as Luanda). Trading w1 th the interior began years 
before the founding of the first settlement; itinerant 
Portuguese traders, so important in the history of .Angola, 
were already on Luanda Island bartering with nearby 
natives. 29 
European colonization in Angola got off to a 
false start from the beginning. Tb.e original conquistador, 
Dias de. Novais, failed to fulfill the conditions of his 
e0ntract with the King: he coUld not manage to settle 
100 couples within the allotted t1me. 30 Olimate, imperial 
28Ra1ph Delgado, Hist6ria de Angola (Lobito, 
1961), I, pp. 258-262. Original.ly the crown grant was 
called "a donat~ia de .Angolan but it was a uoaptaincy•• 
similar.to those in Brazil. Dias was gran.d$on o:f the . 
discoverer of the Oape of Goed Hope, Bartholemew Dias. 
Delgado, ~· £!i., P• 256. 
29 Du:f:fy, o:p. ill_., p. 55. 
3°Jofre Amaral Nogueira, 0 Governo de sousa 
Ooutinho, pp. 20-26. 
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commitment elsewhere, and the hostility o£ the natives 
contributed to this failure. Yet the soldier Dias was 
an intrepid campaigner, and his penetratio~s o£ the 
sertio and sallies. up the Ouanza River set the pattern 
!or Portuguese expansion during the .first century and 
a half of occupation~ A series ~£ fortresses or presid1os31 
were built inland from the coast and southeast !rom the 
port of Luanda. At the time of Dias's death in 1589, 
nearly half a dozen forts were built on or near the 
Ouanza or Lucalla Rivers. 32 Military expansion had 
succeeded, but civil colonization or the settling of 
European farmers in sufficient numbers had not progressed. 
This was to be the pattern !or centuries. 
From the beginning, the territory of Angola was, 
in Portuguese legal terminology, a Oonguista or noonquest.n33 
Originating in Roman and then in Spanish and Portuguese 
law, this term impl.ied the existence of ub.eathen" popu• 
lations or in!idel.s. The structure of Portuguese 
administration in 16th century Angola was peculiarly 
31 nPresidio" means "fortress, military prison;" 
Maria Teixeira de Oliveira, .Dicionario Moderno Portugues-
Ingles (Lisbon, 1954), yet in Spanish the word also has 
the meaning of tlle penal settlements on the North Coast 
o£ Africa. 
32see the map :for the. expansien of Portuguese 
control. 
33Note the use of Oonguista in the writing of 
Cadornega, 2£• cit. and Silva Correa, ~· g1l.; in the 
18th century, t~word took on a more permanent meaning 
as "kingdom" or "domain." 
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Iberian and medieval in many se:m.ses.. The Portuguese wne 
~ermded the interior fortresses, as in the recongu.ista 
against the Arabs in Sp~in, were a military caste, 
penetrating i~idel territery.by a series o.f conquistas, 
or islands a~ control. The society was a military 
society whieh traded in slaves, ivory, and wax. Using 
tb.e canoept af "vassalag.e, n the Portugues.e recognized tb.e 
status and illtluenoe of native chiefs, or sobas (sova, 
18th century variation), in exchange .for alliance or 
"vassalage" witb. the Portuguese autb.orities and merchants. 
Variati.ons a:f this system of vassal.agem remai:ned 
part af Angalan politics until the early 20th. century. 
In theory, the soba who signed treaties or made verbal 
-
agreeme:m.ts was obligated to aid the Partuguese in various 
ways, with men or trade goads. Portuguese conquistadores, 
so few in namber, in order to trade suecess~ully and 
create the atmosphere in which trade could fleurish, 
were in turn obliged to give the sebas eredit fer t.heir 
power in a military system. In practice, a:ften the 
Partug1,1.ese ceul.d not make sobas vassals., but allies; 
still, the name vassal persisted in the terminolagy ~or 
centuries. ••Taat mass of b.eatb.enu er ttsueb. an 1mme:m.sity 
of heathen" constituted the reason the Portuguese had 
. 34 
to employ such a policy. 
34cadornega, Hist6ria Geral, I, pp. 33-38. One 
is reminded by readi:m.g this account a£ the letters of 
Cartes to Char1es v. 
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Portuguese traders medJled in native politics more 
aut of necessity than out of cruelty or spite. If trade 
was to be had, protection had to accompany it. Native 
warfare and distinct political systems existed before 
the Portuguese came to Angola, so that gathering African 
levies for war and trade was merely a more organized 
variation of an old theme. In some cases, sobas paid 
th.e Portuguese a tax, or religious tithe, dizimo e'Tentb!1 ) 
in way of tribute. Other times sobas paid both dizimo 
and gave porters or slaves for war and trade. Vassalagem 
was often formalized by a treaty or tt.A.ctu of Vassalage.35 
Traops, given to t}le Partuguese by sobas or 
forcibly raised, became organized in large units, often 
called guerra preta.36 By the early 17th. century, the 
guerra preta was an established institution in Angola. 
Oadornega lists a certain ,.Ant6nio Dias Muzungo,u a 
native o! Aagola, as the first Oaptain-Major of guerra 
preta that he knew; this man held the post from 1620 to 
1630.37 Most ot the leaders o! this corps were Negroes. 
The Portuguese created a frontier based on their 
system o! vassals. The territory inland was divided 
very simply into the area with vassal chiefs and the 
area outside, of non-vassal chiefs. Often the European 
35see Chapter III for discussion of an. 11 Act of 
Vassalage" of 1838. 
36Guerra Preta means, literally, "black war." 
37cadornega, ~· £!1., II, p. 589. 
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control went no further than a cannon shot beyond the 
most distant presidio; but theoretically, outlying 
territory was friendly if the !!!!• or soba in r9th 
century orthography', had a previous agreement with the 
authorities. 
The conguista of the interior progressed under 
the presidio system. When a :fortress was built, Portu-
guese settlers, or moradores, set up their homes nearby. 
Each establishment of the Captaincy had the following 
personnel living in the fort: Captain-Major, Chaplain-
priest, Lieutenant of Militia, Clerk, Treasurer, and 
a Constable, or law officer.38 Theoretically, garrisons 
which were closest to tb.e sertio, or the :frontier With 
non-vassalized tribes, had a larger contingent of 
troops.39 
On the death of Paulo Dias bis grant o:f land and 
his conquests in the interior reverted to the Crown o:f 
Portugal, and became a. "Kingdom,u and 11 Captainey-General .. tt40 
The forts of Oalumbo, Massangano, and Golungo Alto had 
been :founded by 1589. Muxima was founded in 1599 south 
38 8 ~., III, P• 15 • 
39Ibid., III, p. 156. 
-40 Delgado, ~· ~., I, pp. 323·325. Dias died 
at Massa:m.gano, after 14 years of campaigning and a futile 
search for reported mines of silver up the Cuanza. 
Massangano had been founded in 1583 and named "Our Lady 
of tb.e Victory of Massangano,u commemorating his defeat 
of native forces. 
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of the Ouanza, the highway to the interior so lyrically 
praised by Cadornega. Shortly after, in 1604, a -presidio 
was built at the falls of Oambambe, marking the limit of 
navigation on the river. Portuguese traders preceded 
the military occ~pation of the presidio, and, in the 
early phase of expansion in the region between the Dande 
and ouanza as in the later phases, constantly ambulant 
traders paved the way for Portuguese control. 
The Lucalla River, an affluent of the Ouanza, 
was another path to the interior north of. the main line 
of settl.ements. In 1614 Portuguese forces founded a 
presidio at .Amba.ea on the Lucalla; the Lucalla was less 
navigable than the Ouanza, and only small rafts were 
useful for movement.41 
It was in the 17th century that the Portuguese 
encountered the first serious trouble from foreign 
powers in Angola. Dutch fleets had attacked sporadically 
most of the Portuguese empire in the early years of the 
century. But a£ter 1630 these attacks threatened to 
expel the Portuguese £rom Brazil and Angola as well. 
Dutch forces occupied Angola from 1641 no 1648 and were 
expelled by a fleet and army from Brazil. 
Dutch occupation of Luanda, Benguela, and some 
of the sert~o near the Ouanza had a definite effect on 
41 Oadornega, ££• £11•• III, p. 163. 
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42 Portuguese relations with the natives. After the Dutch 
left, the Portuguese had to reoccupy a great deal of 
territory, and remake alliances, often forcibly, with 
native powers. The King of Congo and the Queen of 
Matamba had openly rebelled against Portuguese rule and 
had allied with the Dutch forces. At one point the 
Portuguese held only the fortress of Massangano. The 
Dutch did not tax the native chiefs, and this memory 
bore bitter fruit for the Portuguese authorities when 
they began to reassert their influence after 1648. As 
a result, the Portuguese began a campaign to break the 
power of the major native polities. By 1671 their work 
was nearly oam:pleted. 
In short succession, forces of Congo, Matam.ba, 
and Dongo were defeated in the field by Portuguese armies, 
heavily supported by guerra l>reta from loyal groups north 
of the Ouanza. The full extent of military occupation 
was achieved in 1671 with the capture of the hill fortress 
of the King of Dongo, theoretically a vassal of the 
King of Oongo, and a former vassal of Portugal. Dongo 
had rebelled in 1670 and had attacked the presidio of 
Ambaca, after he observed a Portuguese defeat in Sonho 
province of Oongo. .Dongo had a reputedly invincible 
42Alberto de Lemos, Histdria de Angola (Lisbon, 
1932), pp. 200-209; Duffy, 2£• cit., pp. 65~68. For the 
expulsi'on of the Dutch from ..Angela see Charles R. Boxer, 
Salvador de Sa and the Stru.~le for Brazil.and .Angola, 
1602-1686 (London, 1952). .. · 
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strongha~d at Pedras ~ Mapungo, some ten miles north o£ 
tb.e Cu.a.nza~ .A three month siege reduced the native 
garrison and the Portuguese founded a new presidio 
there, after another reinforcement from Brazi~.43 
In this campaign, again, guerra preta played a 
decisive part in enab~ing the Portuguese to break a 
native power. In the field o! logistics, tb.e native 
vassal sovas provided carriers for the campaigning 
army.44 Chronicler Cadornega remarked that this cam-
paign against tb.e powerful. Dongo King was ~ike a "Civil 
War," since black men were £igb.ting mainly black men 
with ouy "a few Portuguese, .. and the native kingdom 
was so very powerf~.45 
Tb.e presidio furthest east £rom Luanda was the 
converted native .fortress, renamed Pungo Andongo after 
the defeated potentate. There were a number of Portuguese 
trading .feiras or market-fairs in tb.e sert~o which stretched 
perhaps another 120 miles inland. The fair of Cassange, 
a market of Portuguese traders, and mes~ipos at the 
court o£ the King of Cassange, was located west a! the 
Cuango River, some 300 miles !rom Luanda. Oadornega 
mentions Cassa.n.ge as a trading past since tra.D.ers reached 
43cad.ornega, ll• ill .. , II, PP• ~98-358. 
44Ibid., II, p .. 302. Porters were then eal.led 
"gente de oarruagem," in the 17th century; in the 19th 
cemtury;-the term used in most oases was ttearregadores. tl 
45 . . Oadornega, ~· £!!., II, p. 303. 
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the town on a regular route from the presidio of Ambaca.46 
Oassange was visited by Portuguese from Ambaca and Pungo 
Andongo before the last half of the 17th century. 47 But 
Pungo Andongo remained, until the 19th century, the 
frontier post of Portuguese military occupation in 
48 eastern Angola. 
In expanding to the south, the Portuguese moved 
along the coast past the Ouanza River mouth, looking for 
ports. In 1617 Benguela was established and a new 
ukingdom" was created with a more or less separate 
administration for several decades. Portuguese officers 
anxious to escape the control of Luanda, set up a trading 
town which acted as a base for pene.tration into the 
sertao. Yet it was not until 1685 that presidios were 
were founded on the plateau at Oaconda and Quilengues. 
These small stations, w1 th only a handful. of mil.1 tary 
personnel, were eventually abandoned because of their 
unhealthy locations. Even on the Benguela plateau. 
expansion was hampered by climate; together with climate 
46~., III, p. 220. 
47Renrique Dias de Carvalho in his Q Jaga ~ 
Oassange (Lisbon, 1898) says the ,.Fair'1 at Oassange was 
not founded until 1807 (p. 114). Yet it is clear from 
other records that the Pest of ttnireetor of the Fair o:f 
Oassangett was recognized as a post by the Governor General 
in the 18th century. Such an appointment appeared in 
1790. See .Archivos de .Angola, Vol. III (1918), No. 15, 
pp. 11 6-1 21 • 
48nas Neves, OonsiderayBes (1830), p. 200. Das 
Neves in 1830 considered Pungo ..Andongo as the eastern 
frontier of Angola. 
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and difficulty of access from Benguela, this regi~n had 
distinct disadvantages until the 18th century, when · 
PortUguese expansion moved southward with more effect~ 
ive:m.ess.49 
The first century of Eortuguese expansion was 
decidedly military in character. Although traders 
preceded the presidios, a distinct military group ruled 
the "Kingdom and Captaincy-General. of .Angola .. long after 
the death of the first canguistador in 1589. Expansion 
was based on Luanda at first; and the port city grew 
in importance as the outlet for main trade routes 
bringing "some slaves, some ivory and a great deal of 
wax,"50 for export to Brazil. ud Portugal. 
Expansion to the east came to a standstill. in 
the late 17th century, and the territory settled down 
to build a commercial ltingdom. Wars with native groups 
continued sporadically, but the Portuguese in Angola 
came to conoentrate on trade and preserving conditions 
conducive to business security. The 18th century was 
in many ways as much a century of war as the 17th, yet 
49Nogueira, 2.£• .2..U,., pp. 120-124. R~pl:l Delgado, 
Ao Sul. do quanza (2 vels., Lisbon, 1944), II, PPe 
50oadornega, !Z• cit., III, 167. Oadornega's 
account would lead one to believe taat ivory and wax 
were as important in producing revenue in 17th century 
Angola as were slaves. By tl:le time of Silva Correa, 
however, taere is no question but that slaves were the 
major item of receipts. 
49 
the difference was an augury for the future: Portuguese 
policy shifted from inland penetration to controlling, 
or attempting to control, trade along the coast. The 
attempt to monopolize the coastal trade, exelude foreign 
vessels from trading with natives in the territory, and 
the fear of further .foreign i:nvasian, drave the Partuguese 
to direct more attention to the coasts tlaa.n had been 
true in the 17th century. 
After losing control of the Mina coast in Guinea 
by 1642, the Portuguese put more energy into controlling 
the coast of Angol.a and Benguel.a. Yet the naval power 
of the Portuguese, and their economic situation, were 
very weak by the end ot the 17th century. Portuguese 
merchants could not compete with French, Dutch and 
Engl.ish traders. What had been true on the Guinea 
coast would be true on the Angolan coast; as Bosman 
wrote in 1698 about the Portuguese at Mina: native 
middlemen outdid the Portuguese since the latter ttare 
loaded with such sorry goods, that they oan scarcely 
get slaves anywhere else."51 In Angola, at the begin-
ning of the 18th century, the Portuguese found their 
monopoly of trade gravel.y threatened; their control of 
the territory was likewise in danger.52 
51o. w. Newbury, The western Sl.ave Coast and 
its Rulers (Oxford, Cl.arendon Press, 1961 ), PP• 16-17. 
52Nogueira, ~· £!i., pp. 47-52. 
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0. 18th Oentury Angola 
1. Struggle for the Ooast 
I 
From the late 17th century until the Conference 
of Berlin in 1884-1885, Portuguese authorities in Angola 
attempted to assert control over the coast from the 
Ounene River in the south to as far north as present-day 
Gabon Republic. Foreign vessels were trading in what 
the Portuguese considered their sovereign territory. 
After the expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil and Angola, 
the pl.antatioa economy of Brazil required full. cooperation 
from Angola: more slaves than ever were needed. All 
foreign attempts to get slaves or any trade near Angolan 
settlements constituted a. threat to the revenue of both 
Angola and Brazil. In this way Angola became a dependency 
... 
of :Brt~:zil.53 
Later troubles were foreshadowed in the 17th 
century. About 1 670 the Dutch built a factory at Loango, 
north of Oabinda, and shipped slaves to the West Indies. 
Portuguese intelligence also learned that tb.e Dutch were 
getting slaves right from under their nose at Pinda, near 
the Oongo river mouth. In order to safeguard Luanda •.s 
monopoly over the slaves exported from Oongo, a plan 
53Nogue1ra, op. cit., pp. 22•23. Jose R. Rodrigues, 
Africa e Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1961), pp. 17-28. Angola, 
''the black mother," became subordinated to the interests 
of Brazil. At one time tb.e military commands in Angola 
were under the authority of the Governor-General in Bahia, 
Brazil. Brazil absorbed all the trade and navigation of 
.Angola. 
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was made to urge the vassalizing of the Ohief ot Sonho, 
near Pinda town, by way ot permitting the King ot Oongo 
to invade the territory and also crush the Dutch trade 
on the ooast.54 Yet apparently the Dutch continued to 
trade there and it is likely the plan was never carried 
out. 
The French in the 18th century attacked Angola 
and Brazil and began to oppose Portuguese monopoly ot 
trade on the Oongo coast. In 1707, Benguela town was 
sacked by French pirates.55 In order to control trade 
further north, King John V ot Portugal in 1723 ordered 
the construction of fortresses at Oabinda and at 
Molembo; French opposition to this plan was enough to 
destroy it. In 1758 another plan propo.sed the puilding 
o:t forts at Oabinda and Loango to oppose French trade 
with the natives. Yet nothing was done decisively until 
1759, when the Portuguese in Angola built a new presidio 
in the interior at Encoge, or Pedras ~ Encoge.56 This 
tort was situated on a trade route !rom the east to the 
Oongo coast in the hope that the Portuguese could control 
native trade before it reached the coastal ports north 
o:f Luanda. Encoge became the nortb.er:mnost station in 
Angola until the 19th century, but it did little to prevent 
54oadornega, ~· £11·• II, P• 545. 
55uBenguel.a,u Grande EneioJ.oP,edia Portuguesa e 
Brasil.eira, Vol. IV, .p. 528. (G.E.P.eB. hereafter). 
56Nogueira, ·£E.· .£!.! .. , P• 46. 
52 
French and Engl.ish traders :from trading with natives on 
the coast.57 
As the 18th century wore on, the Portuguese 
became preoccupied with foreign vessels la:nding south 
of Luanda and avoiding Portuguese customs houses at the 
main settlements. Governor Francisco Sousa Ooutinho 
(1764-1772) was determi:aed to cripple foreign "contraband" 
by buil.ding a coastal presidio at Novo Redondo. Besides 
preventing the l.anding of English vessels, which had 
previously threatened Pertu.guese control at Oabinda as 
well, the founding of Novo Redondo was designed to ease 
overland communication between Luanda and Benguela.58 
The Portuguese used Novo Redondo as a base to enter the 
sertao o:f Quissama, a wild, uunvassalized" terri tory, 
southwest of the presidio of Muxima. As in so many other 
moves for expansion o:r control in .Angol.a, tb.e Portuguese 
at Novo Redondo aimed to retrieve many escaped slaves 
:from the Luanda and lower Ouanza regions. 
Portuguese economic policy with regard to Angola 
was criticized by the more illustrious of the Governors-
General in the 18th as well as the 19th centuries. In 
1775. a:rter returning to Portugal, Governor Sousa 
57nas Neves,~· cit.,pp. 200-2G1. Encoge before 
18}~0was growing oo:ffee a.ncr-sent it to Lu~da and other 
ports. Sarmento, Alexandre, Os Sert'Oesd .Africa (Lisbon, 
1880), P• 39. 
58silva Oorr&a, ~· 21i·• II, p. 149; Nogueira, 
~· 2li·· pp. 55-56. 
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Ooutinno ~inished his report on Angola with a scathing 
denunciation o£ metropolitan budgeting. 
It is best to spend money as events dictate, 
and attract trade; experience shows my view 
is correct.... 'What good is a sordid economizing 
policy in a State? What good are rui~ed towns? 
or Sol.diers' pay in arrears, the oredi tors o:f , 
the Royal Treasury in continual. debt and subject 
to the miserabl.e formalities which make the 
Governing even worse? 59 
Governor Sousa Ooutinho had an idle fix~ in regard 
to Portuguese expansion and foreign competition. He was 
a precursor of the Brazil.ian expl.orer Lacerda who feared 
Dutch and English expansion into the interior north of 
60 Oape Colony. For Sousa Ooutinho, the kingdom o:f .Angola 
would not prosper until. a route could be secured across 
Africa to Mozambique in order to tap what he considered 
nthe stream of ge1d 11 :from the Sena region. Portugal 
must expand into Central Africa to prevent the Dutch from 
extending their settlements up to the Zambesi River. 61 
With this idea in mind the Governor, known to 
many historians of Angola as the most enl.ightened and 
energetic governar of four centuries, encouraged expans1on 
59Franoisco de Innocfnaia de Sousa Ooutinho, 
Memorias, B.M.P.P., Oodice 437, p. 56, dated Lisbon, 
3 February, 1775. 
60nutfy, ~· £!i., pp. 190-191; Jose Maria de 
Lacerda, nobservacoes sobre a viagem da costa d'.Angol.a 
a c0sta de Mocambique,u Annaes Maritimes e Ooloniaes, 
Parte Nao Official, No. 5, 1844, pp. 1B8-2o5. La.cerda 
~oted the English threat in 1795. 
61Bibl.ioteca Munic1 aJ. Pttblico de Porto, Manuscript, 
Oodiae 337, Memorias ••• de Sousa Ooutinho Lisbon, 1773), 
p. 41. 
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onto the Benguela uplands. New stations at Caconda and 
Quilengues were renovated and at least half a dozen fairs 
were established in the sert~o east of Oaconda; it is 
likely that the first official Po~uguese authorities 
were sent to Bailundo and Bih' kingdoms by the end of 
62 the term of Sousa Coutinb.o in 1772. 
Despite Sousa Cautinho's encouragement of industry 
.and agriculture, and a lessening of slave trade in .An.gol.a, 
his pl.ans of development and of expansion fell snort of 
success. ~he Portuguese still were unable to control 
the coast north of Luanda up to the Congo River, and 
French and English vessel.s traded at will. and continued 
to make a mockery of Portuguese decrees ordering the end 
of foreign contraband. Portuguese customs duties were 
heavy even for national vessels. ~he ports of Angola and 
Brazil were in theory closed to foreign navigation, but, 
at times, due to the profits to be made from trade with 
English and French merchants, the ports were opened. 
Portuguese merchants nad poor quality goods to trade with 
the natives for slaves; Brazilian merchants did not pay 
as well for slaves as did their English and French 
competitors in the West Indias. ~hus, Portuguese fazenda, 
or trade cloth, was consistently rejected by natives who 
62Alfredo de Albuquerque Felner, Angola ••• 
I, see Documents No. 8, 9, and 10, PP• 177-207. Delgado, 
Ralph, A Famosa e Histi)'rica BengU.ela (Lisbon, 1940), 
PP• 9-15. 
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knew the foreign cloth's higher value.63 
Driven by pressure from Brazilian slave-owners 
who needed a greater supply of slaves, and by the detri-
mental effects of foreign trade on the commerce of Luanda 
and Benguela, Portuguese leaders planned to renew the 
schemes of King John V and to build fortresses and 
stations along the coast north of the Congo River. 64 
Although attempts were apparently made to construct forts 
further north, the Portuguese decided on Cabinda as the 
key point to be occupied. 65 In 1783 an expedition of 
about 1100 troops, including engineers, led by Lt. Luis 
Pinheiro Furtado, landed at Oabinda port and built a 
fortress. The climate was so unhealthy that over one-half 
of the Europeans died o:f fever in a few months. The French 
considered Cabinda important enough for their supply of 
slaves to the West Indies that they sent a fleet under 
Captain Bernard Marigny to end the Portuguese occupation. 
Furtado, seeing his garrison half-dead from the humid 
climate and bad supplies, capitulated and destroyed the 
63Jose Maria de Lacerda, 11Memo'ria," .Am:laes 
Maritimes, p. 194. · · · 
64Felner, Angola, I, Doc. No. 10t pp. 199-201; 
Archivos das Oolo"nias, III, No. 14 (1918}, p. 81; letter, 
Baron of Mossamedes to Seoretario in Lisbon, 18 Jan. 1786; 
'
1My attempts an the Prineeship of Sonb.o have not had the 
least effect for tb.e good of commerce, because the advan-
tages of the price o:f the French, quality, cheapness of 
their Fazendas, exclude all other nations from competi-
tion." 28 June, 1786, p. 261. 
65 / Rodrigues, Africa e Brasil, pp. 27-34. 
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fortress in June 1784. Portugal protested this action 
and negotiations proceeded which ended in the Convention 
of Madrid, signed on the 30th of January 1786.66 
By the convention, Portugal was obliged to 
recognize north of the Oongo freedom of slave traffic 
for all European nations. France, in return, promised 
not to extend commere&al activity to Angolan ports south 
of the Oongo. This clause also stated that no other 
nations, such as England, were allowed south of the 
Oongo. In effect, the Convention of Madrid, not 
protested by England, blocked Portugal 1 s move to expand 
north of tb.e Oongo in the slave trade, and diverted 
Portuguese attention to the southern coast. The abortive 
attempt to take Oabinda weakened Portuguese prestige on 
the ooast and established a fatal precedente Portuguese 
sovereignty had been rejected by a major European power 
in an important commercial region. 67 The failure left 
Portugal a frustrated ambition to ponder for the future, 
and increased European and native hostility would appear 
wb.en Portugal tried to reassert power on tb.e unorth coast. rt68 
The failure at Oabinda turned the Government's 
attention to the area south of Benguela. ~he Baron of 
66 Gast~o Sousa Dias, Os Portugueses em Angola 
(Lisbon, 1.959), pp. 251-2. .Arc hi vos das Col6nias, III, (1918), Messamedes to Lisbon, Sept. 1784. · · · · 
67st{ da Bandeira, .Factos e Considera9o'es, pp. 10-30. 
68 Sousa Dias, £!• £11., p. 252. 
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Mossamedes, Governor from 1784 to 1790, considered the 
Cabinda area as out of his reach. Historian Elias Silva 
Correa realistically noted that native enmity in the north 
69 
country had increased since 1784. Portuguese expeditions 
by land and sea explored the arid region south of Cape Santa 
Marta in 1785-86. The bay near the mouth of the Bero River 
was named Mossamedes after the sponsoring Governor. Al-
though the village of Mossamedes was not founded until 
early 1840, the initial expeditions found traders barter-
ing with the natives. Expansion to the south was foreshadowed, 
for Mossamedes was reportedly the most healthy region. for 
European settlement in the area of Portuguese influence; 
70 
moreover, the port was superior to that of Benguela. 
English competition north of Luanda presented 
two grave dangers to Portuguese power at the end of the 
century. These foreign vessels sold arms and powder 
to natives near the Congo mouth and they traded persis-
71 
tently in slaves. In attempting to gain allegiance from 
native leaders north of Luanda, the Portuguese became 
involved in a serious campaign. 
69silva Correa, Historia, II, pp. 61~65. 
7°Felner, Angola, I, pp. 6-8; Pedro Alexandrine 
da Cunha, 111-tlossamedesu, B.S.G.L., Series 6, No.4, (1886), 
pp. 249-254. . 
71sousa Dias, Os Portugueses, p. 295; B.M.P.P., 
ms. Codice 764, Baron of Mossamedes report on Angola. 
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~he Marques of Mossul, or Manigui tungo, was the 
native ruler controlling both banks of the lower Logt 
River, or Quitungo. The port of Quitungo was later 
called Ambriz. The Maniguitungo in the late 1780's was 
carrying on a prosperous trade with English and French 
vessels, and receiving slaves .from a major trade route 
overland .from as far east as PUngo .Andongo (See Map). 
A Portuguese embass~ of 1785 was rejected by the ruler. 
In 1788 another group, this time a small army, was 
defeated and sent back to Luanda in disgrace, thus 
terrifying the capital into preparing .for a general 
invasion. The native forces reacted by invading the 
European farms down to the Bengo River. Merchants in 
Luanda had long pressed the Government to move upon the 
Marques of Mossul. In late 1790, finally, the Portuguese 
cornered the native leader, who took refuge aboard an 
English vessel in the port' of Ambriz. At the same time, 
a small fortress, called the fortress of Our Lady of 
Nazar' and St. John of the Log,, was built on the left 
bank of the river close to the port. Shortly afterwards, 
the Marques submitted and offered "vassalage" at Luanda, 
1n a treaty of April 25, 1792.72 Later, in the 19th 
century program to reoccupy this region, the Portuguese 
used the facts of this fartress construction and the 
72soasa Dias, Os Portngueses, p. 298. 
vassalage treaty to their advantage.73 
The English Minister in Lisbon, Walpole, pro-
tested the building of the ~ort after complaints from 
English naval captains. The French supported the complaint. 
The Portuguese Government claimed that her rights to the 
coast were still intact, yet in a dispatch to the governor 
of Angola on August 12, 1791, the Government was obliged 
to order the destruction of the ~ort at .Ambriz.74 
An interest~g sidelight to the incident had a 
para1lel with the international conflict of the 1850's 
and 1860's. One of the Princes ot Mossul captured by 
the Portuguese, a certain Jorge Mangolfe, escaped from 
his captors and fled to England on a vessel in the 
Ambriz harbor. Apparently his supplications had a 
degree of influence upon the English pressure to out of~ 
Portuguese occupation. In early 1860 another Prince 
with a European name, Nicolas, would also attempt to 
escape on an English vessel near .Ambriz. 
. 
2. Social and Economic Preludes for the 19th Century 
Angola was truly a fugitive society. By fugitive 
is meant the transitory charaet~r of the inhabitants, 
their occupations and their accomplishments in a hostile 
73s~ da Bandeira., Factos e Oonsideraooes (1855). 
For the text of this treaty ·o:r vassalafie seer a polemical 
work similar to that of Sa da Bandeira·s appearing at 
the ltllmle at the Portuguese occupation of .Ambriz: Viscon.de 
cl@ San.tarem, Demonstras:ao dos l)ireitos 4ue Tem a Ooroa 
R Portugal. •••• (Lisbon, 1855), pp. 36- o. 
74sousa Dias, ~· ~., p. 299. 
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and wretched land. Few Europeans came to .Angola ot their 
own choice. Many who came hoped to return to Brazil or 
Portugal with a small fortune. Moreover, Angola was a 
land o~ exile for both Portugal and Brazil. All manner 
of political exiles, criminals, unruly soldiers, and 
even·gypsies ended up on her shores. The conquistador 
Paulo Dias in the 16th century searched the jails of 
Lisbon tor many of his recruits, and later, as Brazil 
grew to have an important popu.l.a.tion, many of her out-
casts were sent to Angol.a.75 
Luanda became the home of what Silva Oorreia 
called "the monsters of iniquity.n76 The army, police, 
petty merchant class, artisans, and tavern-keepers were 
all degredados. These rootless men added to the already 
implanted instability of the white population, and their 
relations with natives complicated the situation. Many 
convicts there were recruited for service in the army 
or the obras reaes (royal works), that is, roads, canals, 
and galleys. 77 
Governors with foresight deplored the imbalance 
of males to females in the European groups and urged the 
sending of females. Yet few white women came, partly 
75Adriano Moreira, 0 Problema Prisional do 
Ultramar (Ooimbra, 1954), pp. 55~61. 
76 / Silva Correia, Historia, I, p. 13. See 
quotation below, p. • 
77oharles R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil 
(Berkeley, 1962), p. 140. 
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because of the climate. Sousa Coutinho recommended that 
all Europeans should marry "white women or almost white 
women. "
78 
This fugitive society was difficult to control. 
Stern measures seemed the only solution since jails were 
full to capacity. Native groups reacted violently to the 
men who came as outcasts. Most of the degredados 
traded in the bU$h1 or became service-people in the 
towns after their service was up or they received pardons. 
Disdaining the life of !arming, so difficult under the 
oiroumstanoes of Angola, these men often succeeded in 
escaping Portuguese territory by boarding foreign 
vessels. 79 Sousa Coutinho was thinking of the 
calamitous group of degredados under his charge when 
he wrote to his successor in 1772: 
The public good was never lohked after 
here, and I believe that the Country was 
ruined more by its lack of order, than by 
even its climate. 80 
Few reliable statistics exist for Angola in the 
18th century, but one rare exception is in the report of 
Governor Ant6nio Lencastre in 1778:81 
78 Felner, A. A., Angola, I, p. 198, Doc. 10. 
79 Ibid., I, pp. 199~200. See B.M.P.P., ms., 
Codioe 674-siira. 
80 Felner, Angola, I, p. 199. 
81 Archivos de Angola, III (1918), No. 3, 
pp. 30-32. 
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1'777 
1778 
Whites 
1 ,581 
1, 700 
Mestis:os 
3,546 
3,874 
Negr0es 
430,000 
449,000 
Total for Angola 
474,117 
487,358 
Mesti9os or pardos, in Angola at the time, outnumbered 
whites by over 2 to 1. Many of the lower echelons in 
the ad~nistration were filled with pardos. All the 
shades of color were said to drink heavily. Brazilian 
rum, or geribita, was a staple export; Silva Oorr~a's 
accounts picture the native earavans' addiction to rum. 
as habitual and long-standing. White society died off 
82 as much tbroagh over-drinking as through climate. 
The Portuguese native policy followed an old 
path. Vassal chiefs were liable to castigo, or 
punishment, through the sending of punitive expedi-
tions from presidios, if they refused to give the 
Oaptain-major porters to carry goods to the fair at 
Oassange. The Portuguese were determined to maintain 
their "bush prestige"; and time and again in the flux of 
native politics, military force was called upon to make 
the native powers fear reprisals. 83 The fugitive society, 
with very little religious or educational influences to 
soften it, was based on militarism and the most conserva-
tive form of mercantilism. Ohange, as more stable and 
settled societies knew it, was long Ln coming. 
82s11va Oorrea, Angola, I, pp. 13-20, p. so. 
83silva 0 "' it II 1 1'8 orrea, .2E.• !__·, , p. . At • 
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The Portuguese managed to collect taxes in trade 
,goods or in currency later in the form of the dizimo. 
Some form of tax had been levied on a11 conquered regions 
since the second aecade of the 17th century. In the late 
1780's the following towns and Eresidios in Angola 
paid the dizimo, listed by distr1ots. 84 
Luanda 
.Alnbaca 
Muxima. 
Massangano 
Bengo 
Icaolo 
Golungo 
Dande 
Ouanza 
Eacoge 
Oam.bambe 
Benguela. 
Oaoonda 
Oerta~ sobas paid the dizimo in a yearly 
tribute to Luanda in slaves, ivory or other trade goods, 
or sati.sfied the obligation by contributing porters 
or guerra preta forces in time of war. 
By the late 18th century, most writers agreed 
that Angola was in a state of economic decadence. The 
slave-trade continued and annually between 1785 and 1795 
up to 8,000 slaves were officially exported to Brazil 
from each of the main ports of Luanda and Benguela.85 
The pursuit of more slaves and better ivory led to an 
expansian of the commercial cqntrol of the Portuguese 
in the interior of Angola. The flag followed trade, 
84
s11va Oorr~a, Vol. I, p. 167. ttnizimo" 
meant originally, "tithe'' but the religious m.oti vatia:m. 
behind such a tax quickly disappeared in Angola. Silva 
Correa severely criticized the tax collectors' rgbberies 
among the natives, and adding to his anti-clerical bias, 
he poured scorn on the religious connotation of dizimo. 
See pp. 163-167, I. 
85silva Correa, ~· cit., II, pp. 61-65. 
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since after the establishment of a fair outside the 
jurisdiction of the frontier presidios, incidents between 
the merchants and natives often brought J?ort.uguese 
military intervention and subsequent occupation on a 
small seale. Trade routes from the east of Luanda 
were especially guax-ded; and the traveling of European 
or mestico pombeiros tended to extend Portuguese respon~ 
sibility for territory far outside the last fortress on 
the Ouanza R1ver. 86 
There were several basic weaknesses in the 
economic system of pre-19th century Angola. Until 
the 18th century, al1 public officials, as the Governors 
and Oaptain-majors, were allowed to trade to supplement 
their meager salaries. Secondly, after many complaints 
from officials and native leaders, all Portuguese merchants 
were forbidden to personally trade in the interior out-
side the presidios. Thirdly, there was the monopoly 
system of revenue: all sales of slaves, salt, and ivory 
were strictly controlled by the Government at Luanda. 87 
86Ibid., I, p. 44. Silva Correa lists as the 7th 
cause of the ruin of oommeroe in .Angola, "the deceits, 
insults, and violences applied to the natives by the 
Traclers.u Henrique Galvao and Oarlos Selvafem, 0 Imperio 
Ultramarine Portugues (Lisbon, 1953), III, .Angala," 
p. $6. Mestioo meant mu1atto or hal.f-eas.te. A pombeiro 
was an agent, usually a native slave or .freeman, working 
for a merchant. 
87Nogueira, J. A.,~. £it., pp. 22-23. See also the 
excellent article on this subject for the years before 1750. 
Ralph Delgado, "Faotores de Atrofiamento economico e fina.n-
ceiro de Angola, relatives aos primeiros 182 anos de exploracao 
do territorio," in Actividade Economioa de Angola (No. 33, 
1 959, Luanda). 
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Various measures during the 18th. century J.i!ted 
the prohibitions on trading in the interior by Portuguese 
merchants, yet it remained a great issue and a problem 
into the 19th century. Such were the complaints and 
disorders over merchant activities that o.ften onJ.y 
mestieos and natives were allowed to trade outside the 
presidios into ••unva.ssalized terri tory. • 
The early centuries of history in .Angola handed 
down ihe principle of mercantilist economy. Portugal's 
imperial system was based on the ideal that only 
Portuguese vessels could trade with her dominions; 
this pacto colonial lasted in Angola well into the 19th 
century. The merchants o.f Luanda formed the most power-
ful economic pressure group in the territory; their 
interests were shortsighted and .frankly opportuniStic. 
They urged the Government to undertake military expedi~ 
tions to control more regions .for eommerce.88 On the 
other hand, i.f the administration of Angola had possessed 
sufficient means of power, this situation might never 
have arisen; as it turned out, Portuguese trade was 
continually ravaged by .foreigners and natives alike, and 
the effect was to entrench mercantilistic principles. 
88B.M.P.P., manuscript, Ood1ce 674, letter 12 
June 1791, Benguela Governor to Baron of Mossamedes; 
Silva Correa, ~· £!i., I, author warned against listening 
to the advice of merchants i~ Angola in very strong terms. 
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.Agriculture, fishing, and cattle raising had 
little or no foundation in 18th century Angola. 89 
Native cultivators supplied much of the food for Portu-
guese settlements, and the majority of .Portuguese traded 
in slaves and ivory. Dependence upon Brazil. was one 
certain cause for lack of agriculture and industry; 
preoccupation with exporting slaves to Brazil diverted 
activity from settled occupations. Brazilian supplies 
of ti~ee~,rrmm, brandy, flour, and meats were imported 
to Luanda; indeed Brazil since the middle of the 17th 
century had provided Angola with men, money, and equip-
90 
ment. 
The economy of .Angola lived on the exportation 
of slaves across the Atlantic. Conditions in Brazil 
were very important for the economy of Angola. In the 
last quarter of the 18th century, fewer slaves were 
demanded from Angola in Brazil, because of the decline 
of the gold and diamond mines.91 Moreover, as Silva 
Oorrea argUed, Angola had no need to expand to new 
slave territories, as Oabinda, until a new receiving 
port in Brazil was opened.92 Hence even expansion in 
89 . A Das Neves, ~· cit., pp. 230-235; Silva Correa, 
ll• £.!!., I, pp. 15-10; Feo Cardoso, !E.• ill_., p. 336. 
90Das Neves, ~· ~., p. 230; Cadornega, S£• ~., 
II, pp. 300-301. 
91 Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 
pp. 86-92. . -
92silva Oorrea, Hist6ria, II, pp. 61-65. 
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Angola could be geared to the interests of Brazil. 
A:fter the end of the .American War of Independence, 
French and British vessels increased their searches for 
slaves. These vessels were anxious to push aside the 
Portuguese, as did the French at Oabinda in 1784. 
Portuguese authorities feared the loss of ports, how-
ever, even within Angola.93 
Various voices among the Portuguese recommended 
a change in the export slave trade, although none advo-
cated the end of slavery. Silva Oorr~a resented the 
misery caused the African peoples, but he was not an 
all-out enemy of the trade, and proposed reforms to 
improve its role in the economy.94 Feo Cardoso, in 
Angola in the second decade of the 19th century, deplored 
the effect of the trade on the labor potential of the 
Negro; the loss of population meant the dearth of 
workers for farming, fishing, and mining.95 
All writers agreed that Angola was in a terrible 
condition. The territory was as economically dependent 
upon :Brazil, as it was politically dependent upon 
Portugal, and with the various disasters that befell 
93B.M.P.P., ms., Codioe 674, Baron of Mossamedes' 
reports. 
94see Duffy, Port*uese .Africa, f• 73, for a 
different interpretation ~ Silva Oorrea s view of the 
trade. The Brazilian soldier was a eynio who had 
little love tor the African, with whom he had spent 
many a campaign in the bush. 
95Feo Cardoso, ~· £1i., P• 336. 
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Portugal after 18o7, the territory proved a greater 
burden. There was na secure foundation beneath society 
or the economy; the white population as well as the 
black was nearly impossible to control with the poor 
:forces Portugal had in the area. With .a :fugitive 
society interesten only in quickly making a :fortune 
and in escaping the deadly qlimate, the string of 
settlements outside Luanda and Benguela could hardly 
be called collectively a "colony." 
.Angola was a "commercial-military factory,n96 
but with a special qualification. Tiny settlements of 
European traders penetrated inland over two hundred 
miles, as in Mozambique and in South Africa. But in 
Angola there was a gradual expansion going on in the 
18th century, which was lacking in Mozambique. hThe 
extension of the Conquest increases day by day encour-
aged by Trade," said the soldier, Silva Oorrea.97 
Angola was a oonguista and the military system of allies 
and guerra preta made it more than an nil.l-defined trading 
preserve";98 time and time again in the years before the 
19th century the :Portuguese raised suerra preta forces 
in the thousands. The vassalage system, as precarious 
96Galvao and Selvagem, ~· £!i., pp. 84-88. 
97Silva Correa,~· £11., I, p. 26. 
98Quotation from Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, 
A Short Risto~ of Africa (London, 1962, :Penguin African 
Library), p. 1 1. 
and 1tt1th.1oal as it proved at times, was a reality- in 
Angola more than in any other African territory of 
Portugal. 
Angola could not be considered a colony as of 
1822. But the military-commercial caste system, 
established in the 17th century, made it more than a 
land of convicts. The administration was impotent to 
bring to Angola white colonists to settle and remain 
as a unified society. Small numbers and poor quality 
of settlers combined to undermine such a program and 
the Portuguese could barely manage_ to hold the allegiance 
of some of the sobas near the presidios. Doggedly- the 
Portuguese encouraged a tradition of miscegenation and 
assimilation whether through inclination or expediency. 
A mulatto group in early 19th century Angola outnumbered 
the whites by over 2 to 1 (see above p. 6t). Certainly 
this mixed group aided Portuguese influence in the bush.99 
Administration as well as society existed on 
ephemeral and tenuous lines. Governors usually served 
terms of three years. A few served in .Angol.a as l.ong 
100 as eight years. Yet normall.y there was no continuity 
to law-making or its execution. This "lack o:f oontinuityn 
in administration was a fatal legacy :for the 19th century. 
For vested interests, lack of discipl.ine, and poverty 
99Mul.attoes in .Angol.a were often called "pardosu 
or ufusoos.u 
100Noguetra, J. A., 0 Governo, p. 31. 
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ruined the best plans o£ the best administrators, and 
most o£ these weaknesses were based upon a false start 
in the art o£ government. 101 
The beginnings of profound change in Angola 
could be seen at the end of the 18th century. The 
independence of Brazil was the vital watershed for the 
history of the Portuguese in that area. It underlined 
the great need for reform plans in Lisbon, and illuminated 
the scathing descriptions of Silva Correa, who was con• 
vinced that fugitive society was not fit for men with a 
consoience. 102 
101~., Sousa Ooutinho served in Angola eight 
years. 
102 I Silva Correa, Historia, I, p. 15. 
OHAPTER III 
THE BEGINNINGS OF ORANGE, 
1822-1846 
(If England patrolled Ambriz port) ••• it would 
restore to us part of the ivory trade flourishing 
there equal to the decrease in vessels calling at 
Ambriz. This port is particularly damaging to us by 
the facility with which canoes and long boats can 
elude the vigilance of the Government by sneaking 
there to sell the ivery that is the exclusive trade 
of the Government here in this Oity. 
-Governor and Oaptain-General of Angola 
to Secretary of the Navy, 1825, Letter, 
A.H.U., Angola, Oaixa 70, No. 49. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE: 1822-1846 
Profound change faced the Portuguese of Angola 
in the first decades of the century. Portuguese control 
in Angola was seriously threatened by a weakening of the 
mother country, the ending of dependence on Brazil, 
and the British campaign for abolition of the slave 
trade. With the defeat of France in the Napoleonic 
Wars, Britain became Portugal's major competitor for 
the coastal trade of Angola. For the first time, the 
basic revenue of that territory was hopelessly crippled 
and marked f.or destruction; the slave trade could no 
longer aet as the underpinning of Portuguese West Africa. 
Yet the changes had a curious effect on Portu-
guese policy. Instead of permanently undermining 
Portuguese administration and expansion in Angola, they 
in fact encouraged improvement. A new colonial policy 
arose in Lisbon; a legi~imate economy, as pictured by 
men like S~ da Bandeira, had to be built to replace the 
banned export of Africans across the Atlantic. A new 
economy in itself implied greater control of trade on 
the coasts of Angola and the control of interior markets. 
Thus abolition of the slave trade indirectly encouraged 
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expansion of Portuguese power.1 
The events from 1807 to 1822 gave Portugal a 
new but desperate perspective. Brazil was restless and 
Africa, poor and desolate, remained a burden and respon-
sibility. From 1822 to 1846 the Portuguese in Angola 
were in transition from the old to the new for Brazilian 
men, arms, and food supplies inevitably began to dwindle 
in their flow to Angola. Portuguese administration and 
economy were set on their own in this era. Brazilians 
began to compete instead of cooperating, and the Portu-
guese learned how great had been their links with Brazil 
in .Angola. Administration remained much the same, as 
Governors went out to fight the slave-trade and also 
to extend Portuguese jurisdiction and control. It was 
the beginning of a trial and error period for Portuguese 
expansion. 
A. Slave-Trade and Turbulence 
In treaties signed with Britain in 1810, 1815 and 
1817, Portugal promised to limit the slave-trade and 
gradually abolish it in all her African dominions. The 
Treaty of 1815 limited the trade by Portuguese vessels to 
south of the Equator. 2 The slave trade in Angola had 
1see S~ da Bandeira's Trabalho Rural e Adminis-
trao!o Colonial (Lisbon, 1873) for a continuation and 
enlargement of liberal arguments for ending the slave 
trade and servitude in Portuguese Af'rica. Also, Sebastiao 
Xavier Botelho, EsoravaturaS beneficios ••• da proibi9~o 
daguell.e Trafico (Lisbon, 1 4o). 
2Duf'f'y, Portuguese Africa, p. 144. 
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shown signs of decrease since the last quarter of the 
18th century, but by the years 1822-1836 it declined even 
more. Politics and British pressure did the most to put 
the writing on the wall for Portuguese negreiros (slavers). 
In February 1822 a revolt shook Luanda when an 
infantry regiment mutinied against the liberal govern-
ment. This was the first important sign that events in 
Portugal would have pepercussions in Angola. The revolt 
was crushed but many more followed in the 19th century. 
In 1823, Benguela, always a home for separatist sympa-
thizers in· Angola, rebelled and voted to join Brazil, 
newly independent, in a so-called Oonfedera9ao Brazilica. 3 
Luanda promptly called for reinforcements and crushed this 
attempt. 
After Brazil had declared its independence in 
September 1822, Portugal for several years refused to 
recognize its independence and fought an unofficial war 
in Brazil and on the seas. King John VI as late as 1824 
retained his traditional title; in theory at least, he 
was, "King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, 
and of Algarves, of this side and beyond the Sea, in 
Africa, Lord of Guinea, and of the Oonquest, Navigation, 
and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and of India.u4 
3Galvio and Selvagem, III, pp. 94-96; Pinheiro 
Ohagas, As Oolonias, pp. 46-47. 
4Archivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, 
Dom Joao VI Ohancelleria, Livro 44, folha 45; Oarta 
Regia !or Surgeon General of the Royal Navy Hospital, 
Luanda, 1824. 
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Portuguese expeditionary :forces were sent to 
Angola to guard against a Brazilian invasion or an 
uprising among the whites over politics. Merchant 
correspondence :from Rio de Janeiro informed the Governor 
of' Angola that a Brazilian :fleet, af'ter capturing 
Pernambuco from Portuguese forces in early 1825, was 
goi~g to attack Luanda. It was rumored the shrewd 
Lord Ooohrane, English mercenary, would lead the attack;5 
Portugal sent forces and the Governor tightened the 
defenses of Luanda. 
Britain in 1825 negotiated a treaty with Brazil 
whereby for diplomatic recognition and trade, Brazil 
would agree to reduce gradually her slave imports from 
Africa, especially Angola. 6 In Angola, certain Brazilian 
merchants became frightened and some left the colony 
beginning in that year. The Governor of' Angola wrote 
that most of' the merchants there had their headquarters 
and credit in Brazil.7 
"' According to the reports of' Silva Oorrea, the 
slave trade from Angola showed signs of decreasing in 
the late 18th century. This Brazilian soldier deplored 
5A.H.U~~ Angola, Oaixa 70, Letter of 23 February 
1825, Governor to Overseas Ministry. (Hereai'ter all 
correspondence of this type will be designated simply 
nGov. Gen.u since the majority of letters cited are 
correspondence from Luanda to Lisbon.) 
6nutfy, Portuguese Africa, p. 144. 
7A.H.U., Angola, Oaixa 70, Letter of 23 February 
1 825. Gov. Gen. 
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the crue1ty of the trade and misery of the Africans in 
.Angola, but he was by no means an enemy o! Portugues.e 
slave trade at the time. He foresaw a humanitarian 
movement, but he a1so recommended that Brazil open a 
8 
new port and market to improve that trade in Angola. 
Many traders in Angola in the 1780's were deeply 
in debt. The aviados, or agents sent into the backlands, 
were so poor and in debt to the merchants on the coast 
that cheating and robbery were inevitable in their 
trave1s. The slave trade, as Silva Oorraa saw it, was 
crippled in Angola by t~e vicious circle of Portuguese 
poverty.9 
In 1825 another account of the trade added 
perspective to the decadence portrayed by Silva Corr~a. 
The British traveler, Commander William Owen, visited 
Luanda in 1825 and wrote that the usua1 export of from 
18,000 to 20,000 Africans a year had decreased lately. 
He was told by the irate merchants on the coast that 
the supply had considerably decreased on 
account of the severe losses incurred by 
the merchants from the dishonesty of their 
black agents in the country, who had fal1en 
into the practice of converting to their 
own use the goods furnished to them by 
their principals for the purchase of slaves. 10 
8Silva Correa, Historia, II 1 pp. 61-..65. 
9~., I, pp. 30 .. 35. 
1 0William owen, Narrative of Vozages,... (London, 
1832, 2 vols.), I. pp. 277-78. 
Clearly the trade began to fall off at least 
at Luanda, long before the abolition decree of 1836 
issued at Lisbon. For the events in Brazil, due to 
British pressure, were equally important in causing a 
depression in Luanda. Other causes were quickly dis-
cerned by the Governor of Angola. 
Brazilians were no longer under the authority 
of Portuguese navigation laws after 1822 and often 
refused to call at Luanda unless necessary. They 
frequented ports immediately to the north of Luanda 
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and added their number to British, French, and American 
merchants avoiding the Portuguese customs at ports to 
the south. A Portuguese fort had been built at the 
, 
mouth of the Loge River, at Ambriz in 1792 to guard 
against the foreigners' trade near Luanda, but it had 
been destroyed by order of Queen Maria I under pressure 
:from the Englisn. 11 Portuguese merchants continually 
complained that Luanda's business was ruined by the 
lack of government control to the north. 
Noting the Brazilian exodus to the northern part 
of the coast, the Governor of Angola proposed to Lisbon 
that Portugal should occupy Ambriz town and kill two 
birds with one stone. By capturing a well-known slaving 
depot, the Portuguese would gratify the British author-
ities on the coast, and at the same time gain the control 
11 A.H.U., 23 February 1825, letter cited above; Sa da Bandeira .. Factos e Considerayoes, pp. 10-15. 
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o~ trade and relieve Luanda o~ the pressure o~ ~oreign 
trade in ivory and slaves. In this document o~ 1825 began 
a new phase of the long co~lict for the control o~ the 
coast north of Luanda; Britain and Portugal would dis-
agree over the solution until the settlement at Berlin 
in 1884-1885. 12 
Nothing came of the proposal of the Governor o~ 
Angola, since Portugal was far too occupied in home 
affairs, and since her power had been considerably 
weakened by the independence of Brazil and the wars in 
Europe. 13 
For several decades after the separation o~ 
Brazil and Portugal, Brazilian capital and traders 
dominated business 1n Angola. In 1830 there was only 
one Portuguese merchant o~ any importance in Angola who 
had a branch firm in Portugal; all the other major 
business leaders were Braz1lian. 14 Indeed, Brazil 
well into the 19th century, despite a profusion of 
Portuguese laws, took up all the navigation and trade 
of Angola, so that by the late 18th century, Luanda 
imported from Rio de Janeiro more goods than any single 
12In effect, Britain had replaced France as the 
power most concerned with the extension of free trade on 
the coast north of Luanda. France had opposed the 
extension of Portuguese occupation in the 18th century 
in this area between Ambriz and Gabon, and now Britain 
would continue to oppose Portuguese occupation in the 
19th century. 
13Pinheiro Ohagas, As Oolonias, pp. 45-47. 
14nas Neves, Oonsidera9oe!, pp. 239·240. 
city of Brazil.15 .Angola was in fact "a colony of 
Brazil. ul 6 
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The threat of a Brazilian invasion did not 
materialize. 17 Angola remained safe for the time being 
from outside aggression, but native and white discontent 
was growing. Rumors of the eventual abolition of the 
slave trade brought a violent reaction-from Negroes and 
whites alike; with many Brazilians still in Angola, new 
ideas of independence circulated. The army in .Angola 
was reinforced and governors-general called for more 
help; as usaal the climate played its deadly role in 
reducing the European elements of the militias. African 
sobas feared the end o~ slave trade and began to pro-
test. They remained reluctant to believe that the 
traditional traffic was ending. Thus a crescendo of 
discontent arose in the interior. By 1830, however, 
many African chiefs close to Portuguese posts knew that 
the British vessels had made export of slaves very 
difficult. Governor Oastellobranco wrote in that year 
that certain sobas felt the King of Portugal, or 
maniputo as they called him, wished to punish the 
-
15 I f-JoSe H. Rodrigues, .Airica e Brasil (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1961), p. 33. 
16 ~ Gastao Sousa Dias, 
(Lisbon, 1959), pp. 235-239. 
Africa, p. 28. 
Os Portu~ueses em Angola Quoted n Rodrigues, · 
17A.H.U., Angola, Oaixa 73, 1829-30, Letter, 
26 August 1829, Gov. Gen. Abreu e Oastelbranco to Lisbon 
asked for a Portuguese vessel of war to remain to guard 
Luanda, ~earing an attack of Brazilian vessels. 
/ 
Africans and was cutting dow.n.the trade in return for 
"the violences and robberies tb.ey [ tb.e Africans] had 
done to the whites, yet that the trade would shortly 
increase again."18 Caravans entered Luanda but were 
..... 
often obliged to return to the sertao with few goods. 
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Yet the general trade continued while trade at 
certain well-patrolled places, like the capital Luanda, 
was periodically reduced. Only after 1844 did the 
general slave trade decline significantly. In 1839, 
:for example, one report said that some 39 slavers called 
in the port o:f Luanda alone. 19 Since British vessels 
often re-viotualled at Luanda. the majority o:f Brazilian 
slavers avoided that port as a point o:f slave embarkation, 
and concentrated further to the north toward the Oongo 
River. Smaller ports to tb.e south were also used for 
slave embarkation for Brazil. 
On December 10, 1836, the Portuguese Government 
published a royal decree abolishing all slave trade in 
20 Portuguese vessels in her African possessions. As 
stated above, the trade in certain localities had declined 
since 1825; but the decree of 1836 put tb.e official stamp 
ot royal approval upon the abolition movement led by 
Great Britain. Protests from all quarters in Angola and 
18 A.R.U., Angola, Caixa 73, Letter of 10 June 
1830, Gov. Gen. 
1860)' 
19vogel, Le Portugal et Ses Colonies (Paris, 
p. 554. . 
20Pinheiro Cb.agas, As Ool6nias, pp. 58-60. 
,. 
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Mozambique, and even from Lisbon, were fully expected. 
In Africa the trade did not receive its death blow from 
the decree of 1836 •. For as late as 1844, about two-thirds 
of the annual revenue of Angola still derived from the 
traditional slave trade duties imposed at ports. 21 Yet 
by 1847, the trade and its revenue were virtually finished 
as the economic basis of the budget. 
Portugal feared the effects of the 1836 decree. 
Native reactions proved very dangerous in certain areas 
of Angola. From 1830-1834 rebellions broke out in 
southern Angola, near Benguela and the Government was 
obliged to reinforce garrisons in the area besides 
building stronger fortifications around the town of 
Benguela. The basis of the native agitation was a 
reaction against the curtailment of the slave trade. 22 
Portuguese statesmen negotiated with Britain in 
order to obtain certain guarantees of aid in case of a 
general insurrection in Angola and Mozambique. In 1838 
there was a short term agreement, to last only a few 
years, whereby Britain promised to aid Portugal if the 
abolition of slave trade in Africa caused such a revolt 
among the whites as well as among the Africans. 23 
21 Ilfdio Amaral, Povoamento Branco de Angola 
(Lisbon, 1960), p. 15. 
22 Delgado, Ralph, Ao Sul do Ouanza, I, p. 107. 
23 Documentos Officiaes Relatives i Negociaggo do 
Tractado entre Portu al e a Gram Bretanha Para a Su ressao 
do Tra.fico da Escravatura Lisbon, 1 39, Imprensa Naoional • 
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Already the Governors of Angola had warned that to publish 
the 1836 decree in the interior o~ Angola would have been 
foolish until the discontent leveled off. 
The next step in the abolition campaign was to 
declare that the slave trade in Portuguese vessels would 
be considered piracy at sea and penalized accordingly. 
The Ministry of Palmerston in 1838 pressured Portugal 
to incorporate the piracy penalty in the 1836 slave trade 
decree. Yet this measure had to wait ~our years until 
the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of July, 1842. 
Besides instituting the piracy penalty, the treaty pro-
vided for the establishment of a MixEd Commission and 
Court of Arbitration for the slave trade in Angola. The 
Court sat at Luanda and consisted of six officials in 
three categories o~ Commis$ioner, Arbitrator and Secretary; 
there was a British and Portuguese member for each office. 
The Court judged vessels captured by the .Anti-Slave Trade 
Squadrons and there was no appeal when the vessel was 
judged a slaver. Slaves captured on board vessels were 
declared free and were liberated under the charge of the 
Junta de Superintendenoia dos Negros Libertos. 24 
When Si da Bandeira was in power he pledged 
himself to expand Portuguese control in Angola as well 
as end the slave trade. However, slave trade interests 
24Pinheiro Chagas, As Col6nias, p. 85; Francisco 
Travassos Valdez, Six Years o~ a Traveller's Life in 
Western Africa (2 vols., London, 1861 , Hurst and Blackett), 
II, p. 114. 
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in Portugal were powerful. Many argued the end of slave 
trade woUld cause the loss of the colonies. S~ da 
Bandeira proceeded cautiously, yet in 1838 ordered the 
annexation and occupation of the ports of Ambriz, Cabinda, 
Sio Jolo Baptista de Ajudi (Dahomey), and a few otherse 25 
From 1843 onwards, British and Portuguese Oommis-
sioners sat at Luanda and examined oases. The traffic 
near Luanda had received its death blow. But from 1843 
to 1865 official government correspondence from Luanda 
to Lisbon indicates that slave export continued on a 
small scale, especially from the Congo mouth and from 
small ports close to Benguela. Brazilian vessels flying 
United States flags were often the oulprits. 26 Portu-
guese expansion became a reality in tlds period. The 
British naval officers on the western coast were fully 
aware, that the Portuguese were expanding their control, 
but; if so, many remained skeptical and incredulous. 
Throughout the years 1845-1860, when the Congo or 
"north questionu reached a crisis, British authorities 
underestimated Portuguese efforts and achievements in 
expansion. 
In 1838 a Portuguese expedition ttvassalized n 
and annexed to Angola the district of Duque de Bragan9a, 
25Pinheiro Chagas, As Col&nias, p. 86. 
26 A.H.U., Angola, Gov. Gen. See Pastas for 1840, 
1850, 1857, 1862, and 1865. A particular surge of slave-
trading took place in 1857 near the Congo, partly because 
of French efforts at recruiting ufree emigre laborersn 
for their plantation colonies. 
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about 50 miles east of Ambaca. 27 This additional district 
was the first significant expansion since the exploratory 
moves of the Baron of Mossamedes in 1783-86, south o.f 
Benguela. Also in 1838 a company for the exploitation 
of petroleum east of Luanda was founded, but it quickly 
collapsed after its head, the Swiss Doctor Lang, succumbed 
to the climate. An expedition to the Bay of Mossamedes 
sent by Governor Noronha in 1839 .found Portuguese 
traders along the shore bartering with natives, and in 
the next year a smal.l. settl.ement was founded. 28 ,..,. Lt. Joao 
Francisco Garcia explored the pl.ateau behind Mossamedes, 
building the foundations .fo~ the settlements of Huil.a, 
Jau, Bumbo, Gambos, and Humbe, which were receiving 
smal.l numbers of settlers by 1845-46. By 1845, Mossamedes 
had a garrison of 50 ttpra9as" and 70 settlers to boast 
of, and in the next year began a smal.l. exportation of 
dried fish. In 1849 the Governor-General visited Mossamedes 
and found a small but rugged colony, beginning to spread 
out into the interior, and complaining of native attaoks. 29 
In 1849, Mossallledes was made a ••vila.n b.y deqree, 
and showed signs o.f importance partly because of the 
privileges granted to colonists willing to settle there. 
Colonists were given free passage, often from Brazil, 
27 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, 1838-39, March 16, 
1839, No. 547. 
28 Feiner, Angola, I, pp. 9-20. 
29Felner, ~., P• 23. 
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free lands, material for building homes, food for six 
months, no taxes for ten years and libertos or slaves, 
. provided by the Government.3° Mossamedes was called 
the ttA:frican Sintran for its more healthy climate. 
Nevertheless, the first decades in Mossamedes were full 
of hardship due to constant native attacks upon the town.3 1 
The first year of the settlement seemed plagued with mis-
fortune, yet perhaps not altogether without humor. 
Lieutenant.Joao Garcia left Benguela in a merchant vessel 
to definitely establish the town, but the vessel was 
apprehended by an English cruiser at sea, and captured 
upon suspicion of being a slaver. The British hauled 
the ship to Sierra Leone, but were kind enough to dis-
embark the chagrined Garcia on the way at Benguela. 
Eventually Garcia accomplished his mission in the cor-
vette Israel Maria, and Mossamedes was off to a delayed 
but determined start.~2 
In 1844 the ports of Luanda and Benguela were 
opened to the trade of all nations. But differential 
customs duties in these ports discouraged foreign 
vessels from calling often. Customs on foreign imports 
ranged from 6% to 25% depending upon conditions. Foreigners 
30 Feiner, Angola, I, p. 19. 
3 1 ~., I, pp. 25-30. Sintra, noted for its cool 
climate, is about 20 miles northwest of Lisbon, Portugal. 
32~., I, p. 10. 
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complained of these oppressive duties, and in 1860 the 
diplomat Charles Vogel called for reform: 
The greatest obstacle to the development 
of_ the relations of the colony Angola with 
foreign ports, is the system of differential 
customs.... One cannot help applaud the idea 
of a very desirable reform, in the interest 
of the colony itself. 33 
B. Slavery and Portuguese Oontrol 
In the period following the decree of 1836, there 
were two serious rebellions in Portuguese-controlled 
territory. One uprising in Dembos district, not far 
from Luanda, was further evidence of the traditional 
hostility of that region toward Portuguese rule. The 
other revolt, to tb.e south near Benguela, tohk a more 
original but equally serious form. 
In 1841 a Prince of Congo, Dom Aleixo de Agua 
Rosada, a member of the dynastic line accepted and 
favored by the Portuguese administration, raised revolt 
among the Dembos people by persuading them to disobey 
the Chefe of the region, and to refuse payment of the 
dizimo. Dam Aleixo was captured by an expedition, 
imprisoned in Luanda, and ordered to exile in the Cape 
Verde or Sao Tome islands. Yet he remained in prison 
in Luanda until about 1856, and died a few years after 
33vogel, Le Portugal et Ses Colonies, p. 555. 
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relea.se. 34 
Perhaps a more serious threat ta Portuguese 
power, originating in native discontent over the approach-
ing end o~ the slave trade, occurred in the rebellion o~ 
the brothers Ferreira Gomes. In 1835 a Benguela Negro, 
Ferreira Gomes was sent to prison in Lisbon ~or rebellion. 
Later he returned and joined two other Negroes, with his 
brother, one mulatto, and a white in killing a white 
woman in 1845, burning Portuguese £actories, and murder-
ing a merchant. There was a plan to gather loyal Negroes 
near Oatumbella, march to Benguela, and drive out the 
Europeans. This surge o~ racial hatred included the 
murder o~ natives who re~used to take a part. The 
Portuguese e~£ectively crushed the rebellion. 35 
According to documents from the Government of 
Benguelat now published, the Benguela area in the years 
1830 to 1846 was more endangered by native unrest than 
the regions to the north. 36 Except for the Bailundo 
peoples, who by 1860 had a reputation as important 
recruits in guerra preta armies ~ighting north o~ the 
34oastelbranco, Hist6ria, PP• 195-96; A.H.U., 
.Angola, Pasta 8, Na. 371D, 3 October 1845, Gov. Gen.; 
Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 100. Valdez visited Luanda 
in 1852 and noted that in the Fortress o~ Penedo there 
was a "dungeon with five secret cells, in one o~ which 
an African prince was incarcerated." This was probably 
an allusion to Prince Aleixo. 
35 A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 10, No. 13, Letter of 
14 November 1846, Gov. Gen. 
36nelgado, Ao Sul Do Ouanza, (Lisbon, 1944, 
2 vols.), I, p. 107. 
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Ouanza River, the other peoples of the southern distriots 
were virtually non-reoruitable for the Portuguese system. 
One significant reason for Portuguese weakness in Benguela 
district after the 1830's was the fact that militia 
garrisons had been withdrawn or disbanded upon the triumph 
of the liberal regime in Portugal.37 In fact, Portuguese 
fighting strength was greater in Bih$ in 1790 or 1800 
than it was in 184o.38 
With a dWindling of forces, and a tradition o:f 
using the omnipresent degredados for all services in 
Angola, these exiled men were recruited by Governor 
Vidal. He felt degredados were as useful as the empaca-
ceiros, negro auxiliaries in 2nd or 3rd line army units. 
Usually included in levies o:f guerra preta from friendly 
sobas, some 20,000 o:f these soldiers were in theory the 
reserve 6f the provincial army.39 They were useful for 
porterage, message-sending, recapturing deserters, policing 
and regular fighting. As the Governor-General optimistically 
wrote: 
37Delgado, A Famosa e Hist6rica Benguela (Lisbon, 
1 940 ) ' p. 11 0. 
38 ,.,. . / Henrique Galvao and Oarlos Selvagem, 0 Imperio 
Ultramarine Portugu~s, III, pp. 97-100. Lopes de Lima 
noted, Ensaio, III, p. 53, that 1n Bihe in 1834 some 
four companies of militia existed, in 1845 only one officer 
with no military force behind him. 
39voge1, Le Portugal, pp. 551-2 .. 
••• they have been of very great use in our 
wars against the Negroes of the Sertao; it 
is a type of Militia, who earn a little 
something when employed, and who blindly 
obey the authority of the Governor. 40 
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A native raid upon .Ambaca presidio in 1837 b;r 
forces of Soba Quilange Quissane began a Portuguese 
pacification campaign that ended in expansion of control. 
This soba had been nominally a ttvassalu but rebe11ed 
-
hoping to find the Portuguese weak. Quite the contrary, 
in early 1838 an expedition with several. thousand guerra 
preta was recruited and marched with artilJ.ery to Ambaca 
to punish the rebels. This army was ordered to "extend 
ruJ.e as.muoh as possible on that side of the Portuguese 
dominions. u41 
More important to o:fficiaJ.s in Luanda at the time, 
however, was the issue of abolition of the traffic. 
Governor Vidal noted with alarm stirringscof revolt at 
Oambambe and Muxima on the Ouanza, traditional. entrepots 
of a sJ.ave trade route from eastern Angola. Agents from 
Luanda, sent by white merchants were spreading the nearly 
incredible news that the slave trade would be ended. A 
ttrevoJ.utionary spirit 11 was in the air. 
1838, 
1838, 
Agents of the City and friends of the in-
surgents, never cease to work, but I will do 
all. I can to suppress this revolutionary 
spirit. As I said to you already, there 
wi11 be no result if Your Excellency pub-
lishes the Law of Slavery in its entirety, 
40 A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 2, No. 433, Feb • 24, 
Gov. Gen. 
41 A.a.u., .Angola, Pasta 2, No. 433, Feb. 24, 
Gov. Gen. 
since one cannot end this Trade with mere 
papers~ I greatly fear the moment may come 
when Portugal may lose all this portion of 
her Dominions for it is at least necessary 
to send funds to deal with expenses here. 42 
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In spite of the uproar over the trade, a new presidio 
had been added to the list mE: eastern .Angola, and Duque 
de Braganza became the fortress furthest inland in 1838. 
Pungo.Andongo had held the dubious honor up to the 
pacification of Soba Quilange. This hapless soba was 
-
made to sign a treaty or uAet of Vassalage 11 witb. Luanda. 
It is worthwhile listing in detail the stipulations of 
this treaty. 1) To swear vassalage and obedience to the 
Queen of Portugal, Maria II, [1834-1853] to defend the 
Portuguese from enemy peoples in wartime, and to fly 
the flag openly. 2) To pay the royal tax on all houses 
and cattle. 3) To receive kindly all missionaries and 
to aid Portuguese officers. 4) To capture or drive 
away all deserter soldiers and escaped slaves who 
cannot show passports or documents. 5) To contribute 
to the state porterage service (0 serviyo de Oarregadores), 
for trade, royal public works 1 and iron mines. 6) To 
aid and respect Portuguese traders and help them with 
porters. 7) "It shall b.encefortb. be tb.e custom for all 
native sobas, either conquered or who voluntarily come 
to do homage and vassa11ze themselves 1 to be branded 
with the Royal Mark on the left breast so their people 
42 4 A.H.U. 1 Angola, same document, Feb. 2 , 1838, 
Report of Gov. Gen. Manuel Vidal. 
will respect them, obey and recognize them as vassals 
of Her Portuguese Majesty.n43 
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This treaty of vassalage in 1838 may serve as a 
standard model, with few variations, which was used in 
regions where the Portuguese had more bargaining power 
and control. Such extensive demands rarely were complied 
with, however. 
The Treaty of 1842 had established on paper the 
M1xed Commission or Prize Court at Luanda, but in fact 
it was officially established by decree only by September 14, 
1844.44 In spite of the energetic Governor Da Cunha 
(1845-48), slave trade continued from ports in southern 
Angola such as Novo Redondo, Quicembo, Bay of Farta, 
Egito and further south. Yet even more important than 
slave trade matters was the issue of Portuguese sover-
eignty in the territory north of 8 degrees south latitude. 
As shown above, the question was first officially recog-
nized by the Portuguese in 1825 with an allusion to a 
possible occupation of Ambriz. Trade was increasing in 
that district and British competition was stronger than 
ever before. Later, in 1846, the questions of slave 
trade came to confuse the issue of free trade on the 
coast. This will be the subject of Section ~Df of this 
chapter. 
43Mensario Administrativo, 1948, No. 7 (Luanda), 
nTratado de Vassa.J.agem de 1838 de .Angola. 11 
44castelbranco, Hist6ria, pp.· 196-7. 
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c. In the Interests o~ Revenue 
Silva Oorr&a wrote that trade was gradually 
expanding the rule o~ the Portuguese in Angola. By this 
he did not necessarily mean £ormal administration or even 
military control. Much "expansion" in the sertao, given 
the trading nature of the Portuguese population, was 
i~ormal and produced modi~ications in the native society 
but rarely absorbed very many natives into European 
society. The concelhos (councils) at Golungo Alto, 
Oazengo, and Ambaca, by reason o~ their proximity to 
the largest concentration of Portuguese in the territory 
at Luanda, were affected by European customs. A chefe 
of the presidio at Cazengo in 1847 noted changes over a 
decade among the natives in his area: 
Already one sees today many civilized blacks 
who speak Portuguese, are dressed and shod, 
and who know, however poorly, how to read and 
to write; however, there is still not one who 
deserves th.e name o~ settler.. The best class 
o~ people are the pretos de tanga (blacks 
w1 th cloth). 45 · · 
In Cazengo the dizimo tax was paid in currency, not 
fazenda (trade cloth), and natives took advantage o£ 
status as nwhitesn to avoid such duties of the "native 11 
status as labor, porterage, and army service. This 
chefe in Cazengo recommended combatting the influence 
of the sobas by sending in Portuguese priests to organize 
freguesias (parish districts). 
45Annaes do Oonselho Ultramarine, 1854-58, Vol. I, 
pp. 470·73. 1847 Cazengo report from Joio G. Pereira 
Barbosa. 
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Ambaoa became known as the home of the negro 
auxiliary, or empacayeiro. In the 17th century, the 
Portuguese brought a number o£ Ambaca sobas into the 
vassalage system, distributed land areas and appointed 
o£ficers in the guerra preta, called quilambas. By 
the 19th century, however, only four major guilambas 
remained in Ambaca. Certain chiefs sent men to hunt 
game .ror tb.e Portuguese settlers. These hunters, seeking 
tb.e .Angolan buffalo, or empaca, later wel;"e named the 
empaca9eiros, and their descendants served as auxiliaries 
in guerra preta. In 1847 the officer at Ambaoa wrote 
that relatives of these servicemen were avoiding military 
service by bribing the captain-majores. Others avoided 
service by "putting on shoes, 11 as whites, and hence 
. 46 . 
claimed exemption. Most empaca9eiros were £orros, or 
freemen with some small subsidy from their employer~ If 
Lopes de Lima's estimate was correct, in .Angola at this 
time the ratio of slaves to freemen was about 12 to 4o. 47 
46Annaes do Conselho Ultramarine, II, Aug. 1860, 
Ambaoa report of 15 February t848 by Oliveira Chaves. 
An estimate of 1855 taken from Lopes de Lima•s earlier 
estimate, noted that Ambaca presidio contained more 
sobas vassal.ized in the Portugues·e system than any 
other singl.e area in Angola. The society of Ambaca 
experienced a great deal of European influence which 
probably tended to mul.tiply petty cb.ieftaincies. Out 
o£ 340 vassal sobas listed north of the Ouanza, some 
130 were in Ambaaa. See Jos~ de Al.dama Ayala, Oompendio 
Geo rafico-Estadistico de Portu al sus Posesiones 
U1tramarinas. Madrid, 1 55, pp. 0-51. 
47Lopes de Lima, Ensaio, III, p. 7. 
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Rum was imported into Angola ~rom Brazil perhaps 
as early as the 17th century. Silva Correa noted the 
e£fect upon the population. 48 Governor Pedro da Cunha 
in 1846 commented that alcoholism was prevalent in 
Portuguese territory.49 The effect of alcohol 
is :far more visibly defined in our conquests, 
than in those of the surrounding sertoes, where 
one observes in the stature and vigor of men a 
certain evidence that this poison there is 
rarer and more expensive.... !J!he manufacture 
of rum, which will occur in this Colony, is 
very prejudicial to tb.e well-being and morality 
of these populations, and, as a result, such 
an industry does not merit the protection of 
the Government.... Otherwise who will be able 
to rule this people or obtain from it any 
worthwhile service? 
Unfortunately the good intentions of Da Cunha 
were not executed completely in his time, nor in the time 
of his successors. For rum importation and rum manu-
facture, first in northern Angola and later in Mossamedes 
district, continued and increased in the 19th century.so 
As shown above, dizimo collection at various 
times had caused rebellions among the natives. The 
DemboK rising of 1841-44, led at first by Dom Aleixo 
of Agua Rosada~ was sparked when the Portuguese told 
the Dembos they had to register on tb.e regular dizimo 
48silva Correa, Hist6ria1 II, p. 40. See also 
the quotation at the beginning of Chapter II of the 
dissertation. 
49 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 10, No. 3, Nov. 14, 
1846, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
50 Felner, Angola, I, PP• 55-97. Malheiro, 
Alex., cr&nicas, pp. 84, 160. 
94 
list, with so many houses per district, and pay currency 
or trade goods instead of an annual tribute of slaves.51 
Taxation was increasing in the later 1830's and 184o•s, 
due partly to the abolition of slave trade. The Govern-
ment needed more revenue, and direct taxation o~ 
vassalized districts provided one source. Too often 
extortions and trouble originated in an official se~ling 
positions as tax collector to natives and then letting 
the natives go from village to village collecting in 
his district. 52 
The administration at Luanda realized that this 
tax extortion occurred in places like Pungo Andongo. 
For in the early 17th century, laws were passed prevent-
ing whites, pardos, and·negros cal7ados from passing 
beyond presidios to trade in the bush. By 1720, however, 
this law was abolished and the aviados, or agents, pushed 
inland and established fairs far to the east and abandoned 
old fairs near Portuguese settlements.53 Lopes de Lima 
in 1845 believed the old law needed reinstatement in 
order to avoid trouble with native powers.53 
51 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, 1838-39, Sept. 20, 
1839, Session of Department of Treasury, Luanda, Minutes, 
Aug. 2, 1839, Session. Oopia dos Autos da Junta da 
Fazenda Publica da Provincia de Angola relatives ao 
anne economico de 1838 a 1839
1
." 
52 . Annaes Maritimes e Coloniaes, (Serie 6 n 1• . . , .~,,o. "T, 
for 1846), .Parte Nao Official, "Memoria Sobre o Presidio 
de Pungo .Andongon by Fracisco de Salles Ferreira, pp. 105-
119. 
53Lopes de Lima, En.saio, III, PP• 63-64. ncalyaa.ou 
means wears shoes. · 
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But trade was such a powerful impulse, and was 
so quickly transferred to the natives, that merchants 
and their agents were likely to appear anywhere in 
Central Africa. Salles Ferreira, as chefe of Pungo 
Andongo, about 1838-40, observed and encouraged the 
expansion of military control in his region toward the 
east. He recommended expeditions to Quissama and Libolo, 
south of the Ouanza and hoped to achieve a line of com-
munication with Oaconda presidio, which he described as 
uvery populous and abundant in ivory.n54 In 1841 Salles 
Ferreira ''vassalized, 11 he says, some fourteen sob as in 
the Pungo Andongo region with 200 auxiliaries and one 
artillery piece. He proposed opening direct communica-
tions with the Kazembe, through Lunda, and with the 
lands of Lovar or Lobale, today in the area of Mexico 
and Barotseland. This would not be so difficult as 
t~ught at Luanda, since sertanejos with all their 
uoppressive actions," had long traded in this section 
east of the Ouango River. Shortly afterwards, Joaquim 
Rodrigues Grapa reached Lunda kingdom on a trade mission 
for the Portuguese Government. Although nothing was 
formally decided in terms of a trade treaty, individual 
traders consistently visited these areas. 
Benguela was separated from Luanda by 300 miles. 
Travel and communication between the two governments 
54Annaes Maritimes, 1846, Serie 6, Parte Nao 
Official, p. 118. Salles Ferreira, 11Memdria. 11 
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were safer and more certain by sea; since the land route 
:passed through independent sobados south of the Ouanza. 
In the early 1840's Benguela was prospering from a new 
ivory and wax route which reached to the u:p:per Zambesi. 
This trade route became .more regular when many black 
agents from Benguela and Bihe merchants traveled to the 
east. Long before official$ arrived to administrate 
a :place, traders were there establishing new channels. 
Jean Douville, a French. traveler in Angola in 1827-29 
observed factories in the Bay of Mossamedes, over a 
decade before the establishment of a town or official 
settlement.55 
Even unlikely events influenced the direction 
of trade. For in 1839, at Luanda the Governor received 
a letter sent from Kazembe by Captain Monteiro and 
Gammtto in 1832. New trade relations were begun with. 
Lunda :partly as a result of the passage of this letter 
into Angola.56 
But trade was more than obsession in a vacuum. 
It spread like a disease to the native :population. 
Trade dominated the mentality of the Portuguese, whether 
55see Jean Douville, Voyage au Oongo et Dans 
L'Interieur de L'Afrigue Eguinoxial.e (Paris, 1832, 3 vols.). 
56 8 A.R.U., Angola, Pasta 2, April 30, 1 39, Gov. 
Gen. Noronha to Sa da Bandeira. This letter was dated 
May 10, 1832, from Lunda. See Ian oun•~son's transl.ation 
of Gamitto's King Kazembe (Lisbon, 1960), 2 vols. Junta 
de Investigaooes do Ultramar. 
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it was in slaves or in any legitimate commodity, until 
all other considerations seemed unimportant. The native 
population soon became plus royale que J&_ ill and outbid 
the European. Those convicts who were dumped in Angola 
caught the bug as well as other colonists. 
The Portuguese colonist was plastic, 
humanitarian, and at the same time, fond 
of native civilization; but, with this ten-
dency, he was also the scourge of the black 
population for the sake of trade. 57 
A modern historian of Angola thus described the colonist 
who would ngo nativen and change his dress and speech 
in order to obtain a better trading advantage over an 
opponent in the bush. Later in the 19th century, 
reformers of Angola, as Henrique de Carvalho, pointed 
to this trait as most unfortunate.58 
Silva Porto was such a trader. Nevertheless, 
his energy and ambition for Portuguese expansion must 
place him several marks above the ordinary sertanejo. 
He was born in Oporto, Portugal, in 1817 and emigrated 
to Angola; he died in Bih~ in 1890. 
life was spent in trade and travel. 
His entire adult 
, 
Settling at Bihe 
about 1842, with a base at Benguela, he sent agents 
into Central Africa. But by 1845 slaves were no longer 
accepted as payment for debts at Benguela by order of 
Governor na Cunha. Many traders lost fortunes as a 
57nelgado, Ralph, Ao Sul do Cuanza, I, p. 24. 
58oarvalho, EthnographiaeHistdria Tradicional 
dos Povos da Lunda (Lisbon, 1890), p. 49. 
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result and accumulations of slaves were sold back into 
the interior in this period.59 
With the enforcement of the 1836 decree 1 and 
the energetic administration of Pedro Da Cun&a (1845-48), 
a shift of emphasis was inevitable in Benguela. Traders 
still obtained slaves but sold them in interior markets, 
in exchange for ivory, wax and other valuable goods. 
Slaves were brought down from the plateau after 1845 to 
work on plantations, which were increasing in number, 
in Benguela and Mossamedes districts. These fazendas, 
as they were generally known in southern Angola, or 
arimos in northern Angola, clustered along the river 
valleys upon the litoral. Major stations and trade 
entrepots between Benguela and Mossamedes included tiny 
forts at Caconda, Huila, and Quilengues. Black slave 
agents or pombeiros traveled from these points into the 
eastern bush districts for ivory. Few if any Europeans 
or 11 assimilated 11 natives traveled there. As for the 
tradition of mixing the races, Lopes de Lima wrote that 
this policy was 11necessary in those dominionsu because 
of the sheer numbers of the natives. 60 
59silva Porto, Viagens e apontamentos de um 
Portuense em Africa, I, pp. 304-309, ms. in B.M.P.P., 
Codice 1235. The term sertanejo means one who lives in 
the interior of Angola, and usually applied to European 
traders. For an excellent study of trade in 19th century 
central Angola see Gladwyn Childs, Umbundu Kinship and 
Character (London, Oxford University Press; 1949), 
pp. 199-215. 
60Lopes de Lima, Ensaio, III, pp. 49-53. 
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In the period, 1842-45 a regular trade route 
between Bihe and Luanda was discontinued. Several 
£actors were responsible for this. First there was the 
growth in importance of the Benguela market. Secondly, 
abolition of slave trade at Luanda made payment for 
Luanda merchandise more difficult. Thirdly, because 
Benguela merchants were deeply in debt to large trading 
houses in Luanda, as that of Dona Joaquina dos Santos 
Silva. 61 Journeys to Luanda were longer and more expen-
sive than a straighter route to Benguela by way of 
Bailundo. Later in 1854 David Livingstone observed that 
the Bihe to Luanda route was still used for trade, 
however. 62 
To illustrate the powerful character of certain 
Luanda merchants, it is useful to cite the case of Dona 
. Anna Joaquina dos Santos Silva, mentioned above by Silva 
Porto. This wealthy lady was also known as the "Baroness 
of Bungo, 11 or in the interior, as 11 Dembo Ualala.u During 
the period of 1840 to about 1855, her agents and enter-
prises were spread over much of Angola. In about 1846 
or 1847 Dona Anna was a trade partner of Joaquim Graca, 
the explorer of Lunda, and apparently had a hand in 
preventing Graca's passing beyond Lunda to cross Africa.63 
61 Silva Porto, Eiagens e apontamentos, XI, 
April 5, 1885, pp. 53-6 • 
62Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches, 
(London, 1857 edition), p. 426. 
63
valdez, Six Years, II, p; 175. 
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In late 1850, it was noted Dona .Anna possessed a large 
fishing and trading factory at Mossamedes.64 Later in 
1852 Valdez noted she had established a sugar manufac-
turing project in the Benge region.65rt seems Dona Anna 
was every bit as influential as the Brazilian merchant, 
Francisco Antonio Flores, who will appear later in 
Chapter IV. 
In spite of native revolts, lack of European 
population, an empty treasury and the abolition of 
slave trade, by 1845 Angola was gradually changing. 
The administration of Pedro Da Ounha marks a dividing 
line. For he convinced at least a section of the 
merchants in .Angola that the Atlantic slave trade was 
over. 66 With DaCunha began a series of fairly active 
Governors-General, who visited the interior of the 
territory, and attempted some measure of central control. 
In 1850, while passing through Alto Dande district 
(see map), Governor Silveira Pinto observed some pros-
pering farms along the Dande. .Along the way, Pinto had 
interviews with tribes and held some hearings. Like the 
proverbial district officer, described in later English 
accounts, this Portuguese Governor sat at native courts 
64Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, Vol. LVI, 
1851, Slave Trade, Part I, "Reports from Naval Officers," 
Governor General Adriao da Silveira Pinto to Commodore 
Arthur Fanshawe, Luanda, 9 December, 1850. 
65valdez, Six Years, II, p. 277. 
66Galvgo and Selvagem, 0 ImpJrio Ultramarine, 
III, p. 99. 
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and decided some litigation. 67 
Lisbon read with interest the volume o~ Lopes 
de Lima on Angola. The writer put ~orth three major 
conclusions which applied in his time, and which would 
be true in later decades. The revenue o~ Angola, he 
proved, was not less tb.an it had been during the slave 
trade era before 1836, as writers were wont to assert. 
Moreover .Angola had always been "a teedbagu to enrich 
a few men to the detriment of the nation. .And lastly, 
Portugal must pay her colonial.o~~ioials better, tor 
Angola could triple her revenue i~ well-administered. 
The military and naval expense in the budget was far 
too great.68Ris conclusions were correct. Angola in 
1845 had new opportunities to expand, but good adminis-
tration was far more necessary and urgent. With limited 
means, and a tradition of poor administration, the 
territory could expand only at the expense of develop-
ment. Yet if expansion obtained greater revenue, 
administration could wait. The resolution o~ this 
dilemma in the next few decades was a key problem for 
the Portuguese, and one which was o~ten made more 
di~ficult by Brit1sb. activity along the coasts of 
western .Africa. 
67A.R.U., Angola, Pasta 16, 1850, No. 579, 
Aug. 28, 1850, Gov. Gen. Pinto to Sec. of Navy and 
Overseas. Relat6rio. 
68Lopes de Lima, Ensaios, III, pp. 175·181. 
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D. Mr. Palmerston lkkes a policy 
The question of Portuguese claims to the western 
coast lay dormant during the first four decades of the 
century. When the issue was reopeneg., the mainsprings 
of dispute were the slave-trade and Portuguese expansion. 
Treaties made in 1815 and 1817 were considered at the 
time of signing to be consistent with the known occupa-
tion of Portuguese territory. Yet by 1846 when the 
question of Britain's recognition of Portuguese claims 
arose over an incident in the anti-slave campaign, the 
so-called "Additional Convention of 1817u bore special 
significance for Portuguese claims~ 
It is worthwhile quoting the relevant sections 
of this treaty:69 
Additional Convention to the Treaty between 
Great Britain and Portugal, of 22nd January, 
1815, for the prevention of the Slave Trade. 
Portuguese limits on East and West Coasts of 
Africa. London, !8th July, 1817. 
(English version) 
Art. II. The territories in which the traffic 
in slaves continues to be permitted under the 
Treaty of the 22nd January, 1815, to the sub-jects of His Most Faithful Majesty, are the 
following:-
Portuguese Possessions ••• and upon the western 
coast, all that which is situated from the 8th 
to tb.e 18th degree of south latitude. 
Portuguese Claims. Molembo and Cabinda. 
2. Those territories on the coast of Africa to 
the south of the Equator, over which His Most 
69sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Africa bz 
Treaty (London, 1909) 3rd edition, Harrison and Sons, 
III, No. 298, p. 985. 
Faithful Majesty has dec1ared that he has 
retained his rights, namely-
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The territories of Mo1embo and Cabinda upon 
the eastern ~hould be western] coast of 
Africa, from 5°12/ to 8° south latitude. 70 
The Portuguese claimed this set of clauses was 
tantamount to British recognition of her claims to the 
Congo. Britain maintained this was not true, but it is 
clear that when the Portuguese came to assert rights of 
expansion in Angola, the ambiguous nature of clause 2 
invited disagreement and controversy. 
In 1838 Sa da Bandeira ordered the reoccupation 
of places on the coast north of Luanda, and therefore 
the reassertion of de facto Portuguese sovereignty in 
--
those regions. In the years 1838-1846 interior stations 
in the north and south were taken. Next in line was 
the region of the coast at Ambriz and north. Portuguese 
vessels cruised north of Luanda searching for slavers 
along with the vessels of the British squadron; the 
trade to be had in ports near the Congo mouth was 
increasing and Portuguese reports emphasized the need 
to take action.71 
Lopes de Lima took up a campaign in Portugal 
to assert new sovereignty over the Congo region in 1845. 
7°This mistake was rectified in 1819 by mutua1 
agreement. 
71see A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, No. 798, Relatorio, 
1838 of Governor 'Noronha to Lisbon. The Ministry of 
overseas in 1838 ordered a reconnaissance of the Congo 
mouth, and construction of a fortress on the northern 
bank in order to use the river as a highway to the 
interior. 
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In an article in a daily of Lisbon, upon the occasion of 
the visit to Lisbon of a young ~ince of Congo, this writer 
claimed Portugal owned the coast from the mouth of the 
Congo to Cape Negro (see map). Moreover, he tried to 
prove that the King of Congo was a vassal of the King of 
Portugal. By discovery, conquest and "outright grant 11 
from native powers, he added, Portugal had rights to 
move again into the Congo. The reward for ruling the 
Congo would be: 
the advantage of a commercial monopoly, which 
all the Protectionist Nations have a right 
to maintain in countries dependent upon them, 
as well as Patronage. 72 
Other writers supported Lopes de Lima in 1845. Are-
assertion ot control of the northern region would help 
the economy of Angola. In an article of December of 
this same year, the writer deplored the abandonment of 
Ambriz after 1792 since now foreigners were trading so 
well close to Luanda. Ambriz should have a fort and, 
of course, a customs house. Naturally the current 
Minister tor the Navy and Overseas, Joaquim Falcao came 
under direct fire for supposedly doing nothing about 
all this. 73 
Yet in fact Falcao did do something about it. 
For at that very moment in Lisbon was young Prince 
72Diar1o de Lisboa, 25 November, 1845; 
31 October, 1845. 
73Revoluyao de Setembro, 31 December, 1845; 
o Patriota of Lisbon, No. 737 of 1845; A Revolu9ao, 
7 November 1845. 
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Nicolas, son of King Henry II of Congo (1842-1857). 
Nicolas had been brought to Portugal to "visittt Queen 
Maria II and get some education at the expense and urging 
of Falcao's Ministry. Although this act of Falcao's 
' 
was later severely criticized by a former official of 
Angola as a waste of state funds, it is clear the visit 
of Prince Nicolas marked the initiation of a new policy 
of direct action in the Congo.74 
The British reaction to Portuguese moves to take 
up an occupation policy at Ambriz and further north was 
very much the same reaction as that of 1792 when English 
pressure prevented occupation of the small fort on the 
river Loge. But several new factors entered the situ-
ation. Trade at Ambriz increased in importance after 
the 1830's and a number of influential British houses 
were established there. The next factor was the slave 
trade. Portuguese and Brazilians leagued together to 
export slaves despite British surveillance. A table of 
African slaves imported by Brazil indicates the continuing 
74see the work ot J. Carvalho de Menezes, 
Memoria ••• (Rio de Janeiro, 1848). This work was 
banned in Portugal, and had to be printed in Brazil 
because of the criticism and libel against certain 
persons contained in its pages. Menezes lambasted 
Falcao and criticized several officials in Angola for 
atrocities against the Africans. 
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trade and the date of abolition.75 
1840 30,000 1846 50,324 
1841 16,000 1847 56,172 
~842 17,435 1848 60,000 
1843 19,095 1849 54,000 
1844 22,849 1850 23,000 
1845 19,453 1851 3,287 
Many of these slaves originated in Angola and Congo. 
Lord Palmerston believed Portugal was an 
important ally and base to use strategically in inter-
national affairs. Before 1830, he was new in dealing 
with Portugal and far more sympathetic. 
Why,Sir, do what we will, there is a 
fatality which draws us, like the moth into 
the candle, to entangle ourselves in the 
internal affairs of Portugal; and so it 
must be, for no man can deny that England 
is deeply interested in the tranquility and 
happiness of Portugal. 76 
But by 1838, having failed to make Portugal 
fha. 
declare~slave-trade piracy in her own vessels, and hearing 
of continual Portuguese slaving, he changed his tune. 
And in 1839 he obtained from Parliament an act to allow, 
unilaterally, British cruisers to search and seize 
suspected or known slavers with the flag of Portugal. 
The Tories opposed this Whig actt but remarked signi-
ficantly for the time: that neither Palmerston nor his 
colleagues were uquite accountable for his actions where 
75Jos~ H. Rodrigues, Africa e Brasil (Rio, 
1961), pp. 162-3. 
76Herbert c. Bell, Lord Palmerston (London, 
1936, 2 vols.), Vol. I, p. 144, Palmerston speech on 
Motion on Affairs of Portugal, Parliament, 10 March 
1830. 
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the Black Man was concerned.u77 Portugal protested and 
asked for guarantees of her African territories from 
possible revolts following the abolition. No treaty 
in Portugal was possible, for political reasons until 
1842, on July 28 when the long-awaited agreement was 
signed, declaring slave-trade in Portuguese vessels 
~iracy, and opening opportunities for British merchants 
78 to invest and work in Angola. 
The issue of the slave-trade, however, was as 
much a political issue for the Portuguese as it was a 
humanitarian issue for the British. For the ghost of 
Captain Owen lingered on in the official mind of the 
Governors at Luanda. As Governor Noronha wrote in 
1838, the traffic was no longer feasible 
••• without exposing those Provinces to the 
insults of the English cruisers, and giving 
them pretexts for negotiating directly with 
the neighboring Potentates of the Ooast, as 
Commodore Owen did then in 1825 (if I remem• 
ber correctly) in the Bay of Marques [Delagoa 
Bay J , thus endangering and making precarious 
in law, and scorning the fact of Portuguese 
sovereignty in those Regions, since the Treaty 
made by the Commodore is a tacit (if not 
express) recognition of the independence of 
the Saba of that Bay, who had always considered 
himself a vassal of the Portuguese OroWll. 79 
If the issue on the western coast at Congo and Angola 
+he-
had been simply that of~slave-trade, or even free trade, 
77Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, p. 234. 
78Pinheiro Ohagas, As Oolonias, pp. 82·86. 
79A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2, 1838, No. 798, 
Relat6rio, Gov. Gen. Noronha to Lisbon. 
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the Portuguese would not have been so anxious to expand 
their occupation and formal control north of 8 degrees. 
But British naval officers created such suspicion and ill~ 
will among Portuguese officials that the administration 
at Luanda fear a serious loss of territory. Perhaps 
they thought Angola might become 11 another Brazi1 11 , and 
be" emancipat ed 11 by Brit ish aid. 
Within the Portuguese sphere of influence upon 
the eastern coast at Mozambique, British activity also 
fomented great disputes over territory. What began 
with Captain William Owen, reached a peak in the 1860's, 
and was decided in arbitration by Marshall MacMahon of 
80 
France in 1875 in favor of the Portuguese claim. Yet 
until the 1870 1 s when international arbitration became 
more feasible for African territorial disputes, the Portu-
guese believed Britain would take all she wanted. In 
Angola, the mounting fear of direct British intervention 
or annexation often became an obsession. 
As shown above, Governor~General Da Cunha tried 
81 
to the best of his ability to enforce the Treaty of 1842. 
It was during his conscientious administration that the 
British policy toward Portuguese coastal claims became 
clearly defined. Fittingly this occurred under the 
80Raymond Bixler, rtAnglo-Portuguese Rivalry for 
Delagoa Bay, n Journal of Modern History, VI, December, 
1934, pp. 425-440. 
81Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 76. 
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aegis of the magnificent chauvinist Palmerston. The 
entire affair was triggered when a Portuguese cruiser, 
doing its duty, captured a Brazilian slaver north of 
Ambriz. 
In 1846 the Brazilian brig, Boa Uni~o ("Good 
Unionu) was captured at 7 degrees 36 minutes, close to 
shore by a cruiser. Oondemned by the Portuguese Gam-
missioners at Luanda for slaving, this vessel was declared 
to have been captured in waters of Portuguese territory. 
This decision implied, therefore, that Portugal owned 
the territory between 8 degrees and 5 degrees 12 minutes. 
British Oommissioners at Luanda, however, protested this 
decision, saying they would have delivered the same ver-
dict as to the guilt of the slaver, but that enforcement 
of Portuguese sovereignty in this territory (where esta-
blished British merchants had houses) would prejudice 
free trade there; and besides this formal occupation 
••• would interfere with the intercourse 
between British merchants and the natives, 
who at present carry on their trade without 
payment of any duties to the Portuguese 
Government. 82 
Palmerston soon learned of the incident and 
felt that if the decision went unnoticed Portugal might 
move in and occupy the area. In reviewing the matter, 
he had to admit that Portugal was finally fulfilling 
82Parliamenta~ Accounts and Papers, Africa, 
1883, "oorrespondence~ pp. 10-11. 
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her Treaty obl.igations. 83 But now this seemed immaterial, 
~or an even more important issue was at stake in his 
mind. · "In the interests o~ commerce, 11 was the phrase 
he used to convey to the Portuguese his decision that 
Britain hence~orth did not recognize as Portuguese 
territory, this area north of 8 degrees and that the 
natives of that section were considered to be indepen-
dent not Portuguese. 84 This policy was outlined in a 
note of October, 1846, but 'later on November 30, 1846, 
Palmerston wrote personally to Baron Moncorvo, Portuguese 
Minister in London, relaying the same information. (See 
Appendix II for the verbatim text of this letter). 
Palmerston's motivation is clear but his legal 
basis was less than respectabl.e. Free trade, of course, 
was his cardinal. principl.e. Merchants were protected 
and encouraged by British pol.icy on the coast tor the 
essential. weapons were "Diplomats with gunboats in 
the offing."85 Extending British infl.uence and power 
in empire, however, was often more "informal." than 
83For opinions that Portugal. was honestly 
pursuing anti-slave trade obl.igations, see Wil.bur D. 
Jones, uThe Origins and Passage of Lord Aberdeen's 
Act, '1 ( 1845). Hispanic .American Historical Review, 
XLIII, 1962, No. 4, pp. 502-520. . 
84 I See al.so P.R.O., F.o. 63 1114, Nov. 30, 1846, 
Pal.mers~on to Moncorvo. 
85Gallagher and Robins.on, "The Imperialism of 
Free Trade,n Economic History Review, 2nd Series, VI, 
No. 1, 1953, pp. 1-15. · 
111 • 
.formal, as shown recently by modern historians.86 "Free 
Traden was not merely a principle o.f liberal economics, 
it was in .fact a weapon. Few nations felt the edge o:f 
it more than the Portuguese in Angola. In the case o:f 
this territorial dispute with Britain and Portugal, free 
trade put the issue o:f slave-trade into shadow. For the 
:future, the high-blown humanitarian statements o.f men 
about the Oongo included denunciations o.f Portugal. 
They argued that Portugal was a slaver and a severe 
protectionist nation and was incapable o.f "effective 
oocupation 11 on the Oongo coasts. 
How ironic it was that Portugal wished to make 
good a pledge o:f ue:ffectual ocoupation 11 in 1846, but 
was told that .free trade .for British vested interests 
was more important than slave trade abolition. Indeed, 
1846 was a turning point in the relations between Britain 
and Portugal. As British power waxed, Portuguese power 
waned in Europe and in Africa. More important .for the 
study o.f Portuguese expansion in Angola, this bit o:f 
British bullying and double-dealing had such a decided 
effect upon the external policy o.f the administration 
at Luanda that other aggravating factors were rendered 
less important. Luanda increasingly paid more attention 
to the question of the north coast. Instead o.f dis-
couraging Portuguese expansion along the coast, the 
86Gallagher and Robinson, Africa and the 
Victorians, pp. 4-6. 
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British comp1icated Portuguese po1icy and made the 
unattainable a11 the more desirable. The interior was 
1ess important part1y as a result o~ the policy o~ 
Pa1merston begun in 1846 and carried on, with ~ew 
exceptions, unti1 the 1ate 1870's. British colonia1 
thinkers ~ergot that the reason Portuga1 did not occupy 
Ambriz years be~ore 1855, or other areas, was part1y 
because of naval threats. 
British authorities had a realistic view, how-
ever, of the Portuguese power to expand. They knew of 
the materia1 weakness of Ango1a and o~ the rationale 
behind the proposed occupation o~ Ambriz. But forgotten 
were the occupations and establishments of Mossamedes 
district from 1840 to 1850, and the pushing eastward 
o~ the frontier toward the Ouango va11ey. A Consul 
wrote in 1851: 
Thus it is that they can hard1y keep what 
they have much less make new estab1ishments; 
if, however, Ambriz is not occupied, Victor 
Hugo's 1anguage ~ tuera £!!!may be applied 
to Loanda. An expedition must come ~rom 
Lisbon, but the results wi11 we1l pay the 
expenses •••• If the war o~ Cassange repre-
sented ivory and wax, and consequently, abun-
dance and wealth, in the market, the occupation 
of Ambriz means increases of public revenue. 87 
The reasons could not have been better expressed by the 
Governor-General himse1f. Ambriz became a question o~ 
nationa1 honor to the Portuguese. Just as the Brazilians 
B7P.R.O., F.O., 63/1112, Brand to F.O. 1851, 
(See Chapter IV for the "Oassange Warn), enclosed in 
No. 15, Pakenham to Pa1merston, 18 Oat. 1851. 
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made a question of honor British slave trade legislation,88 
so the Portuguese took up the battle against the prosperous 
free traders. Ambriz might well have become a casus belli 
between Britain and Portugal, in spite of the traditions 
of the noldest Alliance.u89 
Palmerston's government was committed to a policy 
of non-recognition of Portuguese claims to the coast 
including the mouth of the Oongo. In effect, the vague 
u 
clause of the Treaty of 1817, which recognizedAthe 
Portuguese had a cl;aim to the coast, was unilaterally 
nullified by the British note of 1846. Thus 1846 was 
a vital year for Angola and for the shape of the future 
territory. In this year began the situation and the 
clear issue which eventually lead to the Berlin West 
African Oonference. 90 Portugal had a fair legal case 
throughout this entire dispute with Britain, but the 
decisive factor was not legality of argument, but power 
and prosperity. PortUgal possessed none of the prere-
quisites for international influence, and hence was 
rather helpless. 
88Rodrigues, Africa e Brasil, pp. 144-178. 
89Eduardo Braz~o, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 
(London, 1957). 
90Acconnts and Papers, Africa, 1883, Vol. XLVIII, 
uoorrespondence, 11 Andrade Oorvo to Lord Derby, 1875-76, 
pp. 66-71. Oorvo noted the year 1846 as a crucial turning 
point in the claims dispute. 
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Yet that helplessness was relative to the situ-
ation. For on the coasts of Angola, the Portuguese had 
considerable influence. In the long run, the British 
underestimated Portuguese staying power and activity. 
The pace of Portuguese activity in Angola definitely 
took a more active turn after 1845 in exploration, paci-
fication, trade,and oocupation.91 On the other hand, the 
Portuguese for their part tended to overestimate British 
pretensions to ownership of territory in Africa. Out 
of a reaction of fear, the Portuguese favored the nfor-
bidden coast,» kept out of their reach by Palmerston, 
and paid less attention to other possible areas of 
expansion. 
91rn 1845 the Government began printing a weekly 
official gazette containing news, official announcements, 
and some private articles. This was the Boletim Official 
do Governo Geral de Angola, which is to this day printed 
in Luanda. Mozambique was behind Angola, and began her 
gazette in 1854. ~e A. X. da Silva Pereira, 0 Jornalismo 
Portuguez (Lisbon, 1896).. The appearance of these gazettes 
marks a general upswing of European activity. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, 1846-1863 
A. One More Challenge 
The Portuguese in Angola had received a challenge 
from Palmerston's decision to oppose occupation by refus-
ing to recognize Portugal's rights to the territory between 
5°12' and 8° south latitude. The stakes were essentially 
the same as they were in the 18th century: control of 
the trade along the coast to the north and south of the 
Congo. Palmerston felt confident in view of reports on 
t 
the situation in Portugal and in Angola that fortugal 
had neither the power nor the justification to expand. 
Events in Portugal cast a shadow upon Portuguese 
effort in Africa at the end of 1846. Spain was threaten-
ing, and a revolution in Oporto had been mercilessly 
crushed by the Queen Maria II. British observers in 
Lisbon considered the country had reached a low point. 
The country found itself without com-
merce, without arts, without agriculture, 
without authority, without property, with-
out peace, without order, without means, 
without credit, shedding its own blood, 
losing lives, piling upon itself a number 
of misfortunes, and without the facility 
to get out of the dilemma whose duration 
even more increased those calamities. 1 
1 " I Marques do Lavradio, Memorias do Conde do 
Lavradio D. Francisco de Almeida Portu al (Lisbon, 
1937 , Vol. III, p. 23 • 
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Early in 1847, the Portuguese monarcnr fell once 
more into the bad graces of English humanitarians in 
connection with Angola. Prisoners, captured at the 
battle of Torres Vedras of 1846, were deported to 
Angola without charges or a jury trial. The British 
charge in Lisbon, Mr. Southern, appealed in vain for 
the amnesty of same 40 political prisoners, including 
Former Overseas Minister, the Oount of Bomfim. 2 
To a contemporary, it must have seemed unlikely 
that Portuguese forces would be able to extend their 
rule deeper into Angola. British observers on the spot 
were skeptical of plans for expansion.3 Among the 
Portuguese themselves, Governor-General Silveira Pinto 
in 1850 wrote that certain tribes in the interior were 
superior to the Portuguese troops in marksmanship. 
Expansion to the south seemed to be languishing. In 
a visit to the newly-created nvila'' of Mossamedes in 
Jul.y 1849, Pinto found the garrison in "complete abandon, 
and without form or discipline."4 Portuguese prestige 
everywhere seemed low. 
There was a slight surge in the slave trade from 
Angola during 1849 to 1850. Slaves were exported from 
several ports to the south. of Luanda, such as Novo 
2 Ibid., III, pp. 235-37. 
-
3P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, letter Oonsul Brand to 
F.O., 1851. 
4A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 16, No. 580, Relatdrio, 
1850, Gov. Gen. 
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Redondo, Quiyombo, Lobito, Bahia Farta, and some even 
south of Mossamedes. In January 1850 a Brazilian slaver 
was captured at Quiyombo, where there was a Portuguese 
resident official. British officers again warned the 
Governor-General to keep his word and enforce the Treaty 
of 1842. A last peak of Brazilian demand helped this 
surge, but by 1852 the Brazilian traffic was virtually 
finished.s 
British cruisers did not always stick to the 
rules themselves. At this period it was quite common 
for the Portuguese merchants to transport domestic 
slaves by sea from Luanda to Benguela or Mossamedes, 
since overland travel through Quissama country was out 
of the question. 6 Overzealous British officers often 
captured and summarily confiscated these legally owned 
domestic slaves not meant for trans-Atlantic export. 
The Portuguese protested often to little avail. Legi-
timate plantation activity in southern Angola was thus 
hampered by British activ1ty.7 
Some of the slaves freed during this surge of 
traffic were slightly unlikely candidates for export 
5Rodrigues, Africa e Brasil, pp. 162-64. 
6George Tams, Visita As Possessoes Portuguezas ••• (Porto, 1850), II, pp. 53-54. · · -
7Accounts and Papers, 1851, ~ol. LVI, Slave 
Trade, Part I, II, "Reports from Naval Officers, 11 
pp. 100-224; No. 140, December 9, 1850, Gov. Gen. 
Silveira Pinto to Commodore Fanshawe. 
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slaves. One report ~rom an o~f1oer noted the Luanda 
origin o~ the captured slaves. 
We ~ound many o~ the slaves on board her 
speaking the Portuguese language, who stated 8 that they had been household slaves at Luanda. 
Only a sporadic trade with Ouba continued a~ter 
1852. In 1853 the Governor-General reported that 
negreiros (slave-traders) had agencies in both Europe 
and in America. In that year some Lisbon merchants sent 
the brig ~ to ports south of Benguela in order to 
ship slaves to Havana. 
British cruisers, with some Portuguese aid, 
could not patrol the coast o~ Angola and effectively end 
the trade, and in the end, it was the termination of 
Brazilian demand that brought the humanitarian dream. 
David Livingstone in his visit to Luanda in 1854 remarked 
that the British cruisers had done the job,~9but in ~act, 
i~ the Brazilians had not legally ended the importation 
in 1850, after much pressure and British captures within 
Brazilian territorial waters, a steady trade woUld have 
continued. Portuguese leaders tended to agree that the 
demand had to be squelched. Si da Bandeira in his 
Factos e Oonsidera9oes (1855) and the Governor-General 
of Angola believed the British cruisers were, in fact, 
helpless against the thrust of Brazilian enterprise. As 
8 See Note 3, Ibid. 
-
9navid Livingstone, Miss1onar~ Travels and 
Researches in South Africa (London, 1 58), pp. 429-430. 
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Governor Silveira Pinto wrote to Lisbon in January 1850: 
The complete extinction o£ the traffic 
will take place, in my opinion, when Brazil 
does not allow its importation. 10 
I By 1855, when Sa da Bandeira wrote his short 
tract, the export trade went mainly to Ouba and Porto 
Rico. This statesman felt Britain should have spent more 
on umaldng sure Spain completely exti~guishes those same 
marketsu than on coastal squadrons.1 1 Nevertheless, 
the trade from the coast of Angola continued sporadically 
into the 186o's and perhaps later. Monteiro claimed that 
the last shipments of slaves took place in 1861-63 south 
o£ Benguela at Bahia Farta tor Ouba or nthe Brazils. 11 
At this time there was such a great demand for domestic 
slaves for the cotton plantations at Benguela and Mossa-
medes that only a small portion of the slaves were shipped. 
The nlast shipments, tt Monteiro :f'el t, r~ached Ouba in 
vain since the Spanish authorities were then in :f'ull 
cooperation with the Britisb.. 12 
Evidence in archives of Lisbon indicates a certain 
amount of o:f':f'icial complicity with the slave trade. 
Although the Governor Generals were rarely involved, 
certain lesser o:f'fioials' activities nearly caused 
scandal in the 186o's. Examination of' the papers ot 
10A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 16, No. 580, 1850. 
11 S~ Da Bandeira, Faetos e Oonsideraro'es, p. 36. 
12Monteiro, Angola, (London, 1875 edition), II, 
pp. 181-84. 
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a deceased Portuguese merchant at Ambriz revealed in 
1863 that Major Joaquim Olavo Gamboa, ~ormer Governor 
of Ambriz had taken part in slave-trading. Apparently 
the matter was quietly shelved before it reached final: 
consideration by the Overseas Council: of Lisbon. 13 In 
some oases, however, it seems the accusation of slave-
trading against an official in Angola at mid-19th 
century was a sign not of his guilt but that he had 
bitter enemies. The Viscount Pinheiro, Governor-General: 
of Angola in 1854, submitted a report dated August 10, 
1854, to the Overseas Council: and denied categorically 
the slander found in several journals in Lisbon. 14 This 
Governor-General: had been exonerated of such accusations 
by a petition of Luanda citizens, with some 3868 signa-
tures. Pinheiro's plight, and his very short term of 
office in 1854, were typical o~ the dilemma of the 
average Governor-General of Angola: no matter what the 
situation, his reputation and his length of service were 
often given short shrift. Personal feuds dominated 
administrative cares as much as the l:aok of means to 
execute well~intentioned plans. 
After a decrease in the trade about 1854, there 
was a definite increase in 1857. British officers on 
the coast noted the increase, reasserted their refusal: 
13A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarino, Pasta for 1863. 
14A.:a:.u., Conselho Ultramarino, 1854, Rel:atorio, 
Visoonde do Pinheiro, No. 704. Pinheiro was Governor · 
until June 19, 1854. 
121 
to allow Portuguese occupation of north of the River 
Loge., and lamented the deteriorated relations between 
Britain and Portuga1. 15 Slave-trading continued along 
the lower Congo, where Portuguese factories were in-
volved. Vessels with American flags cruised the coast, 
and the Governor of Angola in a letter of 1857 to Lisbon 
noted: none could say that the flag of that nation is 
the only one protecting such a vile traf£ic.n16 Yet 
more startling than American slave-trading in 1857 was 
that of the French from Gabon colony. Along the Congo 
ooast French slavers, some of them steamers, collected 
negroes near the mouth of the Congo with the consent of 
the French authorities in Africa. Portuguese correspon-
dence about this spate of French activity in 1857 clearly 
condemned the practice but with mixed motives. 17 
Governor Amaral in Luanda wrote that the French 
called this slaving, the collection of "contract labor" 
for French colonies, and said the Negroes were to be 
liberated after a ncertain number of yearsn of, as he 
termed it, 11forced labor.n Besides abusing the Portuguese 
attempts to end the trade in Angola, the French were also 
15 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 23, 1857, No. 12, of 
No. 468. Letter Rear Admiral Grey to Gov. Gen. Amaral, 
14 September 1857. 
16 Pasta 23, Letter No. 480, A.H.U., Angola4 Gov. Amaral to Lisbon, 1 October 1857. 
17A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 23, Letter No. 486, 
Gov. Amaral to Lisbon, 17 October 1857. 
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defying Portuguese claims of sovereignty to the disputed 
section of coast. However, the French had not formally 
come out against these claims as had the British. Upon 
every instance of French slaving near the Congo in 1857 
and at other times, the Portuguese reintroduced the 
question of sovereignty and rule north of Ambriz. After 
occupying Ambriz in 1855, the Governor-General of Angola 
b.ad orders to use every measure short of upermanent 
occupation., to gain control. of the coast to the north.18 
B. The overseas Council and Administration 
The Government-General o~ Angola replaced the 
old Captaincy-General in 1836 and was put under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry for the Navy and Overseas. 
Among other changes made in the Portuguese Regenera9to 
(Regeneration) Movement beginning in 1851 was the 
re-establishment under S~ da Bandeira of the Oonselho 
Ultramarine which began in 1640 and was discontinued l~i 
in 1834. Receiving an annual stipend !rom the Monarchy, 
this Council consisted of a President, six members 
(Vogaes), and a secretary. It met regularly in Lisbon. 
Members were chosen from a cadre of high officials with 
previous service overseas, such as former governors-general. 
18A.R.u., Angola, Pasta 23, 1857, No. 468, 
3 October 1857, Gov. Gen. Amaral to Overseas Einister; 
see also letters of October 1857, Nos. 480, 486, 498. 
The letters of Admiral Protet, French naval commander, 
admitted the purpose of the French vessels near Congo 
to the Governor of Angola. See letter, Protet to Amaral, 
29 September 1857 in Pasta 23. 
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The Council•s function was to study the needs and admin-
istration of the colonies and suggest reforms. A monthly 
journal, containing official and non-official material, 
was published as the Boletim e Annaes do Conselho 
Ultramarino. 19 
This decision-making body worked closely with 
the Mtnistry for Navy and Overseas, and, especially 
during the most ao.tive phase of expansion in .Angola, 
1851-1861, the members 1 opinions were instrumental in 
making such decisions as the occupation and annexation 
of Ambriz in 1855. By 1868, however, when the title of 
that body was changed to the Junta Consultiva, its power 
had decreased and more executive decisions were made 
within the Ministry itself. 20 
The Governor-General usually was chosen from 
the armed forces. .Angola was, in fact, two overseas 
provinces of .Angola and Benguela in one during much of 
the era before 1869 when .Angola was officially made a 
uunited provinceu in a decree of administrative central ... 
ization. Although there were alterations at different 
periods in territorial divisions, for our purposes it is 
useful to consider that Angola from 1855 to 1885 was 
19voge1, Le Portugal, pp. 537-548. 
20rnformation obtained from the staff of the 
.Arquivo Historico Ultramarine, Lisbon, and by personal 
research. By 1864 it seems the Conselho Ultramarine 
was very weak in power, and a newspaper editorial 
assailed it for impotence, adding that the King and 
Ministers were not consulting it. Jornal do Commercio, 
1 February 1865. 
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composed of five main districts: Ambriz, Luanda, Golnngo 
Alto, Benguela, and Mossamedes. In 1885 the Oongo 
district was created. Within each district were various 
presidios, con~elhos, (councils), vilas (towns), etc. 
Each district was headed by a governor, and a secretary, 
advised by a Oouncil, all subordinate to the Governor-
General residing at Luanda. 
Administration before 1836 was largely in the 
hands of one military official, the Oaptain-General. An 
Auditor-General (ouvidor Geral) was appointed by Lisbon 
to check that o.f.ficial•s powers, but only rivalry and 
dispute resulted. Revolts against the Oaptain-General, 
especially during the 18th century, were often the 
result o.f tyrannies and rivalries. 
In 1836 the liberal regime in Portugal established 
a Cabinet or Oonselho do Governo to check the powers o.f 
the Governor-General. This cabinet was made up of all 
the high officials in Angola, usually with two elected 
members from the settlers. Two other important ruling 
bodies were the Junta da Justi9a (Board of Justice) and 
the Junta da Fazenda (Treasury or Exchequel.'0'. Unfortun-
ately the powers o.f each group were poorly defined in 
law. Further disagreement and dispute resulted. 21 
Above all, the administration was military in 
character. All o.ffieials were either army or navy 
21 vogel, Le Portugal, pp. 549•551. 
\ 
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officers. Districts were organized along military 
lines and the Governor-General was commander of all 
armed forces. Under him was the Commander of the Naval 
Station at Luanda. The Governor-General was bothered 
with far too many insignificant details and duties 
which otherwise should have been done by Secretaries. 
His immediate subordinate was the Secretary-General.22 
After 1836 the Governor had no power in judicial matters 
as before. And one result was a great rivalry between 
the different judges with the Governor taking one side 
or the other. 23 
Piles of dusty petitions, letters, and volumin-
ous reports in Lisbon archives attest to the energy, 
time, and thought consumed in the fire of personal 
invective and dispute within the Luanda administration. 
Disunity seemed to be rife among officials on all levels, 
and certainly the climate, poor pay, and generally 
adverse conditions added to the already highly sensi-
tive natures of the administrators. At times it seemed 
all the Portuguese were their own worst enemies. The 
administration lacked not only honesty but also cohesion 
and self-respect. Petty argument and intrigue too often 
22 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, Nos. 15, 198, 1867-68, 
Gov. Gen. Governors-General were obliged to attend to 
masses of petitions for pardons or reprieve from degredados. 
Pasta 38, No. 270, 27 July 1870, Gov. Gen. 
23valdez, Six Years, II, p. 117. 
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obscured good ideas for reform and improvement.24 
O. The Occupation of Ambriz and Its Consequences 
Ambriz had been the apple of theewe of Portuguese 
expansion plans for over two decades in the century 
before it was taken in May 1855. The small port was 
an important strategic point close to Luanda, the 
capital and heart of the province, and was also the 
entrepot of a very flourishing trade, as yet untouched 
by the Portuguese customs system. Merchants of Luanda, 
officials, and colonial thinkers in Portugal were 
united in their assertion that Ambriz had to be captured 
to end the mockery of Portuguese control that was 
practiced by the foreign merchants, especially British 
and American, only a few miles from Luanda.25 
The note of Palmerston complicated the conflicts 
of the coast in late 1846. For the first time, the 
:British stated that the suppression of the slave trade 
was not the only cardinal point of their policy; the 
other, and equally vital point, was the maintenance of 
free trade with· the coastal peoples of Africa. Sporad-
ically, British authorities moved near Ambriz to end the 
trade. For example, in 1848 and 1849, Ambriz was raided 
24 6 A.H.u., Angola, Pasta 32, No. 2 7, 1874, 
letter of Presidente da Rela9ao (Oourt) complaining of 
another judge; Pasta 37, see bundles for 1868, Pasta 45, 
No. 252, Pasta 32, No. 190. 
25F.R.o., F.O. 63/1112, copy of letter, 18 June 
1853, Lisbon Oonsul Pakenham to Lord Olarendon. F.O. 
355/97, Jackson Papers, No. 15, 13 December 1853, Com-
missioner to Olarendon. 
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and several slave baracoons were razed. 26 But the fact 
remained, British merchants there remained, with the 
trade in slaves and copper ore continuing around them 
if not in their own hands. 27 
By 1846 Ambriz was known as a key place of trade. 
Great cargoes of ivory, wax, and gum, and even copper 
ore crudely mined by natives, came down to Ambriz from 
the interior. Most of the caravans by-passed Portuguese 
stations to the northeast of Luandae The plans of the 
Governor-General of Angola in 1825 to take Ambriz were 
based partly on the need to tap the trade from the 
interior to the coast north of Luanda. Native traders, 
learning of the prices offered by Brazilians, Americans, 
British, and Dutch avoided Luanda and sold their goods 
in Ambriz without paying any duties. Copper ore was 
mined by natives in the hills of Bembe some one hundred 
miles east of Ambriz, and was carried by porters to the 
coast. Goods sold or exchanged in Ambriz, as hardware, 
arms, and luxuries were distributed sub rosa to Portu-
--
guese settlements, including Luanda. Portuguese 
authorities watched this contraband trade with experienced 
26 Sa da Bandeira, Factos e Considera9oes, p. 27. 
27Ibid., p. 35; A.R.U., Angola, Pastas for 
1846-55; Roger T. Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the 
Nineteenth Century (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) ,-
pp. 21-23. In the 184o's a number of Liverpool firms 
moved into Ambriz, attracted by the trade and possibility 
of exploitation of copper deposits at Bembe, northeast 
of Ambriz. Gradually a British scheme to work the mines 
was developed. 
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eyes and realized Ambriz was the distributing point to 
be eliminated in the program for the renovation of 
Angola's economy. 
There were Oortes debates on the issue during 
1852-53, and the debate over Ambriz reached a fever-
pitch in the 1850's. 28 British arguments were stated 
in private diplomatic correspondence with the Portuguese 
but the Portuguese wrote articles in the newspapers of 
Lisbon, in the Boletim Official do Governo Geral de 
Angola,in diplomatic correspondence and in pamphlets 
translated into several languages from Portuguese. In 
the year of the occupation of Ambriz, 1855, two important 
pamphlets on the subject appeared in Lisbon. The Marquis 
of si da Bandeira wrote his Factos e _Oonsidera~oes and 
the Viscount of Santarem, an historical researcher 
living in Paris, had his Demonstra9to dos Direitos Que 
Tem a Ooroa de Portugal published in Lisbon the same 
year (see bibliography for full titles) by the National 
Press. 
In the formal statements by the Portuguese, 
Ambriz was claimed for two main reasons: one, that it 
was a center of slave trade and had to be cleaned out, 
and two, that it was not a secure place for trade nor 
a place of "free and unrestricted intercourse,,. quoting 
28P.R.O., F.o. 63/1112, Slave Trade No. 15, 
Pakenham to Palmerston, 18 October 1851. Enclosure of 
a Portuguese journal, Revolus;ao. 
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the exact wording of the Palmerston ~ote of November 30, 
1846. Sa da Bandeira effectively argued that the "inde-
pendent Africans at Ambriz forced European traders to pay 
heavy tribute or taxes, that anarchy prevailed there, and 
that there was little personal or property security for 
29 Portuguese or British alike. 
According to Sa da Bandeira and others, in 1855 
there were eleven factories at Ambriz. Of these eleven, 
some six were Portuguese, two English, two American, and 
one French. He claimed that the Portuguese owned the most 
important factory, with the Americans in second place. The 
American Commercial Agent at Luanda, John G. Willis, wrote 
that the Portuguese were correct in blaming disorder at Ambriz 
upon the African uking 11 in 1855; Willis feared for American 
lives and property upon the Portuguese occupation, but his 
official instructions kept him to a strictly neutral policy 
30 
and he made no protest to the Angolan authorities. 
The British authorities, however, beginning about 
1843 opposed the Portuguese plan to occupy Ambriz. Corres-
pondence from that date to 1855 stressed the desire to keep 
free trade, which, in effect, meant British paramountcy over 
inferior Portuguese trading goods. British diplomacy was 
steadfast. in upholding their traders' supremacy north of 
29 Sa da Bandeira, Factos e Consideracoes, pp. 46-47. 
30 P.R.o., F.O. 63/1112, No.4, Confidential, 28 Decem-
ber, 1855, Howard to Clarendon; National Archives, Despatches 
from United States Consuls at St. Paul de Loanda, 1854-1893· 
(Hereafter, N.A., Despatches) T-430, Roll 1, Valencia,Vol.I, 
Willis to Sec. of State, 16 May, 1855, 2 July, 1855, 25 Oct. 
1855, 3 Nov. 1856. 
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Luanda and claimed tnat tne tribes living between 5012 1 
and 8° south latitude were nin reality independent 11 and 
not Portuguese at all. Also, they claimed that the 
Portuguese ancient rights of discovery and conquest in 
intervening centuries had lapsed.31 
Besides using words, British leaders used naval 
power to back up their policy. The activities of 
Captain Wilmot in 1853 and 1854 sufficiently frightened 
the Portuguese into seeing the British policy's strength, 
but, on the other hand, as was true in the entire history 
of the Portuguese expansion in Angola, this foreign 
threat actually encouraged rather than discouraged 
expansion of control. Captain Wilmot, in effect, pro-
vided the necessary last push to motivate Portuguese 
occupation of Ambriz and other places in Angola. 
In 1853 Wilmot as commander of the H.M.S. 
Harlequin, cruised the coasts of Oabinda and Ambriz 
signing anti-slave trade treaties with the native powers. 
In February 1854 Wilmot succeeded in getting tb.e "x" 
signatures of chiefs at the port of Porto Rico, Oabinda. 
S' da Ba.ndeira and otb.ers claimed Portuguese rights had 
been infringed upon by Wilmot and others like him, but 
that these Oabinda chiefs later sent a statement of 
Portuguese loyalty to Luanda in 1854.32 The clever 
31 6 I P.R.o., F.O. 3 1112, Foreign Office to Count 
Lavradio, Portuguese Ambassador,26 November 1853. 
32 / ~ Sa da Bandeira, Factos e Considera¥oes, p. 33. 
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Marquis also used material from the Parliamentary 
papers to show that in 1854 slaving flourished in spite 
of the energetic if dangerous Wilmot.33 
Wilmot's treaties were composed in such a way 
so as to insure that the signing chief or chiefs were 
independent leaders, not owing allegiance to the 
Portuguese. These clauses in the treaties provided the 
disagreement between the two nations. Moreover, the 
Portuguese ambassador in London, the tenacious Count 
Lavradio, was continually claiming territory and pro-
testing the sending of arms and powder by British 
merchants in the trade with the western coast of Africa. 
Ambriz was an important point for the exchange of powder 
and guns to the natives, without a doubt, and all 
European national traders knew that such hardware 
fetched good ivory and copper ore. Moreover, as 
Lavradio wrote, Portuguese ttnational honoru was at 
stake. 34 
Wilmot's treaty-signing and cruising infuriated 
the Portuguese, and reminiscent of the fear caused by 
Captain Owen in the 1820's, his bold actions urged them 
to take positive action. Vessels in early 1854 were 
sent north to Cabinda and Ambriz, the council of 
33 Ibid., p. 35. 
-34Marqu~s do Lavradio, Memorias do Conde do 
Lavradio, Vol. VII, pp. 269-280; Vor. VI, pp. 136-38, 166-
168, 184-187. 
132 
Government, including the Governor-General of Angola, 
sat more frequently in Luanda, and in Lisbon by December, 
1854, the order for the occupation of Ambriz had been 
issued to the Governor. The Overseas Council sat and 
decided Ambriz would be taken by a military expedition. 
A further spur to Portuguese action was the fact that 
Britain had entered the Crimean War in March, 1854.35 
S~ da Bandeira and Santar6m argued that the 
Additional Convention of 1817 recognized their present 
claim. Moreover, Portuguese claims for Ambriz and the 
coast to 5012' south latitude were based on five main 
points. 1) Priority of discovery, 2) possession for 
centuries, 3) introduction of civilization by conver-
sion of the native peoples of that ooast, 4) conquest 
by arms of many areas, 5) chiefs' recognition that they 
and their successors were and are nFeudatories and 
Tributaries of the Portuguese Crown.u The Viscount o:f 
, 
Santarem reflected the feeling among Portuguese that 
there was a general conspiracy of foreigners against 
Portuguese power overseas,36 and he based his important 
argument on the production of the treaty of vassalage 
signed by the Marquis of Mossul, a Mussorongo chief, 
in 1792, trying to prove that this native leader owned 
35P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, No. 4, 23 March 1853, 
Consul Brand in Luanda to William Smith at Lisbon; 
Letter, Foreign Office to Pakenham, 6 April 1855, pre-
dicted the occupation of Ambriz. 
36santarem, Demonstrayao, p. 3, 24. 
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Ambriz and region, and his subjugation in 1792 signified 
Portuguese right to occupy it in 1855.37 
The major reason ~or the Portuguese occupation 
o~ Ambriz was almost entirely practical and economic. 
Although slave trade did take place there, the Portu-
guese purpose was less hum.ani tarian than economic. The 
capture of Ambriz was to bring new revenue to the 
increasingly expensive administration and expansion 
after the occupation of Mossamedes, Huila, other southern 
stations and the drive in the east which ended at Cassange 
fair in 1850. 
In 1854 Major Salles Ferreira, the conqueror o~ 
Oassange, reported on journeys he made northeast of 
Luanda. He urged the Government in December, 1854, to 
capture Ambriz in order to better control the region 
around the presidio of Encoge. Roads had to be con-
trolled, he felt, and a new fort was needed which was 
situated close to Encoge; new roads had to be built from 
Ambriz into Dembos country. Ferreira found that the 
Dembo or Soba Nam.boangongo was not the vassal of Portugal 
he appeared to be on paper, but was a chief who taxed 
his villages heavily and who used the excuse the taxes 
were for the King of Portugal. But he then paid Luanda 
37Ibid., pp. 36-40 for this nTermo de unda.mento, 
suj eioao, e-vissalagem. n 
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onl.y one slave per year.38 Salles Ferreira urged 
expansion to the north, and revealed that Namboangongo's 
town "has many roads to .Ambriz where goods of trade are 
carried from dealing in the ports o:f the North. r• Later 
the Portuguese applied the knowledge learned .trom this 
o:ffioer in their occupation o:f Bembe. They hoped this 
way to out off the contraband trade from the north. It 
was reported in 1861 that there was at least one military 
post in Dembos country, but it is not clear exactly 
where. 39 
In early May, 1855, Governor-General Amaral 
found a ready excuse to finally occupy Ambriz. The 
nKing of Ambriz 11 had been terrorizing European traders 
and ppralyzing trade in the town with taxes and violence; 
moreover, this paramount chief refused to become a 
Portuguese vassal and submit. On May 15, 1855, a small 
Portuguese force, at :first mainly naval personnel, led 
by the Governor-General himself, landed at Ambriz. 
Fighting broke out after a larger Portuguese force 
arrived on vessels :from Luanda, but Ambriz quickly fell 
to the Governor. The 11King of Ambriztt fled to the bush, 
and by June 1855 the Portuguese were in control of 
-~ 38Tb.is same region during March, 1961, was the 
first scene of African rebellion against Portuguese 
rule in Angola. See Helio Felgas, Guerra em Angola 
(Lisbon, 1961), pp. 25-34. 
/~ 39A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 20, 1854, No. 20, r~-, · .. ·· ario da Viagem para S. Joze d 'Encoge Dezembro 1.854, n 
/ _ · __ Major Francisco de Salles Ferreira; Valdez, ~ 
- ·~~·, ·. ars, II, pp. 301 ... 302. · 
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outlying villages. At this small port, supposedly 
protected by British cruisers, slave baracoons were 
found to contain over 150 slaves ready for embarkat1on.40 
Perhaps the Portuguese expected stiff British 
resistance to this ~ facto occupation after decades 
of disagreement over the place. Immediately upon 
annexation the Portuguese declared that customs duties 
would be waived for at least one year in Ambriz. Accord-
ing to one report, British merchants at Ambriz were 
involved in the slave trade by having 
••• received hard cash in Spanish gold, at 
a profit of 2-300% for the goods of pious 
Manchester and Liverpool, with which almost 
every one of the thousands of slaves shipped 
were bought. 41 -
This revelation weakened the British case a good deal. 
British authorities concluded that not only necessity 
moved the Portuguese tb take Ambriz. Portuguese pamph-
lets and articles justified the occupation and tried to 
allay British fears of oppressive customs duties. There 
was ugreat concern 11 but little actual intention to use 
naval force and strike back. Britain warned Portugal 
that Ambriz could not remain Portuguese as of August, 
1855. Sir Richard Pakenham in Lisbon learned from the 
Foreign Office that a vessel of war would be sent to 
; 
-
40castelbranco, Hist6ria de Angola, p. 244; 
Valdez, Six Years, II, p. 93. ·· 
41 ~ Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo (1875), 
--~~' pp. 1 84-8 5. 
~ 
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Ambriz to protect British interests.42 
British o~ficers on the coast in 1851 scoffed 
at the possibility o~ Portuguese expansion. Yet Ambriz 
was occupied, and Britain did nothing directly to hinder 
further Portuguese expansion in the interior. In 1856 
Lord Clarendon reiterated Palmerston's policy and declared 
that any occupation north of Ambriz would be opposed by 
British naval forcea.43 This policy stymied tb.e Portu-
guese ~or decades until a new set of circumstances 
changed tb.e situation and brought Britain and Portugal 
closer together. 
In 1857 an alfandega, or customs house, was 
erected at Ambriz. With this act, the fears of the 
foreign merchants were confirmed. But the Portuguese 
were true to their word and diddnot apply duties during 
the 11~ree year" from May 26, 1855, until May 26, 1856. 
On June 4, 1857, the Marquis of S' da Bandeira decided 
that the English merchandise entering Ambriz would pay 
6% ~valorem duty.44 
42 I P.R.O., F.O. 63 1112, F.O. to Pakenham, 
29 August 1855; Ward to Clarendon, "Slave Trade, No. 12, 11 
8 August 1855; Clarendon to Pakenham, 17 August, 1855. 
43P.R.O., F.O. 63/1112, Clarendon to Moncorvo, 
12 October 1856. 
44Museu de Angola, Ambrizt Exposi9ao Documental. 
Oatalogo (Luanda, 1955), pp. 1-12. ·· · 
/ 
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The occupation of Ambriz was but the first step 
in a plan to expand northwards that lasted about six years 
to 1860. In the first month of his administration, Gover-
nor Amaral proposed occupying the Congo and Cabinda regions 
as part of a new program for ttstrong Government" in Luanda 
45 
and Angola. Amaral later claimed that the Mussorongos or 
npirates 11 were constantly raiding shipping in the Congo 
river. That proposal to take the Congo mouth was really 
a long frustrated desire of the Portuguese, and was based 
upon legitimate reasons. Governor Amaral reflected the 
ideas of Sa da Bandeira when he wrote to Lisbon in 1857: 
An occupation of the Zaire(Congo] is called for 
because of the security of trade. Is not this 
alone sufficient to justify it, independent of 
the question of sovereignty? That area also is 
the focus of slaving businesses which still 
flourish. This is another reason for such an 
occupation. 46 
Ambriz was a beach-head for future military 
operations in the Congo region. Within four years of 
its taking, Ambriz was the supply depot for Portuguese 
expeditions to new stations at Quiballa, Bembe, and 
the capital of the Old Congo Kingdom, Sao Salvador. 
Roads were built from the coast into the interior, and 
copper mines near Bembe received steam engines for 
exploitation. The ore that was mined was exported 
4 . 5 A .H .u., Angola, 
Gov .Gen. to Lisbon. 
46 A .H .u., Angola, 
1857, Gov.Gen. to Lisbon. 
Pasta 20, 2~ October, 1854, 
Pasta 23, No. 133, 4 February, 
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through the port of Ambriz. Ambriz became a logical 
development of a policy begun in 1845 to reassert new 
authority over the Oongo.47 
A fortress was constructed at Ambriz for pro-
tection against African hostility. Although the 
Governor said it was the foreigners who stirred the 
Africans to revolt, it is clear that Portuguese expan-
sion in itself created trouble. Thus after March, 1857, 
a ngrave insurrectionn broke out east of Ambriz, and 
north of the river Logl. The Governor advocated 
building more ~arts to the north not only tor security's 
sake but for "vigilance against the clandestine intro-
duction of merchandise."48 
New revenue was the goal of the expansion. Yet 
military lines were over-extended, and positions were 
exposed to new dangers. Portuguese policy had been to 
"let sleeping dogs lien except when it was absolutely 
necessary to take action in the field. With so few 
reliable troops, with new fortresses to be maintained 
in the north and south, a military campaign would be 
disastrous for the system of security for Europeans. 
Native powers were supposed to tear Portuguese power, 
but if the Portuguese sustained a defeat, it was likely 
471845 marked the visit of Prince Nicolas of 
Oongo to Lisbon. 
48 A .. H.U., Angola, Pasta 23, No. 13, November 19, 
1857' Gov. Gen. 
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to be a disastrous ·blow to the military security. As 
Livingstone wrote, about his observations in eastern 
Angola in 1855: 
The negro character in these parts, and 
in Angola, is essentially cowardly, except 
when influenced by success. A partial 
triumph aver any body of men would induce 
the whole country to rise in arms, and this 
is the chief danger to be feared. 49 
Enterprises undertaken north of Luanda beginning 
in 1855 committed Portuguese power to new risks. Within 
five years, Angola was involved in the most serious war 
of mid-19th century. Leaders who wanted the trade of 
the northern coast and the Congo tended to forget that 
expansion of Portuguese control in eastern and southern 
Angola had also created serious new burdens for the 
public revenue. 
D. The Drive for Control and Revenue, 185J-1861 
In the eastern region of Angola, Portuguese 
traders and their agents had for centuries traveled to 
the Cuango River and sometimes east of it, in the quest 
for slaves and ivory. Beginning in the 17th century, 
the fair of Cassange by mid-19th century was the eastern 
terminus of the most important regular trade route in 
northern and central Angola. The major routes north of 
the Ouan.za were from Luanda to Gol.ungo Alto, Golungo .Uto 
to Mal.ange, and from Malanga to Oassange. Less important 
49David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and 
Researches in South Africa (New York, 1858), P• 483. 
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routes included those :from Luanda to Ambaca, and to 
Pungo Andongo. The haul of ivory, wax, and other goods 
from Oassange to Luanda, and to Golungo Alto required 
the greatest number of porters, or carregadores. In 
the month of June 1860 alone, according to Government 
statistics, some 5,037 porters carried on the route 
from Luanda to Gol ungo Alto. 50 
By the 1840's Oassange was the trading place of 
several dozen Portuguese merchants. Later in 1859, 
after Oassange was formally ttpacified 11 and made part of 
uthe Province o:f .Angola," experts on .Angola believed 
that until the traders o:f Oassange could be guaranteed 
better transportation, and security for their trade 
goods coming to Luanda, the entire balance of finances 
in Angola would be upset. A road :from Luanda to Oassange 
could be financed by Portugal through the institution of 
a toll-road tax.51 The importance of Oassange and its 
contribution to the economy of Angola can be studied in 
the attention given the problem by Dr. David Livingstone 
in his series of articles written in 1854 while recover-
ing from his journeys in Luanda. 52 Livingstone, in the 
third part of these nApontamentosu for the Boletim Of:fioial 
5°Boletim Official ••• (Angola), 1860, Sept. 1. 
51Jornal do Oommereio, 26 August 1859, p. 1, 
tt.Angola. 11 
52nouglas L. Wheeler, "Livingstone and .Angola: 
Some New Letters, 1854-1856,n Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 
No. XXXII, December, 1962, pp, 23-45. 
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made several key suggestions for improvement of Angola's 
economy: 1) the use of animal transport instead of 
negro porters, 2) concentration of Angolan enterprise 
in agriculture and mining, 3) the building of a carriage 
road, and in the future. a railroad from Luanda to 
Oassange. Livingstone had passed through Lunda on his 
way through Oassange to Luanda, and he realized the 
size of the trade dominated by the Mbangala peoples 
acting as middle-men between the Lunda and the Portu-
guese settlements. 
If this road was built and extended in 
the direction of Matiamvo, it would be the 
best means of stopping the robberies of the 
neighboring tribes, who keep the commerce 
of the country to themselves. I speak of 
Matiamvo, because according to what I hear, 
he is the most powerful Ohief in that direc-
tion, and if the Government can be assured 
of his cooperation, it would be easy to put 
my proposal into effect. If it would be 
announced that the road belongs to the 
Muene puto (Portuguese), making it known 
that since the road is free for all, it 
would be considered a great crime to 
trouble any per.son travelling on it. This 
would be followed by some examples of 
punishments for crimes, and would give a 
basis for that scheme, making it permanent.53 
Livingstone himself had considerable trouble in passing 
freely between Luanda and Lunda in 1854-55, and this 
in itself indicated the insecurity of the country, and 
the tenuous position of the Portuguese at Oassange 
even after the punitive expedition of 1850. 
53 IE,g,_.' p. 36. 
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In the late 1840's, Portuguese merchants at 
Oassange met increasing hostility in their dealings. 
After several Europeans were killed by native forays 
in 1850, the Government sent a military expedition under 
Francisco de Salles Ferreira, ttconqueredn the town and 
area of Oassange fair. African leaders aided Portuguese 
forces in this expedition. The soba, Dembo Oaboco 
Oamilho, D. Francisco Andr~ Fernandes Torres, from the 
Oambambe region, aided with his forces in the conquest 
of Duque de Bragan9a in 1838, and in the expedition to 
Oassange in 1850. Named a uGeneral. o:f Guerra Pretau 
by the Ki.ng of Portugal, he also l.ent support :for the 
occupations of Ambriz and Bembe. Dembo Oaboco Oamil~o 
died in 1860 after a long life of service within the 
system o:f Portuguese vassalage.54 
The fair at Oassange originated when the Portu-
guese began to travel there for trade in ivory which 
came from Lunda to the east. The "Jagas, u or Mbangalas, 
permitted the Portuguese to establish a fair at Oassange, 
but rarely were they allowed to pass beyond the Quango 
River to reach Lunda. After two Portuguese merchants 
were murdered in 1850, and the ex-Jaga, or Soba, nBumbau 
-
rebelled against the Portuguese, a regular expedition 
moved eastward to insure this vital life-line of trade 
54Boletim Official, Angola, No. 778, 1 September 
1860, p. 5. This Dembo is said to have been born in 
1784, the son of a sargeant of Guerra Preta, in 1828, 
he was made Dembo Oaboco Oamilho on the death o:f his 
father. 
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for Angola. Apparently, the road to Lunda beyond the 
Cu.ango, even after 1850's conquest, remained dangerous 
and largely unknown. Salles Ferreira referred to the 
way to Lunda as "the hidden road.u55 
Portuguese striking power was at least nominally 
extended eastward to Cassange in 1850, but actual occu-
pation or military garrisoning were not possible for 
that isolated and unhealthy place.56 Livingstone noted 
there was a settlement of Portuguese traders, mainly 
half-caste Ambacas, east of Cassange, at Oabango on the 
Chihombo River, a dwelling place of one of Matiamvo 1 s 
subordinate chiefse This village consisted in 1855 of 
about two hundred huts and nten or twelve square houses 
••• the latter are occupied by half-caste Portuguese 
from Ambaca, agents of the Oassange traders.u57 Oabango 
was placed at 9°31 1 south latitude and longitude, 
20°31 1 east. These Ambaca traders had an arrangement, 
albeit an informal one, with Matiamvo in order to reside 
so near to Lunda. The fact of their residence in the 
country east of the Cuango denotes some improvement of 
Portuguese influence and power in eastern Angola over 
55F. Salles Ferreira, "Mem6ria Sobre o Sertao 
de Cassange," Annaes do Conselho Ultramarine, Parte Nao 
Official, February 1854- Decembe'r 1858, pp. 26-28. 
56Livingstone, Missionary Travels, 1858 edition, 
p. 473. 
57Ibid., p. 493e He noted Cabango was part of 
Lunda kingdom of Matiamvo, situated about 132 miles east 
of the capital. May, 1855. 
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the situation in the 18th centurye A century before a 
Portuguese expedition had been turned back at the Cuango 
by the Mbangala forces.58 
Livingstone noted that Cassange valley, east 
of the Talla-mugongo range, was rather unhealthy for 
Europeans. Yet the area was not so unhealthy that the 
Ambacas, or Ambakistas, did not frequent the trade routes 
across the Cuango River. The explorer found the town 
of Ambaca poor and nearly deserted in 1854, but the 
Africans of the town ranged far to the east and south 
for ivory and wax.59 
The Portuguese had long questioned the wisdom 
of giving rapacious traders permission to travel deep 
into the eastern region past their settlements. Laws 
regulating penetration into the sertio had been created 
and forgotten, but in 1855 Livingstone noted a continual 
trend in policy with regard to the east • 
••• no European resides beyond the Quango; 
indeed it is contrary to the policy of the 
government of Angola to allow their subjects 
to penetrate further into the interior. 6o 
Cassange fair was the frontier post of the territory 
of Angola. In times of war and crisis Portuguese 
merchants had no security since Cassange was never a 
58GastS:o Sousa Dias, 11 Uma Viagem a Cassange, tt 
B.S.G.L., 1938, No. 1,2, PP• 1-30. 
59Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 426, 476. 
60~.' p. 473. 
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presidio, or ~ili tary post. There was a resident chefe 
at Cassange after 1850, but apparently the dizimo tax 
taken at Talla-mugongo post was not collected at Cassange, 
since this town doesn't appear on the tax lists of 1858.61 
The Mabangala waged war on the Portuguese in the region 
from 1859 to 1863 and afterwards official Portuguese 
representation at Cassange was withdrawn until about 
1882. The policy and conflicts which shook the rest of 
Angola at mid-century, unsettled Cassange and the 
surrounding peoples. A long and costly war was the 
result. In spite of this war, trading proceeded in 
eastern Angola and there is record of at least one 
large trading expedition which in 1862 reached well east 
of Cassange to perhaps Lunda. Returning with some 850 
pombeiros, seven European Portuguese and two Brazilian 
traders brought from Lunda a lot of ivory and wax. 
Although most of Cassange country was in rebellion, the 
Chefe at Malange could report this large expeditions' 
arrival from journeys east of the Cuango after a march 
of 41 days. 62 The motto of 11business as usualtt was 
true to the commercial-military character of the European 
settlements. The penetration of this 1862 expedition 
61 A.H.u., Angola, Pasta 26, 1860, No. 153, 
"Resume dos Lanc;amentos do Dizimo dos Concelhos do 
Interior ••• " for 1858-59. 
62 A.H.u., Angola, Pasta 31, No. 903, Letter 
15 October 1862, Gov. Gen.; enclosure No. 1 is. letter 
from Chefe of Malanga dated 13 September 1862. 
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indicates Portuguese influence in Central Africa but 
cannot prove territorial ambition. 
If penetration of Portuguese influence to the 
east was primarily for purposes of gaining more trade 
for the major settlements of Angola, the plan for 
expansion to the north from Luanda, was for trade, and 
for preventing the entrance of contraband goods, and to 
exploit minerals. The capture of Ambriz was the starting 
I gun. Governor-General Jose Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral, 
a former Governor of Benguela (1851-1854) and a soldier, 
planned a line of fortresses, copper mining operations, 
more customs houses and agricultural development for 
the hinterland of Luanda. When Portuguese forces 
occupied Bembe and Congo from 1856-59, it appeared that 
Portuguese power was in the ascendant. A contemporary 
of Governor Coelho later lamented the current belief of 
the Portuguese in Luanda: 
••• the advantages resulting from the occu-
pation of Bembe and of Congo can be easily 
understood, because, linking these points to 
the jurisdiction of s. Jose de Encoge, and 
increasing in such a vast extension of terri-
tory our interior frontiers, incalculable 
agricultural and mineral riches were included 
and they unquestionably represented a very 
valuable source of revenue for the province of 
Angola. 
All this, however, was no more than a 
seductive mirage, for the semblance of the 
deceiving affair, had hardly an ephemeral 
duration. 
So now, with regret we can say that that 
unfortunate attempt cost great sums of money, 
and no small number of lives. 63 
63Alfredo de Sarmento, Os Sertoes D'Africa 
(Lisbon, 1880), pp. 156-7. 
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At mid-century, Portuguese plans ~or Angola were 
no longer exclusively defensive in nature. Encoge had 
been founded in 1759 to 11defendtt the northern fiontier, 64 
but its proximity to a well-known ivory trade route from 
the Oongo was another motive. Duque de Bragan9a was 
founded in 1838 "for the de~ense of the territory,u after 
a native raid. 65 But now in 1855, 1856 and 1859, Portu-
guese stations were established with an eye toward 
surplus revenue and the deve~opment of facilities lost 
to Portugal with the independence of Brazil. New enter-
prises in the economic exploitation of the territory 
encouraged leaders to look to a better day, instead of 
merely a defensive status quo within the traditional 
~rontiers. Portuguese and Brazilian merchants, with 
some capital and the example of activity in British and 
Dutch territories or colonies, began to support more 
agricultural and mineral enterprises. The most impor-
tant schemes, however, all had ~oundations in past 
activity in Angola. 
During the period of intense activity of 
expansion, 1855 to 1860, the most favored enterprises 
were the cUltivation of cotton and sugar, the building 
of roads, and the mining of copper. The Oivil War in 
the United States encouraged the cUltivation of cotton 
64sousa Monteiro, Jose, Diecionario Geographico 
(Lisbon, 1850), p. 247. 
65~., p. 245. 
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in Africa, and Ango+a was no exception. Steam navigation 
companies on the Ouanza River began in the 1860's, and 
were encouraged by the establishment o~ a regular steam 
line connecting Lisbon and Luanda. Livingstone had 
observed in 1854-55 that Angola had the elements o~ the 
traditional slave economy together with the nerr legitimate 
enterprises in minerals and agriculture. He noted, 11The 
Portuguese are now in a state o~ transition ~rom illicit 
to licit commerce.u 66 
As tn the entire Portuguese system o~ adminis-
tration, which s):lowed a chronic nlack o~ continuity, 11 the 
economy of Angola was forever in the throes o~ transition. 
The ideals of statesmen in Lisbon rarely were reconcilable 
with the hard ~acts o~ Portuguese impoverishment in 
African territories.67 The administration o~ Governor-
General Ooelho do Amaral (1855 to August 1860) was pledged 
to execute two key decrees; the decree o~ 1856, abolishing 
tlll.eieal!'reiro, or ~orced porter system, and the decree of 
1858, abolishing slavery over a period of twenty years 
under the liberto system. Both decrees, upheld and 
encouraged by the Marquis o~ sl da Bandeira, were designed 
~or the economy's utransition.n Tnese laws su.£~ered the 
common ~ate o~ measures imposed upon vested interest 
66rsaac Schapera, ed., Livingstone's Missionary 
Correspondence (London, 1961), p. 273, Letter, 14 January 
1855. 
67n~~y, Portuguese Africa, pp. 225-226. 
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groups who could not afford to carry them out. Even 
with sufficient compensation from the Portuguese 
Government, individual Europeans in Angola would have 
been reluctant to comply with change, for change in 
Angola had never been easy. 
Transition problems were eternal in Angola because 
the choice of alternatives was limited to changes without 
solution of one basic problem: the poverty of Portugal 
and Portuguese in Angola. Governor Amaral's correspon-
dence with Lisbon abounds with proof of the basic 
weakness of. his administration: lack of means to 
execute plans. 68 Beneath many failures lay pitiful 
salaries for public servants, and poor pay for the 
armed forces in a sickly land where Luanda was more 
expensive living than Lisbon. 69 Governor Pinheiro in 
1854 noted the types of Portuguese who came out to 
colonial service in Angola. There were two types: 
first, the few regular army men in Portugal willing to 
sign up for ~ years in a deadly climate, and who 
returned to Lisbon broken in health; secondly, there 
were the "bastard sonsn with no place in Europe or 
68A.H.U., Angola, Papeis de S~ da Bandeira, 
Maco 1, Letter, Amaral to Sa da Bandeira, 25 April 1860; 
Pasta 23, No. 30, 1858, December 12, 1857. 
69Lacerda, Jose de, Exame das Viagens do Doutor 
David Livingstone (Lisbon, 18'67), p. 239; Vogel, 
Le ~ortugal, pp. 549-550, 607. 
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opportunity in the regular army who came to Angola as 
a last resort.7° 
Abolition of slave trade helped bring changes 
in the drive for new revenue and control. Since the 
export traffic was almost finished by 1845, 1n that very 
year the Government established the carreto system. 
This was a system of semi-f'orced porterage. .Oarregadores 
in each district were registered as porters; each 
merchant who needed goods carried for trade had to pay 
the Government 1000 reis to the Government and 50 reis 
each day to each porter as pay.71 Livingstone noted 
that Golungo Alto district had over 5000 of these 
11carriers,u and that it was really a veiled system of 
slavery. f Later apologists, as Jose de Lacerda, defended 
the carreto system as a necessary expedient since if 
the porters were freemen, they would not work, and then 
commerce would stagnate. He argued trade in Angola would 
decline if parters got real wages since the profits 
would be cut and most Negroes would never seek wage-
employment.72 Lacerda came to be supported in this con-
tention by Governors of Angola in this era who repeated 
his belief that the African population had to be strictly 
7°A.H.U., Angola, Oonselho Ultramarine, 1855, 
Relatorio, 1854, Visconde do Pinheiro. 
71 Liv1ngstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 434-35. 
72Lacerda, Exame, pp. 234-237; Vogel, Le Portugal, 
pp. 553-54. 
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controlled in a porterage system since there were no 
draft animals to speak of north of the Cuanza, and since 
otherwise the people would not work. 73 
S~ da Bandeira, however, believed that the 
decrees of 1856 and 1858, abolishing carreto and beginning 
the emancipation of slaves, would establish a tradition 
of a wage economy for the Africans in Portuguese areas. 
Settlers always complained of a continual shortage of 
labor for agriculture as well as for porterage. Well-
informed leaders knew that nforced porteragert within the 
old vassalage system had been systematized in the 17th 
century, but under the guise of various names and cir-
cumstances. But in the 19th century, the Government had 
seen fit to regularize recruitment of porters for trade 
routes through the officials of presidios ana sobas. In 
1856 Lisbon decreed the end of forced service in the 
carreto, or porterage, and declared that henceforth 
all porters would be paid wages by Europeans. Since 
there was no immediate source of revenue to "compensate 11 
merchants for hitherto nfreen service, the Government 
of Angola raised the native tax, or dizimo, several times 
to provide new revenue. Later in 1858, the abolition 
of slavery decree was issued to reform agricultural labor 
practices. Taken altogether, these measures and the 
expansion program of Governor Amaral represented crisis 
and conflict for Angola. 
73see references to reports of Governors Amaral 
and Calheiros below. 
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In effect, the raising of the dizimo in 1856 
dissatisfied\ the native groups who had to pay it, and 
I 
the decrees of 1856 and 1858 infuriated the settlers 
and officials who profited from the slave and forced 
labor systems. The Government sought new revenue in 
development of copper mines, new crops, and small. manu-
facture for the long run; but in the short run, new 
revenue had to offset the decrees. Certainly Portugal 
could not produce more than a small annual subsidy for 
Angola beginning about 1854. The expense of maintaining 
the new establishments o~ Ambriz district and Mossamedes 
district required new sources of revenue in addition to 
the reform of the economy.74 
In 1857 Governor Amaral wrote a letter to Dembo 
Oabooo Oambilho of Oambambe,75 explaining the measures 
decreed in 1856 including the dizimo.76 He explained to 
the native leader, a General of Guerra Freta, that his 
Government would not tolerate idleaess in his people. 
Natives without their own land sb.ould seek porter 
service. The inaction of native peoples, he asserted, 
was "harmful for the State," and·its economyrs develop-
ment. Dembo Oaboco should dispel the impression that 
74Jornal do Commercia, 26 August 1859; 13 January 
1864. 
75see material on Dembo Oaboco (1784-1860) above 
on p. 142. 
76Boletim Official (Angola), 1857, No. 612, 
20 June 1857. 
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the decree brought an "absolute rest 11 for the people. 
The main burden of the increased tax would fall on the 
concelhos of Golungo Alto and Ambaca, which he referred 
to as t'the most developed and rich 11 in .Angola. 77 But 
Oambambe would be taxed as the rest of Angola, and only 
the very old, or young, and the sick would escape payment. 
In this letter of June 16, 1857, Amaral indicated 
the forceful urge toward expansion and development that 
characterizes his administration. He was determined to 
preserve a carreto system without forced labor. Yet 
even before the 1856 decree, it was known that fiegroes 
avoided porterage service in various ways. In Ambaca 
district in 1846 a traveler noted that the Ambaquistas, 
often half-caste literate natives, enlisted in the army 
to avoid porterage. By claiming descent from Europeans, 
natives of Ambaoa called Oamundelles, also avoided 
military service and porterage. Sons of settlers were 
exempted from service with conveniently-placed bribes 
in the pockets of Ohefes. 
In Ambaca, Oamundelles were Negroes considered 
as whites. Certain sobas were known to have many of 
them in their jurisdiction. Ambaca was the most notor~ 
ious region for this, so that a large percentage of the 
population was exempt from service, since so many claimed 
77 Livingstone 1 s opinion of .Ambaca as a town 
disagrees with Amaral's opinion. See Missionary Travels, 
(1858 edition), p. 413. 
·, 
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descent from an empaca!)'eiro, or native mercenary soldier. 
In the carreto system sobas annually gave levies of 
porters twice to the province. Levies were to be in 
proportion to the population. Many paid dizimo ~' 
or the royal tax, besides giving porters. Dembo Oaboco 
of Oambambe, mentioned above, was known in 1846 as the 
only !£k! to get enough porters because he did not allow 
these Oamundelles into his kingdom. Oambambe had only 
one 11noble family," and all the rest were considered 
Negroes. In Ambaca, however, noble families with 
Portuguese names, as the Fragosos, Mendes and Regelles 
remained to claim exemption from all carreto or military 
service. 78 
The £ar-ranging peoplesof Ambaoa were considered 
by the Portuguese and by foreigners who observed them 
as the most 11 civilizedu in .Angola. It is significant 
that Ambaca is in northern-eastern region of the hinter-
land of Luanda. This was a region settled and cultivated 
since the 17th century campaigns of conquest up the 
Ouanza River. 79 
An explosion was produced in Angola in the years 
1855 to 1861, when various decrees, expansions and 
conflicts coincided. Governor Amaral was perhaps the 
78The account of Ambaca and the carreto is from 
Manoel Castro Francina, nitinerario De uma Jornada de 
Loanda ao Districto de Ambaca, na Provincia de Angola,n 
Annaes do Oonselho Ultramarine, Serie I, Feb., 1854, pp. 3-15. 
79Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 476, 493; 
Winwood Reade, Savage Africa (London, 1864), p. 264. 
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most ambitious military mind to run the administration 
in the 19th century. His ttline of :fortressesn scheme 
was both defensive and offensive but most of his activity 
was military. The rise of Portuguese activity aroused 
native hostility and schemes o:f colonization failed 
because settlers were constantly defending themselves 
or were causing violence in imitation of the native wars. 
At Huila a military colony was a flop even with Government 
backing since tb.e colonists were continually "distracted 
by military operations, and the colony disper~ed.n80 
Portugal's plans for a peaceful transition of the economy 
of Angola broke down after 1857, and the result was a 
series of costly and exhausting wars in northern, southern 
and eastern Angola. 
E. War1are and Migration to 1863 
As stated above, the society and administration 
of Angola for centuries had been militarily oriented. 
The majority of officials on the coast or in interior 
stations were either regular army officers or naval 
officers of Portugal or were enlisted in the provincial 
army of Angola. Often the degredados sent to the African 
territories were deserters or malfactors from the army 
in Portugal. Yet the law made a distinction between 
exile in African regions, and it was considered more 
80s~ da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural Africa.D:o (Lisbon, 
1873)' p. 149. 
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serious a penalty to be sent to Mozambique than to 
Angola in the 19th century. 81 S~ da Bandeira was an 
influence to try to bring about more civilian coloniza-
tion in Africa, but he was up against an old military 
tradition in Angola.82 
With a scarcity of regular European troops in 
Angola, the administration was obliged to recruit any 
available material. Runaway tiegro slaves were drafted 
into the army in Luanda, and others in the interior 
nvolunteered" to avoid labor in porterage or agricul-
ture. Monteiro observed that few Negroes or mulattos 
achieved secondary post~ in .Angola, but that he recalled 
a certain Captain Dias who was Captain of Barra do Benge 
(see map, north of Luanda) and who succeeded as a 
pros·perous trader f 83 in the period from 1858 to 1875. 
Portuguese authority was based on military lines 
and it was subject to the ills common to militarism. 
Native leaders, from the obscure to the important, were 
given military titles and posts in the reserve of the 
army of Angola. The Guerra Preta force was considered 
part of the nsecond Lineu of the army and was estimated 
on paper to consist of 15,000 to 20,000 empaoa9eiros in 
84 time of war. By creating a native military elite 
81 rbid., pp. 151-152. 
82 !QM.., pp. 148-151. 
83Monteiro, Joaquim, .Angola and the River Congo 
{New York, 1876 edition), p. 43. 
84 Vogel, Le Portugal et Ses Colonies (Paris, 
1 860) ' p. 551 • 
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among the sobas and empacaceiros the :Portuguese provided 
protection but also the possibility that these units 
might be used against Europeans in time o£ crisis. It 
has been shown how native groups avoided service with 
the :Portuguese by becoming in .fact uassimilated." It 
is clear that desertion rates were very high among 
native recruits in the army o.f Angola, and these deserters 
£led to the bush with arms and knowledge to be used later 
against £urther European encroachments. 
1. Trouble in the East 
The war of Cassange, 1860-1863 is useful as 
a study of the Portuguese policy in a £rontier region. 
Cassange had been at least nominally pacified in 1850, 
but European power there was to remain tenuous until 
after the Berlin West African Conference. 
Authorities seem to agree that the hostilities 
that broke out between the :Portuguese and the Mbangala 
of the Cassange Valley were due to :Portuguese errors. 
:Portuguese merchants traditionally were characterized 
as "greedy,n85 but in this case, :Portuguese officials 
started the trouble by demanding the dizimo tax of the 
traditionally independent Jaga of Cassange. Winwood 
Reade characterized tb.e warfare of Cassange as nstrik-
ingly illustrative of :Portuguese m1srule .. u86 
85Grande Enoiclopedia Portuguese. e Brasileira, 
VI, pp. 148-149, 11 Cassange 11 article. · 
86
winwood Reade, Savage Africa, p. 264. Reade 
was traveling in Angola in 18 2. 
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The Jaga or King o£ Cassange before 1860-62 had 
paid no dizimo tax but an annual tribute of ten porters, 
or carregadores, to Luanda. Living some 300 miles east 
of the coast, this monarch had the advantage of distance 
and barriers to discourage actual Portuguese military 
occupation. Minor disputes were continually breaking 
out between Portuguese merchants, or feirantes of the 
trade fair, feira. But it was not until the Commander 
of Cassange, a certain Carvalho, asked for an annual 
tttenthn tax that the Jaga rebelled and took to the 
field. True to the 11 divide and rule'' tradition in their 
native policy, the Portuguese supported a ~urper leader 
and de-throned the powerful Jaga Bumba (Ambumbu a 
Quinguri) for a short period. Then the usurper died 
and Bumba returned. The Portuguese official in Cassange 
then tried to appoint a puppet minister to the Jaga, 
and the Jaga refused. A vendetta began when the Portu-
guese official was killed after ordering the death of 
a native leader.87 In the meantime the Jaga was told 
he must pay dizimo for the first time against the custom 
of his ancestors. 88 
The Portuguese took the worst of it in the 
beginning and were obliged to retreat to Malange. 
87Reade, Savage Africa, P• 265. 
88 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 32, 1863, No. 380, 
Letter 2 October 1863, enclosed is original letter from 
Jaga of Oassange to either the King of Portugal or the 
Governor-General of Angola. 
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Disaster after disaster followed for Portuguese arms 
near Cassange as late as 1862, and there were many 
changes of personnel until the native rebellion, later 
called a "civil war 11 was finally quelled. Governor 
Oalheiros e Menezes brought reinforcements from the 
coast to Malanga and Sanza, but he could do little. 
But by August 1863 the forces of the Jaga of Oassange 
were defeated and weary, and peace was made at Malange. 89 
On August 29, 1863, the Jaga, his Portuguese 
name given was Dom Pascoal Raiz Machado, signed an 
rrAct of Submission" along with his main chiefs and cap-
tains at Malange. Pardon of the King of Portugal was 
asked in the ncivil waru after the surrender to Colonel 
Teotonio Maria Coelho Borges. The conditions of the 
11 Aotn were as follows: 1) The Jaga remained subject to 
the Portuguese Crown and laws, and to re-establish 
Portuguese authorities in Cassange. 2) Restore all 
prisoners of last war and slaves of Europeans held. 
3) Recompensate the province and traders• expenses of 
war and destruction. 4) Guarantee the payment of 
Portuguese merchants by the subjects of the Jaga in 
outstanding debts. Wax and ivory were to be payments 
by the native leader to symbolize peace terms. 
89 86 A.H. U., Angola, Pasta 32, 1 · 3, same, copy 
of uAuto da Submissao 11 with signatures of chiefs. 
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The Jaga Bumba lived another decade to 1873,90 
but he wanted Portuguese friendship and trade in spite. 
of hostility. An embassy of peace was sent to Luanda 
and arrived in October 1863. A letter of complaints 
against the Portuguese arrived with it. The Jaga 
Bumba had been educated in Ambaca to read and write 
Portuguese and apparently he composed it himself'. 
The entire letter reflects the spirit of' autonomy and 
independence that the Jaga wished to exercise. He 
knew prosperity in trade before, and dizimo taxation 
would have meant an end to it.91 The Jaga explained 
carefully the history of the war, mentioning Portu-
guese merchants by name in blaming them for stealing 
from him. He wished to maintain trade with the Portu-
guese and not to emigrate from Angola as it was rumored 
he would.92 
The Portuguese abandoned Cassange in the realm 
of formal rule after 1862 and the Treaty of 1863 remained 
largely a dead letter. Malanga remained the furthest 
eastward frontier post and armed station.93 It is not 
90Boletim Official (Angola), No. 52, p. 352, 
of 9 August 1873. 
91carvalho, Henrique, Etnographia e Hist~ria 
Tradicional, p. 83. 
92 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 32, 1863, No. 380, Letter. 
93Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo (1876 
edition), p. 213. Monteiro laid the origin of' the 
nsuccessful. revolt 11 to oppression of Portuguese officials. 
clear whether the dizimo £or Oassange was official 
policy of the Government-General,for tax lists up to-
1859 omit Oassange but include Talla-mugongo. The 
well-known sensitiveness of the Mbangalas to European 
encroachment and the importance of the trade route to 
L.unda through Oassange put together perhaps made such 
a tax policy impolitic. But it is known that a regUlar 
caravan route between Ambaca and Cassange was begun in 
1857 in the hope of greater trade for Luanda. 94 More-
over, taxes in other regions of Angola rose after the 
1856 decree, and it is quite possible Oassange at times 
was listed on taxes rolls in an attempt to gain more 
badly needed revenue.95 
The war of Oassange weakened Portuguese power 
in the field, but more important it crippled that vital 
necessity of the European surrounded by hostility: 
"moral forcett or prestige. Governor-General Andrade 
writing in 1863 knew the Portuguese had been at fault 
in the wars of Oassange, and said as much to Lisbon.96 
Later in 1867, a Governor-General commenmed that Portu-
guese rule in Oassange had always been "tenuous and 
94For Oassange hostility see Livingstone, 
Missionary Travels, pp. 394-99· A.H.u., Angola, Pasta 23, 
No. 271, 2 May 1857, Gov. Gen. 
95see above page 100 and see Appendix III. 
96 A.K.U., Angola, Pasta 32, No. 380, Letter 
2 October 1863, Gov. Gen • .Andrade to Overseas Minister. 
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very limited." As in the entire interior of Angola, 
only "moral forcen could sust~in sovereignty in the face 
of weakness. The "excesses 11 of merchants and officials 
consistently destroyed this prestige. Oassange was 
too far inland to control formally at that time. But 
even so, the trade from Oassange to Golungo Alto to 
the northern coast continued to increase in volume in 
1867. 97 
A Portuguese official may have been accepted by 
the Jaga of Oassange after the treaty of 1863, or uActn, 
but it was not until early 1883 that the Portuguese 
formally raised the flag of rule at the remote fair so 
important to the economy of Angola. In 1882 Talla-Mugongo 
had been occupied by a Captain with a usecond-Line" :force. 
Portuguese merchants at Malanga had doggedly called for 
reoccupation of Oassange after 1862 but to no avail. 
After 1862, the Mbangala refused Portuguese authorities' 
regulation of the :fair o:f Oassange. Later authorities 
in Luanda put the blame on Portuguese merchants who, if 
they b.ad ttused their sense,n might not have fomented the 
wars of 1860-63.98 
In spite of the wars in eastern Angola, trade 
continued throughout the insecurity and expeditions 
97 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, No. 533, Letter 
18 October 1867, Gov. Gen. 
98A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, 1882-83, Gov. Gen. 
Relatorio, No. 331. 
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regularly reached Lunda through Oassange. The above-
mentioned expedition of 1862 which returned to Malange 
was one ex~ple. Lunda kingdom continued to offer wax 
and ivory to .Portuguese merchants or their agents. 
Although Oassange remained a thorn in their path, 
Portuguese merchants, as the Luso-African Louren9o 
Bezerra, traded at Lunda court between 1865 and 1890, 
and some amassed fortunes in ivory.99 Malanga was the 
last frontier station fully under PortBgaese control, 
and, as such, it became a great entrepot and warehouse 
for expeditions of the far-ranging Ambaguistas and 
Malanjes traders. 
The risk of robbery or death at the hands of 
the Mbangalas of the Oassange Valley, a natural obstacle 
between Lunda and .Angola, r.emained until after pacifi-
cation in the 1890's. But even this danger could not 
hold back the trading impulse of the Portuguese rarely 
discouraged by insecurity. It was that trading tendency 
which found and held the best routes of commerce. 
Oassange remained a key component of Angola 1 s economy 
even though it was not militarily occupied. In this 
respect it was like Bihe to the south (see map). 
2. Taxation Eguals Migration 
The taxation law of 1856, raising the native house 
tax from 200 reis to 1600 reis was a key factor in causing 
- -
99carvalho, Etnographia, pp. 702-710. 
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native migration from the major areas of Portuguese 
control. Monteiro made a journey from September 1859 to 
1 860 from Luanda through. Bengo to Oambambe and found 
sections of the country deserted where large populations 
had been before. He ascribed the desertions to uthe 
rapine of their Portuguese rulers."100 In this case, 
the rapine was the collecting of the higher taxes after 
1856. 
Governor-General Amaral came to realize that such 
an extreme rise of eight times would not work, so he 
proposed a so-called 11 progressive tax," in order not to 
alienate the people. The most unfortunate natives 
should have to pay 400 ~' not 1600 ~· He added; 
I have already said that I greatly fear 
the emigration of the peoples: ••• the 
increase of the tax this year 1857 is small, 
but only in the most prepared areas can they 
support it. Thus I feel that my very same 
fear will be verified. 101 
In a letter dated 30 May 1857 the Dembo Oaboco 
of Oambambe wrote the Governor-General complaining that 
his people had nothing to sell or buy and were migrating 
because they weren't able to pay the new tax. The 
Governor then sent instructions to the official heading 
the District of Golungo Alto (including Oambambe) to 
convince native leaders that the natives had to continue 
100Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, 1876 
edition, pp. 202-203. · · · 
101 8 A.R.U., Angola, Pasta 23, 1 57, No. 327, 
30 May 1857, Gov. Gen. 
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working hard, serving in the carreto (forced labor was 
legally ended by 1856 as developed above) and that the 
Portuguese would see to it they were justly paid and 
protected from violences. 102 
Amaral, however, had little control over his 
subordinates in the bush and his ideas on softening the 
effects of the increased dizimo tax after 1856 could 
not contend with the general impoverishment of Portu-
guese revenue in the province. For public revenue after 
the establishment of the new districts of Mossamedes 
and Ambriz, both of which were not paying one-sixth of 
their way throughout Amaral's or Oalheiro's terms of 
office, 103 it was a choice between increased taxes on 
the people or increased customs revenue. The debate 
as to which was appropriate continued until the early 
1870's when it was decided the direct tax should be 
abolished in favor ot increased customs taxes. 104 
Governor Amaral in October 15, 1857, wrote 
S' da Bandeira in Lisbon that the collection of d1zimos 
in Golungo Alto that year had been fair. This section 
of Angola, however, was by no means typical and was, 
102rbid., Letter Gov. Gen. Amaral to Gov. of 
Golungo Alto:--A useful discussion of currency in Angola 
twenty years after this can be found in A. E; Lux, 
Von Loanda Nach Kimbundu (Wien, 1880), p. 28. 
103Gov. Oalheiros e Menezes, Relat&rio (1867, 
Lisbon), pp. 14-16. 
104see Chapter V above. 
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in fact, the richest region of agriculture at the time. 
Sa da Bandeira publicly declared that the newly increased 
taxes on Africans in Angola were not unreasonable com-
pared with taxation of natives in Natal (the equivalent 
of 2475 reis fortes to Angola's 1200 reis fortes) and in 
Zanzibar where tb.e tax perhb.ead was the equivalent of 
1920 reis fortes to Angola's 1200 reis fortes. 105 Unfor-
- - -
tunately Sa da Bandeira miscalculated the situation for 
Golungo Alto was the most fortunate region in Angola 
and soon it was loathe to pay the dizimo other regions 
paid little or nothing of the new tax. To compare Natal 
or Zanzibar with Angola in 1857 was hardly fair since 
the ruling elite of Angola was more impoverished than 
the English of Natal or the Arab traders of Zanzibar 
or Muscat. 106 
Certain favored regions of Angola were exempted 
from the dizimo: these were in 1859, Mossamedes, Ambriz 
105niario de Lisboa (Lisbon daily), 1 January 
1858. In Francisco Valdez 1s Six Years, Vol. II, p. 153, 
we find an evaluation of Portuguese currency between 
1852 and 1861 when 100 Angolan reis equalled 62i- Portu-
guese reis. Each currency, bot~ovincial and metro-
politan, had a regular specie, ~fortes (strong reis), 
and a devaluated specie, ~ fracos (weak lli!.). One 
English pound sterling equalled about 4,500 ~ fortes 
Portuguese. Livingstone said 1 milreis equalled about 
3 shillings. Missionary Travels (1858), p. 474. 
106As Amaral wrote later in this year, the 
province was very poor and without means. A.H.U., Pasta 23, 
No. 242, 11 April 1857. 
and Bembe (then called after the King o£ Portugal, 
D. Pedro V). Taxes were laid on houses (fogos), farms, 
(arimos), cattle (gado}, and hunting (~), and some-
times on £ishing (!!sea) •. Migration or desertion of 
natives can be measured to some extent by the record 
of the collection from 1857 to 1860 which indicates 
that the number of house.s collected from decreased 
considerably in those years. The 1859 collection value 
was nearly one-£ifth lower than that of 1858.107 (See 
Appendix V for places taxed in the interior.) 
The raising of the dizimo caused unrest and 
tension. One guage of this can be found in the letters 
citBd above from the .Dembo Oaboco of O.ambambe. Other 
indications are in the numerous rebellions and skirmishes 
after 1856. Portuguese occupation of new stations coin-
cided with the raising of the tax and the natives 
responded with fear of domination. 
There was a rebellion at Huila, in the hinterland 
of Mossamedes in 1857. Raids on the newly-settled 
Europeans there discouraged the Governor-General who 
wrote he had no troops from Luanda to spare for protec-
tion of southern Angola. The impulse of expansion was 
being carried on with little chance of ending well. As 
Amaral wrote in December, 1857: 
107 A.H.U., Angola, 1860, Pasta 26, No. 153, 
nResumo. 11 
It would be necessary to have some thousands 
of good soldiers to be able to continue resol-
utely on the set path of conquests.... I want 
to reserve for myself justification for a 
very probable reverse, if we continue in this 
system of building without a foundation. 108 
In his plan for expansion, Amaral had a bias with 
a practical basis. He favored the north of Angola to 
other areas. Failing to pacify and conquer the region 
south of Muxima ~residio, the wild Quissama country, 
Amaral justified this with his lack of means and with 
the history of invincibility o~ Quissama, well-known to 
Europeans in Angola. When it came to expanding further 
in the south, he believed the trade was too poor to 
bother with, and the Negroes too backward to warrant 
the expenditure of forces needed in the Oongo region. 
For example, the only engineer possessed by the Govern-
ment of Angola in 1857 was working in Bembe at the copper 
mines. 109 
Native migration, or emigration, in areas near 
the Portuguese settlements in the northern half of the 
province, was one certain guage of Portuguese prestige. 
When there was a great deal of emigration away from 
Portuguese-controlled regions, it meant policy had 
broken down. Every adverse event acted on the native 
population as a call for exodus. Portuguese authorities 
108 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 23, No. 41, 13 December 
1857, Letter. 
109 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 23, No. 242, 1 1 April 
1857, Gov. Gen. 
carefully noted all signs of emigration in monthly reports 
to the Government. During war, famine, epidemic or 
increased taxation or labor recruitment in late 1860, 
for example, heavy emigration was observed. 110 
3. Crisis in Northern Angola 
The article on nAngolau in the standard Brazilian-
Portuguese dict1onary, 111 has named the era 1836 to 1878 
in Angolan history as 11Abo1ition of Slave Tra(ie and 
Slavery," and characterizes the epoch as one of ttgreat 
tranquility.n Documents, however, indicate Angola 
underwent during the decade 1855-65 the most serious 
general crisis up to that time in the century. 
In the late 1850's, discontent brewed to boiling 
point in Angola. Reminiscent of the ferment of the 
1830's during the transition from abolition of the 
slave trade to Brazil, Angolan whites as well as Negroes 
nursed ideas of independence. A contemporary Portuguese 
living in Luanda confirmed at least a hazy outline of 
such a movement about 1860: 
At that time in Luanda, some utopian ideas 
of independence fermented so that some radical 
natives tried to liberate the mother country, 
as they called it, from Portuguese rule. They 
talked of a republic, preferring Brazilian 
nationality, and there were even those who 
thoUght of making a present of the beloved 
country to the republic of the United States 
of .America. 11 2 
110Boletim Official (Angola), No. 793, Dec. 15, 1860. 
111 Grande Enciclopedia Portu5uesa e Brasileira, II, 
pp. 640-645. . 
112sarmento, os Sertoes d'Africa, p. 67. 
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The master and slave relationship seemed to 
reach a peak of distrust and suspicion, especially near 
the larger settlements. In the years 186o to 1862 a number 
of slaves carried out premeditated murders upon their 
masters in Luanda and Benguela. The murder of a 
Brazilian resident of Luanda on September ~9, 186o, was 
counted as the fourth such slave murder in four months 
in Luanda. 11 3 Fear gripped the white society again in 
1862 when a certain uJohn Cook" took a knife and killed 
his master in his sleep. The judge wrote Lisbon that 
this slave had to be made an example of in order to 
insure the safety of the whites.f 14 
Livingstone had noted a general atmosphere of 
suspicion in settlements in Angola during his stay in 
1854 to 1855. Everyone knew that Portuguese power was 
11firmly seated only between the rivers Dande and Ooanza.nf15 
Tribes outside this limited region were quite independent. 
Later the traveller Winwood Reade firmly believed the 
Angolan slaves intimidated their masters and were very 
bold during his stay in 1862 in the region o£ Luanda 
and its hinterland. 116 His remedy for the current 
113 Boletim Official, No. 783, October 6, 1860, 
p. 11. 
114 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, July 4, 1862, No. 688, 
Gov. Gen. 
11 5LiVingstone, Missionary Travels, (1858 edition), 
p. 466. 
116Reade, Savage Africa, p. 317. 
171 
attitude of Angolan slaves was brutal and like that of 
many Portuguese settlers according to the 1854 report 
of Governor-General Pinheiro. The bitterness created 
by such cruelty had its outlet in the murders during 
the years 1860-62 when slaves rose to kill or to escape 
their bondage. Pinheiro's report noted that Portuguese 
masters were beating their slaves during meals in order 
to make their food 11more tasteful. 1111 7 
Coinciding with new stresses in the master and 
slave relationship were the stresses created by the 
Congo policy of the Government-General. Ambriz had 
been occupied in May 1855. Quiballa and Bembe had 
been occupied with small garrisons in 1856 under 
the plan to work the mines of malachite (copper) ore 
in the hills east of Bembe.. A chartered company, 11 The 
Western Africa Malachite Copper Mines Company Limited,n 
with Brazilian and _British capital, developed the mines 
beginning in 1856. With the permission of the Portu-
guese Government, some English miners aided operations. 
But British resistance to the Portuguese claim to the 
mouth of the Congo and the coast between 5°15' and 80 
south latitude in 1857 drove the Portuguese to strike 
at two points in the disputed region. A British naval 
officer, Commander Hickley, landed a force at Quissembo 
in that year to stop the Portuguese from interfering 
11 7A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarine, 1855, Relattrio, 
1854 August, Visconde do Pinheiro. 
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with the bui~ding of a new British factory. Later in 
1857, Hickley deployed his force and caused an occupying 
Portuguese mi~itary force to leave the river town o~ 
Punta~ Lenha (on the Congo) where it had landed.118 
Governor-General Amaral had proposed the occu-
pation of the Congo in February 1857 to contro~ trade 
and to e~iminate slave traffic. Britain's justification 
for opposing Portuguese expansion in this period and 
before was composed of essentially the same points. 
The difference was that British naval power he~d British 
paramountcy, however informal, and Portugal did not have 
the power to compete or to carry out the humanitarian 
dreams. 11 9 
The Portuguese after the failures of 1857 sought 
to move overland to assert sovereignty and to control 
trade to the nnorth coast. 11 In 1859 a Portuguese vessel 
planted a traditional padrio, or stone marker for navi-
gators, on Cape or Point Padron, 120 claiming sovereignty 
and reinvoking the muse of history and the memory of 
Diogo Cao. British reports paid this ceremonial event 
little heed, 121 except as part of the Portuguese expan-
sion plan. 
11 8Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 51; 
G.E.P.eB., Vol. IV, pp. 502-3; Monteiro, Angola_(1876), pp. 88-9. 
11 9see Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo, for diplo-
matic background up to 1876, pp. 1-56. See above p. 137. 
120From the Portuguese Punto Padrao. 
121F.O. 63/1114, 1859, No. 10, Gabriel to Russell, 
29 September 1859. 
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Of vital im~ortance to the Portuguese attempt to 
outflank the obstacle of diplomacy placed in their path 
of expansion, was greater control over the Congo kingdom 
after 1858. In that year the Marquis of Catendi, heir 
to the throne of Congo, came to Bembe, the newly-established 
Portuguese concelho, named for King Dom Pedro V of 
Portugal. Portuguese and Congolese negotiations 
followed this visit. Soon Portuguese armed forces 
supported this candidate to the throne after the death 
of King Henry II in late 1857.122 
Rebellions at Bembe and Ambriz in 1857 were 
put down. The legitimate heir to the Congo throne, 
nephew of the deceased king, was accompanied to his 
coronation by Portuguese authorities at Sao Salvador, 
the capital. Later Portuguese forces were expelled by 
an army under a rebel claimant to the throne, Dom 
• Alvaro Dongo, apparently a minor chief with military 
ability. After asking for and receiving Portuguese 
aid, the Marquis of Oatendi was crowned Dom Pedro V, 
after the name of Bembe concelho, and the King of 
Portugal (1855-1861). 
Portuguese forces in June 1859 drove the rebel 
Dongo from Sao Salvador. These forces under J. Baptista 
de Andrade, later two-time Governor-General of Angola, 
were supported by African auxiliaries, guerra preta, and 
122 Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, pp. 113-118. 
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they occupied Sao Salvador.1 23 Yet native forces were 
in rebellion against the Portuguese all over Angola at 
this time. 11A grave insurrectionn broke out at Ambriz 
and Bembe again in late 1859. The province was threatened 
from "all sides. 11124 
In the meantime, Portugal found her new Congo 
policy challenged by an educated native leader, Dom 
Nicolas of Agua Rosada. Born the son of King Henry II, 
but ineligible for the throne of Congo under the rules 
of succession that the king's nephew was eligible only, 
Nicolas had been educated in Lisbon (a visit of 1845-46), 
and in Luanda. Later employed in Luanda and in Ambriz 
as a Government clerk, he came in contact with foreign 
groups, such as the British and the Brazilians. Nicolas 
was a part of the Luanda "independenceu movement des-
cribed by Alfredo de Sarmento, and there is evidence he 
was sympathetic to Brazilian ideas for Angolan indepen-
dence.125 
In September 1859 Prince Nicolas wrote a letter 
of protest to Lisbon journals claiming he was best 
qualified in education for the throne of Congo and that 
the Portuguese had no legal or historical right to 
123Jornal do Commercia (Lisbon), 19 January 1860. 
124Jornal do Commercia, 13 June 1860. 
125sarmento, os Sertoes, pp. 66-67; A.H.U., 
Angola, Pasta 26, 28 February 1860, Letter Gov. Gen. 
Amaral to Lisbon. 
175 
"vassalizen tb.e Oongo Kingdom and rule it; as Portuguese 
policy had been to support D. Pedro V as King, and to 
place a garrison at the capital for the first time in 
centuries, Nicolas claimed precedent that the Xing of 
Oongo was traditionally an nally and friend u and not a 
"vassal 11 of the Portuguese in Angola. This letter was 
published at Lisbon at least once, on December 1, 1859.126 
This protest letter was read by the Governor of 
Angola and considered nridiculoustt in its audacity, yet 
such discontent was not out of context in 1859-60 
Angola. When the Portuguese forces were driven out of 
Ambriz and besieged in the fortress at Bembe in late 
November 1859, the Governor realized it was a crucial 
moment to act. 127 
Immediately the British were suspected and 
/ 
charged as giving the rebel Alvaro Dongo arms and powder 
at the coast. The Governor called for aid from Portugal 
when he learned that the southern Portuguese settlements, 
as Huila, were again under native attack. 128 In 
February 1860 communications north of Luanda were cut 
and the Portuguese in Bembe were still besieged. Rebels 
126B1blioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Jornal do 
Oommercio, 1 December 1859. 
127Jornal do Oommercio, 19 January 1860; 
Revista Mllitar, Lisbon, No.7, April 15, 1860, pp. 240-1. 
128 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 26, February 28, 1860, 
Letter, Gov. Gen. Amaral. 
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nearly starved it out before reinforcements arrived 
after April 186o. 129 Guerra Preta auxiliaries from 
Golungo Alto concelho were ordered to Ambriz by the 
Governor; in the summer of 1860 a force of 300 empaca-
ceiros was ordered to Ambriz under the Honorary Colonel 
of Guer~a Preta the Soba Bango-Aquitamba. 13° 
Meanwhile in February 1860 Prince Nicolas had 
left Luanda, and, after he was ordered to work at 
Mossamedes, traveled to Ambriz, then Quissembo, where 
he was killed by natives who claimed he was a traitor 
to the white man. Ironically, the man accused of 
11selling" Ambriz·to Portugal and presently, the Congo, 
was accused by Portuguese as a traitor for his protest 
letter. 131 There is evidence that the British and 
Brazilian consuls in Luanda were intriguing with Nicolas 
with regard to the Prince's future and the Congo Kingdom. 
What ever the origin of the plan, after Nicolas was 
to board an English vessel of war at Quissembo, the 
goal is not clear. 132 Nicolas left Ambriz perhaps in 
fear of his life, but the extent of foreign involvement 
is not clear. Portuguese at Luanda doubted that the 
129 6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 2 , No. 207, May 25, 
1860, Gov. Gen. Amaral. 
130Boletim Official, September 15, 1860, No. 780, 
p. 4. 
131 Jornal do Commercio, 13 June 1860. 
132 A. H. u., Angola, Pasta 26, 28 February 1860, 
Gov. Gen. Amaral to Lisbon. 
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famous protest letter was written by Nicolas himself.133 
The Governor of Angola gathered an expedition 
to 11 avengeu the death o:f Nicolas, well-known in white 
society, and also to reassert by force the claim to 
the coast north of so south latitude. Crossing the 
river Log~, his force was turned back. Because of 
poor supplies and bad leadership. it was put into 
full retreat to Ambriz. Another Portuguese attempt on 
Quissembo had failed. 134 
The general ferment in Angola included certain 
Europeans who wished Angola independent of Portugal.135 
Portuguese prestige and power were at such a low ebb 
that an expeditionary army from Portugal was sent to 
Luanda in several contingents, arriving in June, August 
and September 1860. This force consisted of about 700 
European recruits and officers. This 11fire-fighting 
brigade" of 1860 was unlike a similar brigade sent to 
Mozambique in 1869 in that a distinguished royal 
personage accompanied one contingent. For about fifteen 
days the brother of King D. Pedro V, the Duke of Oporto 
(and later in 1861 King Luiz I of Portugal) visited 
l33Boletim Official, No. 750, 18 February 1860, 
pp. 8-9. Notice of death of Prince Nicolas. 
1 34Jorna~ do Commercio, 13 June 1860. 
l35A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 26; 25 May 1860, 
Letter, Gov. Gen. Amaral. 
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Luanda on a naval training exercise. 136 The expeditionary 
force remained as a fighting unit in northern Angola, 
mainly at Ambriz, Bembe, and Sao Salvador until late 
1861, when the weakened remnants were shipped back to 
Lisbon. Yellow fever and malaria took a heavier toll 
than native spears or bullets. The hospitals were 
crowded with the unacclimatized, and 304 recruits, and 
12 officers remained in graves upcountry.137 Later 
Portuguese officials referred to this fiasco as proof 
that the African tro~ps should be exclusively employed 
in Angolan campaigns. 
Governor Amaral found his reputation ruined 
by the failure at Quissembo and the general state of 
insecurity. Assailed by irate Portuguese settlers as 
a tyrant and a failure, 138 this bold expansionist was 
replaced by Governor Carlos Franco in August 1860. 
Before he left Angola, Amaral gave a final statement 
reviewing the achievements of his administration. 139 
Our flag reappeared in the Congo, and was, 
for the first time raised upon the banks of 
136Jornal do Commeroio, 25 October 1860; Vogel, 
Le Portugal, .p. 636. 
137 A.H.U., Angola~ Pasta 31, No. 748, 1 July 
1862, uRelacao Mortuaria; ' Imprensa Nacional, Relatorios 
sobre a Epidemiada Febre .Amarella no anno de 1860 (Lisbon, 
1861). 
138A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 639, March 1862, 
Gov. Gen. 
139Boletim Official, Supplemento, No. 74, 
9 August 1860. 
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the Cunene. Then there arose difficulties 
in maintaining such distant conquests. It 
was the necessary and predictable consequence 
of the lack of proportion between our ends 
and our means ••• the work of pacification 
in the country remains to be completed. 
Indeed 11paoifioation, tl if that was the fitting 
word, was still only a plan that would lay unacoomplished 
for five decades thereafter. Amaral's ambition had 
overleapt itself. In bad health after one of the 
longest terms as Governor in the history of Angola, 
Amaral left the province in warfare but with a series 
of forts and stations, and a tradition of meeting 
British ninformal expansion,n140 with determined if 
ineffective resistance in the Congo. .The sertanejo, 
Antonio da Silva Porto disagreed with Amaral's enemies 
and praised his expansion plans and his standing up to 
British diplomatic and naval power. The administration 
of Angola was shot through with personal feuds, and 
expansion was no doubt hindered. Silva Porto deplored 
the sending of the European expedition to Congo, since 
he believed that natives should fight natives in Angola. 
He believed Amaral was not to blame for the disasters • 
••• as if he were responsible for such 
events! It would be better for those minds 
to fight the reprehensible leadership of 
~-~1!:; England in all affairs acting as if Portu-
gal were a colony of England. Contrary to 
this. they berate the man whose greatest 
defect is to seek the aggrandizement of his 
fatherland. 141 
140I use the term of Anstey in Britain and the 
Congo, of. p. 229. ·· 
141 Silva Porto, Viagens e Apontamentos, ms., 
B.M.P.P., II, entry for December 22, 1860, p. 113. 
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The north country was pacified by late 1862, but the 
war of Oassange dragged on until the summer of 1863. 
If roads and towns north of Luanda were safer and more 
secure for trade than during the war, the country was 
pillaged and, as before, tribes migrated away from 
Portuguese settlements. Portuguese armed force was 
crippled by the campaigns, and in 1862, in order to 
escape service in the war of Oassange, entire companies 
of the ttsecond Line 11 or guerra preta deserted or became 
unreliable. The wars created a fund of discontent and 
physical debility among the native peoples.142 
Governor Andrade, who personally played an 
important role in campaigns in 1858 to 1865, looked 
back to that time when Governor again in 1874 and 
attributed the impotence of armed force in Angola to 
the disastrous events of this war. The programs for 
expansion and genuine white colonization, or even 
moving an army, were stymied by difficulty of finding 
porters or empacaceiros to aid expeditions. Travel in 
the interior had always been difficult for troops, 
but after 1864, and the epidemic of small pox, few 
auxiliary Negroes were availabl·e :for service in campaigns. 143 
142rmprensa Nacional, "Relat6'rios dos Governadores, 
Jose B. de Andrade, Report for 1872-74 (Lisbon, 1875), 
p. 84. 
143 , 84 Andrade, Relatorios, p. • 
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F. Beginnings of a New Policy 
The challenge had met a weak response. The 
wars virtually ended hopes of controlling the Congo 
country and of thereby deriving profit from the trade 
reaching foreign factories on the coast from Quissembo 
to Punta da Lenha. Nevertheless, Portuguese claims for 
this territory were reasserted in 1860, in 1862, in 1867, 
and later. Yet British policy remained steadfast. Wylde, 
the British minister in Lisbon, had been consideringiin 
1858 Portuguese claims might be granted by Britain if 
Portugal would comply with British conditions of low 
tariffs and no slave-trade on the Congo. Although 
he doubted that Portuguese power could effect reforms 
144 
in 1858, still he was willing to experiment. By 1867, 
when Wylde wrote another nMinute" on this, however, he 
was convinced that Portugal was in no position to uphold 
145 
British conditions as a buffer power. The wars and 
campaigns in intervening years condemned Portugal's 
position in northern Angola. With no prestige in the 
field or security at home, Portuguese expansion generally 
came to a standstill by 1863. In 1860, Amaral had even 
feared a successful slave revolt, when he wrote to 
Sa da Bandeira in Lisbon. 
144Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 52. 
145Ibid., p. 53. Refers to P.R.O., F.O. 63/1115, 
Wylde, 10 August 1867 Minute. 
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Our real power here is insufficient •••• 
The failure of the enterprise undertaken has 
broken our prestige.... It is necessary to 
not lose sight of the lessons of history. 
The island of Santo Domingo was no more 
advanced in 1802, than is Angola presently. 146 
In the report of Governor Oalheiros e Menezes 
dated 1861, but printed at Lisbon in 1867, a Portuguese 
policy of withdrawal and consolidation is outlined and 
contrasted with the crisis of former years. This sue~ 
cesser of Amaral recommended a regulated native labor 
code and policy for Angola as well as a policy of con-
centrating administration and expenditure in northern 
and central Africa, and eventually abandoning Mossamedes 
district. Oalheiros considered Golungo Alto to be the 
heart of the province, but he also valued Oongo and 
recommended renovation of Portuguese paramountcy at 
Sao Salvador and on the banks of the Oongo River in 
order to eventually establish a road between Sao 
Samvador and the bank near Nokki. 147 (See map). 
The report of Oalheiros, a very military-minded 
Governor, as were Amaral or Andrade, was essentially a 
plea to leave the interior to the care of a skeleton 
administration, centralize power on the coast, and 
develop Angola as an economic unit principally by means 
146 A.H.U., Angola, Papeis de Sa da Bandeira, 
Mac;o 1, Amaral to Sa da Bandeira, April 1860. 
147 rrr I Oalheiros e Menezes, Sebastiao, Relatorios 
dos Governadores de .Angola, Imprensa Nacional, Lisbon, 
1867. Oopy in Library of Society of Geography, Lisbon. 
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of economizing and adopting a rigorous native labor 
code. Although Oalheiros in his term of office in 1861 
had founded two white convict colonies at Bumbo and 
Oapangombe, stations on the plateau above Mossamedes, 
he had little faith in the future development of 
southern Angola. Finding most administrators 
uabsolutely incapable,n and Mossamedes and .Ambriz 
scarcely contrihuting to the annual deficit of the 
colony, he considered the Fortuguese had to settle down 
in the area between the Bengo and the Ouanza Rivers, 
bounded on the east by the Lucalla River. Indeed, 
Livingstone had noted this was the most comfortable 
seat of Portuguese power. 148 
The frontier provinces were unproductive and 
wasteful to Portuguese power, rarely collecting dizimo 
and always under native attack because of the pitiful 
number of available troops. Oalheiros lambasted 
I the liberal legislation of Sa da Bandeira and proposed 
a labor code, treated in the next chapter, which was 
in effect the basis for much Portuguese legislation 
in the future • 
••• nor do I also believe that the small and 
changing European population, which inhabits 
Angola, and the small native population, con-
sidered civilized in Luanda or Benguela, 
appreciate these institutions or know how to 
make use of them. 149 
148oalheiros, Relat6rio, p. 10; Livingstone, 
Missionary Travels (1858 edition), p. 466. 
149 I Oalheiros, Relatorio, 
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The warfare, loss of life and failures of the preceding 
few years and the disheartening experience of Oalheiros 
in pursuing the long Oassange campaign in 1861 brought 
a watershed to the history of expansion. The Governor 
ordered the construction of forts at Malanga, Sanza, 
Talla-Mugongo and Oassange in 1861 to little avail 
since the native auxiliaries hitherto more cooperative 
were now unreliable. Hostility increased against the 
Portuguese everywhere, and in the south, near Gamboa, 
Humbe and Huila, there seemed to be no respite from 
raids and attacks by the uNanos." 
Oalheiros hoped that many more natives might 
be "civilizedlf by teaching them to read and write 
Portuguese under a "patriarchal organization,n perhaps 
an early formulation into policy of the 20th century 
assimilacao concept.150 This report of the Governor of 
Angola spared no words or recriminations, and mentioned 
that the new dizimo tax raises had caused much emigration 
in northern Angola. The carreto service, a traditional 
native scourge, was also mentioned for causing native 
emigration away from Portuguese settlements toward 
nunvassalized 11 country. 
Although Oalheiros felt that the Oongo was an 
important part of the development policy that should 
have been maintained, there were voices of disagreement 
15°oalheiros, Relat6rio, p. 84. 
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in 1861, and some said the area had to be abandoned. 
/ Silva Porto, writing from his home in Bihe, reiterated 
his expansionist principles. He cried out against nthe 
blasphemy of saying we should restrict ourselves to the 
coast, and abandon the interior ••• 111 51 He pointed to 
the continual English threat, in another warning of 
future loss in.the interior. 
Yet in spite of the protests of men like Silva 
Porto and the expansionist colonial thinkers in Portugal, 
Portuguese policy of military expansion reached a turning 
point by 1861-63. The correspondence of Governor Jos~ B. 
d'Andrade in 1862. indicates the exhaustion of the armed 
force in northern Angola, and the inability of the out-
lying posts to offer any resistance to native armies. 
Garrisons at Huila and Humbe in 1863 were withdrawn and 
posts abandoned after continuous native attacks on the 
settlers and their cattle. Humbe and Gamboa were 
deserted until about 1880. Several decades ago, a writer 
characterized this common occurrence of posts being 
abandoned for years, by saying, "the lack of continuity 
in the plans of the government, and in their execution, 
have been one of the evils of our overseas administration.n 152 
1 51 Silva Porto, ~ee-L I:@@? :ret ~t:oli3, ms. , 
B.M.P.P., Vol. II, 11 Augufrl(~61, p. 2~ Near this 
entry, he also recommends the occupation and pacification 
of the Bihe plateau by Portuguese forces, and produces a 
petition to the Government written in 1850 on the occasion 
of the Oassange pacification. II, pp. 207-211. 
152Alberto de Almeida Teixeira, Ro9adas, Na 
Occu}a~S:o do Sul de Angola (Pelo Imperio Series, Lisbon, 
193? ' p. 15. 
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It is clear that armed forces in southern Angola lan-
guished, and were decimated after the first third of 
the 19th century. For before 1834 there were militia 
companies and officers living at Bih' and Bailundo. In 
1861, another writer, echoing Silva Porto's wishes, 
called for the occupation of these southern points to 
build up defenses for white colonies on the healthy 
plateaus. 153 
Yet PortUguese expansion stopped the effect of 
the wars after 1859. Quissama country remained unpaci-
fied and hostile. Contraband trade continued to and 
from the north coast and it was known by the Governor 
that the coffee exports of Encoge instead of going to 
Dande and Luanda were falling into foreign hands at 
Quissembo or Ambrizette. Dembos country and small 
pockets at Pungo Andongo, Ambaca, and Duque de Bragan9a 
harbored escaped slaves, degredados and generally caused 
trouble for Portuguese communication and trade. 
The British policy of refusing to recognize 
Portuguese claims to the Congo region, ·especially the 
coast north of Ambriz, remained steadfast and galling 
to the Portuguese. In 1860 bitter diplomatic notes 
153Revista Militar (Lisbon), Nos. 13-15, 
15 July- 31 July 1861, and issue of 14 June 1861. 
These articles by a former Governor of Mossamedes 
called for expansion in southern .Angola, and a mili-
tarization of all activity. 
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were exchanged between London, Lisbon and Luanda. The 
Portuguese ambassador Count Lavradio in London accused 
the British of nabuse of power and.oppression towards 
a faithful allyu in regard to the Prince Nicolas affair, 
British activity in selling ar.ms and powder to natives 
at Quissembo and Ambrizette, and for consistently oppos-
ing by diplomacy or by naval power Portuguese occupation 
north of Ambriz.154 On August 13, 1860, Lavradio wrote 
to Lord Russell, foreign minister, quoting Lord Canning's 
statement that Portugal was for Britain the most vital 
place of support in Europe. 155 In spite of this retort, 
Lord Russell wrote back reasserting the traditional 
policy begun by Palmerston, and carried on by Clarendon 
in 1855 and 1856. Moreover, his letter to Lavradio shows 
the British concern over the Portuguese campaigns in 
northern Angola. He constructed a telling argument against 
expansion, which, in part, was similar to ideas in the 
reports of Governors Calheiros and Andrade in 1861 and 
1862. The last paragraph of his note of October 13, 1860 
read: 
The undersigned, in conclusion, has the 
honour to state that he must repudiate the 
charge of abuse of power and oppression towards 
154For Lavradio 1 s correspondence on Angola, see 
especially Volumes IV, V, VI, and VII of his Memorias 
(Lisbon, 1937-42). 
155Accounts and Papers, 1883, C3531, XLVIII, 
Correspondence, 1B45-1B77, p. 61. 
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a faithful ally which Count Lavradio brings 
against Her Majesty, on account of their 
refusal to acknowledge what her Majesty's 
Government consider the unfounded territorial 
claims of Portugal on the West Coast of 
Africa; and he cannot help adding that ••• 
the interests of Portugal would be far better 
consulted by developing the resources of the 
vast territories which she already possesses 
in Africa, than by seeking to extend a barren 
sovereignty over further tracts of country 
on that Continent, which can only be acquired 
by violence and bloodshed. 156 
Britain's policy dug deep into the mentality of 
the Portuguese leaders in .Angola at this time, but fear 
of British power and competition in trade had been 
present on the coast since the 183o•s. Resistance to 
the Portuguese occupation of Ambriz had accustomed the 
opponents to an uinformaln warfare along the coasts and 
in the channels of diplomacy. If Britain's policy toward 
Portugal was "of arguable legality,n157 it also was 
pragmatic and effective. The expansion program under 
Governor Amaral had foundered on British obstinacy, 
and Portuguese weaknesses. A turning point was reached 
when informed authorities decided that the dizimo policy, 
new frontier occupations, and the army organization and 
expenditure policies, as well as the vital labor problem 
had to be re-examined in the hard light of the final 
"failure of the enterprise undertaken. 111 58 
156Ibid., Russell to Lavradio, 13 October 1860, p. 63. 
157Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 229. 
158Referring to the words of Gov. Amaral in April 
1860 of the cited letter to Sa da Bandeira. Specifically 
he refers to the failure of his expedition to reach and 
control Quissembo, but this can stand for his entire policy 
of expansion in the north. 
Dr. Duffy, in his history of Portuguese Africa, 
says that Angola was at a turning point in 1858 when 
the compromise decree abolishing slavery was issued at 
Lisbon. 159 nThe legal abolition of slavery severed the 
major link with a discredited past, and Angola turned 
to a new and perhaps more difficult era." Ending the 
chapter u.Angola to 1858,u he also adds that the appearance 
of Dr. Livingstone in Angola in 1854 was another important 
inf'luence on changing Angola t1from the past into the 
present.n160 An examination of Portuguese policy and 
official correspondence at the time, however, indicates 
that both of these factors were of relatively little 
importance when it came to Portuguese policy and 
experience in Angola. The turning point at mid-century 
came in the years 1859-1863, as a result of the wars 
begun initially because of Portuguese policy in taxation, 
porterage, and military occupation. The plan to renovate 
Angola's economy after the abolition of the slave trade 
was behind it all, since the expansion called for needed 
new revenue. The need for new revenue coincided with 
new occupations in the north and in the south. British 
policy on the coast of Africa, far more than the travels 
or writings of Livingstone after 1854, stirred Portuguese 
ambition and national honor and provided a school of hard 
knocks for Portuguese expansion. 
none of 
159James Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 77-78. 
160Ib1d., p. 175, espec. ially paragraph beginning, 
- n the results ..... 
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Governor-General Andrade, after experience on 
campaigns in the north, wrote Lisbon in 1862: 
This Government finds itself today in 
most critical circumstances because of all 
these very distant occupations ••• without 
possessing any force to support them in the 
midst of more or less constantly hostile 
natives. 161 
Andrade in this same letter to the Overseas Ministry 
recommended the abandonment of the southern posts of 
Gambos, Bumbo and in the future, perhaps the abandon-
ment of even Bembe and Congo, which were very costly 
operations. The guerra preta system had in ef.fect been 
ruined by the wars a.fter 1859. 
The decree o.f 1858 was merely one more law on 
paper even though it aroused great opposition among the 
settlers. What was more important to the history o.f 
this period, and to the daily li.fe o.f the economy, was 
the carreto system, begun in 1845, and legally abolished 
in 1856. This caused a furor that ended in the report 
of Calheiros and the labor code o.f 1875. The entire 
abolition o.f slavery issue was obscured during the 
campaigns .from Ambriz to Cassange, and in the south, 
because forced native service was actually .further 
entrenched during the crisis. 
Livingstone brought to the Portuguese news o.f 
the interior o.f Africa, and reinforced fear o.f British 
1 61 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 768, Andrade to 
Lisbon, 1 July 1862. 
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ambitions and activity especially on the eastern coast. 
But in Angola his influence was obscured at the time by 
the crisis and upheavals that lasted through 1864 and the 
small-pox epidemic. The Government of Angola, after 
Livingstone, continued interest and plans to tap trade 
or minerals in the interior. There is little or no 
mention of the intrepid explorer in the official pro-
vincial correspondence, except perhaps with regard to 
the establishment of one British commercial house in 
Angola in 186o. 162 
The Portuguese realized that the chronic problems 
of the colony had only been worsened by the attempt to 
expand. Angola went into a dormant period after the 
peace with Cassange in 1863, and the major developed 
section, the Ouanza River region, and a few other 
regions, developed a very modest prosperity in trade. 
Sao Salvador was abandoned in 1870, and Bembe several 
years later. The remote stations east of Mossamedes 
fell into disrepair. The Governors of Angola were 
occupied with traditional problems after 1863, but not 
until the late 1870's was there the impetus to expand 
Portuguese control again into the hostile and impover-
ished interior. 163 
162Livingstone's speeches and writings encouraged 
only a handful of British entrepreneurs to attempt a start 
at Luanda. A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 26, 1860-61, Gov. Gen. 
1631lphonse de Figueiredo, Le Portuga~ (L1sbon,1873) 
nAngola. 11 The correspondence of Count Lavradio from London, 
however, constantly after 1855 called for Portuguese expan-
sion into the interior. Like Silva Porto, he disagreed 
with the policy of restricting occupation to the coast. 
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For the practical administrator on the coast at 
Luanda or Benguela, serious interest in the interior, 
and serious policy were two different matters. British 
naval activity and commercial pres.sure on the coast 
north of Ambriz centered Portuguese attention on the 
north coast. Fear of losing the Congo region dominated 
the attention of the central government, and at one 
moment in 1862 Governor Andrade feared a British occu-
pation of Ambrizette and Quissembo. 164 Plans for con-
trolling this north coast originated in the 18th century 
interior stations established to try to prevent foreign 
activity on the coast from the interior.165 
Although this Portuguese strategy of dominating 
Congo kingdom to later dominate the coast seemed to have 
failed, the idea was implicit in the official mind that 
the interior was useful only in so far as it aided 
control and prosperity on the coast. Indeed, Amaral's 
administration was an example of this tradition. In 
his second term as Governor of Angola for a short period 
in 1869 to 1870, Amaral reiterated his tactics in explain-
ing why he went into the Congo after 1857. It was:nThe 
object we really had in mind was "to achieve the domin-
ation of the coast, by the occupation of the interior."166 
164 86 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 773, 10 May 1 2, 
Gov. Gen. Andrade. 
165Lacerda, Exame das Viagens, p. 215. 
166 lo 6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta ~o, No. 311, 1 August 
1869, Gov. Gen. Amaral. 
CHAPTER V 
CENTRALIZATION AND RECOVERY, 1863-1877 
Without the complete abolition o£ forced labor, it will 
not be possible to establish in our colonies, a durable 
system, to bring them to prosperity. 
- S~ da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural A£ricano 
(1873), p. 102. 
I don't consider the black sufficiently educated now to 
receive complete freedom •••• The free black, save for 
a few exceptions, does not work, because he sees no need 
for this, and I have for this proof in the incredible 
number of thousands of free vagabond-blacks who live in 
the city of Luanda, of whom none presents himself for 
labor in the Public Works. 
- Governor-General of Angola, Francisco Garrido 
1867, A.R.U., Angola, Pasta 37, 20 March 1867 
Letter to Overseas Minister in Lisbon, No. 232. 
CHAPTER V 
CENTRALIZATION AND RECOVERY, 1863-1877 
A. Climax in the Labor Problem 
If the Government General at Luanda in 1862 
considered that its lines of control and communication 
were over-extended, it also felt that the legislation 
of 1854, 1856, and 1858, obscured by the wars and 
rebellions of 1857-62, had proved unsatisfactory. 
The Negro's status had not been altered for the good, 
but had, in fact, been worsened by the raising of the 
hut tax, a violent European settler reaction, and the 
many uprisings. The old carreto system was still in use, 
and although slaves were now (since the decree of 
December 1854) registered by many masters with the 
Government, the new name liberto had no basis in truth. 
Labor was more scarce after the Cassange war ended in 
1863 than before. Migration and mortality complicated 
the labor problem in Angola at a crucial moment in liberal 
execution of the laws. 
Governor-General Sebastiao Calheiros included 
in his Relatorio published in 1867 his observations and 
convictions about the labor issue. His conclusions 
represented the naked reality of what happened in Angola 
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in decades to come. He felt forced labor was the only 
solution to the problem of a chronically weak agricul-
ture and general undevelopment. The Portuguese were 
obliged by necessity, he believed, to show little mercy 
to those who did not follow their example. 
Agriculture of the whites in Angola, in 
colonial products, can be called impossible 
without forced labor •••• Free labor of the 
blacks, given to the whites for payment, as 
permitted by the respective product of tropical 
agriculture, is, at least for now, a dream. 1 
Oalheiros felt that the growing number of 
libertos was as much a burden upon the public budget as 
was the large community of degredado~ concentrated near 
the coast. A liberto was an African slave, often branded 
w1 th an ''L 11 by the Government, who was registered for 
emancipation within twenty years. By t~a decree of 
December 1854 Portugal declared the slave inhabitants 
of Angola, below a certain age, as libertos. Portuguese 
masters were supposed to register their slaves in 
Government records. By the end of 1863, over 30,000 
were on the official lists at Luanda. Yet the actual 
numbers of slaves, who remained unregistered, were 
probably considerable; in any event, it was difficult 
to keep track of masters and slaves in the sertao.2 
1sebastiao Lopes de Oalheiros, Relatorio do 
Governador Geral da Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 1867), 
pp. 66-67. 
2 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4o, 10 November, 
31 December 1869, Gov. Gen. In these documents, Amaral 
gave statistics of European and African population in 
Angola; A. E. Lux, Von Loanda Nach Kimbundu (Wien, 1880). 
Lux shows a facsimile of a Government brand for libertos. 
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Portuguese administration developed a definite 
system of control for the Negro population. All slaves 
were obliged to carry bilhetes, or passports signed by 
their masters. Even pretos livres, or free blacks, 
carried passports near settlements, and if found without 
them, were punished.3 The empaca9eiros, or auxiliary 
servicemen were regarded as a step above the ordinary 
freeman; it is clear they regarded themselves as a 
privileged elite, enjoying special favors from the 
Portuguese who hired them.4 
Governor Oalheiros, especially after observing 
the devastating events before 1861, propeeed that forced 
labor was vital for the economy. Governors-General in 
this era well realized the effect of dizimo taxation, 
and porterage service upon the African population. 
Migration was Bn inevitable result, and a consequent 
loss of labor and revenue. Governor Andrade as well as 
Governor Oalheiros realized the deplorable effects of 
recent events upon the population near settlements. 
Andrade had to admit at the onset of his first term of 
office: 
The Black is, and will continue to be 
for many years, the only means the govern-
ment and commerce can use for the transport 
3Boletim Official, 1861, Nos. 828-829. 
4Livingstone, Missionary Travels, pp. 445-46. 
On Empacaoeiros: nThey are very trustworthy, and, when 
on active service, form the best native troops the 
Portuguese possess.u 
of supplies, war material, baggage, and 
merchandise. 5 
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So great was the turmoil and movement in Angola 
of tb.e 186o's that the Negro population experienced 
little mercy from Europeans or from their own traditional 
leaders. Inter-group warfare was common on the Angolan 
plateau, but the exact recording of it would be monotonous 
and perhaps fruitless. Portuguese apologists claimed 
that slavery under Europeans was merciful compared to 
certain death as a prisoner of war in the sertao. 
Although the term resgate was falsified and at times 
misused, it cannot be wholly dismissed as being without 
a profound historical basis. Portuguese traders in effect 
did resgatar or ransom prisoners and criminals from sobas 
a famous example being from the Matiamvo of Lunda. Such 
prisoners of war, or criminals in the traditional penal 
systems of the African societies were destined for death 
by a variety of methods. Trial by poison was one·custom. 
Slavery•s influence remained unaltered in the 
,.., 
sertao. There is a parallel with the past of Dahomey 
in the words of Garrido in 1867: 
Slavery will continue in places where we 
do not rule, subject to chiefs and rulers so 
absolute and despotic that, when they cannot 
5A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, No. 57, December 
1862, Gov. Gen. Oalheiros, Relat6rio, pp. 66-70. 
sell their prisoners, they turn to the 
expedient of killing them. 6 
199 
Portuguese slavery in Angola was perhaps more 
harsh for the slave than life in Brazil, but Angolan 
slavery found some defenders among foreign observers 
in the 19th century.? Bringing the Negro to the coast 
from the warfare of the interior in many cases must 
have had some similarity to the concept of resgate.8 
Governor Garrido believed as many governors of 
Angola that the emancipation of the Negro was very 
distant, and that S~ da Bandeira's date of freedom, 
1878, was reasonable. Angola must develop before the 
emancipation, not merely after it. 
The idea of forced labor repels me also; 
I recognize, however, that it is a necessity 
for this province. 9 
6A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, No. 232, 10 March 1867, 
Gov. Gen~ For a complaint of the Matiamvo of Lunda 
against the suppression of export slave-trade about 1845 
see the following. Matiamvo said the end of slave-trade 
would mean he would have no outlet for his criminals 
and prisoners of war. Annaes do Conselho Ultramarine, 
Vol. I, 1854, nviagem a Lunda," by Joaquim Rodrigues 
Graqa. 
7winwood Reade questioned the effects of uaboli-
tion" in Angola, and felt the slaves were well-treated. 
Sava~e Africa, p. 257. J. Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, 
pp. S-90. 11Slaves as a rule are very well treated in 
Angola by the Portuguese, and cases of neglect or ill-
usage are rare. 11 
8nr. Duffy says resgate had uno reality in the 
African trade, 11 Portuguese Africa, p. 140. 
9A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, No. 232, 20 March 
1867, Gov. Gen. Garrido. 
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As stated above, shortage of labor in Angola 
was pressing after the 11time of troubles, 11 1857-63. 
Every event seemed to take Negro population away from 
Portuguese settlements or agricultural regions. The 
Portuguese themselves, however, by their transport 
system of labor were responsible for drawing away more 
population to the islands of Sao Thome and Principe. 
This system had continued since the 1840's in one form 
or another, and was, of course, noted and protested 
by British authorities at Luanda.1° The system seems 
to have continued steadily throughout the 19th century, 
especially the second half. 
An early example of labor transfer to the 
islands is found in a petition to the Portuguese Govern-
~ , 
ment in Lisbon by a merchant of Sao Thome wishing to 
ship ttup to 200 black libertosn from a port in southern 
Angola. Permission was granted,11 and later published 
in the Diario do Governo of 2 October 1855. Such 
transportation of Angolan negroes to the islands, rarely 
followed by repatriation, continued steadily throughout 
the century. In 1875 Cameron learned near Benguela that 
such vessels, for an undisclosed destination, regularly 
left Benguela and Mossamedes. 12 At one period, however, 
10nutfy, Portuguese Atric~, p. 158. 
1 1 A.H.U., Conselho Ultramarine (C.U.), 1855, 
No. 433, August 1855. 
12cameron, v. L., Across Africa (London, 1885), 
pp. 470-471. 
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the Governor-General gave evidence and accused the 
British cruisers of taking the captured slaves near 
Angola and carrying them to British colonies in labor 
"contracts. 111 3 
As for the shortage of labor in Angola, s{ da 
Bandeira in 1873 asserted that the settlers' claim o:f 
"shortage" was o.ften :false. I.f Africans received decent 
payment, they would work. The hut tax o.f 1856 had been 
increased to encourage the native to work in agricul-
ture. The Portuguese statesman was certain that the 
amount o.f the tax was reasonable, since a slmilar 
native tax in Natal was twice the amount.14 Yet, in 
the meantime, critical events had made payment o.f this 
tax impossible. Governor Andrade in 1862, supported 
by the Oonselho do Governo (Cabinet) and the Junta da 
Fazenda (Exchequer) in Luanda, moved to reduce the tax. 15 
Later in 1873 the dizimo, which in this case was a hut 
tax, on interior concelhos was abolished altogether, 
no~ only because it b.ad caused native emigration, but 
because it fomented wars as, :for example, the Dembos 
War, 1871-73. 
13 68 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, Nos. 3 , 50, 
29 July, 5 September 1862. noon.fidencial,u Gov. Gen. 
Letters to Lisbon. 
14sa da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural A.frioano, 
pp. 62-64. 
15A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 31, No. 57, 1862. 
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Settler opposition to the liberal program for 
free labor and for eventual emancipation by 1878 was 
extremely powerful in Angola. Complicating factors 
which caused labor shortages in certain areas have been 
mentioned. Clearly, mining operations and the cultiva-
tion of cotton, sugar cane, and coffee were increasing 
in extent and in profitableness in Angola after 1861 
when the American Civil War began. Steam navigation 
on the Cuanza River encouraged the employment of more 
African labor, whether for porterage to warehouses on 
that river or for agriculture. 16 
As the date of planned emancipation approached, 
the Associa9ao Commercial de Lisboa, with interests in 
Angola, petitioned the Government in 1872 to extend 
forced labor past 1878. / The aged Sa da Bandeira 
reacted to compose a final plea and rationale for 
reform in the colonies in his Trabalho Rural Africano 
e Administracao Colonial (1873). This was his last 
statement of the liberal principles he hoped to perpe-
tuate in Angola and Mozambique, and a plea for a program 
of equal rights for the entire Portuguese empire. Angola 
received the largest share of space in this work, which 
was dedicated to the memory of Dom Pedro V (1853-61). 
16 J. Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, pp. 60-70, 
179-180. Monteiro noticed a definite increase in trade 
and prosperity in Angola after 1866 and the beginning 
of steam navigation in Angola. 
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It asserted that the Portuguese must pay for negro labor 
but that the state, 11 on some exceptional occasions, 11 
has the right to force "a temporary service. 111 7 
Yet unless Africans received education equal 
to Europeans, the future had little hope. Silva Porto, 
a veteran settler who farmed near Catumbella for nearly 
ten years, believed that religious education and stern 
treatment would solve the problem of labor shortage. 
Although he was generally popular among the peoples of 
Bihe, he was no different from other farmers in that 
his workers continually deserted him without notice. 18 
The law did not provide for the gap in understanding 
between the Portuguese and the Africans who labored for 
them. Even Silva Porto felt that the term liberto was 
a sham word for escravo that the administration perpetu-
ated from the highest to the lowest echelons. Silva 
Porto feared that Portugal would become the Poland of 
southern Europe, but he also wished si da Bandeira 
would limit his liberal ideas to that portion of the 
In 1878 the labor code entitled Regulamento 
para os contratos de servicais e colones was put into 
effect with a vagrancy clause which insured the contin-
uation of forced labor. 19 This code had its origin in 
17si da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, p. 69. 
18 silva Porto , J.Page:as.ea:\jApo:a. t iihmims, V, VI , 
p. 415, 26 June 1872. 
19Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 152-3. 
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the rationale of Governor Calheiros in his 1861 Relat6rio, 
published six years later. Calheiros more than any 
other administrator of the era put the thinking of the 
vested European interests in Angola into shape for 
future labor codes of later generations. The year 1878 
was no watershed for the labor problem except on paper, 
although 20th century liberal apologists point to the 
date as the time when slavery was officially replaced 
by forced labor. 20 The Portuguese in Angola at the 
time, however, had the example of Brazil ever before 
their eyes. 
B. The Congo Question Continued 
The Portuguese north of Ambriz, true to the 
predictions of Lord Russell, continued to exercise a 
"barren sovereignty 11 after their sudden expansion. 
In spite of the exhaustion of the army system, the 
devastating small-pox epidemic of 1864-65, and the 
obstinate policy of Britain, Portuguese leaders at 
Luanda still envisioned occupying permanently the coast 
and much hinterland between Ambriz and Cabinda, including 
the Congo River mouth. Portuguese control and jurisdic-
tion were tenuous beyond the guns of the tiny forts at 
Ambriz, Quiballa, Bembe, and s. Salvador. And after 
1863, these stations settled down to a grim battle in 
20 G.E.P.eB., Vol. II, ".Angola: history,n pp. 640-5. 
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vain against climate, hostile natives, no reinforcements, 
little pay, and wretched communications. By 1870 what 
sovereignty and effective occupation Governors Amaral 
and Calheiros once possessed had faded away to nothing 
beyond the pqrt of Ambriz. 21 
Luanda counted on the copper mines at Bembe for 
revenue and a foothold near trade routes to the coast 
north of Ambriz. Bembe proved a mirage on all counts. 
Although ore was exported in some quantity until about 
1865 by the Western Africa Malachite Copper Mines 
Company Limited, 11 by 1868 the mines were in ruin, and 
the last European supervisor had succumbed to the 
climate. 22 With English capital, this company gained 
the concession in 1859 from a former slave-trading 
merchant, the Brazilian capitalist, Francisco A. Flores. 
The Government had promised to garrison and occupy 
Bembe, about 120 miles inland from Ambriz, in return 
for road-building and fort-construction by the company. 
Bembe remained poor and isolated, and in 1872 Governor 
Andrade recalled to Ambriz the last garrison of forty 
soldiers. 23 
21 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 42, 4 November 1872, 
Gov. Gen. Andrade to Lisbon. 
22A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 38, No. 447, Gov. Gen., 
16 December 1868. 
23Andrade, Relat6rios Dos Governadores (1875}, 
Angola, pp. 3-94. 
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British naval activity in the Congo River con-
tinued to incite Portuguese merchants in Luanda to 
visions of British colonies north of Ambriz. The 
contraband problem remained a thorn in the side of 
Portuguese trade for tariffs at Ambriz and Luanda 
discouraged most foreign traders from settling in 
Angola. Matters reached a crisis in 1865, and Lisbon 
received and considered various proposals to occupy 
anddfinally annex the Congo River. 
The ubiquitous Commodore Wilmot appeared again. 
to Portuguese chagrin, and about 1865 attempted to 
lay out a cemetery for English personnel at Loango and 
construct a factory at Sao Ant6nio do Zaire (near Point 
Padron). Again the King of Congo wrote the Governor-
General that British arms and powder were held by 
/ . partisans of the deceased Alvaro Dongo, who threatened 
to unseat the King from Sao Salvador. 24 
Reacting to these new threats, later in 1865, 
some five Luanda merchants drew up a petition to the 
Minister of Navy and Overseas proposing a veritable 
colonial "deal 11 with France in order to secure the 
Congo for Portugal. In exchange for Portuguese Guinea. 
which French influence had already surrounded, these 
merchants proposed that France support Portugal's claims 
to the Congo and its occupation against British policy. 
24 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 34, No. 194A, 15 April 
1865, Gov. Gen. Andrade. 
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Supporting this proposal, which was in the spirit of 
the later partition era, was the profound belief that 
the Congo, and the coast north of Ambriz, represented 
the "Eldorado tt for the revenue of Angola. 25 Again 
with this proposal came the explicit Portuguese con-
viction that the coast was a ~ gua ~ for prosperity, 
and that the interior was unimportant for Portuguese 
power in Angola. These Luanda merchants echoed a 
tendency several centuries old, especially in Angola, 
north of the Cuanza River. As long as foreign trade 
passed so near to the capital, Portuguese commerce 
would never rest until competition was laden with 
custom duties. 
From Molembo to the mouth of the river 
Cunene will be a very vast and rich empire. 
We won't have to conquer anything toward 
the interior, it is sufficient to occupy the 
principal places of the Coast. All the 
Commerce of the interior natives will un-
failingly come there to be exchanged for 
by the foreigners of Europe •••• This very 
important occupation will cost us merely a 
small cession whereas enormous advantages 
will redound to us. 26 
What became of this curious idea in the channels 
of Franco-Portuguese diplomacy is not known. But a note 
jotted on the 1865 letter from Governor Andrade on the 
25A.H.U., Pasta 34, No. 638, 30 December 1865, 
Letter to Overseas Ministry signed by uL. J. Affonso, 
Joao Tavares, T. P. Falcao, Pinto, and Redrige. Luanda. 11 
26 A.H.U., Pasta 34, December 30, 1865, Letter, 
No. 638. 
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subject of the Congo gives a clue that the proposal 
received a conservative reception. A Foreign Office 
official remarked that the extension of Portuguese 
rule up to the Congo should be accomplished by nego-
tiating with native powers for 11vassalage, 11 working 
with the King of Congo, and use .force only nin excep-
tional circumstances." He suggested following the 
lines of approach using Ambriz, Bembe and Sao Salvador, 
as before. 27 In short, though this cautious policy 
from Lisbon in 1865 probably reflected the lack of 
resources in .Angola to implement a policy of 11force," 
perhaps a bold stroke at this early date upon the Congo 
would have met with less British resistance than ten 
years later. 
Portugal again raised the question of claim 
to the Congo in 1867 following another incident in-
volving native piracy. 28 The British steamer Antelope 
in February 1867 was attacked by "Mussorongo pirates" 
(Bakongo-speaking peoples) at Mangue Grande, a trade 
settlement north of Ambrizette. The British retaliated 
by landing, attacking villages, and in the process 
burning and damaging Portuguese factories there. Portu-
guese authorities immediately claimed the incident 
27scribbled in margin of No. 194A, Pasta 34, 
15 April 1865, Letter Andrade to Lisbon. There were (6) 
proposals by this anonymous official; only a few were 
legible for this writer. 
28
.Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 53. 
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occurred in their territory and demanded extensive 
damages. 29 Little came of it, however, and British 
policy continued to quote the traditional "non-recognition" 
policy begun by Palmerston in 1846. 
Although most British diplomats until 1876 
were adamant in refusing negotiation on the Congo, 
Portuguese diplomats continued to plan ways to appease 
Britain. The customs duties at Ambriz on foreign articles 
were somewhat lowered in the early 1870's.3° But more 
/ important than this was the idea proposed by Sa da 
Bandeira in 1873 in his last book. He stressed the need 
of the Congo or part of it for Angola's future, and the 
)..ong-standing dispute had to end. Mussorongo piracy, 
fully admitted by the British as a reality, could be 
combatted by Portugal, and si da Bandeira was willing 
to guarantee complete freedom of trade and navigation 
on the Congo. The left bank of the Congo was 11indis-
pensablett for the Portuguese, and "in order to obtain 
its indisputable acquisition, it would be politic to 
forego the right we have to a portion of the coast 
north of the same river.u31 
29P.R.O., F.O. 63/1115, March 1867, Vredenburg 
to Russell, No. 4. 
3°Joao de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as 
Provincias Ultramarinas (Lisbon, 1883), I, pp. 150-60. 
3 1 s~ da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, pp. 160-2, 
210-14. 
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Whether or not this reasonable proposal by the 
elder Portuguese statesman was ever noticed or expressed 
in diplomatic conversations is not clear. But Portu-
guese claims and demands for both banks of the Congo 
were supposed by most British authorities to be the 
steadfast line from the beginning, and if si da Bandeira 
had been in power and active in 1873, his conciliating 
terms woUld have met a kind reception from men like 
Robert Marier. I As it was, Sa da Bandeira was dead and 
gone when Morier arrived in Lisbon in 1877, and the 
north bank of Congo was lost to Portugal through the 
pressure of other powers.32 
S~ da Bandeira in 1873 sought a 11 deal 11 with 
Britain partly in fear of 11ill-windsn from Spain. The 
short-lived Spanish Republic and rumors of an "Iberian 
Union 11 of Spain and Portugal prompted him at this time 
to seek protection of the Portuguese monarchY from an 
old ally.33 Whatever the proposals and easier terms 
the Portuguese offered in the 1870's, the chance was 
lost, in effect, by the early 188o's when powers more 
important than Manchester and Liverpool merchants viewed 
the Congo with intense interests. 
32.Anstey, Britain and the Congo, Ohapter V, 
pp. 84-112. 
33sa da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, pp. 210-214. 
The newspapers of the period 1869-74 indicate the 
importance of 11 Iberian Union." 
211 
Portuguese relations with the King of Congo 
steadily declined to mutual recrimination and neglect. 
Nothing was done about the plan to control the southern 
bank of the Congo from a road out of, Sao Salvador 
southward to Bembe, then westward to Ambriz; and 
apparently only tiny garrisons of less than fifty soldiers 
represented Portuguese influence until 1870 when the last 
detachment was pulled back to the coast.34 
Letters from Pedro V, the King of Congo, in 
1867 asking for wine supplies, food, and a Portuguese 
priest met with scorn and ridicule from the governor-
general. Various governors proposed in 1868-69 new 
plans to occupy the Congo region and the Junta Consultiva 
(title of the old Conselho Ultramarine after 1868) was 
asked about such an occupation and interference in 
tribal politics as in 1859-60. The Junta waited for 
the opinion of Jos' Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral, the 
former Governor who executed the £irst occupation, 
and who was on his way out to begin a second term in 
Angola.35 But a tentative conservative policy was put 
forth by Lisbon in 1869 which complemented the general 
"centralization" and withdrawal policy of the era. 
34A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 47, No. 461, 18 October 
1877, Gov. Gen., Letter of "Thomas, Bishop of .Angola and 
Congo.n Also Boletim Official, 1872, No. 51, December 21. 
35A.H.U., Junta Consultiva, 1870, 22 February 
1869, No. 431, 11 Parecer 11 or 11Decision." 
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The Government of Portugal should abstain 
as much as possible from interfering in 
internal tribal questions and kingdoms 
giving us no homage in African territory, 
and more particularly, from supporting 
obnoxious leaders, hateful to the peoples, 
as it seems is the one who presently rules 
the Oongo, from what the Governor of Angola 
says. 36 
Amaral was also of the opinion that Congo was 
of no political or economic importance for Angola.37 
Moreover, his idea of out-flanking British trade through 
Sao Salvador proved a failure. King Pedro V, according 
to a report of 1872 by a certain Padre Nunes who visited 
Sao Salvador, was weak, dissipated, and with "little 
moral authority'' over the peoples around his capital. 
His secretary, and relative, D. Garcia d'Agua Rosada 
was perhaps more important and had great influence upon 
the old King. Nunes, however, urged the reoccupation 
of the Congo kingdom, and the establishment of army and 
officials with European law to instill in the Comgolese 
11love of family and of labor.u38 But clearly in order 
to reach the capital of Congo at this time, the Portuguese 
would begin a major campaign since the roads were held 
by hostile "independent" natives who stopped or turned 
back all European travellers. For later in 1877, when 
36rbid., "Parecer.tt 
37ncongo," in official Portuguese correspondence, 
meant the Oongo kingdom, of the south bank. nzaireu 
meant the entire Oongo River, both banks and some of the 
coast to the north. 
38Boletim Official, 1872, No. 51, December 21. 
213 
another priest tried the road to Bembe, he was told at 
Ambriz that his chances for.safe travel were poor.39 
Monteiro noted in 1875 Portuguese could not pass from 
,., 
Bomat on the Congo, to Sao Salvador because of native 
fear "o.f the example o.f the occupation o.f Ambriz and 
Bembe mines by the Portuguese. 1140 
Amaral when he reviewed the situation in 1869 
counseled a cautious plan with regard to the Congo; 
to oppose with .force British policy, he felt, would be 
"the greatest of imprudences. 11 But it was true that 
the plan to intercept trade by intervening in the Congo 
kingdom udid not have any e.ffect. 1141 Indeed, interfering 
in tribal politics in the interior had been only an 
expedient, not an end o.f policy as .far as he was con-
cerned. nindependent tribesn in isolated and unhealthy 
regions were to be left alone. But on the Congo coast 
it was a different situation. 
Lisbon sent more vessels to cruise the Congo 
coast after 1869, Captain Jos~ Maria de Telles Basta, 
o.f the Infante Dom Henrigue corvette, surveyed conditions 
in the Congo mouth in 1870 and submitted his long report 
to the Governor-General in February 1871. Out o.f .five 
factories at Banana, one was Portuguese. Porto da Lenha 
39A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 47, No. 461, 18 October 1877. 
40Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, pp. 48-9. 
41 4 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta o, No. 265, 26 July 1869, 
Gov. Gen. Amaral to Lisbon. 
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had two English factories, one Spanish factory, and 
four Portuguese factories, and one Dutch branch house. 
Reporting that piracy continued uncontrolled, and that 
incidents on the river were mocking Portuguese juris-
diction, he urged a vessel of war be sent to noccupy 11 
the Congo mouth, and use Porto da Lenha as a base to 
command the river. 42 
Later accounts on the trade of the Congo mouth 
during 1870 to 1877 are divided over whether English 
or Dutch factories had the upper hand. Lord Mayo and 
Anstey claim the English were uppermost, but the Belgian 
Delcommune was certain that the Dutch, especially at 
Boma, were predominant. Most of the Portuguese in 
Boma in 1876, for example, were managing Dutch houses. 
Nevertheless, he noted that Portuguese trade competition 
was very strong, and in his words, neven ferocious.u43 
Portugal continued to harbor the faint hope that 
Britain would be obliged to relax her grip on ttnon-
recognition11 of rights to the Congo. Yet the Portuguese 
persisted in policies, however ephemeral, which hoped 
to educate African elites who lived in territories 
strategic to the great river. 
42 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 42, No. 61, 15 February 
1871, Basto to Governor-General enclosed. 
43Lord Mayo, De Rebus Africanis (London, 1883, 
Allen), pp. 15-35; Anstey, 11British Trade and Policy 
in West Central Africa,n Transactions of the Historical 
Society of Ghana, III, Part 1, 1957, pp. 50-70. Alexandre 
Delcommune, Vingt Annees de Vie Africaine (Vol. I, 
Brussels, 1922), pp. 60-61. · 
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Portugal's policy in Oabinda be~ore 1885 was 
similar to that used with the Oongo dynasty. A major 
traditional leader was supported against his rival and 
given special privileges to bring him into the Portu-
guese party. Manuel Jose Puna (or 11 Poonah, 11 as the 
English called him) was chie~ of Porto Rico in Oabinda, 
and was sent to Brazil some years be~ore 1822 at Portu-
guese expense in order to receive an education. Later 
in 1866 he made a visit to Portugal, 44 was baptized as 
a godson of King Luiz I, and in 1871 was made 11Baron 
o~ Oabinda, 11 a hereditary title of nobility. Manuel 
Puna remained ~riendly to the Portuguese and corres-
ponded with the governors o~ .Angola. His eldest sons 
in 1868 were taken to Luanda ~or primary education and 
later were sent to a school in Lisbon. Whatever the 
importance o~ PUna in Oabinda, it is clear he had been 
offered education by English naval officers, and re~used. 
His native rival, Francisco Franque, controlled a port 
a few miles north and was more ~riendly to the En.glish. 45 
Governor Andrade in his report of October 1873 
to Lisbon asked the pertinent question of actually where 
were the boundaries of Angola? He reflected the concern 
felt by Sa da Bandeira about the claim dispute with 
44 Grande Erlciclopedia P.eB., Vol. 5, p. 273, "Puna. 11 
45 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 38, Nos. 475, 495, 
16 September 1868, 11 0on~idencial, 11 Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
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Britain, and naturally connected the issue with the 
budget o~ the province. He claimed that Portugal had 
all the rights to the coast from ~ degrees 12 minutes 
to 18 degrees (Cape Frio), and he based the claim on 
treaties negotiated with native powers. Angola, he 
admitted, was not colonized. His point was well taken 
when he produced an impressive, if inaccurate, ratio 
o~ populations: there were 11four or ~ive thousand 
.Portuguese to three million Africans .. n46 The old themes 
of too many degredados and so much undeveloped wealth 
recurred. Portuguese emigration to Angola was vitally 
necessary.47 
Despite the patient attempts o~ diplomat 
Robert Morier, a suitable and acceptable treaty on 
claims to the Congo was not made in time before other 
powers became too interested to allow Portugal to have 
48 the mouth of the Congo. Portugal was not risking use 
ot force on the Congo and, indeed, had little opportunity 
to wield 1 t. Proposals for early colonial 11deals rt to 
make Britain drop her guard before 1875 had not received 
due consideration or energetic execution by Portuguese 
statesmen. 
46A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 42, No. 268, 4 November 
1872, Gov. Gen.; Andrade, Relatorios dos Governadores, 
Angola, p. 3, 84. 
47Most of the Portuguese emigration in the 19th 
century, over 75%, went to Brazil. J. P. Oliveira Martins, 
Brasil e as Col6nias Portuguesas (Lisbon, 1880), pp. 159, 229. 
48Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 8~140. 
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The new colonial movement in Portugal rising 
with the establishment of the Society of Geography in 
1875 and the Central Permanent Geographical Commission 
in 1876 kept the congo in mind. The great expedition 
which it raised at the beginning of 1877, and which left 
Lisbon in July of that year, was intended for explor-
ation up the Congo to trace its course.49 Another 
expedition, led by Henry Morton Stanley and backed by 
Anglo-American funds, reached Boma in August 1877, 
having left the East African coast nearly three years 
earlier and traced the entire Congo River course, thus 
altering the destination of the expedition from Lisbon. 
Moreover, Stanley's feat and his subsequent information 
on the Congo interested enough powerful groups to exclude 
all possibility of Portuguese monopoly of the river from 
that time on. 50 
A new period of our study begins with the arrival 
of Stanley at the Congo mouth and with the beginning 
of the Portuguese expedition to explore southern Africa 
in 1877. The interior of Angola would be more important 
to the Portuguese than ever before in the 19th century. 
c. The Dembos Rising and End of Dizimo Taxation 
Dembos country lies on the plateau north~ast of 
Luanda. Mountains and deep valleys compose this broken 
49serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa (London, 1881), 
pp. 16-25. 
5°Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 
pp. 169-70. 
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country, which even in the time of Oadornega had provided 
the native forces with natural stone fortresses against 
European intruders.51 Dembos as a region symbolized 
the uneven character of Portuguese occupation as close 
as it was to the coast and major developed regions as 
Golungo Alto. For centuries passage through Dembos 
followed a dangerous and uncertain path up the Dande 
River to Encoge, or a path directly north from Ambaca 
or Golungo Alto. Always a pocket of resistance for 
Portuguese control, allowing little settlement by 
Europeans, and hence very few slaves or libertos, the 
Dembos people were fierce warriors. Dembos became an 
independent concelho in 1810, separated from Golungo 
Alto by order of the Governor Oliveira Barbosa.52 
Governor Amaral in 1856 had proposed creating 
uone or two" new presidios in Dembos region, since 
Dembos had been hostile to the occupation of Bembe and 
was actually cutting off the coffee and other exports 
on the road from Encoge, Oazengo, and Golungo to Ambriz. 
Yet Amaral was too busy elsewhere to pacify the diffi-
cult country.53 Luanda, however, persisted in sending 
expeditions to appease the Dembos chiefs by gifts to 
51oadornega, Historia Geral, III, p. 202. 
52sarmento, Os Sertoes, p. 159. 
53 4 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 23, No. 133, February 
1857, Gov. Gen. 
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make them open the trade road to Bembe. One such 
expedition in 1862 was accompanied by a priest and 
offered a ndeal" to Dembo Namboangongo: no imposition 
of Portuguese dizimo if the Dembos offered carreto 
service to carry trade.54 
But Dembos remained hostile. Only a small 
Portuguese garrison remained at Encoge. Unlike other 
11vassalizedn sobas within the Portuguese system in 
northern Angola, the Dembos retained their native names 
and took no Portuguese titles as a rule. The chief 
Dembo, or Captain-Chief, was Caculo Cacahenda who in 
1880 was said to have 13~000 people under his rule.55 
Likh the Ambaca peoples, the Dembos were said to be 
able to count many of their number as literate in 
Portuguese 1 made possible by handing down the inform-
ation from father to son.56 
A modern historian with experience in Angola 
called the pacification of Dembos in the early 20th 
century "the most difficult and t.ii;qhest of all those 
in .A.ngola.n57 But in the 19th century an attempt to 
conquer Dembos was perhaps more difficult because of 
54 8 86 A.H.U., Pasta 30, No. 712, 1 June 1 2, 
Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
55sarmento, Os Sertoes, p. 161. 
56Henrique Galvgo, Dembos (Lisbon, 1935, Nos. 3, 
9, 17 in Pelo Imperio Series, Agencia Geral das Colonias), 
p. 14. 
57 ~., p. 5. 
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the small number o£ troops available to the Portuguese. 
Sarmento deplored the outcome o£ the so-called "Dembos 
War" o£ 1872-73, a low point in prestige and activity. 
And, let us tell the truth, what can one 
do in all the vast province of Angola, with 
a garrison composed of two thousand men, or 
little more? 
How is it possible to make the Portuguese 
name respected, and to punish severely those 
who either rebel and insult us or rob and 
steal, as happens in the interior? 58 · 
In Luanda the people were told that the Dembos 
campaigns had been victorious for the Portuguese and 
that_a favorable peace treaty was signed. What began 
as a revolt in Dembos against dizimo taxation and the 
capture of a Dembo became a general rising in Dande, 
Golungo Alto, Ambaca, and elsewhere. Portuguese 
settlers fled to the coast for their lives in 1872, 
and trade was uparalyzed."59 The upshot of his war, 
however, was more important than loss of lives and 
prestige for the administration: it caused a reappraisal 
and a temporary end to the direct taxation on interior 
districts. 
What were the causes of the Dembos War? In 
June 1872, after the war was several months old, a 
Portuguese settler, Silva Oliveira, wrote a complaining 
letter to Luanda saying Portugal was to blame for the 
58sarmento, ~· £!i., pp. 161-162. 
59G.E.P.eB., Vol. 8, p. 532, nDembos. 11 
221 
rebellion and war since Dembos took example from the 
rebels of Oassange a decade before. "That shamefuln 
peace of Oassange (1863), he added, gave spirit to 
other African rebels to take advantage of European 
merchants and property. Portugal should have conquered 
Oassange. 60 
Although the general "independent 11 nature of 
tribes like the Mbangala o:f Oassange reflected badly 
upon the Government, Dembos had a reputation for 
rebellion long before 1863. The old scourge of the 
colonial administration, the dizimo or hut tax on 
interior districts, caused rebellions in the 184o's. 
At that time a Prince of Congo, Dom Aleixo, played upon 
this grievance of the Dembos. 61 It seems more correct, 
therefore, to say that taxation sparked the 1872 rising 
west of Encoge. For after the dizimo was abolished 
officially at the end of November 1872, an explanation 
for the Government approval of the measure appeared in 
the Boletim Official. The abolition of 11 dizimos impostosu 
was decreed, 
••• since according to the general opinion 
it is the most logical corrective to these 
movements of brutal reaction of which the 
Dembos have been the ancient and the modern 
example. 62 
60Boletim Official, 1872, No. 25, 22 June 1872, 
pp. 274-5. 
61 . 84 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 8, No. 371D, 1 5, Gov. 
Gen. to Lisbon; Castelbranco, Hist6ria, pp. 195-6. 
62Boletim Official, 1873, No. 1, January 4, 
"Parte Nao Official..tt 
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The Government abolished three types of direct taxation 
on the natives in the interior concelhos: 11 dizimos dos 
concelhos,n toll charges over rivers, and fishing taxest?3 
In a long memorandum of November 1872 explaining the 
measure, the Minister tor Navy and Overseas, Jayme de 
Freitas Moniz wrote that the dizimo constituted a great 
danger for Angola. Early house or hut taxes, like 
the decima predial (floor tax) of 1808,had not taxed 
natives' huts of straw and sticks. But the dizimo tax 
on huts in the interior destroyed the very thing the 
administration sought: peace and security. 
The small population of Angola can be 
thus explained, and shows the causation of 
abandonment of territory that took place 
there after the increase of the hut tax 
(dizimo por fogo). Still today, almost ten 
years after the reduction of the tax by a 
punitive quota system, all the colored 
people who emigrated during the most oppressive 
period of'the tax have not returned to the 
province. It is sad to have to say it, but 
it seems that many found better favor in the 
lands of the bush natives than in the con-
celhos subject to the Portuguese government.64 
As a result, this direct tax, centuries old in Angola, 
was replaced by a 1% customs duty to be applied to 
exports and imports ~ valorem at Luanda, Benguela, 
and Mossamedes. 65 
63~, Supplemento ao No. 1, 1873, January 7. 
64B.O., 1873, No.2, January 11. "Parte Officialn; 
pp. 12-15.-
65 B.O., 1873, Supplemento ao No. 1, January 7. 
It is noteworthy that the customs house of Ambriz was not 
included in the new duty. The Government was trying to 
attract foreign capital and hence decided to reduce duties. 
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Relations between the Portuguese and Dembos were 
bad in 1871 but actual hostilities did not break out 
until early 1872. Two major attacks by Portuguese 
expeditions in April and in July of that year failed .to 
defeat the major Dembos, although a "neutral," Dembos 
Quibaxe, submitted. In September, after many Portuguese 
sallies to burn villages and open the trade routes, 
Dembos Caculo Cacahenda finally submitted. When Portu-
guese forces returned from the war in October 1872, 
Luanda gave them a royal welcome.66 Yet, in fact, the 
return of the forces was a sign of defeat and the abandon-
ment of Dembos by Portuguese authority. For Governor 
Andrade admitted that the area was abandoned with no 
military force existing there after 1872.67 
Unrest continued in Ambaca and Golungo Alto as 
a result of Dembos until March, 1873. Portuguese 
casualties in the affair were considerable in terms of 
the weakened state of the army and guerra preta system. 
One inflammatory journal in Luanda, suspected of 
Republican sentiments and treachery, o Mercantil, had 
revealed more casualties than the Government would admit, 
and asserted that t~e Dembos leaders actually were in 
contract with a European merchant in Luanda. The Dembos 
66castelbranco, Historia de Angola, p. 244. 
67 Andrade, Relat6rios dos Governadores, .Angola, 
pp. 84•85. 
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11 secretariesu could read and write Portuguese. 68 More-
over, Lisbon later learned that a detachment of one 
Lieutenant and 37 soldiers was missing in Dembos and 
given up for dead. 69 
Dembos was abandoned and taxes were no longer 
collected there. Although there were hopes of re-
occupying it at an opportune moment, the region was 
entered again only in 1890, and was finally pacified 
and administered only after 1910. Dembos left a repu-
tation for guerilla warfare, with ambushes, inexplicable 
escapes, and feats of endurance. A revealing letter 
from a settler toward the end of the "off1cial 11 campaign 
gave total casualties for the European side as n200 
soldiers wounded and dead, 3 officers killed and 3 
wounded.u70 
Dembos was no longer mentioned in monthly reports 
to the Government General from the interior after mid-
1873. Trade with regions passing near Dembos was not 
adversely affected for long. For an important wax and 
ivory caravan from Oassange reached Luanda in July 1872 
at the height of the campaigns.71 Although Dembos kept 
68Boletim Official, 1872, No. 41, October 12, 
Letter of 26 September 1872, from Sebastiao Nunes da 
Matta. 
69.Andrade, Relatorios, supra. 
I 
7°Bole~im Official, 1873, No. 41, October 11; 
Jornal do Commercia, 19 November 1872, p. 2, "Africa 
Occidental." 
71Boletim Official, 1872; Jornal do Commercia, 
4 September 1872. 
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open some of thei trade routes through their country, the 
area remained a pocket of independence, northeast of the 
capital. Apart from loss of prestige, the affair of 
1872 made the authorities in Lisbon and in Luanda with-
draw an old, ou~oded and largely ineffective, measure of 
control for the interior: the dizimo. It was one more 
move of the post-1863 trend of policy to concentrate 
on the coasts of the province. 
D. Eastern and Southern Angola 
In eastern Angola, or from Duque de Braganza to 
Oassange, steady trade between the Mbangala middlemen 
and the Portuguese continued with or without official 
Portuguese representation. After the establishment of 
a regular steamer service on the Ouanza about 1866, 
trade with this section of the province was given new 
encouragement to come west toward settlements north 
of the river. Portuguese merchants generally criticized 
the withdrawal of a force and a chefe from Oassange 
after 1863, since the Mbangala held the trade with an 
iron grip and had little mercy on settlers. Yet the 
Government wanted no responsibility for merchants who 
ventured or settled as far inland as Oassange. Governor 
Andrade had asserted this policy.72 in his first term, 
and later Governor Garrido in 1867 supported him. As 
he wrote Lisbon, "It is best for us to voluntarily 
72 ' 68 86 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 30, No. 7 , 1 July 1 2, 
Gov. Gen. 
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retire from the indicated plac·es [ Hum.be and Gambos in 
the south] and instead to raise our flag where it can 
fly freely and safely.n73 
Gar.rido believed in a withdrawal policy, and 
no more insecure footholds in the east and south. There 
was no useful purpose to wasting the scanty funds and 
lives. Governor Amaral, toward the end of his term, 
in a letter of April 1860 quoted by Garrido, had contra-
dicted this idea: 
I repeat that the security of this province 
calls for the most serious attention of the 
Government of his Majesty, above all, to desire 
the conservation of the recently occupied 
distant places. 74 
Garrido s-aid this was changed now, and that 
prestige with the chiefs of the interior was not possible 
with the weak resources at hand in Angola. In 1868 
Garrido argued the same policy with regard to the 
Congo kingdom, languishing and impoverished, and 
supported by a garrison of only ninety soldiers. The 
King, Pedro V, would be killed, he added, the moment 
the Portuguese forces left his isolated capital and 
stopped wasting funds in maintaining a "chafe" without 
"the least compensation 11 in trade.75 
73A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 37, 1867, Gov. Gen. 
Garrido to Lisbon. 
74Ibid., quotation by Garrido in his letter to 
Lisbon. 
75 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 38, 19 December 186 , 
Gov. Gen. 
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The rationale for maintaining other distant 
stations in Angola can be read in Garrido's discussion 
of the Congo. For he believed that only the coast was 
worthwhile and productive for revenue. Even so, his 
suggestion that merely 150 men could capture Quissembo 
for the administration was not acted upon.76 
Malanga garrison was apparently abandoned after 
a serious rebellion of 1863 when military degredados 
nose. Governor Garrido supported this abandonment as 
well as that of Cassange, and the Government in Lisbon 
agreed.77 A new force of soldiers was placed at Malanga 
in 1871, however, by Governor Ponte e Horta.78 Malanga's 
situation was similar to the problems of other interior 
districts. Critical pens wrote Lisbon that the major 
instigators of native rebellions were the njudges, 
officers, chafes of concelhos, tax collectors, etc.n79 
The soldiers representing Portugal in the interior, 
as at Malanga, were mainly negro recruits. Their deser-
tions were frequent. During the Bonga rebellions in 
Mozambique, the Governor of Angola was asked to raise 
a native army to help in those campaigns. In 1869 
Garrido replied that the natives would not serve in 
( 1887)' 
76ill9:_. 
77Jornal do 
78Guilherme 
p. 4. 
Commercio, 4 September 1872, n.Angola. 11 
I Capello, Relatorio do Governdador 
. . 
79Jornal do Commercia, 10 Mar'h 1864. 
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Mozambique except by force and they would desert if they 
heard of service in East Africa. The raising of a 
battalion at that moment was 11 impossible,n he believed, 
and would endanger the territory. Hard pressed to raise 
some force, he decided that certain interior districts 
in eastern Angola might produce soldiers$ 80 
In training native soldiers for several months, 
the main problems were to pre"Vent desertion and. to teach 
them Portuguese. The Eastern regions, the Governor 
added, were not so warlike as districts to the south, 
near Benguela and Mossamedes, where the natives were 
the Bailundo, Bihe, and Nano. But since these groups 
were not 11vassalized,n he could not attempt their 
recruitment nwithout risking the invasionaand destruction 
of the districts o:f Benguela and Mossamedes.u81 
It is not clear if an expeditionary battalion 
was actually raised in Angola in 1869. But the problem, 
once brought up, revealed the weakness and undependability 
of the army~ In 1876 Governor Albuquerque found the 
armed force in the same state. After two months as 
Governor, he placed absolutely no trust in the soldiers. 
80 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 40, No. 62, 19 January 
1869, Gov. Gen. 
81 ~e, An attempt was made to raise a force 
in six or eight months. 
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Echoing the words of Governor Sousa Ooutinho in the 
18th century, Albuquer~ue said that these soldiers "did 
not deserve the name of troops 11 but were a turbulent 
collection of criminals and deserters.82 The equipment 
of the Government at Luanda was little better than 
the soldiers since the Governor found it nearly 
impossible to raise vessels and transports to carry 
troops from Luanda to Mossamedes for a campaign against 
the Nanos. 
Meanwhile in Mozambique, Portuguese efforts were 
concentrated from 1868 to 1875 in campaigns against 
rebels in Zambezia region. Attention to Angola suffered 
in this period. Moreover, several of Angola's most 
active and outstanding expansionmst Governors, Amaral 
and Oosta Leal, were enlisted to administer Mozambique 
and end the unrest. Both veterans of campaigns in 
Angola succumbed to the deadly climate of the Eastern 
Ooast. Portugal's colonial elite were not spared the 
rigors of several posts of adversity.83 
82A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 46, No. 3~5, 30 July 1876 
report, Gov. Gen • .Albuquerque, enclosed is 110onfidencial,n 
of Gov. Gen. Andrade, 19 November 1875. 
83Filipe Almeida de E9a, Hist6ria das Guerras 
no Zambeze, 1807-1888 (Lisbon, 1954, 2 vols.), II, 
pp. 442-491. Colonel Fernando da Oosta Leal, former 
Governor of Mossamedes, died as Governor of Mozambique 
in 1869. Oosta Leal lead campaigns for expansion in 
Southern Angola. General Jose Rodrigues Ooelho do 
Amaral (1808-1873) was Minister of Navy and Overseas 
for six months in 1868. After a year as Governor of 
Angola, he went to Mozambique as Governor for three 
years (1870-1873), where he died. 
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The health of Governors-G~neral of Angola was 
rarely good, whether residing in Luanda or traveling in 
the bush. But relatively few men succumbed in office 
in comparison with administrators in Mozambique. Amaral 
had two terms as Governor of Angola, and once was Governor 
of Benguela over a period of twenty years- Andrade was 
recalled to service a second time in 1872 for the Dembos 
campaign but by 1875 complained to Lisbon of deteriorating 
health. Much of his service in Angola was spent 11in the 
most unhealthy places of Africa as Ambriz, Bembe, Encoge 
and s. Salvador of Oongo."84 He resigned, but lived to 
a ripe old age, dying in Portugal in 1902.85 
The problem of climate, together with certain 
diseases and epidemics common in the territory, had a 
definite influence upon Portuguese activity and upon 
their native charges. One of the more important reasons 
for the abandonment of Bembe, Encoge and S. Salvador by 
1870 was the effect of the deadly climate upon the 
garrisons. In 1873 the Government officially abolished 
tb.e "Ooncelho do D. Pedro v,n created in 1856 with. 
hopes of rejuvenating the budget of Angola.8 6 This 
capped an effort whose failure was in part due to the 
traditional deadly climate of Congo. 
84 4 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 5, No. 397, 2 August 
1875, Gov. Gen. 
85 4 G.E.P.eB., Vol. II, pp. 539•5 o. 
86aelio Felgas, Hist6ria do Congo Portugu~se 
(Carmona, 1958), p. 113, Felgas fails to mention the 
climate factor as a motive. 
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The smallpox epidemic of 1864-1865 had an 
important and terrible impact upon the native population 
of Angola. To this scourge may be attributed the 
weakening of the Portuguese armed mobility in the field 
for several decades thereafter, and also the general 
complication of the problem of labor shortage. Although 
Castelbranco estimated that 25,000 natives died, and an 
incomplete estimate this writer made from contemporary 
reports was a little over 25,000, this number is undoubtedly 
far short of the truth. 87 A list of European mortality 
in these smallpox years, 1864-65, indicates a significant 
increase, yet how many died of smallpox is not known. 
Smallpox appeared first in this epidemic at 
Ambrizette in February 1864 transferred by a vessel 
88 from Europe. It spread down the coast by vessels, 
and by June 1864 had reached such a critical stage that 
the Government-General issued in the Boletim Official 
a "General Instructions" for all persons, including 
natives, containing methods for combatting bexigas or 
variola (smallpox). Spreading to eastern Angola with 
the frequent trade caravans, the disease wiped out 
entire villages and made others migrate in fear of the 
scourge. Trade was paralyzed and, as in all epidemics 
87oastelbranco. Hist6ria de Angola, p. 117. See 
details in Appendix IV. -
88Boletim Official, 1864; Jornal do Commercia, 
2 September 1864. 
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in agricultural regions, a £amine fo+lowed since farmers 
abandoned their fields.89 A great famine gripped Angola 
for the latter half of 1864 and the early months of 
1865. Reportedly, Golungo Alto district, in closest 
contact with Europeans in number, su£fered the greatest 
number of deaths from the epidemic. Negroes suffered 
the worst, pardos or mulattoes not so much, and whites 
hardly at all.9° 
By mia-1865 the epidemic had died out but had 
passed on further south to Southwest Africa, and to 
Sao Thome island among amher places.91 Clearly smallpox 
remained endemic in some areas, and occasionally as in 
1873-75 broke out again in Angola in epidemic form. 
Certain authorities like Bastos attributed to smallpox 
the beginning of the real diminution of the native 
pppulation, later aided by sleeping sickness.92 Monteiro 
said Bembe was deserted in the early 1870's due to 
"several epidemics of sma11-pox.u93 
The native population of Angola, the true 
economic support of the European minority, had been 
89Jornal do Commeroio, 4 September 1864. 
9°Boletim Official, 1865, No.4, January 21. 
91Heinrich Vedder, South West Africa in Early 
Times (London, Oxford University Press, 1938~, p. 150. 
92Augusto Bastos, nMonographia de Catumbella,u 
B.S.G.L., Serie 28, No. 3, March 1910, No. 4, p. 109. 
93Monteiro, Angola, 1876 edition, p. 108. 
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decimated by smallpox for centuries. Inevitably epidemic 
caused migration, and the Portuguese monthly official 
reports from interior districts were careful to include 
on their forms information on native emigration, and the 
causes. 
Estimates of the population of the Portuguese-
controlled regions called "Angolan are inexact and differ.94 
Europeans 
1845 estimate 1,832 
1855 (Livingstone) 
1855 estimate for S. Angola 
{Ladislau Magyar) 
1856 census 
1869 estimate 
1869-70 estimate of 
Gov. Amaral 
1873 estimate of 
Gov. Andrade 
1,500 
2,863 
1 ,600 
4-5,000 
Mulattoes Negroes 
5,770 4oo,ooo 
6oo,ooo 
1,880,000 
32,000 600,000 
430,000 
3,000,000 
The European population showed a steady increase in 
Anga~a only after 1870. It is difficult to figure into 
the native population regions later taken under Portuguese 
94Al.so see Appendix11t. The 1845 estimate is 
from the Estatistica of Joaquim Lopes de Lima, quoted in 
Gerardo Pery, Geographia e Estatistica Geral (Lisbon, 
1875), pp. 356-7, along w1 th the 1869 figure' from the 
report of the Navy and Overseas Ministry by Corvo. 
Livingstone's estimate can be found in a letter to England 
in 1855, in Isaac Schapera, Livingstone's Missionary 
Corres~ondence, 1841-1856 (London, 1961 ), p. 296. Ladislau 
~:? . .::d. Magyars estimate of 1855. The 1856. census is in Vogel, 
Le Portugal, p. 542. Governor Amaral's estimate is found 
in his letters, A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 40, November, December, 
1869. Gov. Andrade's rather arbitrary figures are in his 1873 
report in Relat6rios dos Governadores (Lisbon, 1875), p. 84, 
u.Angola. 11 
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control atter 1890. But considering the high rate o~ 
mortality among natives near Portuguese settlements, 
whether ~rom epidemic, alcoholism, or other European 
importations, it would seem the native population re-
mained stationary in numbers, i~ it held its own. 
The region and town o~ Mossamedes, first colonized 
in 1840, enjoyed some measure o~ progress after the first 
~ew difficult years. Considered as almost an exclusively 
agricultural region, as opposed to a great volume o~ 
trade north of the Ouanza, Mossamedes built up a small 
European colony along the lines o~ a plantation system. 
In 1849 and 1850 two boatloads ~rom Brazil added about 
300 settlers.95 In 1854 the population was estimated 
at 256 whites, 29 mulattoes and 481 slaves. In 1857 a 
small German colony of about thirty arrived at Huila 
on the plateau and was constantly attacked by the 
Mondombes, or the Nanos as the Portuguese called them.96 
Several other groups ~rom Brazil arrived at Mossamedes 
in the next decade. By 1866 there were about 756 
whites, 48 mulattoes, and 2,345 slaves and libertos in 
the district of Mossamedes created by law in 1856. Since 
the area was more healthy than regions to the north, 
considerable numbers o~ women accompanied the colonies, 
and there were fewer mulatto offspring. The white 
95Felner, Angola, I, p. 20. 
96Felner, Ibid., III, Document No. 12, p. 50. 
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population had tripled since 1854 but the slaveJ..,popul.ation, 
significantly, had quintupled.97 
The farms and stations on the plateau above 
Mossamedes, such as Bumbo, Huila, Gamboa, Jau, Oapangombe, 
and Humbe, and tiny isolated farms, led ephemeral exis-
tences after 1860 due to periodic severe draughts, native 
raids, and little continuous aid from coastal authorities. 
There was little or no Portuguese armed influence and 
the Nanos raided at will. Although certain cotton and 
sugar crops continued to hold their own, the area suffered 
from poor transport facilities for carrying goods down to 
the coast. Nevertheless in Mossamedes district from an 
early date the Portuguese employed many draft oxen, ~ 
cavallos, for carrying merchandise. North of the Ouanza 
the climate did not allow the survival of so many oxen 
as in the south. South of Mossamedes along the coast a 
modest fishing industry flourished under the tutelage 
of Algarvian fishermen.98 
Expansion in southern Angola was in part condi-
tioned by the proximity of English traders and settlers 
on the coast of Southwest Africa near Walfish Bay. 
Especially after 1850, reports reached the Portuguese 
of English activity near the unmarked southern frontier. 
The border was usually considered at 18 degrees south 
97Gerardo Pery, Geographia, p. 357. 
98Felner, Angola, I, pp. 20-25; III, Doc. No. 23, 
pp. 74-77. 
236 
latitude, or near Cape Frio. Alfredo Duprat, the Portu-
guese Consul-General and Commissioner at Cape Town was 
a key expansionist and informant about British activity 
in southern Africa. His reports urged expansion from 
both coasts into Central Africa, north of Transvaal, and 
also into the hinterland of lngola.99 
When in 1868, however, Duprat made a suggestion 
about a possible expansion south of Mossamedes on the 
coast, the Governor of Benguela decided to expand 
control within the regular lines of communication. and 
to end once and for all raids from Seles territory 
directly east of Egito. The scattered Portuguese 
settlers at Benguela, Egito and Novo Redondo had long 
been harrassed by such raids, and by the successful 
escape of tb.eir slaves into this nno man's land.u 
Although the Governor-General disapproved of tb.e inde-
pendent action of his colleague at Benguela, he was 
pleased with the results. An expedition from Benguela, 
aided by detachments of guerra·preta under the Sova of 
Galangue went into Seles and "vassalizedu the most 
important chiefs who had raided farms on the rivers 
north of Lobito. 100 The Governor-General at Luanda 
praised this bit of internal expansion between Luanda 
99A.H,U., Angola, Pasta 38, No. 407, 21 August 
1868, Letter Alfredo Duprat to Lisbon, clippings enclosed. 
100Ralph Delgado, A Famosa e Historica Benguela, 
pp. 226-7. 
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snd Benguela, and his reasoning gave away the tendency 
in the official mind of the administration to favor the 
coast at· the expense of the interior. As he wrote about 
Sales in 1868: 
Considering that sert'o is of great 
fettility and importance, principally because 
it extends down to the coast, it should 
therefore be kept occupied and established 
there, as the ~ facto dominion belonging 
to the Portuguese crown, in order to become, 
as necessarily it will become, a new source 
of wealth for the province. 101 
Centralization of administration and more control 
from Lisbon became the rUles of policy in this period. 
Angola was referred to in official correspondence as a 
nProvince" as it was in the Constitutional Charter of 
Portugal. But on the books of law, the name was still 
ntb.e kingdoms of Angola and Benguela,n a term from the 
17th century. By a decree of December 1869, the nKingdoms 11 
were united into one province with districts and concelhos 
(councils or sub-divisions). In fact, administration 
had worked this way for decades, and this 1869 law 
signified merely a traditional lag in Portuguese law-
making.102 But the trend for centralization and concen-
tration on the coasts were prime tenets of an established 
policy'. 
The Government's attitude to expansion beyond 
the coasts of Angola and Mozambique can be illustrated 
101 .A..H~U., .Angola, Pasta 38, No. 531, 18 November 
1868, Gov. Gen. 
102nelgado, Benguela, p. 231. 
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by the decisions of the Junta Consultiva in Lisbon, 
mne policy-making council within the Ministry for the 
Navy and overseas, 103 with regard to Mozambique parti-
cularly. In 1869 the Governor of Quelimane, Mozambique, 
proposed to Lisbon the creation of a new interior district 
by an occupying force of 120 men. The Governor feared 
eventual English encroachment in this region, nominally 
Portuguese. The ~ta Consultiva vetoed the suggestion 
since there was a campaign proceeding at the time in the 
Zambezia region, and since there were no men nor resources 
to spare to pacify the reputedly powerful tribes in 
what is now Southern Rhodesia. 104 
Alfredo Duprat in the period from 1870 to 1875 
also made proposals about expansion similar to that 
made by the Governor of Quelimane. Generally, his ideas 
met a negative response from Lisbon. Although a treaty 
between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic in 1869 
had left the boundaries of each party undetermined in 
Central Africa, the ~unta decided that expansion at the 
moment was completely impractical and impossible to 
carry out. 
The boundaries proposed by the Consul 
General are situated in territory very 
isolated from the points of our effective 
occupation in the province of Mozambique, 
103The Junta Consultiva was the name of the 
Oonselho Ultramarine after 1868. 
104 A.H.U., ~ta Consultiva (J. ~.), Pasta 207, 
1870, No. 395. 
and they even inc~ude a very great portion 
of lands never occupied by us. 105 
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In 1872 Duprat's idea for a personal land con-
cession was also turned down, and he was told to mind 
land concessions he a~ready possessed in Angola. The 
Junta made a definite distinction between nominal 
control and effective control as regards the interior, 
and considered the coast near Lourenyo Marques as the 
valuable region to protect and develop for revenue 
from Transvaa~ trade. A Company proposing establishment 
of steam navigation on the Zambesi met the same dis-
approval in Lisbon for reasons of lack of capital to 
make even the initial engineering surveys.106 In effect, 
the Lisbon policy ws~ for concentration on both coasts, 
with a particular emphasis upon developing main ports 
for customs revenue. The interior was considered out 
of reach and impractical for the present. 
Until the rise to power in the Ministry for 
Navy and Overseas of Jo~o Andrade Corvo, a staunch 
expansionist, schemes for interior expansion fell upon 
deaf ears. When Co:r•vo came to power during 1875-76 
and later, however, he found many officials in Portugal 
and in Africa who stuck to the coastal policy formulated 
after 1863. Governor Garrido in Angola in 1867-68 had 
105A.H.U., J.c., Pasta 207, No. 798, 1870, June 30. 
106A.H.U., J.C., Pasta 212, No. 39, 11 January 
1872, 1875-76. J.C., Pasta 212, No. 68, 31 December 1875. 
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won his argument with Lisbon and had abandoned 11 for 
goodn isolated stations as Humbe, Gambos, and Oassange, 
feeling that the waste of means on maintaining prestige 
in the interior was no substitute for security on the 
coasts in the more developed districta. 107 
The interior seemed a secondary issue compared 
to the coast of Oongo and available trade north of 
Luanda. Those who held to concentration on the coasts 
could point to the significant increase in the trade in 
Angola from 1869 to 1875, which increased by some 25% in 
that short time. Indeed the revenue from customs, the 
largest item on the budget, in the decade 1863-1873 had 
tripled from 133 contos to 390 contos. Reports on 
increases in busmness and trade after 1865 were generally 
favorable to a policy of keeping the status guo and not 
bothering the interior, but bringing more fiscal control 
108 to bear upon the coasts. Governor Garrido had 
speculated for Lisbon that to capture the thriving port 
of Quisembo would take only 150 men. 109 Nothing, however, 
came of this suggestion. 
Petitions of private persons as Alfredo Duprat 
or Silva Porto, or interested geographical groups met 
little response from Lisbon until after 1876. Yet even 
107Jornal do Commercia, 4 September 1872. 
108J. Andrade Oorvo, Estudos sobre As Provincias 
Ultramarinas (Lisbon, 1883, 4 vols.), I, pp. 208-9. · 
109A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 38, 19 December 1868, 
Gov. Gen. 
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in Africa, officials to a very late period felt attempts 
to move into the bush with authority were useless. In 
1875 the resident chefe at Quilengues south of Benguela 
reported native attacks on his fortress, in which 
Portuguese settlers participated to gain cattle. He 
concluded that to remain in that isolated place was a 
.useless waste of men and money for the administration. 110 
Governor General Alexandre Albuquerque (1876-79) 
represented an excellent example of the tendency to 
prefer the coast to the interior for very practical 
reasons. In his first month of administration he 
reported that uthe Treasury is completely exhausted.n111 
This drawback plus his conviction that the entire admin-
istration needed an overhauling led him to assert the 
policy of his predecessors in Luanda. Angola could 
never control its own territory until the coast of 
Congo, from 5 degrees 12 to 8 degrees south latitude 
was completely occupied and controlled. The interior 
was merely the feeder of trade for the coastal ports. 
No. 58. 
On the contrary, following my illustrious 
predecessors I will tell your Excellency that 
the expansion [internamento] of the province 
into the interior is an evil without compen-
sation ••• for the major settlements are like 
so many other islands drowned in a limitless 
110 4 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 5, 15 December 1 75, 
1 1 1 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 46, No. 317, 22 June 1876. 
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native ocean; ••• then it is sadly necessary 
to confess it, our empire in the interior is 
imaginary. 112 
Albuquerque knew that all rights or pretensions 
to the interior or eastern Angola would not be given up, 
but he felt past campaigns in Dembos and Cassange, dis-
astrous in result, precluded the benefits of interior 
occupation. Other Governors before him had withdrawn 
isolated garrisons. Perhaps attempts to expand into 
the hostile bush with a bankrupt treasury and a pro-
vincial army led mainly by convicts and deserters would 
end in the complete ~ of Angola in the future. He 
constantly deplored, 
••• the heavy sums consumed in disastrous 
wars we have fought, we would do better to 
develop a certain strip of the coast where 
we can exercise secure real influence. 113 
The old golden fleece, the "northern coast, 11 
remained in his mind the reward to be captured to save 
Angola•s .future. 
Albuquerque, when he 1~ote this report in 
October 1877, had already visited with Henry Morton 
Stanley after his successful tracing o.f the Congo 
River. Stanley had spent time with the Portuguese 
officials discussing the potential o.f the Congo River 
112 4 6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 2 7, 19 October 
1877, Gov. Gen. 
11 3~., Relat6rio o.f Gov. Gen. Albuquerque. 
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as a highway into Central Africa and a trade center. 114 
Yet the Governor interpreted Stanley's in£ormation to 
mean that the Congo mouth would be all the more valuable 
in Portuga1 1 s possession. Ideas of getting £urther 
into the interior did not occur to him, and those who 
attempted it, as the members o£ the 1877 expedition to 
explore southern Africa, found little aid £rom Luanda 
and almost complete anarchy and native paramountcy in 
the interior of Angola. The policy of the administrators 
with a coastal perspective bore £ruit when Serpa Pinto, 
Oapelo, and Ivens made their hapless way onto the Benguela 
plateau in 1877. The results o£ their journeys, and 
of others before them who crossed Angola, would rouse 
the administration to a realization that more responsibility 
for the interior would have to be taken in the future. 
E. The Colonial Movement, New Style. and After 1875 
It is difficult to date the exact beginning of 
the second phase o£ the colonial movement begun in the 
1830's by S~ da Bandeira. But the £ounding o£ the 
Society of Geography of Lisbon in 1875 by Luciano 
Cordeiro and his friends is a useful watershed. At this 
same time, Andrade Oorvo was Minister for Overseas and 
114Diario de Not!cias (Lisbon daily); reports 
on Stanley's reception in Luanda on September 16, 1877, 
appeared in the press in Lisbon, November 1-2, and were 
highly complimentary and favorable to the explorer. 
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was encouraging new schemes to develop the Portuguese 
territories in Africa, with a special emphasis upon 
Angola. 11 5 Equally important in placing the beginning 
of the new surge of interest in Africa, was the upshot 
of the travels, writings and speeches of Verney Lovett 
Cameron, an English naval officer. 
Came~on~crossed Africa from Tanganyika to Angola, 
passing in 1874-75 through central Angola and emerging 
at Benguela. What Livingstone had feared about the 
route from Central Africa to Benguela in 1853-54 was 
strongly confirmed by the observations and writings of 
Cameron. 116 Cameron met a number of mulatto traders 
as Lourenco de Souza Coimbra, in Barotseland, trading 
for slaves and raiding outlying territory. With consider-
able difficulty and hardship he managed to contract a 
mulatto guide for the route to Benguela. Shocked by 
the condition of the Bihe plateau, and the complete 
freedom of lawless traders, he exclaimed: "The Govern-
ment of Portugal cannot·be cognisant of the atrocities 
committed by men claiming to be her subjects. 1111 7 
115corvo•s special interest and activity with 
regard to Angola, in contrast to Mozambique, can be 
discenned in the greater material on Angola in his 
important magnum opus of 1883, Estudos sobre ~s Provincias 
Ultramarinas. 
116Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 426. 
11 7cameEDn~ Across Africa (London, 1885 edition), 
pp. 387-8. 
Naturally the Bih' middlemen resented his 
presence in the country and said he would cause the 
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area to be opened up to foreign traders and compet1tion. 118 
Finding no evidence of Portuguese authority whatsoever 
on the plateau before Benguela, the English explorer 
was somewhat soothed by the hospitality he received when 
he fell ill and recuperated in Benguela and in Luanda. 
Came~om1in his book, written after he returned to England, 
exposed what he termed "a vast amount o:f internal slave-
tradett in Angola and in Central .Africa. 11 9 His writings 
and speeches after 1875 represented another edition of 
the writings of Livingstone in the 186o's, and it is 
clear Cameron aad an immediate effect upon Portuguese 
opinion and the press. Later in 1877, when Stanley :first 
emerged from the Congo, the Lisbon press in November 1st 
and 2nd articles, contained a series called ucameron 
and Stanley," in which Stanley's exploration was praised 
at the expense of Cameron. Moreover, the articles made 
clear that Stanley's first pronouncements upon Portuguese 
activity in the Congo region in September 1877 were 
generally favorable. 120 Later, after he left Luanda, 
his letters to the English press had a different tone. 121 
118~.' p. 472. 
11 9Ibid., pp. 528-9. 
-
120Diario de Noticias, 1-2 November 1877. 
121 Stanley, H. M., Across the Dark Continent 
(London, 1877), I, pp. 1-40. 
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Other events caused Portugal to renew public 
interest in the African territories. The International 
Geographical Conference o£ Brussels was called by King 
Leopold II o£ Belgium in September 1876 to consider the 
opening up o£ Central Africa. Portugal did not receive 
an invitation. It is not clear whether Leopold's 
meetings with Cameron in England, a £ew months be£ore 
the Con£erence, determined his action. 1222 But the British 
representative in Lisbon, Robert Morier, noticed an 
immediate effect of this 11unintentional slight, 11 as he 
termed it, upon Portuguese public opinion, and noted 
that the Government was planning two exploration schemes 
for Central Africa.1 23 
Two expeditions were to start, one on each coast, 
and they were to meet in the region between Angola and 
Mozambique. Another, better equipped expedition, was 
to survey the Congo River and try to discover the 
sources. Stanley did not appear until six months after 
this dispatch o£ February 1877· In the meantime, Morier 
also noted the effect of Cameron•s speeches upon the 
Portuguese Parliament, some of whose members early in 
1877 criticized the ulanguage" of the explorer. 124 
122 Anstey, Britain and the Congo, :pp. 57-8. 
123 P.R.O., F.O. 63/1117, 26 February::1877, Morier 
to F.O. 
124 P.R.O .. , F.O. 63/1117, 13 February 1877, Morier 
to Beaconsfield. 
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The Portuguese were stirred also by news of 
German explorers in Angola. In 1874 a Dr. Guessfeldt 
sought porters at Novo Redondo for an expedition based 
at Landana. Guessfeldt's great difficulties of hiring 
carriers made it imperative he "buyn the services of 
Portuguese libertos. 12~>cThe Government at Luanda was no 
less embarrassed and uncomfortable to find the plight 
of several other German explorers in 1875-76: porters 
were not available and, t?J~aen hired, as in the case of 
Dr. Falkenstein at Novo Redondo, they deserted their 
leaders. Dr. Alexander Von Homeyer traveled from 
Luanda to Malange on a scientific expedition in mid-
1875, but his difficulties, together with suspicion as 
to his intentions, showed the Portuguese they needed to 
send their own expedition to explore Angola. 126 Moreover, 
the sad condition of the country gave men like Andrade 
Oorvo and Luciano Cordeiro cause to cry :for reform in 
Lisbon. 
By the end of 1874, Angola was recovering from 
a severe two-year drought which adversely affected all 
trade. Yet Portuguese trade was increasing as evidenced 
by the establishment of the first substantial Portuguese 
factory at Ambrizette in August 1874, in spite of the 
125A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 44, 18 September 1874, 
No. 4oo, Gov. Gen. 
126 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 46, 20 May 1876, No. 198, 
Gov. Gen.; Pasta 45, No. 353, 30 July 1875, Gov. Gen. 
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feeling of native hostility towards the Portuguese in 
that area. 127 
In Lisbon, Andrade Corvo was encouraging projects 
to reform activity in Africa. In 1876, in conjunction 
with the exploring expeditions planned, a nPublic Works 
Commission" was organized to direct expeditions to 
Angola and Mozamb.ique and the islands and to construct 
railroads, bridges, roads, and telegraph lines. Loans 
were obtained for expeditions to both Angola and Mozambique 
in 1876-77 t and by June 1877 the first Public 1'lorks group 
had arrived in Luanda to begin work on a railroad. 128 
The idea of sending a Portuguese expedition to 
Angola was not new in 1876 when Andrade Corvo created 
the Commissao Central Per.manente de Geographia to work 
with the Society of Geography of Lisbon. si da Bandeira 
held the idea several years before. Silva Porto had 
written of it as early as 1868 in his journa1. 129 It 
is clear the first conception of the goal of the 
exploration was to cover the territory between both 
coasts, and to "linkn the two Portuguese provinces. A 
public subscription fund was organized to help finance 
it, and later the Government gave a subsidy. 13° Yet 
121 I P.R.O., F.O. 63 1115, 1 September 1874, Hawkins 
to Stanley. 
128Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 28-34. 
129 Silva Porto, Viagens, Vol. V, 1868, pp. 102-3. 
130E;.; A. Oliveira Martins, 11A Sociedade de Geographia 
nas Explora9oes Africanas do Se'culo XIX, 11 B.S.G.L., Serie 69, 
July-August 1951, Nos. 7-8, pp. 399-407. 
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£rom the beginning, although publio opinion was aroused 
to an unusual extent over the project, there was dis-
agreement as to the purpose of the expedition. Three 
persons with experience in Africa were chosen: Serpa 
Pinto, an army officer, and Oapelo and Ivens, two naval 
of£icers. The disagreement between these men over the 
course o£ exploration from Angola symbolized the rift 
between those Portuguese who wanted to develop only 
coastal regions and those who wanted to drive deep into 
Oentral Africa. 131 
Serpa Pinto felt that a cross-continental march 
was the best goal for the group after it arrived in 
Angola. Oapelo and Ivens believed a thorough investi-
gation of Angola was best. Nevertheless, when the 
expedition left Lisbon on July 7, 1877, there was 
little hint that disagreement would eventually break 
up the group. 132 
The group arrived at Luanda in August 1877, and 
shortly thereafter Stanley appeared at Boma, having 
traced the entire course of the Oongo. One assignment 
of the Portuguese expedition was cancelled when they 
learned of Stanley's triumph, but the Portuguese 
explorers were in fact inspired and encouraged by 
Stanley's advice and information about traveling in the 
131~., p. 403. 
132Diario de Noticias, 9 July 1877. 
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interior. l3.3 Now the expedition was to exp~ore the 
Cunene and Cubango Rivers and it was conjectured that 
the Cunene might be an aff~uent of the Zambesi and 
134 that this would enable them to reach Mozambique. 
The destination of the three Portuguese explorers became 
the town of Que~imane. 
This expedition of 1877 was doomed to u~timate 
failure in terms of exploring extensively the region 
between Angola and Mozambique. For within five months 
of arrival in Angola, after many long delays and cursing 
of the meager resources and equipment provided by the 
Lisbon Government, the explorers split up and went their 
different ways: Serpa Pinto striking out alone, and 
Capelo and Ivens together on their own. 
By 1877, although the first foot of railway 
would not be laid for another decade, there were 
definite signs that Angola's economy enjoyed moderate 
prosperity. There was an upward trend within half a 
dozen years of the end of the costly wars north of the 
Cuanza. Agriculture increased production, and trade 
movement improved. 135 Joaquim Monteiro who knew Angola 
well during the years 1858 to 1875 wrote that trade and 
133Numerous references to advice and information 
from Stanley appear in the books by the explorers who 
met him in August and September, 1877. Their works 
testify to his influence. 
134serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa, pp. 15-25. 
l35see the figures in Appendix XII. 
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light industry had increased significantly in his time. 
The province no longer needed an annual subsidy from 
Portugal to pay its way after 1866. Steam navigation 
on the Cuanza made Dondo into a small boom town for at 
least a decade and a half after the steamers began in 
1866. 136 But activity was only important within one 
hundred miles of the coast. Portuguese trade influence 
was uneven. Only a vital instrument of change could 
alter the pattern of river transportation: that would 
be the task of tb.e railways. 
The year 1877 was an important dividing point 
in the history of .Angola. For the first time national 
expeditions composed of active men reached the territory 
outside the Government of Angola. Although their 
activities did not measure up to the original plans, 
their later writings had a profound effect upon the 
decision of the Lisbon Government to take up more 
activity and responsibility for the sertao on the plateaus 
of Angola. 
136Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo (1876 
edition), pp. 62-77; 235-40. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE WAY TO BERLIN, 1877-1888 
••• that ~earful tarif~-loving nation, the Portuguese. 
-Henry Morton Stanley to the 
Manchester Chamber o~ Commerce (1884). 
CHAPTER VI 
THE WAY TO BERLIN, 1877-1885 
A. The Expedition o:f 1877-79 and New Colonial Ef:fort 
The nationally sponsored expedition arrived in 
Luanda in August 1877 with several counts already against 
it. There was a growing disagreement in Lisbon and 
among the explorers themselves as to the exact destin-
ation of the expedition. Secondly, the highest official 
in Angola to aid the explorers, who were virtual strangers 
to the interior o:f the territory, was the anti-expansionist, 
Governor, Alexandre Albuquerque. And thirdly, to the 
knowledge o:f the best in:formed, conditions o:f security 
and travel were deplorable. 
Officially sponsored exploration in Angola had 
a long history, but the last important attempt to cross 
Central Africa and reach Mozambique had been that o:f 
the sertanejo Silva Porto 1 in 1853-54. Chosen to lead 
a caravan to Mozambique :fo1lowing the footsteps of an 
Arab expedition which had reached Benguela :from the 
other coast, Silva Porto was appointed "Captain of 
1sertanejo means, literally, one who lives in 
the hinterland. But in 19th century Angola, it meant 
also trader, merchant. 
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Passages" by the Governor of Benguela, and instructed to 
carry correspondence to and from Mozambique and to com-
2 pose an itinerary o~ the journey. The hardy explorer, 
already with sixteen years experience in the interior, 
reached the upper Zambesi but was oblige_d by illness 
and native hostility to turn back. His men, however, 
reached Ibo, Mozambique, in August 1854.3 
Other Portuguese exploration, especially in the 
1840's and 1850's, reached as far east as the Lunda 
kingdom, east o~ the Kasai River, and perhaps a few 
trading caravans had reached the great lakes by 1860. 
Gra9a, Ladislau Magyar (a Hungarian citizen), Bernardino 
Brochado, and Fernando Costa Leal were some of the more 
famous explorers in central-southern Angola up to 1865. 
But over a decade had passed when, in 1877, the inaugur-
ators of the new phase of the colonial movement landed 
at Luanda. 
After meeting and conferring with Stanley in 
August and September, the explorers traveled to Benguela 
to engage porters for the expedition. The exploration 
of the Congo River itself had been taken from them by 
Stanley's ~eat, and the Oubango and Cunene Rivers 
became the initial goals, with Mozambique the ~inal 
2nelgado, A Famosa e Hist6rica Benguela, pp. 197-8. 
3Ga$tio Sousa Dias, Silva Porto e a Travessia 
do Continents Africano (Lisbon,· 1938). 
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destination. After four to five months of delays, 
desertions of porters, insufficient supplies, and little 
reaction from Lisbon, the 'explorers reached the Bih' 
plateau. It was here that Serpa Pinto decided to set 
out on his own and attempt to reach Quelimane. Oapelo 
and Ivens stayed together, apparently not interested in, 
nor determined to reach the other coast, and planned to 
explore to the northeast of Bihe. 4 
Serpa Pinto, in explaining the separation of 
the expedition in his later book, pretended that Oapelo 
and Ivens had deserted him for no reason and left him 
with insufficient supplies.5 In fact, he had made 
the decision to strike out alone in the tradition and 
example of his friend Stanley, doing so from a disagree-
ment about direction of exploration, and from his own 
ambitions. 6 
Serpa Pinto, after receiving aid from Silva 
Porto in Bih~, set out across eastern Angola and reached 
Barotseland, or 11 Lu1. 11 Experiencing severe illnesses, 
4Francisco d'Assis d'Oliveira Martins, Hermenegildo 
Oapelo e Roberto Ivens (Lisbon, 1951-52, 2 vols.), these 
volumes contain important correspondence regarding the 
expedition. 
5serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa, pp. 20-25. 
6Eduardo de Noronha, 0 EXElorador Serpa Pinto 
(Lisbon, 1936), p. 17. This interpretation of the vital 
influence of Stanley upon Serpa Pinto's decision to 
separate the expedition is the result of my research, 
based on letters in manuscript in the Society of Geography 
in Lisbon. See references. 
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desertions of porters, and brushes with numerous half-
caste slavers, he remained determined by 1878 to "open 
a road" to Zumbo, the last station of the Portuguese 
on the Zambesi, and continue to the coast.7 In Barotseland, 
he barely failed to persuade the chief to aid his expedi-
tion to Zumbo·, and was told to return to Bihe'. He 
turned south, and came upon the settlement of the 
Missionary Fran9ois Coillard and his wife, where he 
was nursed back to health. 8 But Coillard did not have 
sufficient supplies to enable Serpa Pinto to reach 
Zumbo either. And after a short trip to Victoria Falls, 
where he met a number of Englishmen, he decided to give 
up the idea of descending the Zambesi River. Instead, 
Serpa Pinto traveled to Shoshong, Bechuanaland, on to 
Pretoria, Transvaal, and then Durban, Natal, by 1879.9 
The results of Serpa Pinto's journey were not 
very important for geography, and in fact began disputes 
7serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa, p. 184. 
8 Ibid., pp. 242-266. 
-
9serpa Pinto was convinced traveling alone would 
help him reach Mozambique. As he wrote from Oaconda 
in 1878 to the Governor of Benguela: "Cameron, Stanley, 
and Livingstone crossed Africa because they went alone, 
if they had had companions, nothing would have been 
done ••• n Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, Res. 1, 
Pasta F-5, Cart as ·Particulares do Ex· ·lorador Ser a Pinto 
ao entao Governador de Ben uela ••• de 7 December 1 7 
a 1 de December 1 79, Letter No. 5, 2 January 1 7 , 
Serpa Pinto to Pereira de Mello. 
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10 
among Portuguese colonialists. But the political 
implications were significant. The Government at 
Lisbon after 1877 did practically nothing to aid the 
explorer. In fact, Englishmen and Frenchmen upon 
several occasions in Central Africa saved the life of 
the traveler. Serpa Pinto failed to reach Portuguese 
territory on the eastern coast for exactly the same 
reasons that stopped Silva Porto in 1853: illnesses, 
native hostility and complete native control of the 
country beyond Zumbo, and scanty Government aid. It 
was symbolic of Portuguese impotenc~ in the interior, 
that Serpa Pinto had to head through English territory 
to safely reach the coast, instead of proceeding through 
Mozambique. The ideal of establishing a "commercial 
road" through central Africa was not yet a reality, and 
the problem of the watershed of Congo-Zambesi still lay 
unsolved. .Later the founder of the Society of Geography, 
Luaiano Cordeiro, lamented the pitiful aid given the 
explorers by the Portuguese Government. 11 
Compared with aid given to later expeditions, 
the help offered the 1877 expedition was slight. Only 
in the 1880's did Portugal manage to equip efficient 
1
°For much of the literature on the conferences, 
lectures and discussions on Serpa Pinto's exploration 
see Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, As conferencias (de Serpa 
Pinto), (Lisbon, 1879). 
11 rmprensa Nacional, Regresso dos Benem~ritos 
ExplDradores Capello e Ivens (Lisbon, 1S87), pp. 14-18. 
Letter, Luciano Cordeiro to C~pelo and Ivens, 26 January 
1885. 
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expeditions. In 1886 the "Pinheiro Chagas Expedition," 
which explored from Ibo Mozambique to Blantyre, Nyasaland, 
was very well-provided for. The British Consul reported 
to London that "no expense 11 had been spared to equip 
the expedition of Lieutenant Cardoso~1 2 
Serpa Pinto returned to Portugal in 1879 and 
began to write his book. Apparently he modeled the 
title on the famous best-seller of his idol Stanley, 
How I Found Livingstone (London, 1872).13 In dealing 
with the dangerous and unsettled conditions of the 
Angolan plateau, Serpa Pinto supported Cameron's 
criticisms of the internal slave trade carried. on by 
Portuguese at Caconda, Bihe, and further east. Moreover, 
he lamented the lack of security in interior Angola, 
and the obvious absence of Portuguese contro1. 14 Pri-
vately, he wrote friends about the ntrue slaveryn he 
saw on the plateau. 15 
Experiences in Bihe convinced him that Portugal 
had to take responsibility for the interior, or suffer 
foreign encroachment and continual native independence. 
12P.R.O., F.O. 63/1188, No. 13, 28 June 1886, 
O'Neill to Salisbury. 
13serpa Pinto was in London when he finished 
his book called How I Crossed Africa (London, 1881) or 
Oo~nc BU AA~ravessei a Africa. 
14serpa Pinto, ~., pp. 240-260. 
15soc1edade de Geographia, Cartas Particulares 
do Explorador Serpa Pinto ••• , Letter No. 5, 6, 1878. 
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He encouraged a "secret 11 plan to nbuy" the Bihe{ region 
from Silva Porto, who he thought really owned it, and 
to occupy the region as the center of Angola's economy. 
He considered Bihe the 11 primary strategic place of 
Western Africa.tt16 Criticizing Government neglect and 
inertia, his ideas for post-1880 1-rere reasonable. 
The occupation of Bih~ is the certainty 
of having the primary strategic place of Western 
Africa, it is the security of trade in the 
interior, it is the autonomy of the province 
of Benguela, and it is the Portuguese monopoly 
of trade in Southern tropical Africa •••• 
Belgium and England, within a few years, will 
divert the interior trade of our colonies to 
the great routes they are opening to the Congo, 
and to the south, Walwich Bay [sic] , thus 
annihilating the province of Angola, destined 
to die isolated •••• The Treaty of Lourenyo 
Marques would be very advantageous for us if, 
within it, the boundaries of our eastern 
colonies are demarcated, and if Lourenyo 
Marques would be made a free Port; for without 
these two clauses, it will be the death of 
Mozambique. 17 
It is significant that the ideas of Serpa Pinto 
in 1880, after returning from Central Africa, contained 
no specific plan for fulfilling the original goal of 
the "Expediya'o Africo-Portuguezan of 1877. That plan 
had been to achieve the nroad to the other coast 11 by 
passing through Bihi, to Lake Bangweulu, across Lake 
Nyasa and on to the coast of Mozambique. 18 Serpa Pinto 
16sociedade de Geographia, Cartas de Serpa Pinto 
ao Secretario Perpetuo da Sociedade de Geographia de 
Lisboa, 1876-84, Letter No. 54, 5 May 188o,·serpa Pinto 
to Cordeiro, 11 Confidencial .. 11 
17ng. 
18Diario de Not{cias, 29 October 1877; 
21 November, 20 December 1877. 
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envisioned no plan to reach the central region beyond 
Bih,, and in fact, Bihl was the sole object of his 
thoughts. The writings of Silva Porto, a longtime resi-
dent of Bihe, who had called for the occupation o! Bihe 
in 1850, influenced the young explorer. 19 His predic-
tions of Belgian activity in Central Africa were far-
sighted. Apparently, he had no illusions about the 
Treaty of Lourenyo Marques with Britain, but he erred 
in believing England was going to harm the Portuguese 
in Angola with activity in southwest Africa.2° 
Oapelo and Ivens had no specific plans for 
occupations by Portugal. Their journey began at Benguela, 
passed through Bihe, up the Ouango valley and to Oassange 
fair. That Oapelo and Ivens did not reach Mozambique 
in this the first of their expeditions was due to their 
own attitude of wanting to explore only the Ouango and 
the hostile attitude of the Mbangalas near Oassange. 21 
19Diario de Notfcias, 29 October 1877. Silva 
Porto immediately volunteered his services to the 
expedition and supplied porters and equipment at his 
own expense. It seemed his dream had come true--an 
actual scientific expedition arrived after his years 
of calling for action from the Government. 
20Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 89, for the 
contents of the Treaty of Lourenco Marques, which was 
negotiated between 1878 and 1882, never agreed upon or 
ratified. Essentially it provided for a more liberal 
tariff policy in the port. 
21oapelo and Ivens, De Benguella ~s Terras de 
Iacca, II, pp. 23-4. 
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At one point the explorers contemplated passing east of 
the Ouango, but the difficult situation changed their 
minds. They met many of the same things encountered by 
Serpa Pinto: Native hostility, illness, absence of 
Portuguese authority and slave trade. Turning back at 
Oassange, the two explorers traveled back to Luanda by 
way of Duque de Braganza and the ouanza River. 
In their two volume work, De Benguella ~s Terras 
de Iacca (Lisbon, 1881), Oapelo and Ivens confirmed 
many accusations of Cameron except about the northern 
section of the territory. Slavery and internal slave 
trade continued in central and northeastern Angola, 
partly influenced by Arabs. 22 Angola was changing now, 
with missions appearing in the interior, but life for 
the European on the plateaus would be difficult if not 
impossible. They indicated no specific region for 
colonization, but most importantly they stressed that 
the Portuguese had to leave the sickly coast and move 
to the plateau. rrTo the plateau, therefore, is our 
pat.h. u23 . 
We must escape, we repeat, from the 
coastal region, and if we try to live there, 
we will die, for the great continent is 
condemned by that truth to the immobility 
in which we find it today. 24 
22oapelo and Ivens, De Benguella, II, p. 253. 
23Ibid., II, p. 262. 
-
24Ibid., 
-
II, p. 267. 
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The explorers were not liberal thinkers for 
their day about the African since they wrote that the 
liberto did not merit freedom in 1881 but needed a great 
deal of preparation. 25 But they expressed an attitude 
which symbolized at least a modification in Portuguese 
opinion. Like Livingstone, they publically stood up 
for the future progress and consideration of the Negro 
and in doing so, directly condemned the effects they 
observed of Portuguese administration in Angola. 
11Certainly, they wrote, he is not to blame [the Negro], 
but the one who rules him. n26 
The expedition of Capelo and Ivens provided 
Portugal with a thorough geographic survey, and 
climatological study of the plateau out by the Ouango 
valley; but despite the new knowledge of interior Angola, 
~' learned that German explorers had penetrated 
even further east before their own expedition. Lt. A. E. 
Lux, a military instructor at Eisenstadt, traveled during 
1875-76 from Luanda to Dando to Sanza, past Cassange 
to Kimbundu, nearly 100 miles further east than Oapelo 
and Ivens. His survey 1dth excellent maps appeared in 
1880 as Von Luanda Nach Kimbundu. 27 Together with a 
25Ibid., II, p. 254. 
26~., II, p. 252. 
27Lux, Von Luanda Nach Kimbundu (Wien, 1880); 
Lux accompanied Dr. Pogge and other Germans on this 
expedition to Angola. See Pogge's work, Im Reiche des 
Muata Jamvo (Berlin, 1880). 
262 
host of other enterprising and thorough German explorers 
in central and northern Angola, Lux represented a threat 
to Portuguese sovereignty. In the 1880 1 s when Portugal 
wanted to occupy east of Oassange, the "German threat" 
became more serious. 28 
The work of Oapelo, Ivens, and Serpa Pinto 
spurred expansion plans in Portugal. Minister of Navy 
and Overseas Andrade Corvo used the information of 
Oapelo and Ivens when he temporarily placed the eastern 
frontiers of Angola at the Ouango River up to where it 
joined the Oongo. 29 Serpa Pinto was conferring with the 
Overseas Ministry after his return to Portugal in 1879, 
and his plan for occupying Bihe must have been considered, 1 
I But in the meantime, JUlio de Vilhena (see Appendix) 
worked out a plan for establishing "civilizing stationsn 
in the interior of Angola in 1881. The first station was 
to be located at Nokki, on the left bank of the Congo. 
Wooden buildings and supplies were shipped out from 
Lisbon for this future station in 1882.3° As Minister 
I for NaVY and overseas, JUlio de Vilhena began public 
subscription funds for building the stations he planned 
to put in Angola and Mozambique. Later, long after this 
28A.H.U., Angola, Pastas 4, 7, 1884, Gov. Gen. 
correspondence. 
29Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, p. 62. 
3°Accounts and Papers, 1883, Vol. XLVIII, O. 3531, 
"Correspondence," 14 October 1882, Consul Cohen to Lord 
Granville, No. 17, 16. 
method of finance had failed miserably, he laid the 
blame for the loss of the band across Africa to the 
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rabid politicians who had made Portuguese Government so 
unstable and ephemeral.31 
In 1880 and 1881 important works appeared in 
Lisbon which decried Government neglect of Angola and 
criticized the attitude of the public toward Africa. 
Antonio J. Seixas, a writer and former official with 
long experience in Angola,32 wrote in A Quest~ Oolonial 
that warfare with natives had crippled Angola and 
Mozambique, and that, true to the revelations of the 
explorers on the expedition of 1877, the interior was 
in a wretched condition. Angola, he felt, was more 
valuable than Mozambique, but both colonies had been 
wrongly considered "Eldorados.n Alfredo de Sarmento, as 
,.., 
well, criticized Portuguese colonization in Os Sertoes 
d 1 Africa (1880). He urged immediate occupation in 
Angola, for what Cameron and Livingstone had written 
was true: Portuguese sovereignty was limited to recog-
nition by nsome Chiefs in the vicinity of the presidios 
or settlements.u33 
31Vilhena, J~io, Antes Da Rep£blica, I, pp. 73-78. 
32see articles on Angola in Jornal do Commercio, 
1860, 1864 et. al. by Seixas. 
33seixas, A Questa'o Colonial, fP• 75-77; See 
also Alfredo de Sarmento, Os SertWes D Africa (Lisbon, 
1880), pp. 220-25. 
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In the meantime, new developments were taking 
place in the diplomatic world. Toward the end of the 
187o•s Britain and Portugal came closer than ever 
before or after in the 19th century to cooperation over 
colonial affairs. In 1877 the British diplomat Robert 
Morier came to Lisbon, and by working with Andrade Corvo, 
Morier hoped to create for the future 
••• a ugrand design n f_or the opening up of 
Portuguese Africa, present and future, and 
for a new era of Anglo-Portuguese colonial 
cooperation possessing possibilities of the 
most fruitful kind. 34 
Essentially, this plan involved a drastic lowering of 
Portuguese tariffs or customs on both the eastern and 
western coasts and a military cooperation between the 
two nations with regard to Transvaal. Portugal would 
allow free trade on the great rivers in Africa, in 
return :for protection and aid :from Britain. The chance 
for the success of such a plan was won and lost during 
1879~81 and the dilemma centered mainly around Portugal's 
Congo claim. This latter problem will be discussed in 
the last section of this chapter. 
Diplomat Morier found a nearly kindred spirit 
in Joio Andrade Corvo, Minister several times during 
Marier's stay in Lisbon. Corvo35 was an Anglophile with 
34Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 229. 
35Anstey, Ibid., PP• 85-87, 90, 95. Marier remarked 
that Corvo was in and out of power due to the unstable 
politics, but that only with him in office could he hope 
to engineer a liberal design for the Portuguese colonies. 
a rationalist tinge and he realized that Portugal could 
do no better for her claims to colonial territory in 
A£rica than to ally closely with England and erase the 
enmity of the past half century. In 1883 he published 
his magnum opus on the colonial problem, Estudos Sabre 
as Provincias Ultramarinas. In these volumes we may 
read the program of the Anglophile party. 
Corvo represented a younger version of the 
I liberal Sa da Bandeira in that he worked for free labor 
policies and free trade in Africa. The monopoly trade 
system in Angola was based on a 11false principle,n 
ruining the economy.36 Using many of the same arguments 
as were used in his mentor's Trabalho Rural Afrioano, 
written a decade before, he asserted .that unless free 
labor was established in Angola, the future was black 
indeed.37 
To Andrade Corvo's Estudos politicians could 
look for a plea for patching up the Ancient Alliance 
as the natural answer to fear of territorial loss or 
decay. Alliance with England for developing Portuguese 
Africa could include the proposed settlement of the 
Oongo claim and treaties over Louren9o Marques.38 
Without cooperation 1dth England in lowering custom 
36Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 160-162. 
37~., I, p. 17. 
38~., I, PP• 38-39. 
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duties in Angola and in maintaining free trade on rivers, 
Portugal would not achieve her territorial claims north 
of Luanda, and without this territory, Angola could never 
control her territory or develop as a unit.39 
The contra-costa idea was not explicit in 
Andrade Corvo's work. He considered that the major 
problem was transportation from the plateau down to the 
coasts in Africa. .For .Angola the most important matter 
to conclude was the treaty for the Congo area.40 So far, 
petty politicians had undermined negotiations in Portugal 
by virtue of their personal greed and factious attitudes. 
Plans for Angola followed the work begun with 
the arrival of the Commission of Public Works at Luanda 
in June 1877. Corvo outlined their activities, such 
as the laying of some 344 kilometers of telegraph line 
from Luanda toward Dongo, the key entrepot on the Ouanza. 
After 1877 some 168 kilometers of road were built under 
the Commission, and surveying for a .forthcoming railway 
was progressing. Up to 1877 steam navigation on the 
Ouanza was deemed sufficient for the needs of the province, 
but engineers were now planning a railway from Luanda 
to Oalumbo according to a very dusty and pigeon-holed 
plan of 1862-64 under Minister Mendes Lea1. 41 
39Ibid., I, pp. 41-42. 
-40~., I, p. 157. 
41Andrade Oorvo, Estudos, I, pp. 228-241. 
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Andrade Corvo's Estudos were an eloquent polemic 
to convince anti-colonialists in Portugal, and anti-
expansion~sts in Africa, that foreign powers would 
gobble up what they had so long neglected. Africa had 
to be developed. "For the Ministry today that does not 
pay attention to the colonies cannot survive."42 That 
this kind of statement was necessary for a nation so 
long involved in activity overseas can only be explained 
by the political situation in Portugal in the 1870's 
and 188o's. In the main, the enemies of empire were 
the growing party of Republicans in Lisbon and Oporto. 
Identifying their cause with extreme reform in the 
metropolis, Republicans criticized the Monarchy for 
favoring colonial effort at the expense of the lower 
classes.43 
Republican opposition to colonial effort grew 
apace after the first strike in Portugal in 1872. This 
opposition remained intact throughout the 188o's, 
thriving on writings by Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins 
(1845-94), socialist economist. Curiously, the founder 
of the colonial movement of 1875, Luciano Cordeiro, had 
in 1868 written a socialist pamphlet advocating the sale 
43For literature with this attitude see Oliveira 
Martins, Brazil e as Ool~nias Portuguezas (Lisbon, 1880), 
Portugal Contemporiii'iea (Lisbon, 1881, 2 vols.), Politica 
e Economia Nactional (Oporto, 1885), Bazilio Telles, 
Do Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro, (Oporto, 1905). 
268 
of the colonies. 44 Contrary to Cordeiro who turned a 
volte ~' Oliveira Martins remained convinced, before 
the "Ultimatum." of 1890 united the nation in an African 
policy temporarily, that colonies were ruinous for a 
poor nation like Portugal. 11Brazil is a better colony 
for us than Africa; however, the best of all our colonies 
would be our own kingdom,tt45 he wrote in 1880. 
The pleas of Andrade Corvo for unity over Africa 
in 1883 become clearer against the background of anti-
colonialism. Republican programs opposed colonial 
effort from a financial rationale, when Republicans in 
France were doing the same and when finance was in 
Portugal by far the most important question. Until 
1890, when the temporary unity brought by the 11Ultimatum.u 
shook the Monarchy to its roots, large public support 
was nebulous for positive action in .A.frica. 46 At that 
time, even Oliveira Martins changed his tune to the 
tempo of the day and supported a program for colonization 
overseas. 47 
Portugal, therefore, was deeply divided at a 
crucial moment for effort in Africa. Both mechanical 
p. 229. 
44oliveira Martins, F. A., Oliveira Martins, p. 34. 
45 Oliveira Martins, J. P. , .Brazil e as Colo'nias, 
46see new opinion in his Portugal em Africa 
(Oporto, 1891), p. 219. 
47Marques do Lavradio, Portugal em Africa depois 
de 1 8 51 , p. 1 70. 
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and ideological difficulties undermined liberal solutions 
to the lack of development in Angola. The turbulence of 
politics marred progress. Oorvo wrote: t'The invertebrate 
Parliamentary political administration failed to fix a 
48 
constant African policy.u Moreover, the upheaval of 
socialism came late to Portugal compared with other 
European nations, and when it arrived, it became con-
founded with a hyper-sensitive nationalism and a severe 
financial problem. 
Andrade Oorvo's work of 1883 contained intelligent 
proposals for the future of Angola. Yet again, the coast 
was considered perhaps more important than the interior, 
especially in the Mossamedes district.49 A road had 
to be constructed from Mossamedes to Huila to develop 
the region, which was in a sorry state. Epidemics, as 
well as the habitual slave trade, had devastated the 
native populations of Ouroca. Both scourges caused 
unfortunate native migrations. 50 This southern district, 
however, was envisioned as the most important agricul-
tural district in Angola because of the healthy climate 
and good soil. Most important, Mossamedes needed 
European colonists and in a hurry. 
In sum, the Estudos represented a liberal state-
ment worthy of the school of Sa da Bandeira. Shorn of 
48Andrade Oorvo, Estudos, I, p. 47. 
49.Andrade Oorvo, Esiiudos, I, p. 282. 
50ibid., I, pp. 288-91. 
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impossible demands and incredible dreams, the expansion 
ideas were reasonable and based upon traditional activity 
in Angola. Above all, the author said that Portugal, in 
order to survive in Africa, had to come out of the 17th 
and 18th centuries, and try to change with the rest of 
Europe. 51 
B. The Boers in Southern Angola 
In Southern Angola trans:pertation facilities, 
Portuguese· administration, and :public security were 
suffering from the inertia of a small and stagnant 
population. Few if any European colonists by 1880 were 
emigrating to Angola, and those who remained tended to 
stay on the coast as traders, or close to the coast on 
:plantations of sugar and cotton. Traders in the interior 
of Mossamedes as well as Benguela had a tendency to 
succumb to ttTradism," or the subordination of one • s 
cultural background for the sake of obtaining trade with 
natives. 52 The southern districts of Angola had even 
less military :protection in 1880 than those near Luanda, 
the capital. If Mossamedes had in garrison more military 
units, :perhaps the administration could have stopped 
those settlers Nat Humbe and Gambos from "going native 11 
and adopting native dress to call on the Ouanhama peoples. 53 
51 ~., I, pp. 35-37. 
52This term, describing a Portuguese trait, will 
be explained in more detail in the conclusion, Chapter VIII. 
53Felner, Angola, I, p. 64. 
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Public security on roads and trade routes was 
~ at this time, and ~ew communications were secure. 
Anarchy dominated the bush. Escaped libertos took easy 
re~uge in the trackless wilderness east of the coast.54 
The ~ew stations that remained after the occupations 
under Governors Amaral and Costa Leal, were in decay 
and near abandonment. The o~ficer at Quilengues recom-
mended abandonment o~ his post in a discouraged letter 
0~ 1875. 55 
Lack o~ Portuguese control o~ the region com-
bined with new rumors and ~ears of English activity to 
the south. The French missionary Padre Duparquet was 
active in Mosaamedes after 1870, and his travelB beyond 
the Cunene ended in the ~ounding o~ a mission near Huila. 
Rumors ~lew in Mossamedes that Duparquet was an English 
agent ready to spread English rule and influence. That 
Cassandra of Portuguese expansion, Al~redo Duprat, reported 
articles ~rom the Cape Times o~ 1877 to the e~~ect that 
the English merchants and o~~icials were moving north 
of Cape Frio up to the Cunene River. Realizing the 
delicate state o~ Portuguese administration in this 
district, Duprat warned Portugal of the dangers of leaving 
southern Angola unprotected.5 6 
54 Ibid., I, pp. 74-82. 
55 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta Serie 1875, No. 443, 
19 October 1875. Monthly Report from Chefe o~ Quilengues. 
56A.H.U., Angola, Pasta I-1, No. 108, 4 December 
1877, Consul Duprat in London to Costa e Silva, Lisbon. 
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In this region the administration o£ Luanda felt 
that Humbe, near the Cunene, was _too valuable a station 
to lose to English encroachment.57 The southern boundary 
of Angola was usually considered to be 18 degrees south 
latitude. This was nearly one degree south of the mouth 
o£ the Cunene. Given the limited power of the Portuguese 
armed £orce, it was reasonable to think that some new 
£orce or bulwark was needed in this section. The river 
valley of Cunene was a natural place £or settlement, since 
it was normally devoid o£ the droughts which periodically 
ruined sections further north.58 
The Governor o£ Mossamedes in December 1879 
received a strange letter from a settler at Curoca. 
Mistakenly, observers reported that "English" had attacked 
a band o£ natives there, and that these natives were 
fleeing into Angola. Soon an English gunboat in the 
port o£ Mossamedes corrected the report by saying that 
this was a case of a group of trekking Boers attacking 
natives on their move across the Cunene into Angola.59 
Thus the famous nThirstland Trekkers 11 made their first 
appearance in Angola at a time when Portugal needed aid 
from native and English threats. It seemed that the 
57 4 A.H.Uo, Angola, Pasta I-1, No. 71, 2 December 
1 881 , Gov. Gen. 
58Felner, Angola, I, pp. 74-77. For material on 
Duparquet see Felner, I, pp. 87-90, and Duparquet's 
Voyage en Cimbebasie (Lyons, 1881 ) • 
59Felner, Angola, I, pp. 90-91. 
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Boers were the answer to the problem of security, for 
their fighting prowess against the African was famous. 
They could easily forget the severe criticism of the 
Boers' treatment of natives set forth by Dr. Livingstone 
in his articles of 1854 and later books. 60 
The Boer groups that crossed the Cunene had 
been traveling off and on for over five years from 
Transvaal on a quest for better lands and more freedom 
from administration. Settling for a while in regions 
of Southwest Africa, most of them packed up and left 
when they suspected more English interference. 61 Angola 
was to be the next promised land for the 4oo who survived 
the 1400 mile trek from the south. Some groups left 
in 1875, others in 1877 upon the annexation of the 
Transvaal Republic. Nearly half the men, women, and 
children died on the trek, but they found that at first 
the ~ortuguese were very happy to see them. Those who 
knew about the reception of the Boers under Louis 
62 Trio hard in 18 38 at Del ago a Bay, Mozambique, might 
well have expected traditional ~ortuguese hospitality 
in .Angola. 
6oBolet1m Official (Angola), 1854, No. 483, 
December 30, Supplement, "Apontamentos,n ~art I. The 
Boers are called 11 The Dutch." 
61Lawrence Green, Lords of the Last Frontier, 
pp. 110-116. . 
62warhurst, Anglo-~ortuguese Relations, p. 110. 
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The leader of the Boers when they entered Angola 
was Jacobus Frederick Botha, whose daughter later was 
to marry one of the most famous of the conquistadores 
of southern Angola, Artur de Paiva. His trekkers, 
when south of Mossamedes, found themselves harrassed 
by native hordes described in irate Portuguese news 
articles in 1879 as Mond.~mb~s. 63 That ubarely nominal 11 
sovereignty of the administration away from the coast 
was discovered well by the first Boer families, and 
quickly they achieved a reputation for always winning, 
but with a taste of cruelty that even the desperate 
Portuguese would despise. 
The precedent for land concessions and foreign 
settlement in southern Angola was promising for the 
newly-arrived Boers. In June 1868 the Governor-General 
learned of several English families who fled to Mossamedes 
after escaping Hottentot attacks near Walfisb. Bay. The 
Governor gave them permission to settle, giving them 
residence papers, bilhetes de rezidencia, and his 
rationale for the concession was his hope for more trade 
with Englishmen on the island of St. Helena. 64 Land-
holding by foreigners thus had one clear precedent before 
1880. 
63Jornal do Commercio, 13 August, 20 August 1879, 
signed articles by A. F. Nogueira called 11Mossamedes." 
64A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 38, No. 299, 21 June 1868, 
Gov. Gen. 
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In 1880 a delegation of leading Boers entered 
Mossamedes to negotiate with the Portuguese for a place 
to settle. Landa near Humpata on the plateau was 
chosen for the first Boer homes and by 1881 most of the 
original group were settled and beginning an irrigation 
canal for their town. 65 This land was considered by 
the Portuguese to be choice; about 7500 acres were given 
to a group of over 400 settlers. To the north and east, 
other families spread out in isolated places. 
An agreement between Jacobus Botha and the 
Governor of Mossamedes was signed in September 1880 and 
the "Colony of sa'o Janua:rio" was officially underway. 
Privileges given the Boer families were impressive, for 
each family was offered two hectares (about five acres) 
free with opportunity for more. Certain 11freedoms 11 
were given the colonists: freedom of religion, freedom 
from taxation for the first ten years of residence in 
Angola, freedom to use own language, in return for 
obeying the laws of the territory. The Boers could 
66 elect their own representative for the local town. 
The Boers, with their great carts and a con-
siderable amount of cattle which they brought in with 
65Felner, Angola, I, pp. 90-95; Green, Lords, 
p. 118. 
66 Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 
III, No. 10, October 1881, pp. 588-9. 
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them, proceeded to bring about a minor transportation 
revolution near Mossamedes. They began building roads 
£rom the plateau down to the coast, and aided the settle-
ment o£ a new group o£ colonists £rom the Madeira islands. 
By 1900 Boer carts were running regular transport routes 
£or merchandise from Mossamedes to Huila to Caconda and 
on to Bih,, taking the place of the traditional porters. 67 
The Portuguese were impressed with "this indefatigable 
racen who never seemed tired of travel. 
Perhaps the most important trait admired by the 
Portuguese was their ability in bush warfare against 
the African. In their first three decades of residence, 
Boers played an important role in pacification campaigns 
south and east of the Cuanza. 68 Accompanying Portuguese 
and gue~ra preta units, Boer commandos £ought in Bih,, 
Bailundo, and far east of the Cuanza in Ganguelas. Native 
raids on Mossamedes were virtually ended by the Boers. 69 
Artur de Paiva, son-in-law of the original Boer 
leader, Botha, was appointed Intendante for the Boer 
Colony at Humpata. His writings provide a balanced view 
of Boer character at the time, but seem to favor them 
against the Portuguese criticism which rapidly accumulated. 
South 
67Alexandre Malheiro, Chr6nicas Do BihJ, pp. 199-202. 
68Felner, Angola, I, p. 92. 
69James Johnston, R@alit~ Versus 
Central Africa (London, 18 3), pp. Romance in 60-62. 
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Paiva claimed that after 1880 exports and consequently 
customs revenue increased significantly at Mossamedes 
due to the Boers' work in transport. He was a close 
witness of their guerilla tactics in the field. Although 
the Boers by 1890 had shown signs of discontent, and some 
groups had already left Angola, Paiva beli~vaa the Portu-
guese government could eventually integrate them into the 
colonial society.70 His hopes were continued in the 
policy of Henrique de Paiva Oouceiro during 1907-1909.71 
The Boers were made citizens(nationalized en masse) 
in a ceremony at Humpata in 1882, but soon the Portuguese 
observed flaws in their new ttsaviors. 11 Natives reported 
the Boers raided and robbed their cattle. The Portu-
guese noticed that the game was fast disappearing due 
to the fact the Boers rarely missed and depended upon 
hunting more than farming for their livelihood. By 
1884, the Portuguese authorities were extremely suspicious 
of the new element in their midst, for in that year the 
first Boer families trekked back into Southwest Africa 
complaining that their cattle had contracted diseases 
at Httmpata. The Portuguese officials, however, dismissed 
this reason and claimed that the Boers were naturally 
nomadic and really wanted to return to South Africa. 72 
70Duffy, Portuguese Afr~ca, pp. 99-101. 
71Paiva Oouceiro, Angola (Dous Annos do Governo) 
(Lisbon, 1910), pp. 174-5; Artur de Paiva, Artur de Paiva 
(2 vols., Lisbon, 1938), Preface by Gastao Sousa D1as, I, 
pp. 280-285. 
72A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, Nos. 328, 739, 8 April, 
12 September 1884, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
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fully the Portuguese language was anathema. 
In ortier to achieve a neutralization of the Boers, 
in 1884 the Portuguese Government decided to accept the 
settlement of a group of ''Bastaards," or persons with 
Boer fathers and Hottentot mothers, from South Africa 
who migrated to Angola following the Boers. The Governor-
General Ferreira do Amaral continued the time-honored 
policy of 11 divide and rule," a Roman precept admired by 
the Portuguese. In allowing the uBastaards 11 to settle 
near the Boers at Humpata, he reasoned: 
Enemies of the Boers, their presence in 
Mossamedes is permitted by tb.e Portuguese 
authority ••• this will have the advantage 
of keeping the absorbent tendencies of the 
Boer colony in balance ••• and, therefore, 
I feel that besides the advantages ther.e are 
for the colonization of the southern plateau 
by a race superior to the natives here, it is 
a good policy to have present that element 
as an obstacle to Boer pretensions. 77 
.Although the 11Bastaards" and Boers squabbled at times, 
this idea did not materialize. For in 1909 a report 
confirmed that the two groups were often together and 
in some harmony.78 
Relations between the Boers and Portuguese 
became more and more strained. In 1910, 1911, and 19~8 
several thousand Boers trekked back to South Africa. 
Those remaining were impoverished and regressive in 
77A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 165, 11 February 
1884, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
78Paiva Oouceiro, Angola, pp. 179-80. 
character. Mainly hunters, they stayed as poor as, 
or poorer than, the Portugues~ settlers increasing 
around them.79 
A modern historian confessed the prevalent 
feeling among Portuguese in Mossamedes in 194o. 80 
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Seldom in our long colonial experience have 
we been so unfortunate as we were in the 
acceptance and exaltation of the Boers' colony, 
which produced nothing, took over the best lands, 
and kept them almost completely uncultivated. 
Portuguese assimilation policy failed in the 
case of the Boers. Disdaining Portuguese culture and 
contact, they nevertheless supported one important 
region of Angola for several decades. Remaining Boers 
in the Huila district in 1957 were described by a 
Portuguese as "regressiveu in character and, in fact, a 
poor white cla~s. 81 To the Portuguese the Boers owed 
their lands and homes beginning in 1880, but when their 
hosts desired their independence, it was too much to 
abide. The first Portuguese priest sent to Humpata to 
11convert" the Boers to Catholicism in 1881 (at the order 
of Lisbon) was bound for frustration. 82 Over the two 
generations that followed, the Portuguese changed far 
more than the Boer colony, a law unto themselves. 
1956). 
79Ernesto Machado, No Sul de Angola (Lisbon, 
80 Felner, Angola, I, p. 95. 
81 Manuel v. Guerreiro, 11Boersn de Angola,u 
Garcia de Orta, No. 1, ~1. 6, 1958, pp. 11-31. 
82 A.H.U., Junta Oonsultiva, 1880, No. 1770, 
11 Parecer, n 14 July 1881. 
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O. Native Policy is Reappraised 
According to the letters of the GovernorS-General 
to Lisbon, and official publications in Luanda, the old 
vassalage system with the sobas was maintained throughout 
the period of this study. Through various means of 
persuasion, the Portuguese built alliances with native 
powers for reasons of security, revenue, and labor. 
Formal treaties of tribute and vassalage were drawn up 
for the occasion of an agreement between a Portuguese 
officer, representing the Governor-General, and theoreti-
cally the King of Portugal, and the paramount soba. Some 
-
ot these treaties were very demanding of the native 
leaders. .An example in the n.A.ct of Homage and Vassalage" 
of 1838 by a Soba in the Duquede Braganza region (see 
Chapter III) indicates the c.omprehensi ve nature of the 
alliance and the Portuguese demands. In order to com-
pare policy in 1838 and in this period, it is worthwhile 
examining in detail a treaty of Vassalage signed in 
the Pungo Andongo region in August 1874. 
~ Oabanga, D. Ant6nio Francisco Brenardo of 
the nPedras Divisionu o:f the Ooncelho of Pungo Andongo 
promised to the Portuguese: 1) To respect Portuguese law 
and make his people do likewise. 2) To aid all merchants 
in the region and receive Portuguese peacefully. 3) To 
oblige his people to pursue agriculture and industry. 
4) To keep out of his Sobado (Ohieftancy) all deserters 
and escaped slaves. 5) To develop in his people European 
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religious feelings, and forbid the native custom of 
trial by poison, long prohibited in Portuguese law in 
.Angola. 83 6) 11Wot to emigrate to another concelho or to 
. native terri tory, 11 without authorization or consent from 
Portuguese authorities. 7) To avoid all conflicts and 
wars with other sobas. 8) To give auxiliary troops to 
the Portuguese in times of war. 9) "To treat well your 
nobles and peoples, promoting among them a harmony, and 
giving them patriarchal justice as a good head of a 
family • u84 
Two distinct differences may be noted between 
the treaties of 1838 and 1874. First of all the later 
treaty does not stipulate that direct taxes must be 
paid to the Portuguese. Secondly, the sixth term of the 
treaty of 1874, prohibiting unauthorized emigration, 
is not contained in the treaty of 1838. Both sobas in 
these treaties ruled areas within reasonable Portuguese 
control, north of the Ouanza. P~rtuguese experience 
with the effects of direct taxation upon natives, 
especially after 1856 (see Ohapter IV) and after the 
Dembos War in 1872-73, brought about an official policy 
of abolishing this tax. Such collections required 
commitment and strength·in the interior, but in the 
83The traditional custom of drinking a poison 
liquid to test the guilt er innocence of a native in 
c@urt was often referred to in Angola as 11 juramento de 
indua. 11 The Portuguese prohibited it whenever possible 
in areas they controlled. 
84Treaty is reproduced in Boletim Official, 
1874, No. 34, 22 August 1874, pp. 411-12. 
period 1861-78 withdrawal and coastal concentration 
constituted the mere general policy at Luanda. 85 
Portuguese native policy was founded on the 
"vassalage system, 11 as I call it. I! the taxation 
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policy in interior districts changed several times 
between 1838 and 1880, the traditional alliance system 
with sobas remained the same with few variations. Vital 
to the entire power structure of European rule in Angola, 
the loyal sobas in effect enabled the Portuguese to 
surVive centuries of adversity. Andrade Oorvo wrote 
simply, ttour alliance w1 th the native cb.iefs is the 
principal power .of our rule. 1186 ~his can be applied 
especially to the case of Angola where tb.e Portuguese 
were able to command the loN4~;~.lty of larger numbers of 
Africans for a longer period in the interior than was 
possible in Mozambique. 
The vassalage system was formalized usually in 
written treaties. Later in the 19th century, these 
treaties were sworn by the sobas on the Portuguese flag, 
or on a Bible. 87 The form of these agreements depended 
upon the power of the Portuguese in the saba's region 
and upon the history of that ~· If the ~ was 
85see Ohapter v, and~rade Oorvo, Estudos, I, 
pp. 175-178. 
86Andrade Oorvo, Estudos, III, pp. 387-93. 
8 . . . 
7Boletim Official, 1e93, No. 38, 23 September, 
p. 559. nA.uto de vassalagem do Sob'a Oacongo ••• do 
concelho do Duque de Braganpa. 11 
, 
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power~ul and newly subjugated, the Portuguese dared not 
ask for taxes in the treaty. I~ the ~ or his ancestors 
had submitted be~ore, the demands of the Portuguese were 
likely to be considerable. Treaties far in the interior, 
with more or less independent chie~s, contained terms 
~or increasing trade with the Portuguese but rarely asked 
~or taxes, native auxiliary units, or laborers. In this 
case, the Portuguese ~ormally asked ~or only a nominal 
yearly tribute as several slaves, in the pre-1845 period, 
88 and later, cattle or ivory. 
Portuguese tax policy was a crucial element in 
native policy. In 1872 the traditional dizimo was 
abolished. But by 1880, and the arrival of expansionist 
Governors-Gene»al and the new phase o~ the colonial 
movement in Portugal, a new tax policy emerged. Dizime 
was replaced by De9ima .. or Oontribuirao. 89 Dexima was a 
hut tax collected effectively only a~ter 1883, because 
of the general native dislike· o~ direct taxation. 
Angola•s revenue policy was returning to the pre-1872 
rationale that if expansion was increasing in the plateau 
regions, and on the north coast, then revenue had to 
support it. Nevertheless, direct force was o~ten necessary 
to collect the hut tax, and this expedient was incompatible 
88Boletim Official, 1885, No. 37, September 14, 
pp. 732-33. 
89 4 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta , No. 775, Gov. Gen. 
1884; Boletim Official, 1885, No. 11, 16 March, p. 221. 
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with the idealistic Lisbon hope of Andrade Corvo that 
native policy sh~uld be conducted by peaceful means, 
not by threats or warfare.9° 
Most important in maintaining a native policy in 
Angola was the granting of titles, privileges, army 
ranks, pensions, and educational opportunities to 
sobas and their families. The Portuguese began in the 
Congo Kingdom wi_th this practice, and throughout the 
19th century continued to educate at Luanda or Lisbon, 
various uPrinces" of Congo. Small pensions were occa-
sionally granted to these individuals in the 1870's and 
later.91 Occasionally sons or relatives of the Jaga of 
Cassange entered European society at Luanda for some 
kind of instruction, and later.were living in or near 
92 regular settlements. Silva Porto in 1854 considered 
sending a relative of Sekeletu to Lisbon for education 
to win the allegiance of tne tribe, but Borollo, the 
rival of Sekeletu, vetoed the nrevolutionary 11 proposition 
of the settler.93 
Vassalized sobas took or were given Portuguese 
names and ranks in the Portuguese army of Angola, usually 
90Andrade Corvo, Estudos, III, pp. 387-94. 
91A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 47, 1876-77, Junta da 
Fazenda, No. 1151, 1876. 
92carvalho, Etnographia e Hist6ria, pp. 700-705. 
93silva Porto, Viagens, III, 3 May 1864, p. 133. 
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in "Second Line, 11 or guerra preta. Perhaps this phase 
of the policy tended to baakfire on the Portuguese at 
times for sobas ambitions and warlike tendencies within 
their own societies were not softened by their membership 
in the Portuguese military elite. Disputes between 
native leaders were adjudicated by Luanda. For example 
in 1880, near Cambambe, a Ohefe was replaced by the 
administration for failing to stop a native war between 
two sobas, and a special commission was appointed to 
adjudicate. The Governor General's remark about assi-
milating loyal vassal sobas into the Portuguese community 
can characterize much of native policy: 11 I believe this 
is not only logical but convenience advi~es it. 1194 
Native policy, therefore, was conducted by the 
administration in order to create a true native elite. 
This idea became more concrete after the publication of 
S~ da Bandeira's Trabalho Rural in 1873e 95 For in this 
volume came the suggestion for a special school for 
colonial administrators as well as for the sobas and 
their families. In Oabinda and Congo, the Portuguese 
accomplished a similar policy in this respect, but only 
to a limited extent. Governor Vasco Guedes (1879-80) 
created a short-lived "Professional Schooln in Luall.da 
94 .A..H.U., .Angola, Pasta I-1, 1879-81, No. 10, 
3 March 1881; and No. 1039, 11 0onfidencial, 11 26 November 
1880, Gov.· Gen. 
95sJ da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural .A.fricano, pp. 126-7. 
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for native leaders to learn artisan trades. Telegraph 
operators were trained in this manner for a while, but 
the hopes of this vigorous Governor were destroyed after 
he left due to the traditional tendency for 11lack of 
continuity.u96 
In 1885 Governor Ferreira do Amaral suggested 
Lisbon pay for sending certain sobas to Lisbon schools 
for one year, as a part of military recruitment for 
service in Mozambique, Guinea, and the islands. He 
noted the great resistance displayed by the chiefs. 
11Gradual absorptionu was h.is term for assimilation in 
Angola, and he believed that very powerful sobas who 
resisted vassalage or assimilation should be removed 
from the areas of their power to neutralize them in a 
strange place.97 
The Junta Consultiva was rather shocked by the 
Governor's Machiavellian plans and recommended in 1885 
that the recruitment policy of sobas remain the same, 
since a change might cause costly rebellions as that 
of Dembos in 1872. If the Governor wanted to find 
sufficient personnel for the army, first or second line, 
he was accomodated thereafter by a decree of 1885, 
recruiting Europeans for service between 18 and 35 years 
of age. The guerra preta as 11secon.d line 11 remained in 
96castelbranco, Hist6ria de Angola, pp. 248-9. 
97A.H.U., Junta Oonsultiva, No. 752, 14 October 
1885, Gov. Gen. Ferreira do Amaral to Minister of NavY 
and Overseas, enclosed in No. 3059, 3 December 1885, 
nParecer. 11 
.Angola nthe principal basis o:f the most important 
provincial force, 11 and theoretically was capable o:f 
being mobilized rapidly.98 
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After 1880 the pace o:f treaty-signing, pacifi-
cation, and the first stages of 11assimilationtt quickened 
with the increase in missionary activity. The Portuguese 
o:f:ficial in the interior, usually the che:fe o:f a concelho, 
was not always in a position to get close to the masses. 
He was primarily a link between the ~ and the admin-
istration on the coast. But the missionary was sent 
out to both ucivilize and Christianize" en masse. 
-=;.;..;.;..-. 
Governor Ferreira do Amaral despised the quantity and 
quality o:f missionary he had to send into the sertao. 
By 1878 :foreign Protestant missionaries were moving into 
the Congo district, and onto the Benguela plateau.99 
But Lisbon could produce only a handful of timid and 
lackadaisical priests who :feigned illness to avoid 
being stationed in the interior away :from Luanda. 100 
S~ da Bandeira had written in 1873 that Portugal 
should carry out a ucivilize now, then Christianizen 
doctrine in Angola. But a new school of thought emerged 
98A.H.U., J.C., 1886-87, No. 139, 1885 decree, 
enclosed is letter~February 1887, Gov. Gen. Guilherme 
Capelo to Lisbon. 
99 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta I-1, No. 11, 23 June 
1879, Gov. Gen.; Pasta I-1, 24 March 1881, No. 224, Gov. Gen. 
100A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 224, 15 February 
1884, Gov. Gen. 
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in the 1880's led by Father I .Antonio Barroso, missionary 
to the Congo district after 1881. 101 
Barroso traveled and worked as a missionary at 
sao Salvador and Bembe .from 1881 to 1887. After return-
ing .for a period to Lisbon, he gave a long paper in 
1889 to the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, called 
0 Congo, Seu Passado, Presentee Futuro. 102 Contradict-
ing Governors-General who .felt missionaries should keep 
out o.f politics, Barroso aggressively asserted that 
the Portuguese missionary must be the bush agent par 
excellence .for the Luanda administration. 103 Barroso 
.felt Portugal must Christianize the native first, then 
11civilization11 will follow, :for only missions could 
combat tt:foreign propaganda" and establish prestige in 
the interior. 
The report o:f Barroso indicates the charged 
political atmosphere of the exts~naililaad expansion 
policy in Angola in the 1880's. Moreover, native policy 
for the first time the Portuguese were obliged to 
consider to a degree the .future o:f the nameless "peoplestt 
under the native ~elite. There was a great shortage 
101 Helio Felgas, Hist6ria do Con5o Portugugs, 
pp. 100-110; Guilherme Capelo, Relatorio do Governador 
(1889)' p. 82. . 
102Antdnio Barroso, 0 Congo (Lisbon, 1889, 
Imprensa Naoional). First given as a lecture on March 7, 
1889, Lisbon. 
103~., p. 11, 68. 
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o~ one~es to administer ooncelnos, and unhealthy posts 
consumed more than their snare of minor of~icials. 
Much of southern Angola was completely independent 
during the term of Ferreir~ do Amaral, and expediency 
dictated the rule that the native power structure had 
to be preserved until a later date. Was it possible 
to replace the sobas?104 
It is neither practical nor convenient. 
It is not practical because the people would 
not consent, neither do we have the force 
to persuade the sobas to drop their tradi-
tional power. In general, tb.e soba is less 
submissive to superior authority, but tb.e 
Commander of the Division is less respected 
by tb.e people. The first is more respected, 
the second is more feared. 
In tb.is report ~or tb.e year 1882-83, Governor 
Ferreira do Amaral praised Father Barroso as a missionary 
superior to the majority in Angola, and indicated that 
b.e intended to continue the tteliteu system of vassalage. 105 
By corresponding regularly with the King of Congo, old 
~ Pedro V, appointing his son Prince Dom Alvaro as 
11 Professor 11 of a primary school, and sending gifts 
and missionaries, he satisfied the traditional demands 
o~ the King of that unhealthy kingdom. 106 His special 
attention to the interior of tb.e north coast betrayed 
104 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, No. 331, nRelatorio'' 
o~ Gov. Gen. Ferreira do Amaral for 1882-83. 
105 . ~., Oaderno, No. 2. 
106 Barroso, 0 Congo, p. 74. He considered 
climate in Congo very bad. 
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uis vital concern ~or the ~uture o~ Portugal's Congo 
claims in international chancelleries. 
There was no money to ~inance the building o~ 
churches, or the sending o~ many missionaries. A true 
native policy was being undermined by the situation 0~ 
the treasury at Luanda, ~or the governor in 1887 
reported in this regard, concluding that he was at a 
loss to k:n.ow .,where we should begin.11107 Barroso 
pleaded with the Society o~ Geography in Lisbon to 
help ~inance missions and priests in Angola, since only 
a hand~ul of self-sacri~icing men were willing to come 
out. 108 
It was clear by 1889 that the school s~ "labor 
and religionn was bound to triumph for native policy 
in Angola. Barroso's experience taught him that the 
priest had to precede the soldier, and that, 1~ the 
native did not learn to work, religion had failed in 
its purpose. 109 Portuguese o~~icials as.Capelo admired 
the French, English, and American missionaries in 
Angola a~ter they proved their mettle in the 1880's. 
Portuguese missions, on the other hand, were few and 
plagued by lack o~ missionaries to come into the interior. 
In 1887 there were an estimated twelve missionaries 
107capelo, Relat6rio do Governador, p. 85. 
108 Barroso, 0 Congo, pp. 69-72. 
109 ng.' p. 75 .. 
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working ~or Portugal in all Angola, seven o~ them 
Goanese priests. The most important missions were in 
the Congo district, created in 1885 ~ter the Con~erence 
on West Africa at Berlin. Clearly Governor Oapelo was 
ashamed o~ the two Portuguese missionaries in Bib.~ and 
Bail u.nd o. 11 0 
Although the Portuguese missionary e~~ort was 
slow to start, what began in the 188o's was f'ar superior 
to the earlier neglect and abandonment. Thinkers in 
Lisbon realized the role which missions would play in 
spreading Portuguese control on the plateaus, and some 
harked back to the time when the ~irst Captain-Major 
o~ Bib.' in 1790 worked with an Italian Capuchin to 
baptize "Europeans, Brazilians, and natives. 11111 Two 
missionaries on the Benguela plateau worked ~rom 1886-96, 
but retired with the revolt o~ 1890. A mission was re-
established at Belmonte again only in 1910. 112 
In considering native policy a~ter 1880, the 
Portuguese were in~luenced by the rising interest in 
Africa on the part o~ the more prosperous European 
nations. Books by ~oreigners concerning Angola must 
have had some in~luenee upon the direction o~ o~~icial 
(Braga, 
110aapelo, Relat6rio do Governador, pp. 82-84. 
111 Altredo Keiling, Quaranta Anos de A~ric~ 
1934), pp. 24-26. 
112Belmonte, Bihe, was the town and headquarters 
~or the trader Silva Porto. There are several towns 
in Portugal ~y the same name. 
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thought. Labor shortage was a key problem discussed 
by such works, but their solutions to a traditional 
problem in Angola were by no means orthodox. In 1864 
traveler Winwood Reade suggested Angola solve her 
labor problem by importing 11black.emigrantsu f'rom 
North America. 113 Joaquim Monteiro in 1875 recommended 
the importation of' Chinese coolies into Africa to 
replace the "useless" negr0es. 114 Apparently the 
Portuguese never seriously considered these ideas. 
By 1890, and the emergence of Africanists like Father 
Barroso, the Oapelo brothers, Henrique Carvalho and 
A. F. Nogueira, Negroes were thought of' in a new light 
of' hope and future progress. If' Barroso was discouraged 
with what he saw in Congo, he was also confident that 
the Negro was changing and that Portugal was beginning 
a new phase of' activity. 115 
As much as the of'f'icial mind at Luanda desired 
the education of the native, it could not dismiss the 
past :failures. In 1884 the soba of Bih~ asked the 
-
Portuguese to educate two of' his sons in Europe at 
Portugal's expense. The Governor agreed this might 
cement an alliance or an eventual vassalage, but he 
recalled f'or the Ministry in Lisbon, the examples of 
(1875 
11 3Reade, Savage Africa, p. 452. 
114 Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, II 
edition), p. 310. 
115Barroso, 0 Congo, p. 67 • 
Prince Nicolas of Congo, and other princes, and the 
sons of Manuel Puna of Oabinda who received such 
educations as to make of them t'some useless visionaries, 
others detestable clerks. 111 16 Such products were rarely 
fit to rule because they had learned only "fanciful 
concepts. u 
Many factors brought Portugal's administration 
to reappraise native policy after 1880. Portuguese 
settlers and colonists were not coming to Angola in 
any significant number. The colonization plans might 
well collapse. Yearly thousands of Portuguese immigrants, 
mainly from northern Portugal and the islands, entered 
Brazil. TbDagghout the entire 19th century, Brazil toek 
over 75% of Portugal's immigrants, and Africa remained 
unpeopled. Only after 1888 did more than one thousand 
Portuguese annually emigrate to Portuguese Africa. 11 7 
Native policy was often overshadowed by an emigration 
and colonization program. On the other hand, native 
policy deserved attention because the few Portuguese 
in Angola were in danger of being absorbed. Therefore, 
the eventual policy, given the failure of white coloni-
zation, was to "absorb or be absorbedtt by several million 
Africans. 118 
11 6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 825, 14 October 
1885, Gov. Gen. 
11 70liveira Martins, Brazile as Oo16nias, pp. 159-60; 
Fernando E. da Silva, Emigray~o Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1917), 
p. 1 92. 
118 Sarmento, A., Os Sertoes, pp. 220-225. 
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t
1Portugal has a great social :problem to resolve, tt 
wrote Andrade Corvo) 19 A 'Vast :population awaited 
education. Nevertheless, Portugal's means were too 
scanty to effect a rapid change. Since the traditional 
system was based upon a native elite of sobas, empacas:eiros, 
macotas and their families, this privileged group would 
have to aid the transition. A larger segment of the 
elite needed education, and privilege in order to begin 
governing through municipal councils in the bush. Native 
emigration to outlying country was a well-known fact of 
life in Angola, and the native elite could help :prevent 
it. 120 
The sobas would be supported in their positions 
and power as long as they adhered to the Portuguese 
definition of what was 11civilization. 11121 Essentially, 
what they envisioned, if not always accomplished, was a 
form of indirect rule. Their deprived bases of power 
and authority, and a tendency to favor the coasts to 
the interior administration led to a conservative 
reluctance to administer directly. Except for a few 
isolated cases, when native communities existed close to 
11 9Andrade Corvo, Estudos, III, :p. 393. 
120capelo e Ivens, De Benguella, II, :pp. 235, 251. 
121 A similarity may be noted between Portuguese 
practice and British practice in tropical colonies before 
1900, or later. See Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native 
~~'Ia~ in Africa (New York, MacMillan, 1928), 2 vols. 
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the ports and larger European settlements, the Portuguese 
were satisfied with and indeed only capable of ruling 
through the local sobas. In unhealthy areas as in the 
Congo district, true European colonization was considered 
by many as impossible in the 188o's. Instead of official 
direct rule, a native elite, and native constabulary 
could do the job. 122 
The theory rarely coincided with the practice 
of bush politics. If men in Lisbon wished for t1peaceful" 
expansion, and native admi~istration, those in Angola 
saw themselves driven to violence and often desperate 
action. The sheer force of the native polities in 
southern Angola, for example, caused the administration 
to renew the traditional deportation policy for rebellious 
sobas. 123 Sobas causing trouble in an area under Portu-
guese control were shipped off for army service to the 
Cape Verde~,Azores islands or to Mozambique. 
Native policy was not carried out by officials 
motivated by a sense of ucivilizing mission 11 but by a 
sense of expediency. When the administration examined 
the records they learned that tradition was also based 
on expediency. Few European nations could match the 
12~arroso, 0 Congo, pp. 37-50. 
1~ 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta I-1, 1 79, September 20, 
No. 302; Junta Consultiva, 14 October 1884, letter from 
Gov. Gen. Ferreira do Amaral. For example, Soba C~~mmndade 
in 1879 was given fifteen years exile to Mozambique. 
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Portuguese record in Angola ~or keeping a delicate 
balance between their own weakness and the overwhelming 
.native resources. To do it, every possible maneuver 
was needed. The most important maneuver, however, was 
the vassalage system for it enabled them to raise small 
armies, raise labor forces, institute direct taxation, 
and control each region as a traditional unit. The 
policy broke down when Europeans discredited the 
administration in the eyes of the native elite. Those 
hordes of degredados and bush peddlers who roamed the 
sertao were straining the already tense situation. In 
the same regard, those natives who nbecame 11 Portuguese 
in the 19th century sowed discord among the Europeans 
by their very character. Due to the general atmosphere 
of insecurity and racial hatreds that flared in areas 
near the European settlements, the expediency of racial 
mixing on a small scale, undermined the balance between 
both rae es. 124 
Native policy, therefore, became a social problem 
since miscegenation in Angola was not extensive except 
for a few exceptional periods before 1850. 125 Realists 
1~ 4 6 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta , No. 775, 1 September 
1884, Gov. Gen. A case i~point is that of Oolonel Victor 
of Ambaca, a native evolue, who in 1884 was accused by 
settlers of Dondo of "racial hatred,u and robbery, and 
stationing European soldiers in·the most unhealthy places 
in order to see them succumb. 
125see Ob.apter II, p. for statistics on mestiyos 
out-numbering whites, and Ohapter V for 1845 estimate. 
More white women arrived in the late 19th century, and 
their presence caused a general decrease in mestiyo 
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had another fact to show that Angola by 1880 was not a 
"second Brazil.n The vassalage system was .far more 
successful than the assimilation policy. The attempt 
to "absorb or be absorbed'' was, true to other policies, 
too little and too late. 
D. Farewell to the Congo Question 
This study is not concerned with the details 
of diplomatic negotiations leading to the General Act 
o.f Berlin of 1885. .Only insofar as the diplomacy affected 
Portuguese expansion will a discussion be offered. 
Jirtugal's long-standing claim to the territory 
on the coast from 5 degrees 12 minutes to 8 degrees 
south latitude lay in the Foreign Office at London since 
1846. If recognized, this would have put both sides 
of the Congo River mouth, from just north of Cabinda 
to just south of Ambriz, clearly under the Portuguese 
flag. British policy remained consistently hostile 
to Portuguese occupation north of Ambriz in spite of 
numerous Portuguese diplomatic and naval sallies to 
turn the tide. Nearly every year between 1846 and the 
re-opening of negotiations in 1876, some incident on the 
Congo coast prompted Portugal to renew the claim.1 26 
But Britain was obstinately firm. 
offspring. Much the same phenomenon occurred after 
1930 in Angolan demography. See Il{dio de Amaral, 
Aspectos do Povoamento Branco de Angola (Lis~on, 1960, 
No. 74 of Estudos by the Junta de Investigapoes do 
Ultramar). 
126Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 53. 
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The traveler Cameron, besides stirring Portuguese 
imagination and national honor over the condition of 
Angola, had in December 1874 declared a British protec-
torate over the Oongo Basin and signed treaties with 
Chiefs. 127 This idea was rejected by the Foreign Office. 
Portugal, however, had learned one more fact to urge 
action without delay. When Robert Morier arrived as 
Minister for Britain in Lisbon, he found the Congo ques-
tion the most important issue of the day. Andrade Oorvo 
was perhaps Portugal's most pro-British negotiator, but 
he was a victim of the turbulence of Lisbon politics, 
in office for several months and then out of power. He 
was Minister for the Navy and Overseas, Foreign Minister 
for short durations during 1866-7, 1871-2, 1875-6 and 
1878-9. 128 
Andrade Corvo's policy was distinctly liberal 
and Anglophile. Yet his visions concentrated on terri-
torial acquisition and delimitation in a treaty with 
Britain alone. If Angola did not have the coast fram 
Ambriz to the Congo within a few years, greedy newcomers 
would grab it. As he wrote in 1883: 
The occupation of these territories, whose 
rights the Orow.n ef Portugal has reserved in 
treaties, is still not accomplished; but when 
127
rbid., p. 54; Here the Portuguese learned of 
another British naval officer, like Captain William Owen, 
signing treaties for territory. 
128Almada, Jose de, A Polftica Colonial de Jo~o 
de Andrade Oorvo (Lisbon, 1944), pp. 102-103. 
300 
different nations, especially the United 
States, place their feet there firmly, then 
that occupation will be impossible. The 
English Government has shown and shows an 
inclination to negotiate which assures us of 
the possession of the very extensive terri-
tories from Ambriz up to the Congo, and that 
convention will be one of the most important 
results of a loyal policy of cooperation •••• 
The Treaty of Congo will be a glory for whoever 
celebrates it: not one of these ephemeral 
glories with a short popularity, but one of 
those glories that will remain in history, 
never to be erased from the memory of a 
people. 129 
From 1877 until 1884 it seemed possible that 
Britain and Portugal might come to a settlement over 
the Congo. Negotiations, however, became increasingly 
difficult. Two powerful forces stood against Portuguese 
occupation of the mouth of the Congo: the British 
Manchester and Liverpool merchants established on the 
coast and the International Association. France opposed 
Portuguese claims north of the Congo River. 
Tb.e earliest and most c·onsistent enemies of 
Portuguese occupation of the coast north of Ambriz 
were the British merchant interests. 130 Their hostility 
increased with their prosperity. By 1884 British trade 
on this disputed coast was worth about ~2,000,000 sterling 
129Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 41-42, 157. 
The statesman, as I have shown above, believed Angola 
would be dependent upon at least the southern bank of 
the Congo River. 
130see Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 139-167 
for a survey of British merchant pressure on the Govern-
ment. 
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and was cemparable with the Niger trade of Britain. The 
British dominated the trading groups, outcompeting the 
Dutch, in second place, then the French, and lastly, 
the Portuguese. 131 
The greatest issue at stake was not simply that 
of free trade merchants' interests innocently battling 
protectionist Portuguese administration from Angola. 
The real question was which power could maneuver well 
enough to convince the other interested powers that 
after the disputed terri tory was formal.ly taken a 
minimum of differential duties would be charged on 
trade. 132 
If the Congo question by 1884 was a question of 
11 secondary importance 11 to Britain's Foreign Office, 
quite the opposite was true for the Foreign Ministry 
in Lisbon. 133 Portugal noted in 1878 that a considerable 
expedition of English missionaries had successfully 
established themselves at the capital of the Congo 
_../ kingdom, Sao Salvador. This event alone, placing a 
threat in a place so potentially strategic to the southern 
bank of the Congo River, encouraged immediate action. In 
131Roger T • .Anstey, ttBritish Trade and Policy 
in West Central .Africa Between 1816 and the early 1880's, 11 
Transactions of the Historical Societ of Ghana (III, 
Part 1, 1957, pp. 50-52. 
1-32 s. E. Crowe, The Berlin West .African Confer-
ence, 1884-1885 (London, Longmans, 1942), pp. 1-7. 
133 Crowe, Ibid., p. 208. 
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the Congo kingdom itself~ however, the old King Pedro V, 
as impotent as ever, remained a faithful Portuguese 
vassal and asked Luanda for permission to let the mission 
settle near his town. 134 This aged Negro consistently 
wrote Luanda for more troops and priests to occupy his 
capital, deserted by the last garrison about 1870. 135 
In 1883 he wrote the Governor-General again in the same 
vein requesting a detachment of fifty men and supplies. 
At that delicate moment in Anglo-Portuguese negotiations, 
however, the Governor felt it impolitic to occupy the 
capital with a force. A Portuguese Catholic mission 
under Father Ant6nio Barroso had been established there 
136 
since 1881, nevertheless. 
In 1880-1881 the Foreign Ministry received a 
confidential report from Lieutenant Jaime Serpa Pimental, 
who had conducted a survey of the ports and settlements 
near the Congo mouth. 137 In tbis pessimistic report, 
the Portuguese learned of Stanley's activities in 
11 empire-bUilding 11 :for the International Association, 
134see Halmen M. Bentley, The Life and Labours 
of a Congo Pioneer (London, Religious Tract Society, 
1907). H. H. Johnston, George Grenfell and the Congo 
(Lendon, 2 vols., 1908, Hutchinson). · 
135 4 4 A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 3 , No. 19 A, 15 April 
1865, Gov. Gen.; Pasta 3, 1883, September Relatorio, 
No. 331, Gov. Gen. -
136see above, pp. 289-291. 
137Jaime Serpa Pimental should not be con:fused 
with Antonio de Serpa Pimental, delegate to the Berlin 
West African Conference. 
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and clearly Stanley was suspected of founding tb.e bases 
for a gigantic state monopoly for Belgium. What this 
report reveailied was not breathed by the Portuguese at 
the later Berlin Conference for essentially the observer 
admitted: 
The Congo, I repeat, is lost. Holland 
today dominates there in trade; after her, 
England and France. We ruled it when, 
instead of ground nuts and palm oil, human 
beings were gathered! Today we are the sales 
agents for the foreigners! 138 
nwithin a few years, 11 he wrote, 11there will be an English 
coleny in Sao Salvador.tt With French and English missions 
going up at Landana, Boma, and Vivi besides, this naval 
observer reflected the consternation of his superiors 
when they saw their own occupation of the coveted region 
in such ruins. 139 
A Portuguese 11civilizing station" was placed at 
Nokki (Noqui in modern Portuguese) about 1882, under 
I the plan of Minister JUlio de Vilhena. Later another 
was placed in 1884 at Landana north of Cabinda. 140 Serpa 
Pimental stressed in his report that trade was increasing 
in the Congo, and that although the area was virtually 
lost, Portugal should still attempt an occupation.141 
138Jaime de Serpa Pimental, 11 0 Congo Portuguez," 
B.S.G.L., 1887, Serie 7, Nos. 7, 8, pp. 273-289. 
139 Ibid., p. 275. 
140 A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 4, No. 506, 10 June 
1884, Gov. Gen. 
141 serpa Pimental, supra, p. 280. 
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Later, during the Berlin Con£erence, Portugal decided to 
make a last desperate try and £ollow up his suggestion. 
But for the moment, in Psrtugal, there was a 
struggle between the English party and the anti-English 
party. The issue of £ree trade or monopoly for Portu-
guese Africa was debated vigorously in the press while 
Andrade Corvo tried to convince his countrymen that 
their best interests lay in cooperation with England. 142 
The English party professed more reasonable terms for 
a settlement, and the basis of these terms originated 
with the work of stf da Bandeira in 1873, his Trabalho 
Rural Africano. 143 In this tract he urged Portugal to 
settle the Congo dispute by allowing free trade on the 
Congo River, and giving up claims to territery north 
of the Congo, but retaining the vital southern bank. 
In 1883 Andrade Corvo's Estudos suggested more reasonable 
terms of settlement with Britain than those asked by the 
six Portuguese delegates at the Berlin Conference. He 
advocated £ree trade for the Congo River, and holding 
out for the southern bank and maintaining, in vague 
terms, rights to the northern bank. 144 
142B.N., Jornal do Commercia, 25 January 1880; 
11 July 1880';""'0 Futuro da Africa Central, n by Augusto 
de Castilho. 
143s£ da Bandeira, Trabalho Rural, pp. 160-162, 
210-214. 
144Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 41-42, 157. 
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Luaiano Cordeiro, the soul o~ the Sociedade de 
Geographia, wrote the case ~or the Portuguese side at 
Berlin in his 1883 pamphlet distributed to most European 
Ministries, A Quest~o do Zaire. 145 Here Cordeiro, ~or 
public and political standing was obliged to bid high 
~or all the territory that could be possibly claimed by 
Portugal between 5° 12/ and 8° S. Clearly the Portuguese 
delegates, in private, did not expect to get what they 
asked for. 146 
The Anglo-Portuguese negotiations in the period 
~rom 1877 to 1884 began well but became increasingly 
dif~icult. Robert Morier's plans for 1879-81 involved 
a comprehensive scheme ~or Anglo-Portuguese partnership 
in Southern Africa, including both coasts. This "grand 
design," however well-intentioned, 147 was ruined ~irst 
by hostility in Portugal toward the ~ree trade terms and 
cooperation with 11 J?er.fidious Albion," and secondly, by 
rising pressure from British merchant interests. The 
Lourenro Marques Treaty was not rati~ied by early 1881 
and it stood as a quid pro guo .for the evolving Congo 
treaty. 148 What was more, pro-Portuguese Morier was 
145Luciano Cordeiro, 11 A Questao do Zaire,tt 
B.S.G.L., IV, 1883~ 
146crowe, Berlin Conference, pp. 170-73. 
147Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 229. 
148~., pp. 96-100. 
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transferred from Lisbon to Madrid in JUly 1881, ending 
a short tthoneymoon 1t period. As the French, using 
de Brazza's exploration and treaty-signing, moved into 
action in the Congo region, Britain reconsidered Portugal's 
claims, and negotiations reopened again in late 1881. 
Like Portugal's, Britain's policy was a "coastal policy, 11 
pledged to safeguarding coast~ and mouths of rivers so 
as to prevent foreign powers from getting in behind this 
maritime fringe. 149 Up until mid-1882 a reasonable 
Congo. treaty between Britain and Portugal might have 
been concluded, and also probably accepted by the Powers. 
By late 1882, Portugal's magnificent dream was, in fact, 
at the beginning of the end. 150 
Eventually, however, Britain and Portugal signed 
a treaty in February 1884. There were two stages to 
the negotiations. The first, from December 1882 to 
April 1883, encountered some opposition in England, 
followed by raising of the terms by the Foreign Office. 
The second stage, from April 1883 until February 1884, 
saw the free trade terms for Portugal rise considerably, 
. delaying the final signing. The .final treaty gave 
Portugal the coast so long desired, and control of the 
mouth of the Oongo. 151 Portugal ratified the treaty, 
149Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 102. 
150
rbid., pp. 102-105. 
151 see Anstey, Appendix A, for the verbatim text 
of the 26 February 1884 treaty; also in Accounts and 
Papers, 1884, 0 3886, LVI, p. 45. 
----'~-~-
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but Britain, after the hail of abuse and opposition 
poured on the treaty by France, Germany, the International 
Association, and the British merchants, scrapped the 
agreement. By May 1884, Portuguese representatives 
approached the European powers for a general conference 
to decide the claims. 152 
Fear of French designs on the Congo mouth caused 
the Foreign Office for a period to consider using Portugal 
as a 'tfront-man" for her trade domination, since annex-
ation was out of the question. French opposition was 
decisive in bringing Britain to this view.~SJ Portugal 
felt betrayed in early 1884 when Britain failed to ratify 
the long-awaited 11 dream treaty,u and could hardly be 
blamed for running to the other European powers in May 
1884 for a public conference one day after suggesting 
secretly a Conference to Britain.P.~~ After all, Portugal 
had considered public airings of the claims' dispute for 
several decades and time was running out.tB5 
Before discussing the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, 
it will be useful to describe Portuguese plans and acti-
vities in the disputed region north of Luanda. Portuguese 
power and influence in the region was rising after 1881. 
152crowe, Berlin Conference, pp. 205-7, Appendix VI, 
"The Portuguese Proposal for a Conferenee. 11 
l53R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the 
Victorians, pp. 170-1. 
154crowe, Berlin Conference, p. 207. Refers to 
Portugal's move as "double ... dealing" in May 1884. 
155 . Crowe, Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 197-201, nPortu-
guese Claims on the Congo. 11 Author Crowe, without benefit 
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Father Barroso, on his journey up the Congo mouth to 
..,; Noqui and overland to Sao Salvador, acted as an observer 
and semi-o~ficial political agent, sending to Luanda 
~equent and informative letters from the north. Barroso 
was more optimistic than Lt. Serpa Pimentel and urged 
energetic measures to plant stations on the coast and 
inland. 156 
If communications were smooth between agents in 
the Congo and of~icials at Luanda, there was no such 
harmony betw·een Lisbon and Luanda. Governor-General 
Ferreira do Amaral, in charge during the Congo crisis 
and throughout the Berlin Conference, complained of few 
briefings on the European situation from the Ministry 
in Lisbon. 157 In his report of September 1883, the 
north coast overshadowed all other considerations • 
. For this governor the renovation of the Ancient Alliance 
could result in benefits for Portugal, since Britain 
was so power~ul in industry and capital. Yet the 
character of British naval o~ficers soured his personal 
contact with such a connection, ~or he thought them 
of Portuguese material, has greatly underestimated 
Portuguese activity in the Congo region interior, 1859-70, 
and on the coasts north of Ambriz. Moreover, her inter-
pretation of British motives on the coasts after 1846, 
have been revised by Anstey's new work to put more 
emphasis on the. 11i~ormaltt empire motive of ~ree trade. 
156 A.H.U., Angola, Pastas 3, 4, 7, 1882-84, 
enclosed letters of Barroso to the Governor-General. 
157 A.H. U., .Angola, Pasta 7, 2a Reparti9~o, No. 58, 
13 December 1883. 
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haughty and impulsive. 158 Ferreira do Amaral was planning 
to revive the 1856-60 plans of his namesake, former 
Governor Amaral. Bembe, Sao Salvador, and eventually 
the southern bank of the Congo would be occupied, with 
Ambriz as the base point. His sights were on the left 
bank of the Congo, above all, and like Amaral before him, 
he believed the trade from interior of the Congo ending 
at Ambrizette could be cut and diverted to Ambriz. 159 
Trade was the coveted concomitant of controlling 
the coast. Portuguese expansion theory had come the 
full circle with this Governor, since he forgot the lessQn 
learned by his predecessor: that the interior approach 
to dominate the coast was useless. Besides the trade 
motive, the prestige factor moved him since he doubted 
much revenue would come from the area. 
The King of Congo wrote Luanda on June 3, 1883, 
requesting a Portuguese garrison be stationed in his 
town. His people were unmanageable and he knew the 
Portuguese wanted to renew their power in his region. 
His dependence upon Luanda was manifest when he wrote 
~f the proposed force: "Its presence and moral influence 
will suffice to bring about the complete pacification 
160 
of all these peoples." The Governor wrote back that 
158 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, 4 Cadernos, No. 331, 
1883. 
159 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, Caderno 2, Sala 12, 
No. 331, Gov. Gen. 
1~ 8 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, No. 5 1, 3 June 1883, 
Letter King of Congo to Gov. Gen., in letter 17 July 1883. 
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he would send troops later, but now he had to send 
some .Angolan recruits to Guinea. .A.t this time and later, 
he questioned the reliability of native troops and was 
ready to use European marines for the delicate Congo 
161 operations. 
Portuguese intelligence reported H. M. Stanley's 
work on the Upper Congo in late 1883, and the Governor 
at Luanda dreaded the possibility that Stanley might 
come down to the coast below Vivi. Implicit in his 
fears was the official tendency to dismiss the interior 
Congo in favor of the coast and mouth of the river. 
Amaral felt he had to accomplish something beyond his 
orders to keep the status quo on the coast during the 
diplomatic negotiations in Europe.162 
In October 1883 a Portuguese vessel, .A. Rainha 
de Portugal, formally annexed the port towns of Cacongo 
and Massabi, north of Cabinda. Massabi was actually 
north of the line of 5° 12/. News of this naval maneuver 
stirred Luanda to jubilation. Treaties of loyalty were 
signed with the Chiefs of the region in late September 
and were published in the Boletim Official on October 29, 
1883. 163 Considering this a "historic moment 11 for 
161 
.A..H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, Sala 12, No. 331, 
Caderno 3, 1883. 
1883, 
1883, 
Pasta 
162 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 58, 13 December 
Gov. Gen. 
1 63 Accounts and Papers, 1884, No. 49, 10 October 
Amaral to Consul Cohen, pp. 56-67; .A..H.U., Angola, 
4, No. 726, 13, 14 October 1883, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon. 
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Portugal, Governor Ferreira do Amaral was inflated with 
pride in his letter to the Minister in Lisbon and 
complimented the Portuguese merchant, Joto Jos,Rodrigues 
Leitgo, for his role in dealing with the potentates 
north of Cabinda port. Ferreira do Amaral, however, 
expressed some misgivings about pursuing 
••• our prestige in Africa, which will cost 
us dearly, since it is proven that one of the 
most expensive luxuries a nation can have is 
colonies, as long as they are not ready to 
be emancipated, as was Brazil. 164 
This Portuguese blow was very close to French 
stations at Loango. It is not clear just what effect 
this had upon France's attitude toward the Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty signed a few months later on 
February 26, 1884. Nevertheless, the Cacongo-Massabi 
affair gave impetus to new Portuguese plans :finally to 
occupy the Congo mouth. Stanley's activity increasingly 
worried officials at Luanda and they suspected, before 
many more naive observers on the spot and in Europe, 
that Stanley was out to create a sovereign state ~der 
another guise. 165 Although Amaral realized his puny 
resources and the :fact that ttall the nations" seemed to 
be against Portugal at the time, he did not discern any 
difference in the treatment of natives by Stanley or the 
164 A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 4, No • 822, 14- October 
1883, Gov. Gen. 
165 A.H. U., .Angola, Pasta 7, 13 December 1883, 
No. 58, Gov. Gen. 
Portuguese and he reported to Lisbon that Stanley's 
railway workers above ViVi were in chains.166 
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Emerging from the occupation of two ports north 
of Oabinda, the Portuguese laid plans to begin occupying 
gradually ports at the mouth of the Congo. Luanda knew 
the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was about to be signed in 
February, but thirteen days before it was signed and the 
news was telegraphed from Lisbon, a Portuguese agent, 
Dr. Ignacio Caetano Xavier, was sent to the strategic 
167 port of Banana. Xavier went with instructions dated 
13 February 1884 as observer and upolitical agent," as 
he was:.cS.lled, to watch activities of a large Dutch 
trading house at Banana, and to prepare the way for 
"our forthcoming occupation." Xavier was ordered also 
to keep watch on Cabinda and a newly established French 
mission at S~ Ant6nio do Zaire, as well as to survey 
the mouth for placing. trfuture custom ports.u 
The Portuguese, according to correspondence of 
the governor-general with Lisbon, expected to occupy the 
mouth. ports during March, April, and May of 1884, and 
agent Xavier was sent ahead. Whatever the fate of this 
hapless observer, Portugal learned168 on March. 13 that 
166 
.A..H.U., Angola, Pasta 3, No. 331, September 
1883, Gov. Gen. Relatorio. 
167 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, 2 Reparticao, No. 359, 
15 April 1884, Gov. Gen. to Lisbon, enclosed 11 Copia de 
Instruccoes, 11 dated 13 February 1884 for Dr. Xavier. 
168crowe, Berlin Conference, pp. 23-24. 
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France protested the February treaty allowing the 
occupation. Britain, on the other hand, nad not yet 
ratified the treaty; therefore it was not legally in 
force, and in April the treaty had very slim chances 
in the British Parliament. Germany's protest note,, 
delivered on June 14, finished all hope for the Anglo-
PG~tuguese Treaty. 169 Nothing daunted, the Governor at 
Luanda continued acting as if the treaty were in force, 
and· in October .1884 ordered the building of stations 
at Landana, where competition with French missions was 
170 
strong. 
The Berlin West African Conference was in 
session from November 15, 1884, through February ~6, 1885. 
Major political issues obscured humanitarian questions 
of slavery and the liquor t~affic, and essentially the 
Conference was an organized pa~ade of what Bismarck 
called ttnulli ty and charlatanism. u171 
Only the territorial negotiations concern this 
study, since the questions of free trade and free navi-
gation of the Congo were treated and then largely ignored 
in practice later. 172 
169 Crowe, Berlin Conference, pp. 25-29. Britain 
learned at this time that France and Portugal had held 
secret talks in July and August 1883 but that little had 
come out of them. 
170 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 822, 14 October 
1884. The Governor decided to use European marines for 
this, not native recruits, perhaps indicating his fear 
that Europeans would oppose him. 
171crowe, ££• cit., quoted in Preface. 
172~., p;. 3. 
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Portugal, o£ all the nations at the Conference, 
desired a settling o£ these questions and a delimitation 
of boundaries. Andrade, Corvo wrote in 1883 that a vague 
uvacuumn o£ no frontiers north o£ .Ambriz would be fatal 
for Angola. 173 The six Portuguese delegates, led by 
/ Luciano Cordeiro, Antonio de Serpa Pimentel, and the 
Marquis of Penafiel, presented in essence the pamphlet 
11
.A. Quest~o do Zaireu £or their claims. One o:r their 
strongest arguments was an incident in the Oongo mouth 
in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War. Portugal claimed 
that Germany had recognized her sovereignty over the 
Congo mouth and coast by protesting to Portuguese o:f:fi-
cials the French capture o£ a German vessel near Banana. 174 
Portugal's claims, however, were whittled down 
during the Conference. France and Portugal drew closer 
together seeing their interests in a moderate protection-
ist system the same. Portugal promised free trade in 
the disputed regions if, in return, her claims were 
recognized as valid. Completely alienated from Britain 
during most of 1884, :Portugal sought to revive a "dealn 
173Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, p. 157, Corvo 
sought the Oongo as the n:rrontier o£ effective occupation, 11 
p. 62, I. 
174charles E. Nowell, 11 :Portugal and the Parti-
tion of .A.frica, 11 The Journal of Modern History (March, 
1947, XIX, No. 1), pp. 10-12. A. :Portuguese report on 
this obscure incident is found in the naval report of 
Captain Baste, .A..H.U., Angola, Pasta 42, No. 61, 
15 February, 1871, Captain Baste to Gov. Gen. (See 
Chapter V, p. 214). 
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with France to get her claims. 175 The southern limit 
o:f the "Conventional Basinn of the Congo was placed at 
the mouth o:f the river Log~ in Angola. Germany proceeded 
to back the International Association o:f Leopold almost 
to the hilt; tb.e eventual territorial settlement was, 
in :fact, a triumph :for that organization, and Portugal 
received less than she woUld have :from the 1884 Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty. 176 
The :final negotiations were heated and difficult. 
For the International Association, with new-found power 
and support in Germany and in British interests, 177 
wanted to limit Portugal to the southern bank o:f the 
Congo up to Noqui, thus depriving her o:f her establish-
ments at Cabinda, Cacongo, and Massabi. Portugal, with 
French backing, refused to accept this settlement in 
December 1884. Hence a uTriple Partitionn was inevitable. 
Portugal stuck to her guns for the entire right or north 
bank up to Boma, including the port of Banana, where 
apparently her agent Xavier was hopefully waiting .. 
When France went into negotiation :for a udealtt with the 
International Association, the Portuguese delegates knew 
the game was up, but had to present a strong last :front 
:for the public at home, now deeply stirred by the dispute.178 
175see Chapter V :for the 1865 proposed 11 dealtt 
with France. 
176crowe, Berlin Conference, p. 156. 
177Ibid., p. 160. 
178see Jornal do Commercio, November 1884 to 
February 1885. 
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Yet France settled with the Association by ~arly February 
1885, and was prepared, after receiving concessions on 
the left bank, to urge Portugal to compromise on her 
claims. 179 
The Governor Ferreira do Amaral made a last 
desperate attempt to capture the coveted Congo mouth, 
considered the key to the economy of Angola, and ordered 
naval vessels to move on Boma and Banana about February 3rd. 
His moves were frustrated by cooperation between French 
and British men-of-war. 18·(!) A week later Portuguese 
delegates, hoping this last stand had an effect on the 
Powers, refused the Powers' demands, and claimed the 
port of Banana, the Oabinda enclave, and the left bank 
of the Oongo up to Vivi, instead of Noqui. 181 
The events on the Congo caused three of the 
Powers (Britain, France, and Germany) to hand Portugal 
an ultimatum on February 13th. Either Portugal complied 
with the settlement of getting the Oabinda enclave and 
the left bank to Noqui, or recognition to all her rights 
in the disputed area would be withdrawn. Portugal capi-
tulated two days later and signed a convention with the 
International Association. In the partition treaty and 
General Act of Berlin of 26 February 1885, Portugal 
179orowe, Berlin Conference, p. 170. 
180Ibid., pp. 172-3. The documents in the A.H.U., 
Lisbon, for Angola, Government-General run out at the 
end of 1884. 
181 Orowe, Berlin Conference, p. 172. 
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received the Oabinda enclave, ~rom Cape Lombo to Massabi 
and inland some 35 miles, as well as the left bank of 
the Oongo up to and including Noqui port. From Noqui 
inland she received the territory along the latitude of 
Noqui (about 6°) to the Cuango River, "whose southern 
course was to form the boundary with the Congo Free 
State. u182 
Portugal's claims at Berlin were based largely 
upon the legal case published by si da Bandeira and 
Santar~m in 1855. Since at the last moment in late 
1884 both banks of the lower Oongo seemed at last within 
her grasp, Portugal did not, despite the judgment of 
Crowe, feel she had "profited handsomely 11 ~rom the 
settlement. 183 The ports of Cacongo and Massabi were 
legally occupied at the end o~ 1883, and the International 
Association attempt to take these away during the Confer-
ence was as false as the Portuguese promise to maintain 
ufree trade,n if her ~ull claims were recognized. There 
was a gap in communication between Lisbon and Luanda, 
and the Governor-General had ideas of his own about 
forcing a virtually impossible issue at the last moment. 
Portuguese public opinion was enraged by the 
11 ultimatum11 handed the nation in February 1885. But the 
182
rbid., p. 173; James Duffy, Portugal in Africa 
(Harvard UniVersity Press, Cambridge, 1962), p. 111. 
Quote is from Duffy. 
183 Crowe, ££• cit., p. 156. 
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wiser among them realized that the end of the dispute 
had the effect of freeing the nation for a drive across 
Africa. The district of Ambriz and Congo proved to be 
less than an 11 eldorado 11 for revenue, and several explor-
ing expeditions were preparing to cross Angola.184 
Ironically, the 1885 "ultimatum11 handed Portugal at 
Berlin was only a slight foreshadowing of the later 
11 ultimatumtt of 1890 from Britain over a similarly last 
desperate move made by Portugal in Eastern Africa. The 
first nultimatum 11 freed the Portuguese to pursue long-
neglected or rejected schemes for moving into central 
Africa. Modern historians who see the partition of 
Congo in 1885 as unfavorable for Portugal should consider 
in the light of the coastal mania of Angolan history, 
that, if Portugal had received more coast at Berlin, 
her officials would have been tempted to be satisfied 
with less interior plateau. 185 In effect, the Berlin 
West African Conference provided new perspective. At 
184Guilherme Capelo, .Relat<6rio do Governador, 
p. 83; Rermegildo Capelo and Roberto Ivens, De Angola ~ 
Contra Costa (2 vols., Lisbon, 1886). · 
185see H~lio Felgas, H1st6ria do Congo Portugu~s, 
p. 113. Felgas feels that, if Portugal had kept Bembe 
and s. Salvador occupied consistently, partition would 
have been more generous. Yet evidence points to the 
tendency of the Portuguese to want more coast at the 
expense of the interior, and their naval power could 
not compete with competitors who really wanted to keep 
the Congo mouth out of Portuguese jurisdiction. A· 
secret report to Luanda, of September 8, 1881, reasoned: 
11We urgently need the piece of territory from the 
Congo to Loango, not only because all the future trade 
of Stanley will have to pass through there, but mainly 
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last it seemed as i~ the Portuguese were going to over-
come coastal inertia and actively follow Oapelo and 
Ivens' call ttTo the Plateau! n186 
because that is the territory that we can most easily 
colonize in all the province of .Angola. 11 F. A. Pinto, 
.Angola e Congo (Lisbon, 1888), pp. 407-8. . 
186oapelo e I D B ll II 262 vens, e engue a, , p. • 
OHAPTER VII 
PAOIFIOATION, .OOOUPATION, AND PARTITION 
1885-1891 
Small or large, good or bad, .Angola is our b.ouse. 
-J. P. de Oliveira Martins, 1891 
CHAPTER VII 
PACIFICATION, OCCUPATION, AND PARTITION, 1885-1891 
A. The Drive for Central Africa 
Plans for extending Portuguese rule and control 
of trade from Angola to the contra-costa were drawn up 
formally in 1881 by a group in the Sociedade de Geographia 
de Lisboa. The scheme was an outgrowth of the ncivilizing 
station" plan for interior expansion of the Minister 
I 1 JUlio de Vilb.ena. These plans were influenced by the 
expeditions of Capelo, Ivens and Serpa Pinto, since 
these men advocated Portuguese expansion onto the great 
plateaus east of the coast. Another equally important 
factor, however, was German exploration and activity in 
northern Angola after 1875. 
Governor-General Ferreira do Amaral, who showed 
himself to be a staunch expansionist in the Congo crisis, 
explained to Lisbon in 1884 wb.y a drive into Central 
Africa would be difficult. 
On.e of the reasons why our rule today in 
the interior is weak is because the concelhos 
of the east were abandoned, and everyone knew 
why this was ordered: it was because the expense 
they incurred could not be covered by ordinary 
1oliveira Martins, F. A., 11 A Sociedade de 
Geograpb.ia, 11 pp. 403-5. 
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means, and we had to choose awaiting the 
natives on the coast rather than proceeding 
to civilize them in the interior. Following 
this policy, came the foreign explorations 
and designs obliging us to change our tactics, 
and now it is imperative that we move toward 
the east and reconquer what we possessed. 2 
The treasury was empty and stations in the extreme north 
and south were in great danger unless reinforced. The 
old facts of life of Angolan administration, lack of 
men and money, were i~ortant, but when German activity 
increased in the region north of the Ouanza, it seemed 
that Portuguese fears would triumph over adversity. 
Portuguese officials and small garrisons re-entered 
Talla-Mugongo and Gassange during 1882 and 1883. Except 
for a few obscure exceptions during the 186o's when an 
official or two were allowed to reside in Oassange, no 
authority was exercised effectively beyond the region 
of Malange until after 1882. The war of 1861-63 put an 
end to the Portuguese status observed by Livingstone 
during 1854 and 1855.3 Only half-caste traders and a 
few Europeans represented an informal influence upon the 
Jaga. The Treaty of 1863, mentioned in Chapter IV, was 
in fact a sham. Portuguese bad conduct was partly 
responsible. The Governor in 1884 deplored the fact that 
2 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 335, 9 April 1884, 
Gov. Gen. to Lisbon; see also Pasta 3, No. 331, September, 
1883 Relatorio of the Governor-General to Overseas Ministry. 
3A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 335, 9 April 1884, 
Gov. Gen. 
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his administration had so little control over officials 
in the eastern region. 
To them Portuguese officers are due many 
of the difficulties faced by the public admin-
istration such as wars in the bush, where they 
provoke disorder among the natives, from whom 
they take outrageous extortions, and in those 
places they exercise an authority the law does 
not permit them. 4 
The Portuguese watched the election of the Jaga 
of Oassange with traditional interest. A new Jaga was 
elected by his court in August 1883 and he subsequently 
dispatched an embassy with gifts to Luanda. The Governor 
then secured a "Plea of Homage" from the new Jaga, incor-
porating Oassange into the newly-created concelho of 
Talla-Mugongo.5 
But where was the official border of eastern 
Angola? In 1883 Andrade Corvo felt that the frontier 
6 
was the Cuango River. At the Berlin West African 
Conference, Portuguese delegates admitted that the Cuango 
was the southern limit of the newly created Congo Free 
State. The Cuango had long marked the eastern frontier. 
Expansionists, however, desired an extension of eastern 
Angola to the Kasai River, including the capital of the 
4 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 254, 8 March 1884, 
Gov. Gen. 
5A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 4, No. 750, 14 September 
1884, Gov. Gen.; enclosed is report of Ohefe for July 26, 
1884; Doc. No. 2 is uPlea of Homage •• of the Jaga o:f 
Oassange. 
6
.Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, p. 180. 
Lunda kingdom beyond, a traditional trading partner 
with Portuguese settlements.7 
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A major force behind Portuguese activity was 
the fear of German designs on eastern Angola after 1875. 
Possessing excellent equipment, numerous German explorers 
crossed the northern third of Angola studying the river 
systems of the Cuango, Kasal, and upper Zambesi. The 
Governor-General in 1884 especially distrusted these 
expeditions and ordered officers not to go out of their 
way to help the foreign explorers, as Von Wissmann 
. 8 
and Pogge. Von Wissmann, however, was well-treated 
and given free passage throug~ customs. He, as most 
of the other German explorers, was very critical of 
Portuguese rule. 9 Since the Portuguese had always 
placed a high value upon the Lunda-Cassange-Malange 
trade, German movements worried the treasury. 
In December 1886 the Portuguese and Germans 
signed a Convention drawing the frontier between Angola 
and Southwest Africa. 10 Besides agreeing on this frontier, 
Portugal and ~ermany gave each other a free hand to pursue 
7 Quirino de J~sus, 11 A Delimita<;ao Effectiva de 
.Angola, n Portugal em Africa ( 1894), p. 38. 
8A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7/2 reparticao, No. 817, 
12 October 1884, No. 172, 11 February 1884, Gov. Gen. 
9see the accounts as Heinrich Von Wissmann, Im 
Innern Afrikas (Leipzig, 1888) ; Paul Pogge, Im Reiche 
des Muata Jamvo (Berlin, 1880); A. E. Lux, Von Loanda 
Nach Kimbundu (Wien, 1880). 
1
°Francisco A. Pinto, Angola e Congo (Lisbon, 
1888), pp. 401-2. 
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Central African empires, Portugal, theoretically, getting 
the territory betwean Angola and Mozambique. Yet in 
1887 a map published in Germany showed Cassange not as 
Portuguese but as part o:f the t':free basin" of the Congo. 
Alarmed by this new development, some :felt there might 
be a German colony in Lunda within.a .few years. German 
trade cloth was better and cheaper than the Portuguese 
:fazenda and the natives east o:f Cassange were attracted 
by German trade. Great reserves o:f ivory and rubber 
were to be had in this region. 11 
A well-equipped so~enti:fic and political expedi-
tion was sent from Portugal in 1884 when the threat 
seemed greatest. It was led by the army officer 
Henrique Dias de Carvalho (1843-1909~, who had experience 
in East Africa and Asia. Carvalho proceeded to carry 
out plans for the most politically and economically 
successful expedition to date in Angola. As a result 
o:f his expedition to Lunda beyond the Kasai during 
1884-87, Angolan territory increased by nearly one-sixth 
the previous size of the entire province. 12 
Carvalho accomplished what every other Portuguese 
explorer before him could have accomplished with the 
proper direction. He simply adhered to the 1881 scheme 
of Jtilio de Vilhena for establishing stations in the 
1 1 A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 7, No. 159, 12 January 
1884, Gov. Gen. 
12G.E.:P.eB., "Carvalho," Vol. 6, pp. 75-76. 
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interior, and planted thirteen "civilizing stations 11 
between Malange and. Mussumba, the capital of Lunda; he 
also succeeded in marking out a s·afer trade route to the 
east. Later Carvalho pointed out that the ultimate 
frustration of the contra-costa dream was due. to the 
failure to apply Vilhena's plan. 13 
Carvalho conducted a highly exact geographical 
and climatological survey between Malange and the Kasai, 
but his major assignment was to reach Lunda, sign a 
treaty, and improve Portuguese trade with that region. 
Secondarily, he was to establish either a political or 
a religious mission in Lunda. The subordination of 
these interests to trade indicates that in 1884 there 
was little expectation on the part of the Portuguese 
that Lunda would become a part of the Angolan adminis-
tration. The economic mission to counteract German 
influence was most important. 14 The commerce from Luanda 
to Lunda had decreased lately. The instructions of 
the .African Commission of the Society of Geography also 
told Carvalho to survey conditions for extending the 
planned railroad past ~baoa. 
The Portuguese feared that either Germans or 
Englisrumen would cut off the interior trade to the 
Angolan coast. Serpa Pinto held the same fear. 
13carvalho, Meteorologia, Climalogia E Colonisa9~o 
(Lisbon, 1892), Preface; also his DesorlpVio Da Viagem, 
A Mussumba do Muatianvua (Lisbon, 1890), ol. I. · 
14carvalho, DescriPy~o da Viagem A Mussumba, I, 
pp. 1-15. 
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Carvalho's advisers, :fearing incidents among the hostile 
tribes east of Cassange, explicitly :forbade many 
Europeans to accompany the expedition's leader; only 
a Portuguese priest was allowed to come along. The 
advisers considered that it would be best to keep peace 
with the tribes, and thus lay a more secure :foundation 
:for opposing foreign influences. 15 
Carvalho reached Malange in July 1884 and met 
-
Germans there. After building twelve stations or huts 
along the way, he crossed the Kasai in August 1886 
and entered the Lunda kingdom. On January 18, 1887, 
Carvalho signed a treaty with the Matiamvo Mucanza and 
his court. 16 Germans, like Lieutenant Otto Schutt, had 
already reached Lunda and met the Matiamvo, as early 
as 1879. 17 Carvalho was successful in signing a treaty 
of trade and :friendship which was essentially non-
political. Though Lunda was considered outside the 
regular administration of Angola at this time, an 
embassy was prompted by the work of Carvalho to travel 
from Lunda to Luanda in 1888 and apparently asked :for 
15silva Porto advocated the policy o.f sending 
few Europeans along on expeditions into Central Africa. 
His rationale was largely practical: more Europeans 
meant more expense from tributes along the way. "The journey of the Head [European] doubles the expenses of 
the journey of his agents." Viagens e Apontamentos, 
(B.M.P.P., Oodice 1235), II, p. 296, entry for 1 May 
1862. 
da 
16 General Ferreira Martins, Fi~uras e Factos 
Ooloniza9ao Portuguesa (Lisbon, 194 ), pp. 94-96. 
17o Occidente, 1879, II, No. 41, p. 136. 
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a garrison of from 200 to 300 Portuguese soldiers to 
protect Lunda. 18 A nephew of the Matiamvo accompanied 
the embassy but the Governer was not impressed with the 
presents of these ambassadors, and stated that he could 
not spare troops for an area outside the formally 
administered region. Later he wrote to Lisbon asking 
for permission to extend rule into Lunda, and this was 
granted. 
In the meantime Lunda was invaded by .Af'rican 
groups from the east and from the southwest. 19 The 
powerful Ch0kwes were driving northeast on a rampage 
of conquest after 1885; with arms bought from Portuguese 
sertanejos and their ubiquitous agents, they overpowered 
the Lunda.. From the east expanded the forces of Msiri. 
The Lunda were obliged to build make-shift forts and 
fortified villages on all sides. Their plight grew 
especially desperate after 1887 when their capital was 
attacked by the Ohokwe armies, and they then sought 
Portuguese help. Carvalho found Lunda empty of much 
of the fabled ivory, wax, and rubber formerly taken 
to Cassange fair. The Ohokwes were winning the struggle 
18Archivos de Angola, 1940, Doc. XXX, pp. 283-86, 
290; the test of the treaty is in Descrip~ao da Viagem, 
Vol. IV, Lisbon, 1895, pp. 269-71. By the Berlin Act o:f 
1885, the Ouango River was to be tl:l.e dividing frontier 
between Angola and Congo Free State. 
19Jose Redinha, Etnosooiologia do Nordeste de 
Angola (Lisbon, 1953), pp. 1-50. 
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~or supremacy in Lunda and. the best trade routes now 
followed the Kasal northward. Since the Chokwe obtained 
more Portuguese arms~ being closer to the Ovimbundu and 
Portuguese traders in Bih,, they held the advantage. 20 
Portuguese influence east of the Kasal was largely 
represented by Malange and Ambaca half-caste traders; 
but clearly there were more Germans in Lunda than 
Portuguese before 1890.21 No Portuguese forces arrived 
before 1895. 
The Congo Free State was expanding and sought 
to take all of Lunda; the Portuguese nearly lost the 
region between the Cuango and the Xasai to ambitious 
King Leopold. When Carvalho returned to Portugal in 
1888 he campaigned by writing a tract, A Lunda, trying 
to prove the validity of Portuguese sovereignty in the 
area he had explored. Negotiations between the two 
powers ensued and on May 25, 1891, the frontier was 
drawn, making the Kasai the eastern border of .Angola. 
Thus much of the Lunda district was added to the province~ 
and in 1895 Henrique Carvalho returned as Governor of the 
District, which he almost single-handedly acquired for 
20carvalho, Ethno ra hia e Hist6ria Tradicional 
dos Povos da Lunda (Lisbon, 1 90 , pp. 709-71 ; Jose 
Redinha,._ 11 Sanzalas Fortificadas_ do Nordeste de .Angola, u 
Mensario Administrative (Luanda, January-June, 1961), . 
pp. 53-61. 
21 oarvalho, Etbn.ographia, pp. 715-722. 
22 Portugal. 
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Nevertheless, Carvalho was disappointed that 
Portugal had lost the capital and part of the Lunda 
kingdom to the Congo Free State· in 1891, for he well 
knew how he had established his 13th station from 
Malanga, 11Esta9ao Pinheiro Chagas 11 nearly sixty miles 
east of the Kasai river in 1887 at 8° 21/ south latitude 
and 23° 11/ east of Greenwich. 23 Nevertheless, the 
famous 11mapa ... de rosa" of 1886, which had been cor 
presented to the Portuguese Cortes in 1887, did not 
claim Lunda district even so far as the Kasai but left 
a large blank area. 24 The Portuguese were fortunate 
to acquire a vast district, and trade to Luanda from 
this region increased considerably for at least a 
decade thereafter. 25 
Portugal expanded into Central Africa from the 
coast of Angola along two axes of advance. The first, 
used by Carvalho, to Lunda from Malanga was further 
north than the traditional Malanga to Cassange trade 
22see Carvalho, A Lunda (Lisbon, 1890); Imprensa 
Nacional, Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, A uestao 
da Lunda (Lisbon, 1891 ), Livro Branco (White Book paper ; 
Ferreira Martins, Figuras e Factos, p. 96. 
23carvalb.o, Meteorologia, p. 49. 
25charles Delannoy, uThe Portuguese in .Angola,n 
The Scottish Geographical Magazine (XII, 1896, No. 11), 
p. 568. 
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route. The second was begun first at Mossamedes 
extending in two directions: one went east across the 
Chella mountains to the plateau of Huila and then 
r 
northeast to Caconda and Bihe, while the other went 
southeast along the Cunene and Cubango valleys. Paci-
fication campaigns began in earnest in southern Angola 
about 1885 but were not meant to reach Central Africa, 
only to occupy and control restricted regions and 
build forts. 26 
The axis of advance that eventually developed 
into a route to reach Barotseland, and then Mozambique, 
/ 
was started at Caconda and ended at Belmonte, Bihe, the 
home of the old sertanejo, Silva Porto. True to the 
predictions of Silva Porto in several decades of 
pleading with Benguela and Luanda, and to the plan of 
Serpa Pinto in 1880, Bihlproved to be the pivot for 
expansion into the region of the upper Zambesi.. 27 
Unfortunately for Portugal's aspirations of ruling a 
Portuguese Barotseland, this axis of advance was taken 
too late and with too little force or determination. 
American missionaries reached Bihe before the 
first two Portuguese missionaries who arrived about 
1885. 28 The Portuguese appointed Silva Porto, the 
26~., pp. 569-571. 
27see Chapter VI. 
28capelo, Relatorio do Governador, pp. 80-86. 
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owner of Belmonte town, as Oapitao-M6r, or resident, but 
he was given no force of troops or direct administrative 
authority over Bihe. In 1886, one year after Silva 
Porto received his appointment, the paramount ~ of 
Bihe died 11after a fierce drinking bout,n29 Before his 
violent and unpredictable successor ascended the throne, 
anarchy ruled the region. Long before this, Silva Porto 
established a regular route of trade from Bih{to 
Barotseland·across the Zambesi. When the English 
missionary Frederick Stanley Arnot met Silva Porto in 
Barotseland in 1884, he noted that the Portuguese 
traded for ivory.3° 
After 1886 matters grew critical in Bihe, since 
the new soba, Ohindunduma, was neither as tractable nor 
as reliable as the old ~· Silva Porto found he was 
able to do less with the new potentate. Meanwhile in 
Europe, Portuguese aspirations for a band of territory 
between Angfla and Mozambique reached their culmination 
during the Ministry of Henrique de Barros Gomes (1843-
1898). Barros Gomes in his Ministry of 1886-90 was 
pledged to fulfill the contra-costa dream and he began 
by negotiating frontier treaties with France and Germany 
in 1886 which supposedly, without considering British 
interests, gave Portugal carte blanche for advance across 
29Frederick Arnot, Garenganze (London, 1889, 
3rd edition, Hawkins), pp. 252-254. · 
3ol!?M·• PP· 92-93. 
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the Central African highlands. In 1887 Barros Gomes 
presented a map to the Cortes in which the territory 
between the two colonies of Angola and Mozambique was 
colored a bright pink, or 11 c8r de rosa.n3l 
The Foreign Office in London soon learned of 
this map and its implications for the future. In August 
1887 a formal protest was lodged by Great Britain 
against the political significance of this swath of 
Portuguese territory, not yet occupied or administered 
by any power, or even partitioned by treaty.32 
Silva Porto in the meantime was writing letters 
to Luanda and Benguela warning Portugal of the increasing 
number of English traders and pioneers in the upper 
Zambesi region.33 In early 1888 he recommended that a 
scientific expedition be sent from Bih' down the Kasal 
River to the Congo and then down to its mouth. He hoped 
to follow up the work of Carvalho, but apparently had 
no idea that such an expedition would not gain Portugal 
new territory. There is considerable evidence that by 
1888 tb.e old trader was somewhat senile.34 
31 Lavradio, Portugal em Africa Depois de 1851 
(Lisbon, 1937). 
32warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p. 3. 
33silva Porto, Viagens e A3ontamen~os, B.M.P.P., 
ms., Vol. XII, p. 109, January 28- o, 1888, p. 28, 
August 30, 1887. 
34 The last volumes of Silva Porto's Viagens 
indicate his last few years were difficult in health 
and in mental attitude. Depressed and more melancholy 
than usual, the old trader had little hope that his 
region would be occupied. His schemes for a renaissance 
of Portuguese influence in his region became more and more 
fantastic. Vols. XI, XII, B.M.P.P. ms., Codice 1235. 
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Despite the British protest, Portugal proceeded 
both in east and in west Africa to go ahead with plans 
to have two expeditions meet in Central Africa after 
starting from opposite coasts. This was believed 
tantamount to securing the strip of coveted highlands.35 
Several important expeditions were sent to Mozambique 
after 1884 to secure the Lake Nyasa region, and in 
1888 the famous Serpa Pinto and several other officers 
arrived to carry out the long-awaited plan. 
The expedition of Serpa Pinto which headed up 
the Zambesi in 1889 was certainly. larger and more 
important than its counterpart in central Angola. In 
late 1889, Captain Henrique de Paiva Couoeiro left 
Benguela and reacb.ed Bailundo with a mission to enter 
Barotseland, build a fort, and plant the Portuguese 
flag in cooperation with the expedition from Mozambique.36 
Paiva Couceiro was also accompanied by Lieutenant 
Teixeira da Silva. After a short rest in Bailundo 
and a levy of porters, Paiva Couceiro went on to Bih/, 
met Silva Porto, and asked for porters to go on to 
Barotseland. His expedition was quite small, with no 
more than forty Negro recruits. B~~ore this, Silva Porto 
/ had been on fairly good terms with the ~ of Bihe, 
35 Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 218. 
36 r • I Alexandre Malheiro, Ohron1cas do Bihe, p. 116. 
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Ohindunduma, but after Paiva Oouceiro arrived, the 
chief was informed by an unknown European that the 
newly arrived force planned to build a fort in Bih/.37 
Alarmed, the chief declared war, told Paiva Oouceiro to 
return to the coast, and slapped and insulted old Silva 
Porto. Early the next day, March 31, 1890, Silva Porto 
ignited kegs of gunpowder and blew himself up. Officers 
and missionaries from nearby could not save his life, 
although one report stated that his wounds were not 
physically mortal.38 
After half of his detachment deserted, Paiva 
Oouceiro retreated before the army of Ohindunduma. 
Pursued into the Bailundo region, he wrote Benguela tor 
help. Artur de Paiva, an officer at Humpata, proceeded 
from Oaconda uncertain of victory over the enraged 
Bihenos; Paiva felt he could not trust the auxiliary 
aid of the Bailundos. Within a few months, however, 
Paiva routed the forces of Ohindunduma, and eventually 
in December of 1890 captured the leader himself through 
the aid of American missionaries.39 Somewhat disappointed 
in the fighting prowess of the Bib.enos, b.e later recalled 
37Malheiro, Ob.r6nicas do Bih{, ppo 118-20; Gastao 
Sousa Dias (ed.), Artur de Paiva, I, pp. 180-90. 
38sousa Dias (ed.), Paiva, I, p. 166, the April 1, 
1890 report of Captain-Major Teixeira da Silva reported 
this. It is still~question whether Silva Porto killed 
himself merely out of despondency or out of fear of 
death from the hostile Bihenos. 
39Gastao Sousa Dias, Silva Porto (Or~nicas Angolanas) 
(Lisbon, 1948), p. 49. 
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candidly: "My adversaries were neither Spartans nor were 
they Zulus.u4-0 
Silva Porto had pleaded ~or the pacification 
and occupation of Bib.' since 1850. Artur de Paiva was 
in command of an expedition of Boer auxiliaries, Portu-
guese, and African recruits. The plan to occupy 
Barotseland at the last moment was poorly planned and 
provided for; the force which was to start ~rom Angola 
was weaker than that supposed to set out from Mozambique. 
Paiva Oouceiro was hampered be~ore he reached Bihe(. 
/ While Paiva Oouceiro approached Bihe, however, 
!!I 
a profound crisis threatened Portuguese power in 
Mozambique. The expedition of Serpa Pinto reached the 
Shire highlands in December 1889 and advanced to Lake 
Nyasa in the hope of perhaps annexing the region. After 
the Portuguese repelled a Makololo attack and caused 
the tribe heavy losses, Britain protested; finally, on 
January 11, 1890, an Ultimatum was dispatched to ·Portugal 
telling her to retire her forces from Nyasaland and 
Manicaland without delay or suffer the consequences of 
a break in diplomatic relations. Certain British naval 
units were alerted and mobilized in the Indian ocean and 
at Gibraltar. 41 
40Artur de Paiva, Artur de Paiva, I, p. 192. 
41 Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 216-20; for the 
exact text of the British note to Lisbon in 1890 see 
Bazilio Telles, Do Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro (Oporto, 
1905), p. 115. Also F. A. Oliveira Martins, 0 Ultimatum 
Visto Por .Ant6nio Enes (Lisbon, 1948). Marques Guedes, 
A Allian9a Ingl§sa (Lisbon, 1938).· 
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The British 11Ultimatum,u or Ultimatum as it is 
termed in the Portuguese literature, shook Portugal so 
badly that observers feared for the Monarchy. British 
capitalist and missionary interests were being backed 
to the limit in this case. The Portuguese attempt to 
take the highlands of Shire, already partly occupied by 
Scottish missions, was doomed to the fate of the desperate 
Portuguese try to get the Congo mouth in February 1885. 
Both threatening notes brought capitulations from 
Portugal and the eventual partition of the disputed 
territory.42 
B. Crisis, Partition, and Consolidation 
The Portuguese drive for Central Africa was cut 
off. For all practical purposes it ended on the morning 
of January 11, 1890, when Sir George Petre, British 
Minister in Lisbon, delivered his note to the Foreign 
Ministry. Within one day, the Barros Gomes Ministry 
capitulated to the demands of the note and then resigned. 
The Governor of Mozambique received a wire from Lisbon 
to withdraw all Portuguese armed forces from the Shire 
and Manicaland regions.43 
Portugal reacted quite violently to the 1890 
Ultimatum, thus delaying negotiations for partition of 
42see Chapter VI, Section un". 
43 .. 
Harry H. Johnston, British Central Africa 
(London, 1906 edition), pp. 88-89; before the Ultimatum, 
the Governor-General of Mozambique confidently issued a 
special number of the Boletim Official to the effect 
that the Shire region had been annexed by Portugal. 
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territory and nearly breaking the last ties of the 
Ancient Alliance. King Carlos I (1889-1908) feared for 
his throne, and on January 31, 1890, a Republican 
revolution broke out in Oporto.44 Portugal had surrendered 
her bid for Central Africa, and as a result of the 
heated atmosphere of the era, the normally anti-colonial 
Republicans used this sensational reverse against the 
Monarchy. Patriotic expeditions of Portuguese filibusterers 
from Brazil and Lisbon headed for Mozambique to try 
to retrieve lost prestige, but ended in only embarrassing 
their Governments. 45 Never before in the 19th century 
was the Portuguese.Monarchy so near to complete collapse. 
Bankrupt several times during 1890 to 1892 when 
she needed support for colonial enterprises, Portugal 
was in ruins. German interests and the British South 
Africa Company had designs upon the important and 
strategic ports of Mozambique, and only after British 
aid, and the British and French capitalization of several 
large colonial companies, was Portugal's Mozambique 
empire safeguarded. 46 Three chartered companies were 
44charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal 
(New York, 1952), p. 219; v. Braganya ... cunha, Eight 
Centuries, pp. 189-205. 
45The London Times, 13-14 January 1890; 12 November 
1890, 17 December, 1890, 14 February 1891. 
46 Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese R~lations, pp. 109-
1 28 ' 1 44-1 49 • 
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established in Mozambique, since the Government was in 
no position to administer and finance operations at that 
time. Only after 1894 did Portugal see fit to send 
expeditions and reinforcements from the metropolis to 
upacifyu tribes in the interior. 47 
In Angola, the pacification of Bihi was at least 
superficially concluded by January 1891. But the 
country from Bih' to Benguela remained dangerous and 
insecure territory until well after the turn of the 
century; Portugal was occupied with operations in 
Mozambique and was very badly in need of revenue. For 
. / its defense and security, Bihe depended on small forts 
garrisoned by African recruits and a handful of white 
officers. I In 1900, the administrator of Bihe, Alexandre 
Malheiro, was nearly killed in the region between 
Bailundo and Benguela due to the lack of military 
protection. Later he criticized the Government's neglect: 
This and other occurrences, all identical, 
are a sad consequence of the lack of military 
occupation of the province of Angola so that, 
between the fort of Bailundo and the town of 
Catumbella, in a space of 300 kilometers, and, 
in spite of the urgency, we do not possess 
one single military command. 48 
The forts were practically without soldiers on much of 
the plateau of Angola until after'1910. Occupation was 
purely skeletal. 
47Rocha Martins, Hist6ria das Coldnias Portuguesas 
(Lisbon, 1933), pp. 544-60. 
48Malheiro, Chrdnicas do Bihl, pp. 218-220, 227. 
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.After long and tedious negotiations, and 
numerous Portuguese delays and manuuvers by Cecil Rhodes, 
a treaty of partition was signed on June 11, 1891.49 
By this treaty, the highlands of the Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland became British territory, while Portugal 
received about one-half of Manicaland. The Barotse 
kingdom of King LewanZka, the destination of the napless 
Paiva Cou9eiro, remained in British territory but the 
exact frontiers were still to be determined by an Anglo-
Portuguese Commission. The western frontier of Barotseland 
therefore was theoretically flexible. Oliveira Martins, 
nevertheless, felt that Angola was completely partitioned 
by June, 1891; he confidently wrote then in the Jornal 
do Commercio of Rio de Janeiro: "Small or large, good or 
bad, .Angola is our house.u50 
The Portuguese Minister in London, Senhor Barjona 
de Freitas, proposed a 11 common neutral zone 11 in Central 
Africa to give Portugal free transit through Barotseland 
to Mozambique. This idea failed to survive British 
objections. Moreover, Lewanika after 1891 continued 
to raid and invade Angolan territory, especially the 
land of the Balovale (Lobale in Portuguese), and he 
proceeded to nvassalize 11 several dozen sobas. 
49Edward Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty 
(London, 1909, Harrisons), Vol. III, 11Great Britain and 
Portugal, Treaties,u 1807-1906, see Treaty of 1891. 
50Quirino de a;_esus, 11 .A. Delimita9ao Effectiva de 
AngoJ.a, 11 Portugal em Africa (1894, Vol.. I), pp. 43-46. 
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In the meantime, the Portuguese were pushing a 
,/ line of forts further east along the route from Bihe to 
the upper Zambesi. Treaties of vassalage were signed 
with Chiefs, and penal colonies were established at 
Mexico, or modern Vila Luso.51 In addition, in about 
1895 a fort was built as far east as Nacandundo (modern 
Cavungo) at 11° 50/ south latitude, 23° longitude east 
of Greenwich. The wretched quality of these tiny out-
posts and their rulers is sufficiently well documented 
in other accounts.52 
Portugal and Britain could not agree as to the 
limits of the Kingdom of Barotse, or the division 
between their spheres of influence. The Joint Anglo-
Portuguese Commission appointed an umpire, the King of 
Italy, by a convention of August 12, 1903, to determine 
the western boundary of the Barotse kingdom. On May 30, 
1905, King Victor Emmanuel III delivered an award which 
was favorable to Portugal, since he did not credit 
Lewanika with his conquests after June 11, 1891; the 
King heard expert evidence from local missionaries who 
told of the raids of the Barotse ruler. Thus the 
51Boletim Official, No. 20, 1895, May 18, 
pp. 273-4; No. 41, October 12, Luena River, Mexico, 
"Autos de Vassalagem. 11 
52
naniel Crawford, Thinking Black (London, 
pp. 149-55; James Johnston, Realit~ Versus Romance 
South Central Africa (London, 1893 • 
1912), 
in 
~rontier remained stable. 53 Lewanika had rapidly 
conquered sections o~ the Balovale, Mam.bundas, and 
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Mabungi but these conquests were judged as happening 
a~ter the June 11, 1891, treaty came into e~~ect. The 
exceedingly straight line o~ the ~rontier was justi~ied 
by the King of Italy, since there was no natural geo-
graphical diVision in the area, and since the political 
and social state of the tribes at the time was in such 
a flux.54 
By this award, Angola was completely bounded by 
treaty frontiers. A great deal of internal consolida-
tion remained to be done. Railroad building began in 
Angola on October 31, 1886, when construction started 
on the Luanda to Ambaca line. Loans were ~loated in 
Britain, France, and Belgium ~or the Ambaca line, and 
at the same time plans were made for a railroad from 
Mossamedes to the Huila plateau. It was clear to 
Portugal that, if basic development of utilities was 
to follow in her favored colony after 1885, foreign 
capital was vitally necessary. Britain was paramount 
in the Angolan import economy and imported into Angola 
in 1887 about four times the value of Portuguese imports. 
Oustom duties on Portuguese vessels was 3% ~ valorem, 
on foreign vessels, 5% ad valorem.55 
53Edward Hertslet, The Map o~ ~rica ~y Treaty (1909 edition), pp. 1074-78. · -~ 
54For Lewanika's character see Franyois Ooillard 
On the Threshold o~ Oentral ~rica (London, 1902 edition), 
pp. 388-89, 439-505. 
55Joseph Rippon, "The Portuguese Possessions of 
+.l-\t:> ~nn+.'hT.roo+ (1...,.,..,+ ...,.p A.P .... -4 ,..~ U T .... .-.,...,.~., ~.P +1.-.~ 1111"---1.-.~-..a.--
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The Ambaca line, for some dreamers in Portugal, 
was likely to make the region north of the Cuanza a 
new Sao Paulo, Brazil.56 By 1892 the line was completed 
and const~uction began to Malanga. Theoretically, the 
.Ambaca line was to be a uTrans-.A.frican" railroad. 
Nevertheless, out of the three money-making lines from 
the coast into the interior, all of them following what 
I have called the historical axes of advance in Angola, 
the Luanda to Malanga line is not the most successful. 
The next line to the south, the Benguela Railway, was 
founded by an English capitalist and engineer, Sir 
Robert Williams; construction of this famous and strategic 
line began in March 1903.57 True to the predictions of 
/ Serpa Pinto and of Silva Porto before him, the Bihe 
plateau, on the line following from Benguela through 
the town of Belmonte, was the key to Central Africa from 
the western coast. 
,. 
Bihe was and is a pivot which controls 
the tableland in the heart. 
At the date of writing, the Luanda to Malanga 
line has not been extended to the Cuango River as 
Geographical Society, V, 1889, pp. 362-64. 
56 I A. F. Nogueira, .A. Ilha de s. Thome A 
Bancaria no Ultramar e o nosso problema colon~al 
1892), pp. 2..;.4. 
uestao 
Lisbon, 
57F. c. c. Egerton, Angola in Perspective (London, 
1957), p. 190. The Benguela Railway was completed to the 
border of Belgian Congo in 1929; some 80% of the cost of 
construction came from British sources. Duffy, Partuguese 
Africa, p. 348. See also the account of a stay, !889-90 
in Luanda and area, William Harvey Brown, On The South Afri-
can Frontier (New York, 1899), Pp. 7-36. 
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envisioned by Livingstone and others as early as 1854.58 
The northern third of Angola, in spite of its production 
of diamonds in the Lunda district, and coffee in Cuanza 
district, has not proved the econGmic asset hoped for 
by colonialists in the 19th century. Indeed, the area 
last pacified and occupied, the Benguela to Zambesi axis 
of advance, bears the most potential.59 To the Benguela 
railway this region owes much of its development and 
future. Only this central axis has a railroad into 
the center of the continent, indicating that the economic 
planning of the 19th century was limited to hopes for 
using the Congo or Cunene as great natural outlets and 
entrances to the hinterland. In 1885, therefore, 
Angola's Congo orientation was effectively concluded, 
and Portuguese thinking realized that a land route to 
the heartland was the only alternative. Having lost 
what they considered to be the Delagoa Bay of West 
Central Africa, the Portuguese were obliged to look 
more seriously to land routes. 
As shown above, the partition treaties gave 
Portugal a vast territory. In 1891 perhaps less than 
one-tenth of the 481,000 square miles was under effective 
and direct Portuguese control. In 1875 a survey estimated 
58Wheeler, "Livingstone and .Angola, 11 The Rhodes-
Livingstone Journal, December 1962, No. XXXII, p. 39. 
59see words of Serpa Pinto on Bih~'s potential 
importance in Chapter VI, p. 182. 
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that Portuguese territory in Angola was about 60,000 
square miles. 60 Later, in July 1882, Henry Morton 
Stanley recorded a liberal estimate of Angolan territory 
under 11direct authori ty 11 from Portuguese officials at 
Luanda as "about 300,000 square miles. 1161 Some nine 
years later, Portugal possessed by the partition treaties 
only a little less than the present 481,000 square miles. 
But how much of this territory was effectively controlled? 
An estimate of 1896 stated that Portugal effectively 
62 
occupied only a meager 3,800 square miles. The dis-
crepancies between these figures, all given within twenty 
years of each other, shows the tentative nature of Portu-
guese administration over much of Angola. 
The region was so vast that the Portuguese 
themselves had little conception of the actual extent 
of certain frontiers; moreover, it seemed that the Portu-
guese conception of distance on land was somewhat affected 
by their maritime traditions. Land empires that stretched 
far past the coast were comparatively rare phenomena for 
Portugal. The Luanda Government was so ~ocated that 
over three-quarters of the province was to the south; 
the Congo region and the Atlantic Ocean remained too often 
the preponderant considerations of Luanda's policy. 
60 Gerardo Pery, Geographia e Estatistica, p. 350. 
61 Stanley, The Congo and the Founding of Its 
Free State, I, p. 455. 
62Delannoy, 11 The Portuguese in .Angola, 11 Scottish 
Geographical Magazine, 1896, p. 56Q~ 
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Until after 1910 much of the interior was left 
to the sertanejo trader and the Africans. The only sig~ 
of Portuguese sovereignty beyond 150 miles from the 
coast was a thin line of small forts and penal colonies 
stretching toward the upper Zambesi. Between 1895 and 
1897 small Portuguese detachments of less than fifty 
soldiers traveled in trade caravans to Moxico district 
(then called Lobale). By 1897 there were about half a 
dozen make-shift forts in the region west of the 
frontier with Barotseland. In the main, these stations 
were placed on trade routes, or near foreign missions, 
and were garrisoned by Negro recruits. There were penal 
colonies at Moxico. 63 Just as the Portuguese hurried 
out to put up a line of forts to protect against the 
incursions of aggressive King Lewanika, King of Barotse, 
so they feared Belgian intrusions near Lake Dilolo; in 
~903 the Portuguese established a fort on the frontier 
at Dilolo. 
Until after the First World War, the Portuguese 
were pitifully weak on the eastern section of the 
Angolan plateau. A report of the 1920's commented about 
the good old days on the frontier: 
The commanders of these forts had no 
authority over native politics, and evi-
dently they did not collect the hut taxes 
either; they limited themselves to defend-
ing their forts in case of attack, and 
nothing more. 64 
63Ralph Delgado, .Ao Sul do Ouanza, I, pp. 483-87. 
64Ibid., I, p. 488. 
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An entirely new epoch of pacification and occu-
pation followed upon the heels of the tiny columns that 
went out to plant a shaky authority on the frontier. 
Those in Portugal might have believed that Angola was 
now their t'house, 11 but the year 1891 was little more than 
the year when Angola's frontiers became complete. Frontier 
officers knew the precarious nature of the 11 occupation 11 
better than Lisbon writers. On the other hand, only 
men with the advantages of a Lisbon perspective could 
tell the bush-bound Portuguese that in order to win 
Angola as their ancestors won Brazil, the less savory 
traditions of the 19th century had to be abandoned. Yet 
very little really altered in the year of partition, 
1891, for Portuguese policy remained largely the same 
as before, and Angola was still empty of men and money. 
C. For the Future: an Angola or a Brazil? 
In the deaade following partition, it seemed 
possible and even probable to observers that Angola could 
become a prosperous territory with a stable and mixed 
society. Emigration from Portugal to Angola from 1890 
to 1900 increased to an average of slightly over 1,000 
a year.65 The revenue of the province was increased by 
participation in the great rubber boom; great caravans 
b~ought rubber to the coast from the eastern regions. 
65 A' I\ Silva, Em.igrayao Portuguesa, p. 192. 
347 
Overall trade movement in Angola increased in value 
from 45,923,500 francs in 1890 to 80,775,000 francs in 
1898.66 Benguela district from 1883 to 1893 experienced 
an increase in custom receipts of approximately 160%. 
An old problem of the Angolan eco~omy continued. 
Just as in 1770 or 1870, Portuguese territory was flooded 
with contraband, that is, cheaper and better quality 
foreign manufactures which reached markets in Angola 
without paying tariff. 67 The delicate nature of the 
Portuguese economy remained largely unaltered, and with 
it the Portuguese policy; heavy tariff protection. A 
Belgian observer of Angola remarked in this regard about 
1896: 
Angola, although still behind other European 
colonies, is now really progressing, and may 
expect a brilliant future if not hampered by 
the policy of the motherland. 68 
Unlike Mozambique, which was divided among several 
chartered companies after 1892, Angola remained relatively 
free of chartered company rule and administration after 
partition. One exception to this rule occurred in the 
least productive area of the province: Mossamedes. During 
1893 and 1894 the Mossamedes Oompany was founded and 
66A. D'Almada Negreiros, Angola. Breve Notice 
(Paris, 1901), p. 34. 
67Henrique de 1Barros Gomes, no Oommercio de 
.Angola, u Portugal em Africa ( 1894, I), pp. 114-18. 
68
nelannoy, 11The Portuguese in Angola, n p. 564. 
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capitalized under the direction of Dr. Jose Pereira de 
Nascimento. 69 Unlike the three major companies in 
Mozambique, this company was entirely economic in 
purpose, and had no political or administrative duties. 
It was mainly conceived as a vehicle to develop a 
difficult region and was given rights to run a fishing 
industry and explore mining resources in an area of about 
57 million acres, that stretched to the Upper Zambesi.7° 
The Mossamedes Company, however, was only nominally 
Portuguese.71 A few Portuguese statesmen sat on the 
Board of Directors, but the majority of the shares of 
the Company were held by the so-called "Rhodes Group 11 
of capitalists, consisting of the South African magnates, 
Cecil Rhodes, Wernher, and Beit. The Company owned the 
railroad rights in southern Angola except for a strip 
of ten kilometers along the coast. For a decade, German 
interests fought the capital interests of Rhodes· and 
attempted to obtain railroad concessions in southern 
Angola, as well as the control of the Mossamedes company. 
In the end, by 1903 and the Benguela Railway concession, 
the British-South African capitalists had triumphed over 
German designs in southern Angola.72 Nevertheless, the 
69G.E.P.eB., Vol. 6, ucompanhiastt; Vol. 16, 
"Nascimento 11 ; Negreiros, Angola, p. 5. 
70D~lannoy, 11 The Portuguese in .Angola, 11 p. 575. 
71Horst Drechsler, "Germany and South Angola: 
1898-1903," Preslnce .A:fricaine (1962, 3rd Quarterly), 
pp. 51-55 •. 
72Drechsler, "Germany, 11 pp. 55-68. 
Portuguese found it difficult to forget the German 
attempts to take Tiger Bay (Ba!a dos Tigres) for one 
railroad outlet of Southwest Africa. · The stubborn 
nature of the Portuguese Government in Lisbon, which 
I 
refused to grant concessions to the Germans, and Rhodes 
capital, effectively. safeguarded the integrity of southern 
Angola. 
.Another monopolistic company in .Angola was the 
Banco Ultramarine de Lisboa; a branhh of this company 
was established at Luanda in 1864. This group owned 
plantations in .Angola and in Sao Tom;, and during the 
1890's was responsible,for some development and invest-
ment north of the C~anza.73 Nevertheless, the Banco 
Ultramarine was consist:ently criticized by settlers and 
officials alike for its ultra-conservative and tight-
fisted economic policy during the period after 1864.74 
Traditionally, desire for fast fortunes by 
Angolan settlers had conflicted with some of the more 
liberal principles of Pqrtuguese administration. A 
case in pmmnt in the 1890's was the sugarcane alcohol 
industry; a similar problem arose during the 1845 admin-
istration of Governor-General Pedro Alexandrine da Cunb.a.75 
73A. F. Nogueira, A Ilha de S~o Thome(, p. 114; 
for criticism of the Banco Ultramarine see A.H.U., .Angola, 
Pastas 37-45, 1866-1871, Governor-General. 
74 . Negreiros, Angola, pp. 8-10. 
75see Chapter III on Governor da Cunha. 
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Mary Kingsley remarked about her 1893 visit to Angola 
that many small traders in the country had only one 
ambition: to get enough money to set up an establishment 
for the manufacture of rum.76 The industry was quite 
profitable, but the Governor-General disapproved of the 
effects upon the African population. When the Govern-
ment passed and enforced laws against such an alcohol 
industry in the sugar c.ane districts as Da,nde, Benge, 
or elsewhere, much settler discontent was aroused.77 
During Mary Kingsley's short visit to Angola, 
observers noted a definite impulse of improvement. For 
Miss Kingsley, Luanda was 11the only city in West Africa,n 
and its newly installed street lights added to its 
obscure prestige. The railroad was changing the face 
of the territory north of the Ouanza, and was extended 
by then to Oazengo district. Dondo, formerly the great 
entrepot of the immense porters' caravans from the 
north and east, was now stagnant and nearly deserted. 
The author quoted an English businessman with experience 
in Angola who declared that Portuguese capital was not 
given the proper encouragement to enter the territory: 
Generally the colony exists for the benefit 
of a few manufacturers in Portugal, who reap 
all the profit ••• the merchants are much too 
highly taxed, a good fourth part of their 
76Mary H. Kingsley, West African Studies (London, 
1899), p. 286. . 
77Negreiros, Angola, p. 8-10. 
capital is paid out in duties, with no 
certainty when it will be realised again. 
Angola, with plenty of capital, moderate 
taxes, and low duties, might in a few years 
become a most flourishing colony. 78 
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The Portuguese colonial thinkers themselves, 
however, were far more. optimistic about the future. 
Debate on the great issues of the newly partitioned 
African empire became sharper and more clearly defined. 
Angola was considered the most prosperous and fortunate 
of the colonies. Three generations of dreams seemed 
to be coming true; perhaps a new Brazil was only 
around the corner. A Portuguese writer observed in 
1901 : 
One could say that the province of Angola 
is today the Portuguese Brazil. RUle, activity, 
patriotism are the sacred trilogy leading this 
great movement of material and moral regener-
ation which characterize an epoch of renaissance.79 
.iay But how was .Angola to become another Brazil? The 
old policies remained in force. Portugal shipped convicts 
and criminals to Angola during the entire period of boom, 
from 1890 to 1900. Other tropical colonies were given 
laws which prohibited convict transportation to their 
territories. In 1882 the Oape Verde islands and Sao 
Tam/received such a law, and Mozambique got the same in 
18~5.8° Yet Angola received a regUlar stream of degredados 
78Kingsley, West African Studies, p. 290. 
79 1 . 8 Negreiros, .Ango a, p. • 
80Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thoml, pp. 37-38. 
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who far outnumbered the peasant immigrants until after 
1930. 81 The transportation policy with regard to 
Angola was reinforcing the unfortunate reputation of the 
territory in the eyes of the people of Portugal. In 
the territory itself, this policy encouraged what 
Governor-General Vasco. Guedes in 1878 eloquently referred 
to as 11the moral deficit. 1182 
Colonial thinkers, as Ant6nio Francisco Nogueira, 
Henrique de Carvalho, Pereira do Nascimento, and Manuel 
Ferreira Ribeiro believed that emigration from Portugal 
and Brazil would enable Portugal to create a true mixed 
society and assimilate many Africans into Portuguese 
society and culture. They believed that only white colon-
ization on a large scale could overcome the ruins of 
the past. In the period before the cataclysm of the 
fall of the Monarchy in 1910, Portuguese emigration was 
a key topic of conversation and political discussion. 
The Society of Geography of Lisbon set up a special 
11Emigration Commissionn which hoped to divert all emigra-
tion from Brazil and North America to the African 
colonies, especially Angola. 83 
81 A survey of the Boletim Official of Angola for 
1891 to 1920 indicated that monthly shipments of convicts 
reached Angola. For an account of transportation of 
convicts to Angola in 1926 see Willem Jaspert, Through 
Unknown Africa (London, 1929), pp. 1-30. 
82castelbranco, Hist&ria de Angola, p. 248. 
83sociedade de Geographia, Trabalhos da Commiss~o 
d'Emigray~o (Lisbon, 1894), p. 9. 
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Until the year 1906, when about 2200 Portuguese 
emigrated from Portugal and the islands to Africa, many 
felt that the program was bearing some fruit. But in 
1907 the number dropped to 636 and reached an incredible 
low of nine emigrants in the year 1909. The impetus to 
emigrate to Angola was fini~hed for several decades. 84 
How then could Angola become another Brazil, when the 
majority of hard-working emigrants went instead to 
Brazil? Up until recent times this problem has remained. 
From 1950 to 1956, out of 149,498 Portuguese who emigrated, 
some 127,244 went to Brazil, and some more to North 
Amerioa. 85 Some could still claim, as the Governors in 
the 18th century, that indirectly Brazil was ruining 
Angola's future. 
If enough Europeans could not be brought into 
.Angola, what was to be done t.o create another Brazil? 
Here was where certain Portuguese colonial thinkers 
disagreed. This disunity was symbolic of the lack of 
a continuous African policy in the 19th century. In 
1893 Nogueira published his major work on the colonial 
....r f h problem, concentrating on the island of Sao Tome, w ere 
he had served as an employee of the Banco Ultramarine. 
Twenty years before this, however, he was a settler and 
official in Mossamedes, Angola. The Republican Oliveira 
84 See Appendix XI. 
85 .Armando Candido, Emigracrao e Povoamento do 
Ultramar (Lisbon, 1958), p. 33. 
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Martins wrote a preface to this book and disagreed in 
principle with nearly everything that Nogueira wrote in 
it!86 
Oliveira Martins opposed a monopoly economy 
for the colonies, he d~sapproved of Portuguese emigration 
overseas except under special circumstances, and he was 
pessimistic about the future of the Negro in Africa. 
He represented the party which advocated non-equality, 
and the 11separate streamsn society for .Angola.87 On the 
other hand, Nogueira, the author, advocated monopolistic 
economies for Angola with heavy tariff protection, and 
a merging of the whites and blacks through education 
and equality. 88 Oliveira Martins was enough of an 
anthropologist of his era to create a theory for the 
inferiority of the Negroid race, but his friend Nogueira 
pioneered in Portugal with a book in 1880 entitled: nThe 
Negro Race from the Point of View of the Civilization 
of Africa ••• and the Portuguese Oolonies.u89 Here 
Nogueira called for a Darwinian treatment of the Negro; 
the Negro needed a great deal of education, be~ter treatment 
/ S. Thome, A 
roblema 
87Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thoml, Preface. 
88~., pp. 39-45, 123-26. 
89Nogueira,/ A Ra9a Negra sob o ponto de Vista 
da Oivilisa§~o da Africa ••• e As Ooldnias Portugugzas 
(Lisbon, 18 o). · 
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and encouragement to bring him up to the 11 socialtt level 
of the whites in Africa. Unlike the more reactionary 
anthropologist Oliveira Martins, Nogueira was supported 
in his liberal view by Oarvalho, as well as by Oapelo 
and Ivens.9° 
In Henrique Dias de Oarvalho, Portugal found an 
early Negrophile and historian of the Lunda peoples. 
Carvalho did not believe in miscegenation, but he felt 
that the Portuguese should educate and help the Negro, 
and then encourage separate development in Angola. 
He distrusted those around him who felt that miscegen-
ation represented a ttutopian and a facile duplication 
.91 
of an African Brazil. Perhaps he realized that such 
a policy would prove too little and too late. In re-
constructing the history of the Lunda peoples in Oentral 
Africa, Carvalho's work remained unequalled for three 
generations in Europe. He was a pioneer in the use of 
oral tradition and glottochronology. As b.e wrote in 
1890: 
The proto-history of these peoples, taken 
from their common traditions and the history 
of each tribe by itself, can be reconstructed 
with a real knowledge of their dialects ••• 
it is the persistent study of these two 
important elements, the historical and the 
glottological, and that of ethnics ••• for 
we must get on with the study of these races, 
9°see Chapter VI and comments of Capelo and 
Ivens on the Negro. 
91carvalho, Meteorologia, Climalogia (1892), 
pp. 8, 586. 
which, in the language of men of science, 
is still entirely to be done in this con-
tinent. 92 
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Carvalho campaigned for heavy Portuguese emigra-
tion to Angola, and for a policy of educating the Negro; 
the Negroes had to improve and find themselves in their 
own element, not as part of a mixed society, as in 
Brazil. Starting with himself as an example, Carvalho 
adopted several Negro youths in Angola, and took them 
back with him to Portugal. 
In 1891, colonial thinkers had another crucial 
problem on their minds besides that of the races: this 
was climate. Carvalho, Nogueira, Nascimento and 
Ferreira Ribeiro produced many tomes on how the Portu-
guese settlers could best adapt themselves to the 
atmosphere of tropical Angola.93 In the main, their 
suggestions followed the lines of modern hygiene and 
tropical medicine. Angola's climate, even at this late 
date, continued to have a very bad reputation in 
Portugal; much effort was produced by these thinkers 
to try to erase this threat to the future of Angola. 
The debate on the colonies was never-ending. 
With the increasing power of the Republican party before 
92carvalho, Ethnographia e Hist6ria Tradicional, 
preface. 
93Pereira do Nascimento, uestoes-Medico-Coloniais 
Relativas a Coloniza ao do plantalto de Mossamedes Lisbon, 
; Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro,. A Provincia de Sao Thome 
(Lisbon, 1877); Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, Principes 
Elementares de higiene colonial (Lisbon, 1890). 
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the 1910 Revolution, colonialists wrote feverishly to 
convince wavering partisans. An important question was 
whether or not the empire was too large for Portugal. 
Significantly, although many suggestions came forth for 
selling Mozambique, India, or the Cape Verdes, relatively 
few came for selling Angola.94 Nogueira himself believed 
that the empire should have been cut down to a more man-
ageable size for Portugal. Angola and Sao Tome, he 
believed, should be retained as the heart of the empire • 
. For him, Mozambique was in effect a foreign colony 
controlled by great companies and likely to be eventually 
sold or taken away by foreign capital.95 
A strong advocate of Portuguese emigration to 
Angola was former Minister for the Navy and Overseas, 
J~lio de Vilhena. He believed with one school of thought 
that emigration to Brazil was tantamount to a kind of 
slavery, or indentured service in a foreign land; he 
had figures to prove the poverty of the Portuguese 
residing there.96 In his memoirs, Vilhena bitterly 
recounted the fact that his station-founding scheme 
during the Scramble had been followed by too few leaders 
in Angola. 
94see The London Times, September 1890; Ramalho 
Ortigao, John Bull (Lisbon, 1943 edition), pp. 306-7. 
95Nogueira, A Ilha de S. Thom,, pp. 61-66. 
96Vilhena, Antes da Repiblica, I, pp. 73-76. 
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A more serious and long range criticism than 
this was one of Vilhena's which penetrated to a persistent 
trend in 19th century policy: the unfortunate economic 
policy of the leading interests in Portugal. Just as 
the Associav1to Commercial de Lisboa opposed st da 
Bandeira's emancipation acts in 1872, so this group 
opposed in 1881 Vilhena's decree to drop the heaVy 
tariffs from the coasting trade between the overseas 
provinces and encourage free trade.97 The traffic had 
always been too heavily protected and hindered by 
tariffs; but the Association in Lisbon held the mono-
poly on a number of manufactures and they held tightly 
to protection. 
Vilhena went on to lament the loss of certain 
coveted parts of Central Africa: 
If upon my leaving the Ministry, the con-
struction of stations had not been abandoned, 
then nine years later, we would have offered 
opposition to the greed of England. 98 
In May, 1888, Vilhena rose in the Chamber of Deputies 
in Lisbon and added to his reputation as one of the most 
formidable orators of his generation. He blamed the 
enemies of empire for what happened at the Berlin Con-
ference three years before, and, recalling the loss of 
the mouth of the Congo, he ended his speech with a 
97vilhena, .Antes da Rep~blica, I, p. 74. 
98 ~., I, p. 77. 
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damning sentence: "Portuguese financial interests hold 
a great deal of the blame for what has b.appened to our 
colonial empire. 1199 
Indeed this might have been Governor Sousa 
Ooutinho, or the ecenomist Ferreira Lobos, or even Silva 
Porto. The accusation was partly true. And it was 
repeated by those who came to Angola in the 1890ts to 
make their fortunes and try to create another Brazil. 
Yet the base of the empire was to remain very much the 
same. Unchanging, deep-rooted forces at home continued 
to keep their power over the empire. Other traditional 
forces in tropical Africa contributed age-old influences 
to the populations of Angola. The largely invisible 
physical forces of disease continued to decimate the 
Angolan population. As High Commissioner Norton de 
Matos wisely wrote in the 1920's: 
One should attribute the small population 
of Tropical Africa to two great scourges: -
disease and the exploitation of man by man. 100 
Despite all the poverty, deprivation, adversity, 
and bitter memories present in Angola in the late 19th 
century, some hopefUl men still believed that nit might 
have been different and it may be different.n Angola, 
however slowly for those who knew it, was changing. 
99Ibid., I, p. 79. 
100Norton de Matos, A Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 
1 9 2 6) ' p. 227. 
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The economy was gradually improving, and the Portuguese 
were spreading out onto the great plateaus. The expan-
sion of control was never-ending partly because so little 
had been done before. Whatever progress there was, was 
considered significant; the wretched past tended to 
distort the present. 
Within the continent of Africa, Angola remained 
isolated. Changes elsewhere had always occurred with 
little effect upon Angola. But even before the parti-
tion, statesmen like Andrade Corvo warned Portugal that 
the world as well as Africa were passing through 11 an 
enormous transformation. 11101 Tropical Africa was changing 
perceptibly, but still Angola, for the outside world, 
remained enshrouded in a cloak of secrecy and ignorance. 
There seemed to be no certain answers to the traditional 
problems--only more traditional questions. The most 
important one of all, like an old eche, asked: How long, 
would Portugal believe in the 11 old fllusions 11 ?102 
101 Andrade Corvo, Estudos, I, pp. 213-14. 
102Ibid., this phrase is from Andrade Corvo; 
Charles Vogeremployed a similar phrase in 1860: "The 
great illusions" of Portugal could go on no longer. 
Vogel, Le Portugal, p. 463. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
In History there are no ephemeral actions. As in the 
physical world, phenomena are linked together by strict 
relations o! causality, and in that prison o! enmeshed 
nets there are no values, no matter how insignificant, 
that do not have their own effects. 
-Gastao Sousa Dias 
Os Portugueses em Angola, p. 328 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Portuguese expansion of control in Angola may be 
divided into three major periods within the scope of this 
study. There was the first period of initial expansion, 
coinciding with a gradual abolition of the slave trade, 
from 1836 to 1861; the second period of comparative 
withdrawal and coastal concentration, from 1861 to about 
1877; and the third period of expansion to the plateaus 
from 1877 to 1891, which roughly falls within the era of 
the Scramble and Partition in tropical Africa. 
A. The First Period, 1836 to 1861 
The original incentive to expand Portuguese 
control beyond what it was in the 18th century was the 
direct result of the abolition of slave trade; in order 
to gain revenue for a 11reformed" .Angola, the Portuguese 
needed to raise native taxes and expand their fiscal 
or customs control of the coast. Behind the desire to 
end the slave traffic stood the fear of the British 
navy. The British wished the Portuguese to put down 
the slave-trade, but not to expand their control over 
the small ports north of Luanda. 
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The first period begins with the conquest of 
the presiaio of Duque de Braganca in 1838 and ends with 
the administration of Governor-General Oalheiros e 
Menezes in 1861. Portuguese formal control was pushed 
further to the east, reaching its eastern-most point 
with the Oassange campaign during 1850 and 1851. A 
trading and agricultural colony was planted at Mossamedes 
Bay on the southern coast in 184o. 1 
The capital of the territory or province was at 
Luanda. The power of expansion tended to concentrate 
at Luanda, and the most developed agricultural region 
lay in the vicinity of the lower Ouanza River and the 
Luanda hinterland. To the north, the Oongo coast 
promised to provide a valuable source of revenue. 
Led by the work of the Minister S~ da Bandeira, 
the Oonselho Ultramarine, and the expansionist Governor-
/ General Jose Ooelho do Amaral, the Portuguese embarked 
upon a scheme to dominate by customs control the trade 
from Ambriz to Oabinda. Four key villages were occupied 
by armed forces: Ambriz (1855), Quiballa (1856), 
Bembe (1856), and Sao Salvador, capital of the Oongo 
Kingdom (1859 and 1860)e In vain the Portuguese tried 
to occupy other key trade ports at Quissembo and at 
Punta da Lenha. For a short active period, the Govern-
ment pursued mining operati~ns at copper deposits near 
1see Ohapter III. 
Bembe, dispatched army expeditions, and fought campaigns 
with African powers to achieve supremacy in the lower 
Congo region, and to try to enrich Angola. 2 
The administration of Governor Amaral, 1855 
to 1860, represents a crucial turning point during the 
century. Lacking a strong navy or merchant marine to 
subordinate coastal African powers, or neutralize the 
British naval units, Amaral tried to capture trade routes 
by controlling the immediate interior behind the coastal 
ports. The policy of the British Foreign Office and 
Admiralty was to refuse recognition of Portuguese claims 
to the coast north of Ambriz, and to physically prevent 
any formal Portuguese occupation or establishment; their 
object was to end slave-trade as well as to preserve 
British trade and naval supremacy along the coast near 
the Congo mouth. Amaral's administration failed to 
accomplish the occupation of the Congo mouth, and 
Portuguese land power failed to suppress African hostility. 
Whatever slight sovereignty was exercised over the 
region north and northeast of Ambriz from about 1855 to 
1865 was soon destroyed by climate, terrain, and African 
enmity. The Amaral scheme was ultimately more expensive 
than it was worth. In 1869 Amaral returned for a second 
term to Angola and admitted his error. As he wrote then: 
ttThe object we really had in mind was to achieve the 
2see Chapters III and IV. 
domination of the coast by the occupation of the 
interior. n3 
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Shaken and impuverished further by wars, migra-
tion, expenses, and epidemics, Angola emerged weakened 
from the first phase of Portuguese expansion in the 
century. The search for revenue through increased 
native taxation and fiscal expansion proved almost 
self-destructive. As yet the Portuguese were too 
weak to command the interior. Financial cares and 
basic economic development programs in Portugal helped 
determine the next policy trend for Angola; a policy 
of coastal concentration, centralization, and withdrawal 
followed the administration of Governor Oalheiros in 
1861 • 4 
·-B. The Second Period, 1861 to 1877 
The report of Governor Oalheiros of 1861, 
published in 1867, laid the basis for expansion and 
labor policy in the next decade. Frontier garrisons 
were gradually withdrawn to cut expenses,and a Govern-
ment policy tantamount to forced labor was recommended 
and established by Oalhairos and his successors. The 
policy of withdrawing from the interior held true until 
3A.H.U., Angola, Pasta 40, No. 311' 16 August 
1869, Gov. Gen. 
4 The London Times, 10 November 1890, 11 The 
Finance of Portugal. 11 The Finance Minister of Portugal 
recalled in 1890 that since 1860 internal home develop-
ment had been favored to the exclusion of colonial 
investment or expense. 
365 
a£ter the arrival o£ the Portuguese exploration party 
o£ Capelo, Ivens, and Se.rpa Pinto in 1877.5 
The second per~od was an era o£ economic recovery, 
increasing ggriculture, and decreasing military power in 
the interior. The £ormerly power£ul units o£ suerra 
preta, African auxiliary units, were decimated and 
dispersed by smallpox and desertion a£ter the wars 
accompanying Portuguese expansion up to 1861. Large 
populations migrated away £rom the Portuguese settlements. 
Yet in spite o£ this, Angolan exports o£ tropical produce 
increased gradually. 
Great Britain and Portugal continued to disagree 
over Portuguese claims to the north coast up to Cabinda. 
For the Luanda administration, the Congo represented a 
chance to achieve the prosperity of Angola. But British 
policy remained £irm. 
Meanwhile, the districts to the south, Benguela 
and Mossamedes, were left to shift for themselves; 
expansion onto the central and southern plateaus suffered 
due to the Congo obsession of Luanda and the capital's 
very location in the northern quarter of the long coast-
line. Overland travel between settlements was hazardous 
and often impossible; communication was safest by sea, 
since great pockets of African independent groups stood 
5see Chapters IV, V, and VI. 
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in the way of smooth trade and travel.6 
Trade and the maintenance of favorable trade 
conditions were the chief concerns of Portuguese internal 
policy during the century. The collection of tariff.or 
custom duties upon that trade was equally important. 
In this way agriculture too often took a weak second 
place. Trade or commercio preoccupied the mentalities 
of all from the Governor to the sertanejo and chefe. 
The abortive attempt to conquer the Congo region 
aroused the countryside against the Portuguese: 11 the 
example of the occupation of Ambriz and Bembe minesrr 
created a renewed hostility north of Luanda. 7 But this 
also preserved the conviction of the administration 
that the conquest had to be completed in the future. 
a. The Third Period, 1877 to 1891 
The second phase of the colonial movement in 
Portugal took up an active program in Angola after 1877 
and based its hopes upon geographical discovery in the 
interior and expansion of Portuguese political and 
economic control along the coasts. Men like Luciano 
6 See Ian Cunnison, 11Kazembe and the Portuguese, 
1798-1832, 11 The Journal of African Historz (II, No. 1, 
1961), p. 63 for a map showing nAreas of -Portuguese 
Control." The wrong impression is gained from this 
map since it shows control to be solid between Luanda 
and Benguela; in fact, it was broken and riddled with 
pockets. See Maps at end of this study. 
7J. J. Monteiro, Angola and the River Con~o 
(1876 edition), p. 49. 
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Cordeiro and Andrade Corvo urged the Government to 
begin spending more on the colonies, and to modify its 
ueconomizingn program. 
European activity increased in the Congo area 
and Portugal continued to press her claims to the coast. 
Never really interested in the great basin and interior 
of the Congo, the Government declared in its diplomatic 
note of 1883: "What Portugal claims is on the coast. 118 
Indeed, the coastal orientation of the rulers of Angola 
persisted and colored all effsrts to gain ascendancy on 
the plateaus. The plan to found stations inland was 
generally not followed by Portuguese leaders or 
explorers; difficulties in lack of manpower, climate, 
and the African control of the country usually forbade 
the establishing of stations. Yet the Portuguese 
explorers performed a service for the future by echoing 
many of the same criticisms of weakness made known by 
Livingstone and Cameron; a new awareness was created that 
the plateaus invited colonization, and that the Negro 
populations had to be cared for. 
At the Berlin Conference and during the 1890 
crisis of the Ultimatum, Portugal attempted last-minute 
strokes which failed to move the European powers. 
Portuguese policy was as much to blame as was Portuguese 
weakness; four centuries of coastal concentration and an 
8 nA Quest'ao Do Zaire,n B.S.G.L. (serie IV, 
No.5, 1883), p. 215. 
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all-encompassing exclusivist economy precluded the 
possibility that Portugal could easily open up Central 
Africa. 
A constant spur to Portuguese activity had 
been the fear and resentment felt toward British activity. 
Yet during the struggle for territory after 1880, 
Portuguese claims remained very much the same with 
regard to the coast. The key report of Calheiros in 
1861 claimed the coast from 50 12/ to 18° south latitude.9 
After partition, the coastal limits of Angola were from 
5° to 17° 25/ south latitude. Throughout the entire 
imbroglio with Britain, the issue on the coast was less 
humanitarian than it was economic and nationalistic. 
To the mind of the Portuguese, the British were 
obstructing the progress of Angola as well as affronting 
the national honor. 
D. Angola in the 19th Oenturz 
The administration of Angola from 1845 and the 
progressive term of Pedro da Cunha, to 1891 and the 
active term of Capelo, was in fact a crude and limited 
form of a "young colonial administration. 1110 If we 
accept the definition of Fage and Oliver for such an 
administration as authority and the power to tax, then 
9oalheiros, Relat6rio (1867), pp. 5, 75-78. 
1°John Fage and Roland Oliver, A Short History 
of Africa (London, 1962), p. 198. 
Angola must qualify. Portuguese taxation policy and 
its effects were surveyed in Chapter IV of this study. 
The rulers of Angola knew only too well the effects of 
dizimo upon the Africans; and, like most administrations, 
this one sought to preserve ideally good conditions for 
trade, security for its citizens, and to retrieve 
escaped slaves and labor whenever possible. Considering 
the vassalage system and the recruitment of ~uerra preta 
and empacayeiros before the wars ending in 1863, it is 
clear that .Angola was more of a t'colony," with a larger 
white population, than Mozambique in the same period. 
Up to 1890, Mozambique, more than Angola, was what Fage 
and Oliver term 11an extended trading preserve. 11 11 The 
distinction between the two colonies has to be made 
more perfect. 
In outlining the decisive watersheds in Angolan 
history, Dr. Duffy has placed too great an emphasis upon 
the 1858 decree for abolishing slavery.12 The crucial 
events, as shown in Chapter IV, were the occupation of 
Ambriz, the abolition of carreto, and the accompanying 
raise in native taxation; thus during 1855 and 1856 
the stage was set for the dislocation and withdrawal phase 
of administration which made later expansion more difficult. 
The 1858 decree did not initiate the liberto system, and 
11~.' p. 58. 
12Dutfy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 74-78. 
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was in fact nullified by the 1861 report of Governor 
Calheiros, who admitted that free labor would be 
impossible for decades to come. 
The influence of Dr. Livingstone upon the course 
of Angolan history has been exaggerated.13 His importance 
is more manifest in Mozambique than in Angola. The 
Governors-General were shaken chiefly by concern for the 
north coast question, the activity of the British navy, 
and the rejection of Portuguese claims. If any one 
factor stirred the Portuguese to the realization of 
world opinion and competition, it was the struggle for 
the coastal trade north of Ambriz which in fact had its 
origin in the 17th century. 14 
Portuguese emigration to Brazil in the last half 
of the 19th century provided the reason why, racially, 
Angola could never become a ttsecond Brazil 11 as dreamed 
by colonialists from Das Neves to Carvalho. Although 
Portuguese population between 1845 and 1891 increased 
perhaps six times, such miscegenation as there was, 
came too late. The ratio of mulattoes to whites in 
the territory steadily decreased after Partition. 
Personality and administrative feuds make up 
a great deal of the history of the territory. Too often 
the commonweal suffered because of individual egotism. 
13Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 78, 179. 
14see Chapters I, II, IV. 
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What held true for the Portuguese in the Iberian 
Peninsula in part conditioned their action in Africa. 
As Am~rico Castro wrote, the Spanish and Portuguese 
both participate in 11 an anxious movement through the 
moral region of the ought-to-be."15 Because they dis-
like the true history of Angola, certain writers have 
felt justified in writing an idealized version based 
on what should have occurred; this tendency points to 
the fact that the Portuguese are as yet in chronic 
disagreement over basic values and principles in their 
own society. Yet this does not prevent some savants 
from describing reality. As Ralph Delgado wrote of 
the history of the Angolan bush: 
The Portuguese colonist was plastic, 
humanitarian, and at the same time fond of 
native culture; however, he was also a 
devastator of the black populations just 
for the sake of trade. 16 
The future of Angola was safeguarded for Portugal 
with the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 
1899. In effect, the two nations were reconciled after 
a century of conflict over Africa, and the German hopes 
for southern Angola were finished. Portugal decided 
to adhere to two old traditions which seemed so close 
to annihilation during the crisis of 1890 and shortly 
afterwards, the British Alliance and the African empire. 
15oastro, The Siructure of Spanish History 
(Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 4. 
16Delgado, Hist6ria de Angola, IV, p. 419. 
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Nevertheless, two major weaknesses remained: 
economic poverty and politico-religious disunity. 
Angola was the scene o~ conf~ict between ~iberals an~ 
conservatives, the investors and the economizers, and 
the Church and the anti-c~ericals. One extreme solution 
led to another in the modern history o~ Portuguese 
activity. Portuguese interests at home rarely coincided 
with interests of settlers or Africana in Ango~a. To 
favor economic interests at home was to hurt Angola. 
With its own disunity and factionalism, Portugal could 
not hope to unify the many African tribes and weld 
them into one. 
Too late and in too small a measure came the 
attempt to win the hearts and minds of Africans; indeed, 
young King Pedro V in his wisdom wrote that the Portu-
guese could not force their culture upon the Africans. 17 
For him this was unnatural. Throughout the last six 
decades of the 19th century, the Luanda administration 
was deep~y concerned with the stirrings of African 
political aspirations for independence to the north 
and northeast. The rebel Congo princes with European 
educations, Aleixo and Nicolas, long reminded the Portu-
guese of the power of African po~itical consciousness. 
Such movements were as yet weak, disunified, and sporadic. 
17see Chapter I, p. 23. 
But the presence of Dom Aleixo in the dungeons of 
Fort Penedo and the 1859 letter of Prince Nicolas 
symbolized the continuing African desire to remain 
apart. 18 
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Norton de Matos and others have lamented that 
Portugal failed to attain the old dream of a contra-
costa empire. Matos blamed the Portuguese themselves 
· for not adhering to what he called uthe hinterlands 
principle. 111 9 Remarkably, he connected this error with 
the status of Portugal in the 20th century: if Portugal 
had gained more of Central Africa, nThen our situation 
in the world today would be very different from what 
it is.n Whether or not his conclusion is acceptable, 
it is clear that his placing of the blame is highly 
significant for this study. By his notion, Portugal 
(and the policies of the Governors of Angola, as docu-
mented in this study) made the choice to concentrate 
on the coast; the decision to move into the sertoes came 
too late. Thus, the failure to get more of the 
plateaus and to occupy the Oongo mouth as well was due 
as much to the character and policies of the officials 
in Angola as to the lack of men and money. On the other 
18nom Aleixo was imprisoned in Fort Penedo, 
Luanda from 1841 to about 1856. For an account of his 
history see Chapter III and Tams, Visita as Possessoes 
Portuguezas, II, pp. 17-19. 
19Norton de Matos, A Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 
1926)' p. 18. 
hand, more than foreign competition in the interior, 
African military prowess and climate opposed further 
Portuguese penetration and occupation. 
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Portuguese capital was more readily available for 
investment in Angola than is generally realized; policy 
in Lisbon, however, made less available for overseas. Those 
who emphasize poverty as the key to Portuguese failures 
have overlooked the revealing complaints of Sousa Coutinho, 
20 
Ferreira Lobos, Julio de Vilhena and others. 
Finally, it has been shown that Portuguese policy, 
motives, and activity were neither simple nor one-sided. 
Portuguese knowledge about African society could be both 
profound and realistic. Despite adverse conditions, the 
Portuguese at times displayed an extraordinary endurance. 
After briefly surveying one century, the writer is tempted 
to trace the origins of problems to their beginnings in 
the 16th century. To say, as did certain Portuguese 
administrators, that "the trouble is very old11 , is to 
21 
broadly describe the essential unity of Angolan history. 
That simple Portuguese verdict is therefore a fitting 
conclusion to this study of a complicated problem. 
2°Refer to the quotations in the text of this study. 
21My free translation of the common phrase, "o mal 
vinha de longen is t 1the trouble is very old." This phrase 
was used by officials in the 19th century correspondence 
from Luanda to Lisbon. 
BIBLIGGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
There is no adequate modern history o~ Angola 
in English, Dr. Duffy's Portuguese Afric~ surveys the 
entire history of the territory, yet he concentrates 
on the era after 1875, and uses mainly secondary sources. 
Gladwyn Childs' Umbundu Kinship and Character (London, 
1949) has a valuable historical section dealing with 
the 19th century trade history of central and southern 
Angola, but with little consideration of expansion or 
administration in other areas. F. c. c. Egerton's 
Angola in Perspective (London, 1957) is more of a 
wandering travelogue than a history, but occasionally 
he presents 19th century material not present in Duffy 
or Childs. Numerous articles present fragments of the 
19th century story. Among these are Ian Cunnison's 
11Kazembe and the Portuguese, 1798-1832, 11 in the Journal 
of African History (1961), Charles E •. Nowell's 11 Portugal 
and the Partition of Africa,tt Journal of Modern History 
(1947), Roger .Anstey's ttBritish Trade and Policy in 
West Central Africa. Between 1816 and the early 188o's,tt 
Transactions of the _Historical Society of Ghana (1957). 
A very important contemporary account, invaluable 
for some aspects of the history 1855-1875 is Joaquim 
Jobn Monteiro's Angola and the River Congo (London, 1875). 
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Ot more limited time scope yet perhaps more acute 
observation is, ot course, David Livingston's Missionary 
Travels and Researches in South Africa (London, 1857). 
In the realm o! bibliography Angola is less 
fortunate than Mozambique. To my knowledge only one 
specific bibliography exists in Paul Borchardt's ~ 
Bibliographie de Angola, 1500-1910 (Brussels, 1912). 
Other modern and more up-to-date guides tor material 
that is appearing in Portuguese and other languages are: 
I ....( the Guia Bibliografia historica portuguesa (Vol. I, 
1959-61- ), published by the Academia Portuguesa da 
Historia; the Boletim Internacional de Bibliogra!la 
Luso-Brasileira (Vol. I, 1960, No. 1- ), published by 
the Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisbon. A general 
guide to Portuguese archives is the volume ot Daniel 
H. Thomas and Lynn M. Case, editors, Guide to the 
Diplomatic .Archives o! Western Ew:Jope (Philadelphia, 
1959, University o! Pennsylvania Press); see in this 
volume, "Portugal 11 by Manoel Cardozo. 
There are many histories of Angola in Portuguese. 
Unfortunately the majority o! the material is not objec-
tive and usually treats the era before 1800. Gastao 
Sousa Dias has many volumes on fragments of 19th century 
history as listed·in this bibliography, yet only in 
his posthumous Os Portugueses em .Angola (Lisbon, 1959) 
do we !ind the first three decades o! the century well 
covered after a brilliant essay on the 18th century. 
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I Ralph Delgado in his large Historia de Angola (Lisbon, 
Benguela, 1948-55, 4 vols.) has reached the 18th century 
and in his volumes of documents and narrative on southern 
Angola, chiefly Benguela district, we have a base of 
documentation missing in northern Angola. Most important 
are Delgado's Ao Sul do Cuanza (Lisbon, 1940, 2 vols.) 
and A Famosa e Hist6rica Benguella, 1779-1940 (Lisbon, 
1940). 
Concentrating on the southern plateaus in the 
19th century, A. A. Felner wrote Angola. Apontamentos 
Sobre a Colonizap~o Dos Planaltos e Literal Do Sul de 
Angola. Documentos. (3 vols., Lisbon, 1940). Little in 
the way of documentation or analysis has appeared in 
Portuguese for 19th century Angola, north of the Cuanza. 
/. One exception is the work of Helio E. Felgas in the 
Congo district. His work, however, is uneven and not 
as heavily documented nor as critical as the sweeping 
treatments of Delgado. Felgas has to his credit to 
date: Histbria do Congo Portugues (Carmona, 1958) and 
Popularoes Nativas do Congo Portugues (Carmona, 1960). 
Francisco Oastelbranco's Hist6ria ~e Angola 
(Lisbon, 1942) has considerable material on the 19th 
century, but as Felgas is uneven and largely undocumented. 
I / ( Rocha Martins, Historia das Oolonias Portuguesas Lisbon, 
1933) has a wealth of material on Angola in this era, 
but it is unfortunately undocumented and therefore 
difficult to use except in support of better-known aspects. 
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The Hist6ria da Expansao dos Portugueses no Mundo in 
Volume III, the section of 1833-1885, 11 The Implanting 
of Liberalism to the Berlin Oonference, 11 is largely a 
patriotic account which over-emphasizes external .forces 
of causation and neglects conflicts among the Portuguese 
themselves. For biographical data on colonial .figures 
or material on colonial institutions, the Grande Enci-
clopedia Portuguesa e Braileira (1924-1956, Lisbon and 
Rio de Janeiro) is useful but the reader should be 
cautioned against frequent mistakes on dates and titles, 
and inexplicable omissions. 
Primary material in the .form of published docu-
ments is very plentiful in Portuguese. These documents 
tend to fall within the period before 1800 or after 
1880, however. Such published material as Governor-
General Reports, and officials' reports is found in 
publications as Archives de Angola (Luanda, 1933-48, 
I / 9 volumes), Archives das Oolonias, Portugal em Africa, 
Anais do Oonselho Ultramarine (1854-1864, 4 vols.), 
Anais Ooloniais e Maritimes (1840-50), Boletim da 
Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa (1877- ) , Boletim 
Official do Governo Geral de Angola (1845-1891 or to 
the present), Mens,rio Administrative (Luanda) and 
others. 
Portuguese daily papers or journals contain a 
great deal of material on Angola in the 19th century. 
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Main~y I have consulted for the 1850's and 186o's, 
0 Jorna~ de Oommercio (Lisbon) or the Diario de Notfcias. 
A useful military journa~ published fortnightly in the 
era was the Revista Militar. 
Works in French are second on~y to Portuguese 
for studying Angola in this era. Perhaps the most 
valuab~e contemporary survey of the entire empire and 
Portugal is Charles Voge~'s bril~iant Le Portugal et 
Ses Oo~onies (Paris, 1860). There are a number of modern 
accounts in French of Angola, most notable is the work 
of Portuguese M. Almada Negreiros in a series cal~ed 
Les Colonies Portugaises published at Paris from 1901 to 
1910. Numerous geographical accounts of Angola have 
only fragments of history. 
I have listed in the notes and bib~iography 
some important German works and exp~orers' accounts. 
Without these, a total picture of European opinions on 
Angola would be impossible. 
One basis for the hypotheses presented in this 
study comes from unpub~ished documents deposited in the 
Arguivo Historico Ultramarine of Lisbon, deposit of the 
Overseas Ministry. I have used mainly reports and 
letters from the Governors-Genera~ between 1825 and 
1884, when the documents of Angola run out. Voluminous 
Treasury Department material under Junta da Fazenda 
was not consulted for lack of time. Other valuable 
19th century material was consulted at Oporto in the 
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original manuscript diaries of Antonio da Silva Porto, 
settler in Bihe and letters from the explorers of Angola 
to the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa in Lisbon. 
Several weeks in the Public Record Office in London were 
spent consulting the correspondence of Luanda consuls 
with the Foreign Office. Some of this correspondence 
is published in white books or volumes listed in the 
bibliography. 
Another source of published documents in Portu-
guese is the work of the National Press of Portugal, 
the Imprensa Nacional which throughout the century 
published important material. 
This is by no means a aefinitive bibliography 
that follows. Yet an attempt has been made to provide 
a more comprehensive bibliography for the modern history 
of Angola than usually is available for English-speaking 
students. 
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APPENDIX I 
GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF ANGOLA, 1837-1893* 
Manuel Bernardo Vidal 1837-1838 
Ant6nio Noronha 1838-1839 
Manuel E. Malheiros 1839-1842 
Jos~ Bressane Leite 1842-1844 
Lourenyo Germak Possollo 1844-1845 
Pedro Alexandrine da Ounna 1845-1848 
Adriao da Silveira Pinto 1848-1851 
-1' I 4tonio Sergio de Sousa 1851-1853 
Visconde do Pinheiro 1853-1854 
/ Jose Rodrigues Ooelho do Amaral Oct. 1854-Aug. 1860 
Oarlos Augusto Franco 1860-1861 
Sebastaio Lopes de Oalheiros e Menezes 1861-1862 
' , 
Jose Baptista de .Andrade 1862-1865 
Francisco Antdnio Gon9alves Oardozo {Garrido) 1866-1869 
Jos$ Rodrigues Ooelb.o do. Amaral Apr .. 1869-June 1870 
H~s' Haria da Ponte e Horta 1870-1873 
/ Jose Baptista de Andrade 
Alexandre de Almeida e Albuquerque 
Vasco Guedes 
Antbnio Eleuterio Dantes 
Francisco Ferreira do Amaral 
Guilherme Augusto de Brito Oapelo 
1873-1875 
1875-1879 
1879-1880 
1880-1882 
1882-1885 
1885-1893 
* This list does not include certain 11interinou 
or temporary acting Governors-General. Source: Arehivo 
Historico Ultramarine, Library. 
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1846: PALMERSTON'S LETTER TO MONOORVO: 
NEW INTERPRETATION* 
Foreign O~~ice, November 30, 1846 
M. le Baron, 
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of 
your note of the 10th instant, in which you state that, 
according to information received by your Government 
~rom Loanda, the British member of the Mixed Commission 
there intends to inquire of Her Majesty's Government 
whether they recognize the ports of Cabinda and Ambriz 
as Portuguese possessions, and whereupon you observe 
that, although both you and your Government are quite 
sure that no doubt can be entertained on this subject 
by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, yet it is 
your duty to call my attention to the II Article of 
the Additional Convention (signed the 28th July, 1817) 
to the Treaty of the 22nd July, 1815, whereby Great 
Britain acknowledges the reservation of the rights which 
Portugal has to the points south of the Equator, compre-
hending the territories of Molembo and Oabinda, on the 
western o~ast of Africa, in which Ambriz is included; 
and also to a note !rom Lord Aberdeen to yourself, 
dated the 20th September, 1845; and you request that 
the inquiry of the Loanda Commissioners may be answered 
in conformity with the tenour tb.ereo~. 
Presuming that your present representation had 
its origin in the case of the Brazilian brig ttBoa Uniao, 11 
which was lately captured on the West Coast of Africa 
by a Portuguese cruizer in latitude 7°36/ south, and 
longitude 12°53/ east, and was condemned by the Portu-
guese Tribunal at Loanda on a charge of being engaged 
in the Slave Trade within Portuguese jurisdiction, I 
beg leave to state to you the following particulars:-
Tb.e British CommissioneTs, in reporting to Her 
Majesty's Government the case of the uBoa Uniao,tt 
observed that a similar Judgement would no doubt.be 
given in the case o~ any slave-vessel captured by a 
*Verbatim text ~rom Accounts and Papers, Africa, 
Vol. XLVIII, (London, 1883, Her Majesty's Stationary 
O~fice), o. 3531, "Correspondence," No.8, PP~ 10-11, 
ttviscount Palmerston to Baron Moncorvo." 
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Portyguese aruizer off any port of the coast from Molembo 
in 5°12/ south dolnt to Ambriz in 8° south, and they 
stated their apprehension that if Portugal enforced 
sovereign rights over this territory it would interfere 
with the intercourse between British merchants and the 
natives, who at present carry on their trade without 
payment of any duties to the Portuguese Government. 
Now, according to the Treaty of 1817, Molembo, 
as you are aware, is the extreme northern point of.tb.e 
Portuguese claim to sovereignty not actually recognized 
by Great Britain, but to which Portugal declares that 
she retains her rights, and Ambriz is the extreme 
northern point recognized by Great Britain. Upon the 
receipt1 therefore, of the communication from Her Majesty s Oommissioners, Her Majesty•s Government were 
not wholly without apprehension that, if allowed to 
pass without notice, the sentence of the Portuguese 
Oourt at Loanda, which involves a claim of exclusive 
territorial possession, might prejudice the right, which 
it is important, in the interests of commerce, tor Her 
Majesty's Government to maintain, to unrestricted 
intercourse w1 th that part of the West Ooast of Africa 
which lies between 5°12/ south latitude and 8° south 
latitude. 
I therefore inst.ructed Lord Howard de Walden 
and Seaford to represent to the Portuguese Government, 
with reference to the condemnation of the "Boa Uniao,u 
that, while Her Majesty's Government received with satis• 
faction the renewed proof which the capture of that 
vessel afforded of tb.e diligence of the Portuguese 
authorities in the suppression of the Slave Trade, they 
did not admit the claim of Portugal to a right of saver~ 
eignty from 5°12/ to 8° south latitude, and would not 
permit a British vessel captured off that part of the 
West Ooast by a Portuguese cruizer, on suspicion of 
being a slaver, to be adjudicated by any Portuguese 
Oourt, but would require that she should be dealt with 
according to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1842. 
As it is to be inferred from your note that at 
the time of writing it you were not cognizant of this 
instruction to Lord How·ard de Walden and Seaford, I have 
thought that I could not better answer your representation 
than by thus repeat~ng to you the substance of that in-
struction, as conveying the sentiments of Her Majesty's 
Government upon the matter to which you have drawn my 
attention. 
I have, etc. 
PALMERS TON (signed) 
APPENDIX III 
RESUME OF CONOELHOS IN INTERIOR ANGOLA, 1858-59, RAYING 
DIZIMO OR TAX ON HOUSES, FARMS, CATTLE, AND HUNTING* 
.Uta Dande 
Barra do Bengo 
Barra do Dande 
Oalumbo 
Icollo e Bengo 
Libongo 
Muxima 
Encoge 
Zenga do Golonzo 
Ambaca 
Novo Redondo 
Oambambe 
Oazengo 
Demba {Dembo) 
Duque de Bragan9a 
GollUlgo .Uto 
Malange 
Massangano 
Pungo .Andongo 
Tallamugongo 
Oaconda 
Catumbella 
Dombe Grande 
Egito 
Quilengues 
CONOELHOS EXEMPTED FROM DIZIMO IN SAME YEAR 
.Ambriz 
D. Pedro V (Bembe) 
Mossamedes 
i.-Source; A.H. U., Angola, Pasta 26, No. 153, 
ttResum.o des Lan9amentos do Dizimo dos Concelhos do 
Interior dos annes abaixo mencionados." 
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1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 
1866 
18~G 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
APPENDIX IV 
DEATH LIST FOR EUROPEANS IN ANGOLA~:· 1861-1874* 
Settlers Soldiers Total Deaths 
1:.:129 223 352 
106 48 154 
44 32 76 
96 72 168 
130 63 193 
102 10 112 
120 66 186 
101 56 157 
88 107 195 
169 116 285 
85 53 138 
ESTI~ES OF EUROPEAN POPULATION IN ANGOLA 
1778-1898** 
~ Population 
1778 1,700 
1845 1,832 
1869 2,863 
1898 12,285 
*Source ot this incomplete list, A.H.U., Angola, 
Pasta 44, Ma9o 1, Relat6rio, 1875. 
**Sources: 1778 estimate, Archivos das Ool6nias, 
III, 1918, No. 3, pp. 30-32. Estimates of 1B45 and 1869 
:from Gerardo A. Pery, Geograpb.ia e Estatf.ttica Geral De 
Portugal e Ool.onias (Lisbon, 1875), pp. 356-57. Estimate 
o:f 1898, Annuario Estatistico da. Provineia de An ola, 
Vol .. 2, 1 9 Lisbon, 1900 Imprensa Nacional. , pp. IX-X .. 
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Distribution of libertos (slaves to be freed in time) 
in .Angola, registered with the Government General, from 
years 1854, Dec.,to 1863, Dec. Under law decree ot 
14 Dec. 1854. 
Libertos by District in the Province 
Ambriz 
Loanda 
Benguela 
Mossam.edes 
Golungo 
Sum Total 
422 
6,781 
1 ,583 
291 
21! 182 
30,259 
Libertos by Ooncelho or Settlement 
Loanda 
Novo Redondo 
(Within District of Golungo 
Golungo Al.to 
Dembos 
.Am.baca. 
Malange 
Talla-Mugongo 
Du.t.ue de Braganza 
Pungo .Andongo 
Oazengo 
Oambam.be · 
Massangano 
1,388 
3,879 
.Alto): 
7,180 
421 
2,4oo 
398 
99 
1,109 
790 
2,419 
3,470 
2,890 
Total tor Golungo Alto District 
21 '182 
*Source: A.H.U., .Angola, Pasta 34, Document 
No. 1 o, enclosed in No. 39, 1865, ••Apo:ntam.ento." 
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EXPORT OF COPPER (MALACHITE) ORE FROM AMBRIZ 
1858-63it-
1858 5,000 arrobas (about 80 tons)** 
1859 10,000 II (160 tons) 
1860 3,000 Jt (45 tons) 
1861 14,000 tt (230 tons) 
1862 17,000 11 (275 tons) 
1863 10,000. It { 160 tonal 
Approximate Total 950 tons 
APPROXIMAT~ TONNAGE OF OOPPER EXTRACTED FROM BERBE 
1857-1867*** 
1 ,095 tons 
*Boletim Official (Angola), 1864, Jan. 23, 
No. 4, p. 23, 11Export of Oopper Ore from Ambr1z. 11 
**A Portuguese arroba is about 32 lbs. 
***Grande En.oiolopedia Portuguese. e Brasileira, 
Vol. 4, pp. 502-3. 
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PUBLIC DEBTS AND DEFICITS OF PORTUGAL, 1835-1861* 
Public Debt of Portugal (in cantos) 
1835 
1838 
1846 
1851 
1855 
1859 
55,281 
82,040 
71 ,420 
77,365 
93,314 
131,575 
Deficits by Year (in milreis) 
1850-51 2,330,777 
1853-54 204,114 
1854-55 11,746 
1855-56 496,680 
1856-57 721,539 
1857-58 1,412,838 
1858-59 849,059 
1859-60 1 '365, 188** 
1860-61 2,114,271** 
*Source: Charles Vogel, Le Portusal et Ses 
Colonies (Paris, 1860), p. 370 (debt), p. 373 (deficits). 
**Estimated and provisional deficits. 
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EXPORTATION OF OOFFEE FROM ANGOLA (NORTH OF OUANZ.A.) 
1832-1894* 
!.!!!: .Amount in Kilo~rams 
1832 1,440 
1845 6,ooo 
1857 76,675 
1867 913,325 
1870 891,289 
1871 1 ,226,133 
1872 2,418,874 
1894 4,177,000 
*This chart combines figures from tables in 
Gerardo A. Pery, Geo a hia e Estatistioa Geral de 
Port~al e Oolonias Lis on, 1 75,- Imprensa ,..Nacional), 
p. 35 t and Ernesto de Vasconcellos, As Oolonias 
Portuguezas {Lisbon, 1921 edition), p. 162. Pery writes 
about the coffee production in Angola that the prohi-
bition of slave trade encouraged an agricultural 
revolution, on a small seale, where before 1840 only 
manioc, beans, and millet had been extensively cultivated 
by the natives. In 1838 most of the coffee consumed in 
Angola was imported from Brazil. Ooffee production 
increased more steadily and spectacularly than cotton, 
or sugar cane. The rubber boom of 1870 to 1900, was 
eventually passed by coffee, which remains today the 
most important agricultural product in the territory. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON KEY COLONIAL FIGURES* 
1, Josl Rodrigues Coelho do Amaral (1808-1813) 
Trained as an Army o~ficer 1n Lisbon, he was 
sent to France in 1844 to study military teaching. In 
1851 was appointed Governor of Benguela District. 
Governor of Angola from 1854 to 1860, he was a staunch 
expansionist. Upon return to Lisbon was made a Member 
o:f the decision-making body, the Conselho Ultramarine. 
From January to July 22, 1868, he was Minister for Navy 
and Overseas. Named Governor of Angola later in the 
year, where he served until 1870. He died in Mozambique 
on campaign. His obituary in the Diario Illustrado 
of Lisbon in 1874 remarked he was not appreciated in 
Portugal as one of uthe few men who dedicate themselves 
sincerely to inglorious and treacherous service in our 
colonies." 
2. Francisco Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral (1844-1923) 
Trained as a naval officer, he was early in 
career Governor of s. Tome and Mossamedes in 1878-79. 
His zealous discipline among settlers caused his dis-
missal. Named Governor of Angola in 1882, he created 
the Congo district in 1885. In 1886 was named Governor 
of India and later a President of the Society of 
Geography of Lisbon. 
3. Jos' Baptista de Andrade (1819-1902J 
Trained as a naval officer, he saw service on 
cruisers in the Congo River and coast before 1854. In 
1855 made the first Governor of Ambriz, he led armies 
to the interior mines and towns. In 1859 and 1860 he 
went to Bembe and s .. Salvador. Named Governor of Angola 
in 1862, he served until 1865. The Dembos campaign was 
responsible for his recalling to Angola as Governor to 
1875. He rose to full Admiral. of the Navy by 1896 retiral. 
4. Joao de Andrade Corvo ( 1824-1890), 
Foreign Minister in 1871 and Minister for Navy 
and Overseas during 1875-76, he helped begin the second 
*The majority of this material on colonial figures 
is from the respective biographies in the G.E.P.eB. and 
a few random notes. 
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phase of the colonial movement. A younger version of 
Sa da Bandeira in his principles, he engineered the idea 
of the first national exploration of Angola. 
5. ~enrique de Barros Gomes (1843-1898) 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chancellor, 
1886-90, he was head of the Progressista Party. His 
Government fell shortly after the delivery of the 
"Ultimatumtt of 1890. Offered the Presidency of the 
powerful Society of Geography several years later, with 
typical flourish, he refused the honor. 
6. Hermenegildo Carlos de Brito Capelo (1841-1917) 
Leader of two scientific expeditions to Africa, 
1877-85, with Roberto Ivens, he distinguished himself in 
European exploration circles. Widely known as a geographer 
and astronomer, he was Portuguese delegat.e to the Brussels 
Conference of 1890. His exact surveys of Angola laid the 
basis for the modern map surveys. 
1. Luciano Cordeiro (1844-1900} 
Founder and Per.man.ent Secretary of the Society 
of Geograpby of Lisbon in 1875, writer and historian, 
his researches into the early history of the Portuguese 
discoveries and empire made him a younger version of the 
Viscount of Santarem. For several years from 1875-85 
the Society of Geography was like a special Ministry of 
overseas, for all the colonial men corresponded with 
its members. 
8. Fernando da Costa Leal {1825-69) 
Trained as an army officer, he first went to 
Africa as an aide to the Governor-General of Angola in 
1853. Explorations of the Cunene river valley and the 
mouth of the river in 1854 made him.famous in Lisbon. 
working with Sa da Bandeira on maps of Angola, he 
returned in 1864 to be Governor of Mossamedes. An 
active Governor who built roads and traveled widely in 
the interior, he resigned in 1866 after disputes in his 
administration. Made Governor of Mozambique in August, 
1869, he succumbed to the climate within four months. 
g. Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro (1839-1917) 
An Army medical doctor, he urged reform of 
medical services on s. Tome and Principe. Working at 
.Am.baoa on railway construct.ions, b.e also taught in Lisbon 
at the Escola Superior Colonial created after 1906. 
Writer of tracts on medical prevention of malaria, he 
also composed volumes on exploration. 
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10. Manuel Joaguim Pinheiro Ohagas (1842-1895) 
Minister for Navy and Overseas during a crucial 
period, 1883-86, he led a movement for reform. Considered 
by some as ''one of the greatest Portuguese figures of the 
past oentury,n his basic reforms in administration went 
largely unnoticed beneath more spectacular military 
anticos in Africa. 
11. Luis Augusto Rebello da Silva (1822-1871) 
One of the most original writers and novelists 
of the 19th century, he was also a great orator in 
Parliament, first elected in 1848. His contact with 
Overseas affairs was short but decisive. Minister of 
Navy and Overseas :from .August 1869 to May 1870 under 
the Duke o:f Loule 1s Ministry, b.e resigned due to illness; 
but he left a mark on overseas spending and effort :from 
1870-75 by recommending in his Relat&rio do M1nistro da 
Marinha e Ultramar (Lisbon, 1870) a severe cutback on 
all spending on African territory, and a budgeting at 
home. His opinion coincided with a low point in finance, 
and a withdrawal from the interior in Angola. 
12. 
Studied at Ooimbra and visited England in 1823 
as an army o:fficer and was impressed with what he saw. 
Oliveira Martins remarked of his colonial interests. nin 
this he showed his romanticism. His colonial preoccu-
pation passed to be a mania and soon became that."* 
Appointed Minister o:f Navy in 1835, he made a pioneering 
report to the Queen in 1836 seeking a renovation in 
overseas ef:fort. A staunch liberal during the Civil 
Wars, he lost his arm before 1834 but became known as 
a brilliant strategist even off the battle:field. His 
plans for the defense of Lisbon in the 1860 1 s, in case 
of an attack from Spain or France, were basically accepted. 
13. Viscount of Santar'm (1791s1856) 
Began historical research in 1808 in Brazil with 
the Royal Family in exile. Minister by 1826, he was 
Minister :for Navy and Overseas for a short while to 
1834, leaVing Portugal thereafter for political reasons (he was an Absolutist or partisan of Miguel), he settled 
in Paris in perpetual exile. His patriotism for Portugal, 
however, transcended his disagreement in political 
*Louren9o Oayolla, s{ da Bandeira (Lisbon, 1935, 
Pelo Imp$rio Series, Agenoia Geral das Col6nias), p. 24. 
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principles, and his historical works from 1839-1856 encour-
aged tb.e early phase of the colonial movement. His 
Demonstracao (1855) was translated into English for the 
use of the Foreign Office. Begged to return to Portugal 
by Kings and Ministers, he remained in Paris to the end. 
14 • .Antbnio de Ser;pa Pimentel (1825-1900) 
Professor of Mathematics, writer and diplomat, 
he was a close colleague of Luciano Cordeiro with whom 
he represented Portugal at the Berlin West African Oon-
.f'erence, 1884-85. 
15. Alexandre Alberto Rocha de Serpa Pinto t1846-1900} 
In many ways a Portuguese version of Henry M. 
Stanley, Serpa Pinto was trained as an army officer with 
experience in the disastrous Bonga campaign in Mozambique 
in 1869. The fourth European to cross Africa from coast 
to coast after Livingstone, Stanley, and Cameron, he was 
a popular figure in Portugal. Admirer and friend of 
Stanley, he was highly ambitious for himself and to his 
ambition may be attributed a major factor for dividing 
the expedition of 1877-79. Spending much of his time in 
East Africa after 1882. he ended his career as Governor 
of the Cape Verdes, an exhausting post of four years 
to 1898. Like Stanley, old African illnesses overtook 
him shortly afterwards. Fran{.ois Coillard in 1878 called 
him rta true friend of Africa. ' 
The Monarchs of Portugal, 1_777-191 0 
Queen Mar!a I (insane after 1792) 
Prince-Regent Joao 
Joao VI 
Miguel (younger son of Joao VI) 
Pedro IV (elder son of Jo€o VI) 
Queen Maria II (daughter of Pedro IV) 
Ferdinand, Prince-Regent 
Pedro V (son of Ferdinand and Maria) 
Luiz I (younger son of Ferdinand and Marla) 
Carlos I (assassinated) 
Manuel II (last King of Portugal, deposed 
by Republic) 
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1777-1816 
1792-1816 
1816-1826 
1826-1834 
1834 
1834-1853 
1853-1855 
1855 ... 1861 
1861-1889 
1889-1908 
1908-1910 
APPENDIX X 
FINAL YEARLY DEFIOITS OF PORTUGAL, 1843-1872* 
Years 
1843-44 
1844-45 
1845-46 
1846-47 
1847-48 
1849-50 
1850-51 
1851-52 
1852-53 
1853-54 
1854-55 
1855-56 
1856-57 
1857-58 
1858-59 
1859-60 
1860=61 
1861-62 
1862-63 
1863-64 
1864-65 
1865-66 
1866-67 
1867-~8 
1868-69 
1869';'70 
1870~1 
1871-72 
Deficits in Milreis 
____ ._. _____ .. ___ _ 
1,390,415,567 
611,111,000 
..... _.__.,. ........... .,., ... _ 
--------------------1,213,330,171 
1 ' 1 20, 1 3 2' 2 61 
1,015,964,728 
189,864,167 
24,113,896 
11 '746,477 
294,944,336 
354,953,824 
408,978,647 
479,974,463 
524,446,368 
1 ,483,325,679 
1 '052,424, 324 
800,000,000 
1 ' 399, 1 50, 54 7 
2,718,953,347 
3,780,892,437 
4,6oo,ooo,ooo 
5,67p,ooo,ooo 
6, 133, 631 , 721 
5,276,787,884 
4,583,092,674 
3,921,333,305 
*Source: Ferreira Lobos, As Oonfissoes dos 
Ministros de Portugal, :p. 45. 
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GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION 
1872-1910* 
Remainder 
North of South 
Year Europe Africa Brazil America .America Oceania 
1872 337 16,934 
1873 370 1 2, 61 2 
1874 279 14,546 
1875 252 15,078 
1876 301 10,717 
1877 319 10,722 
1878 362 9,566 
1879 305 12,892 
1880 363 12,217 
1881 360 14,265 
1886 270 17,000 
___ ...,. ____ 
1887 415 493 15,854 294 
1888 349 656 22,952 5 
1889 967 1 ,340 18,305 2 
1890 482 1 ,879 
-------
27,038 16 
1891 351 1,574 29,630 1,929 95 5 
1892 302 1 '189 17' 321 2,141 1 1 1 
1893 290 1 '252 26,130 2,686 13 6 
1894 239 1 '41 0 25,773 1 ,532 31 8 
1895 283 1 '217 40,390 1,830 53 613 
1896 330 1 '141 23,998 1,998 194 16 
1897 228 1 ,536 17,793 1,589 178 16 
1898 207 1 '950 20' 131 1 '151 1 61 
1899 235 1 '541 13,348 2,365 148 136 
1900 441 1 '940 14,493 4,174 162 20 
1901 207 1 '956 14,489 3,787 150 56 
1902 290 1 ,893 15,003 6,841 72 16 
1903 318 1 '920 14,527 4,755 57 22 
1904 379 1 '954 21,449 4,351 163 ---
1905 292 2,083 24,815 6,057 355 
1906 369 2,287 26,147 7' 631 316 1 ,336 
1907 106 636 31 ,483 8,488 181 1 ,053 
1908 83 15 36,362 3,105 579 1 
1909 67 9 30,580 6,023 692 851 
1910 48 29 31,280 5,819 1 '260 79 
*Source: F. E. da Silva, Emigrara:o Portuguesa (Lisbon, 
1917), P· 192l 11 Em.igra'tS:o, 1872-188ln, B • .S.G.L., Serie 4, No.l,(l883) 
chart, pp.40/4l. 
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APPENDIX XII 
TRADE MOVEMENT IN ANGOLA, 1868-1898* 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
In Francs** 
1 6,995 ,ooo 
18,450,000 
18,625,000 
18,680,000 
19,950,000 
15,430,000 
20,240,000 
19,880,000 
24,795,000 
21,335,000 
19,260,000 
16,610,000 
16,240,000 
20,542,000 
18,990,000 
21,244,595 
23,910,000 
18,916,000 
1 6, 531 ,000 
23,929,000 
27,574,500 
39,556,500 
45,923,500 
48,422,000 
47,584,500 
62,278,500 
57,473,000 
58,255,500 
54,904,000 
71,532,500 
80,775,000 
*A. D'Almada Negreiros, Angola (Paris, 1901), 
**One franc = 200 reis. 
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THE PORTUGUESE IN ANGOLA, 1836-1891: 
A STUDY IN EXPANSION AND ADMINISTRATION. 
(Library of Congress No. Mic. 63) 
Douglas Lanphier Wheeler, Ph. D. 
Boston University Graduate School, 1963 
Major Professor: William B. Norton, Professor of History 
Relying chiefly upon official correspondence be-
tween the Governroent-General in Portuguese West Africa,or 
Angola, and the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon as well as works 
of the period, this study outlines Portuguese activity and 
policy in 19th century Angola. For the first time, key 
policy statements from these unpublished docuroents have been 
translated into English and analyzed. A hitherto little known 
phase of Portuguese activity has been brought to light. 
Portuguese activity in Angola can be divided into 
three major periods. In the first period, from the publi-
cation of the 1836 decree abolishing the slave-trade from 
Angola, to 1861, and the end of one phase of expansion, con-
siderable military and commercial expansion occurred along 
the coasts and east to the Cuango river. Consequently, even 
before the scramble for Africa, Portuguese control in Angola 
doubled and spread as a military power resting largely upon 
African auxiliaries. That expansion, however, caused revolts 
among independent African tribes. Next from 1861 to 1877, 
and the arrival of the first Portuguese national exploration 
expedition, came an era of withdrawal from frontier posts, 
while increasing agriculture offset a progressive weakening 
-2-
of Portuguese power in the interior. The third period, 
from 1877 to 1891, and the treaty of partition, saw mili-
tary and missionary expansion onto the plataaus. 
Many forces motivated the Portuguese to extend control 
and to improve their administration. The independence of 
Brazil encouraged activity and the impulse to make Angola 
economically self-supporting. From 1836 to 1861, as fron-
tiers were expanded to the east and south, abolition of the 
slave-trade encouraged the search for new supplies of tropi-
cal produce, and for additional revenues by taxing Africans 
as well as the trade of Europeans. 
To the administration at Luanda, the capital, one remedy 
for the poverty of Angola was the annexation of the Congo 
coast and mouth and the collection of customs there to aug-
ment the revenue of the colony. Yet this attempted expan-
sion came to a halt because of the lack of transport facili-
ties, unhealthy climate, feeble armed forces, and African 
opposition. Governor Amaral (1854-1860), an outstanding 
but forgotten expansionist, learned that it was useless 
to try to dominate the coast from the hostile interior. 
British free trade policy opposed formal Portuguese 
expansion north of Ambriz, and African forces opposed 
interior expansion. After costly wars and epidemics, the 
Governors decided to cut expenses and to administer little 
but the coast. This policy, together with an economizing 
policy in Portugal, and a monopoly economy in Angola, greatly 
weakened Portugalts position in the later scramble. 
The condition of Angola in 1891, generally ascribed 
to the weakness of Portugal alone, derived as much fvom 
Portuguese character and policy. Too often the coast 
was favored and the interior plateaus deliberately ne-
glected. Portuguese emigrants preferred Brazil to Africa; 
thus the absence of a good-sized Portuguese population 
frustrated cofuonialist dreams of large-scale white coloni-
zation and African assimilation. 
After the settlement of the Congo frontiers at the 
Berlin Conference in 1885, Portuguese attention shif~ed 
more to Central Africa. The race southeastward to the 
upper Zarobesi was lost. The explorer Carvalho, however, 
succeeded in winning the Lunda region eastward to the 
Kasai. By the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of partitioh (1891), 
Portugal possessed a region of 481,000 square miles. As 
yet the Portuguese were not the true roasters of Angola, 
for effective control and occupation covered less than 
one tenth of that territory. 
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